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ABSTRACT 
  
 
“What’s the matter with Kansas?”  Or, more generally:  why, given an economic 
and political situation that benefits so few Americans (roughly…1 percent), do all the 
others (the roughly…99 percent) willingly accept it, and sometimes even fight for it, 
seemingly against their interests? 
The most common answer:  they’re dumb.  Or they’ve been duped.  But this 
answer won’t do.  First of all, it’s harmful:  it perpetuates the Manichean, consumerist, 
and destructive way of doing politics called “culture war.”  Second, it’s ineffective:  to 
call someone a dupe is to alienate and exclude that person from the conversation.  And 
finally, it’s incorrect:  “they,” and “we,” are just doing what makes us feel right.  What 
makes us feel valued, and accepted, and worthwhile, in the communities we live in—the 
only yardsticks we’ve got. 
The answer, rather, lies in the way those communities have been built, formed, 
expanded, condensed, altered, weakened, and/or destroyed.  In a word, how they’ve been 
organized.  All meaning-making happens in organized groups—“interpretive 
communities”—which can be as small as two siblings or as large as Christendom.  
Political meaning-making is no exception.  To the extent that all of us act against our 
interests, which we all do, it’s because of the way the communities we live in have been 
organized, to make certain gestures and actions more valued, accepted, and worthwhile 
than others. 
This means that effective rhetoric—rhetoric that makes change—isn’t just about 
finding the right words and saying or writing them.  It’s also, almost always, about being 
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part of the effort to organize, dis-organize, and/or reorganize interpretive communities.  
Ideas, no less than people and money, must be organized if they are to be powerful. 
This is a hard truth for many to swallow, given that most of us have spent a lot of 
time in that large interpretive community called “academia and para-academia,” where 
the truth is objective (not made by human organizations), and the goal is to find it and 
write it down, and it will set us free—and the result is a widespread, sometimes even 
active resistance to building and using our own agency.   
But it’s a truth that the powerful have long known.  Many of the most influential 
“ideas” people in modern politics, from Karl Marx to Carl Schmitt, have been organizers 
themselves, or have taken very intentional part in organizing work.  This is especially 
true for two of the most powerful political activities in recent U.S. history.  One is  
neoliberalism, the organizing campaign that began in the 1930s and 40s as an alliance 
among a handful of economists and businessmen and has grown into a worldwide 
movement that’s changed the nature of politics, economics, and human interaction, 
actively destroying all potential for agency other than being an entrepreneur or consumer.  
The other is public work, emerging from the democratic populist traditions of the Popular 
Front, which is working to build a very different world:  one where people come together 
and work, as collective producers, to make the world they—we—live in.  
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Indeed in nothing is the power of the Dark Lord more clearly shown  
than in the estrangement that divides all those who still oppose him. 
 
—J. R. R. Tolkien 
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PROLOGUE 
The Theory Effect 
 
  
The word “academic” is a synonym for irrelevant. 
—Saul Alinsky, Founder, Industrial Areas Foundation1 
  
Avoid Ph.D.s.  They can’t act.  They get lost in writing books for one another…   
—Ed Chambers, Director, Industrial Areas Foundation2 
 
 
The Story of Me3 
I’ll get to Saul and Ed in a bit.  First, I want to talk about Tom.   
There are a lot of reasons to talk about Tom at the start of this dissertation.  But 
the most immediate one is that he died, suddenly and unexpectedly, less than two weeks 
before I finished the first draft.  The hole he left in my world and my family, in those 
days and weeks and months since Tuesday, January 7, 2014, has been palpable.  I miss 
him in so many ways; there were so many conversations we never had; and I regret that 
only after he died did I start to realize just how important he’d been to me, and the extent 
to which he’d set me on the road that’s brought me here. 
                                                
1 Saul D. Alinsky, “Introduction to the Vintage Edition,” Reveille for Radicals (New York: Vintage, 1989), 
ix. 
2 Edward T. Chambers, Roots for Radicals: Organizing for Power, Action, and Justice (New York: 
Continuum, 2004), 110. 
3 I’ve taken the rough structure of this prologue from Marshall Ganz, the organizer and Harvard professor 
and one-time Obama strategist.  (Which does not mean I’m aligning myself with Obama.  As you will see, I 
draw from many different political traditions in the pages to follow.)  Ganz consolidated a lot of ancient 
and modern organizing wisdom into the concept of a “public narrative,” a structure for understanding and 
communicating about ourselves in a way that builds and reinforces the essentially public nature of these 
selves:  the way in which our deepest, most personal selves are connected to, and part of , the narrative of 
the people we share our world with, and the moment we all find ourselves in.  Ganz explains:  “Public 
narrative is woven from three elements: a story of why I have been called, a story of self; a story of why we 
have been called, a story of us; and a story of the urgent challenge on which we are called to act, a story of 
now. This articulation of the relationship of self, other, and action is also at the core of our moral traditions. 
As Rabbi Hillel, the 1st Century Jerusalem sage put it, ‘If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am 
for myself alone, what am I? If not now, when?’” See Marshall Ganz, “What is Public Narrative?” (2008), 
http://wearesole.com/What_is_Public_Narrative.pdf (January 15, 2014). 
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Thomas J. D’Amore was not a famous man, not exactly.  Unless you’re a member 
of my family, or somehow involved in Connecticut politics, you probably haven’t heard 
of him.  But in those worlds, he was known.  And, maybe just as universally, loved.  This 
despite his eminently unlovable profession:  Tom was a career politician.  The 
consummate fixer, operative, and insider.  The kind of guy who’d feel at home in a 
smoke-filled room.  Yet while he fully embraced all these stereotypes, right down to the 
wide stance and the gut and the newsboy’s hat—I don’t think I ever saw him with a cigar, 
but I can easily imagine it—he made them a good thing.  Tom was a cunning and well-
connected pol, but used his cunning and his connections to bring people together, across 
all kinds of so-called irreconcilable divides.  Not cleanly or easily, but messily, and 
beautifully.  He fought the two-party system and the electoral college.  He ran the state 
Republican Party, brokered the state’s first income tax, and challenged Joe Lieberman 
from the left.  He prodded and provoked pretty much everyone—yet the love remained.    
On the day of Tom’s funeral, the Catholic church in his hometown of Winsted 
was filled almost to capacity with his big family and many friends, including governors, 
legislators, senators and Congresspeople, and political operatives across the spectrum, 
some of whom he’d campaigned for, and yes, many of whom he’d campaigned against.  
His old friend Father Bill “Sang” Sangiovanni, who gave the homily, compared Tom to 
Thomas Aquinas.  For both Toms, he told us, politics meant people.  Getting to know 
people, working with them, making this happen.  And above all, it was about love—
which, Sang reminded us, was written right into Tom’s name.4   
                                                
4 For a lovely recollection by a longtime acquaintance who was also there that day, see Christopher 
Keating, “Political Who’s Who Gathers To Recall Tom D’Amore,” The Hartford Courant (January 13, 
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Tom’s way of doing politics involved a lot of jokes, a lot of stories, a lot of 
informal deals and understandings, and a lot of Italian food and wine.  It’s a kind of 
politics that feels strikingly anachronistic, in a world that, we’re told, is driven by 
technology and mass- and social-media.  It’s the kind of politics that isn’t supposed to 
exist anymore, that “millennials” like me weren’t supposed to get to see.  But I got to see 
it.  And it’s affected me, and this dissertation, profoundly.  I don’t think Tom ever knew 
Saul Alinsky, but I can see him grinning and nodding as Alinsky would argue that a 
“radical” was simply someone “who really liked people, loved people—all people.”5  
Alinsky, and the tradition of broad-based organizing he played such a big role in starting, 
came into my life relatively recently.  But I took to it so quickly and so fiercely, I realize 
now, because Tom had taught me these same lessons, long before.  They were part of 
who I was.  I nearly lost them, in my brush with anti-democratic elitism as a University 
of Chicago student.  And in getting to know Alinsky, and the living tradition of power, 
agency, and public work he represents, I found them again.   
I knew Tom through my father.  The two of them met in 1984, just after we had 
moved from Washington, D.C. to West Hartford, Connecticut.  Back then, Tom was 
Republican state chairman, my father was a young reporter with the Hartford Courant, 
and I was an infant.  The two of them quickly became close colleagues, and then close 
friends.  Tom was a fixture throughout my childhood.  When I was seven, he arranged a 
                                                                                                                                            
2014), http://articles.courant.com/2014-01-13/news/hc-politicos-damore-funeral-0114-
20140113_1_weicker-jr-lowell-p-republican-party (April 8, 2014.) 
5 Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, 9.  It’s worth noting how many of the great radicals and revolutionaries 
write about love.  Like its opposite, loneliness—which we’ll discuss in Chapter Four—love appears to be 
deeply political.  To be a radical who loves all people, Alinsky stipulates, is an ideal to strive toward more 
than a reality.  It is definitely an ideal I strive toward in this book.  I know I do not always succeed in 
reaching it. 
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private meeting for me with the Governor Lowell P. Weicker, whose campaign he had 
managed.  I was extensively prepped.  I still remember it quite well:  the governor met 
me in the lobby, took me upstairs to his office, and asked me typical seven-year-old 
questions about my school and my parents.  I answered his questions politely, then 
shifted the conversation to the state income tax and the death penalty.   
This was my childhood.  One of my earliest memories is talking with my parents 
about Bush and Dukakis, when I was four.  When I was eight, my third-grade Hebrew 
school teacher was teaching us about Rosh Hashanah and asked if we knew about other 
kinds of New Years—expecting the Chinese New Year, etc.  My hand shot up, she called 
on me, and I said:  “What about the Fiscal New Year?”  I spent a lot of time in the 
newsroom, with my father (think Season Five of The Wire), and in the state Attorney 
General’s office, with my mother.  Our house was, and still is, filled with piles of 
newspapers and the sound of the TV news.  I grew up talking with lots of grown-ups—
reporters and lobbyists, senators and representatives.  Politics, for me, was never separate 
from “real life.”  It was life:  the most public, large-scale, exciting part of life.   
Given all of that, it may not shock you to learn I had some trouble making friends.  
I couldn’t understand, when I left the governor’s office and went back to second grade, 
why no one else wanted to talk about the income tax or the death penalty.  Why no one 
else, not even the teachers really, seemed to like or even care about politics.  I got teased 
a lot—and in those last innocent years before we started taking bullying seriously, my 
teachers just told me to “ignore it.”  Looking back on it now, as much as it hurt, I don’t 
blame the other kids.  They didn’t, and couldn’t, see the world the way I did.  And I 
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couldn’t, or wouldn’t, see the world the way they did.  I was too stuck in my own head 
even to try.  I’m sure I seemed arrogant and condescending to my “peers”—a word I 
came to hate, because it appeared in all the parts of my elementary-school report card 
where I did the worst.  Relating to my “peers” is something I’ve struggled with my whole 
life.  I’ve spent long stretches of time feeling, with varying degrees of self-indulgence, 
that I couldn’t relate to anyone. 
When I did finally make friends, it was through making art together.  Specifically, 
through singing in a chamber chorus and directing plays—two activities that I cared 
deeply about, that I couldn’t do alone, and that are still a big part of my life.  My parents 
encouraged me to grow as an artist.  They paid for me to sing in children’s choruses and 
act in youth theaters; they drove me to an increasing number of rehearsals and venues, as 
some of this work became professional; and maybe most importantly, they sent me to 
camp at Appel Farm Arts and Music Center in southern New Jersey, where I made my 
first real friends, and where I now run the theater and creative writing program.   
Then came the moment, just after I’d turned sixteen, when I tried to direct 
Stephen Sondheim’s Assassins in high school.6  It was perfect, I thought.  It combined all 
my nerdiest interests in politics, history, music, and theater, and it was exactly the kind of 
questions we high school kids needed to be asking, in the wake of Columbine two years 
earlier.  I really wanted to do it.  I spent six months planning it.  I researched all the 
history.  I read lots of books to try to learn how to direct.  I even negotiated an affordable 
                                                
6 For the uninitiated:  Stephen Sondheim is one of the greatest and most controversial musical-theater 
songwriters of all time.  He started his career writing lyrics to West Side Story and later wrote Sweeney 
Todd.  Assassins is probably his most radical show:  a 1991 surreal variety show that tells the stories of nine 
real-life presidential assassins in a way that makes them remarkably relatable.  Just the thing that would 
ruin the sleep of any high school administrator. 
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contract with Music Theater International, the notoriously overpriced licensing company.  
I did all of this with tacit permission from my school’s theater department.  But of course, 
the day we were supposed to send in the contract, they had second thoughts.  I spent the 
next three months fighting every bureaucrat in my school and district-wide 
administration.  At several points, I thought I’d almost won.  But I lost.  The 
administrators were arrogant at best and patronizing at worst.  The teachers said they’d 
support me, then didn’t.  My parents didn’t necessarily oppose what I was doing.  They 
were just worried about me, and understandably so.  They wished I weren’t so intense, 
and that I didn’t obsess so much, because they saw it hurting me.  They saw it consuming 
my time and my thoughts and my life.  And of course, they saw it making it hard for me 
to relate to my peers.  I see all this now.  At the time, I felt abandoned.  Alone.  Me 
against the world.   
This experience of trauma—first-world trauma, but trauma nonetheless—ended 
up being pivotal.  In two ways.  First, it made me realize I needed my peers.  While trying 
to claw myself out of the depression that followed the Assassins debacle, I made friends 
for the first time.  I intentionally taught myself, with  my parents’ help, how to ask people 
about themselves, and how to care about what they cared about.  I was taking my first 
steps, unbeknownst to me at the time, toward being an organizer:  I had felt the pain of 
being powerless, and I was learning the skills I needed to become powerful.  Second, it 
made me really, really want to get out of West Hartford, Connecticut—a place I came to 
identify with closed-mindedness and censorship.   
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And I did.  I went a thousand miles away for college, at the intense nerd utopia 
that was (then) the University of Chicago.  After that I went even farther away, to go 
teach and make theater in Berlin, and then Minneapolis.  It was eleven years before I 
came back for longer than a visit.  When I finally did, it was to write this dissertation. 
The tension I felt post-Assassins, between the impulse to build a community and 
the impulse to uproot myself from a community, has stayed with me ever since.  It’s the 
same tension that made me pour a year of my life (2005) into founding and running a 
theater company in Chicago, which produced seven productions during the course of that 
year (while I was still a full-time student)—and that also made me feel like I needed to 
leave Chicago altogether, when that company collapsed in an awful moment of betrayal 
and apathy.  It’s same the tension that made me build a close relationship with a band of 
renegade musical theater artists in Berlin—a relationship that continues to this day—and 
that also made me feel like I needed to leave Berlin and get back to my “real life,” when 
my Fulbright year was up.  And it’s the same tension that drove me to graduate school:  I 
wanted to be somewhere awhile, to really invest in a project—the project of learning to 
teach, and of completing my formal education—but I simultaneously still felt the need to 
float, to be transient, to survey the whole field from above, to not quite land yet. 
It’s a tension I’m still working through.  It’s caused me to make many good 
friends in many places, and to produce a lot of good work in a lot of different fields, but 
it’s also caused me a lot of pain.  It’s made me feel, in a way, that nothing I’ve done has 
been real, that somehow my life has been still-born.  And in a very direct way, it’s caused 
me to write this dissertation.  This dissertation, in its most radically personal reduction, is 
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my three-hundred-page working-through of this tension.  Of course, I wouldn’t have gone 
through the effort—or made you, dear reader, go through the effort—if I didn’t have a 
hunch that my tensions might have something to do with yours, too. 
 
The Story of Us 
“The personal is political.”  That’s what the second-wave feminists said, and since 
then, many others have agreed.   
I agree, too—in certain ways.  I don’t think the personal is entirely political.  Yes, 
there are political implications to every aspect of our individual lives:  the plastic seltzer 
bottle I’m drinking out of right now is implicated in environmental destruction and the 
profits of the oil industry.  But it doesn’t work the other way around:  my individual 
decision to buy that seltzer bottle, or not to buy it, has no meaningful effect on the 
environment or the oil industry.  (To organize a public campaign to purchase or boycott 
plastic seltzer bottles—or better, Big Y-brand plastic seltzer bottles in particular—would 
be another matter.  That becomes an act of collective production, not individual 
consumption.) 
Nor do I believe that the political is entirely personal.  To understand a political 
issue, it’s not enough just to understand my (or your) personal feelings and stories 
relating to that issue.  There are important categories, which I’ll call “markets” and 
“interpretive communities,” that are bigger than individuals, and that are the main 
building-blocks of politics.  But at the same time, we can’t understand political issues—
what forms they take, how they got that way, why people care so much about them—
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without understanding people’s stories and feelings.  I’ll argue in Chapter One, following 
in the footsteps of a lot of recent researchers, that we have our feelings first and our 
abstract positions second, not the other way around.  To talk “politics” with people, 
without talking about their personal stories, is to miss the point.   
I make no exception for myself.  I told you some of my own stories of loneliness, 
so that you’ll better understand my arguments about the politics of loneliness in Chapter 
Four.  I told you about the tensions I’ve felt between investing in my community and 
uprooting myself from that community, so that you’ll better understand my arguments 
about the destructive impulse to just leave in Chapter Two.  I told you how central Tom 
was to my childhood, so that you’ll better understand my allergic reaction to the elitist, 
consumer-based politics of culture war—whether practiced in the popular media (in 
Chapter One) or in academia and para-academia (in Chapter Three)—and my own deep 
need to build a politics in people and love.  I can explain and defend these positions with 
complex, sophisticated rational arguments, and I will, but those arguments don’t actually 
explain why I hold these positions.  The answer to that, for me and for everyone else, is 
in our stories, and in our feelings—or, technically speaking, in our habitual dispositions 
and interpretive strategies. 
This understanding of people and their politics—again, backed by a lot of recent 
research I’ll cite in Chapter One—explains the presence of some pesky pronouns 
throughout this dissertation:  “I,” “me,” “you,” “we,” and “us.”  As for “I” and “me”:  I 
hope we’re far enough into the postmodern moment that I can admit my biases and 
subjectivity—i.e., my humanity—without having my arguments thrown out as 
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illegitimate.  I will bend over backwards to acknowledge and explore the effects of these 
biases and subjectivity, in the chapters to come, but I can’t—and shouldn’t—deny that I 
have them.  (As I explained to a colleague from the zAmya Theater Project, who 
responded to one of my Book Updates on Facebook (see Appendix), I don’t claim to be 
unbiased, just honest.)  I cite my sources exhaustively, and I encourage you to look for 
yourself and question the conclusions I draw.  I intend this dissertation as an incitement 
to dialogue, a set of questions and suggestions, rather than a litany of definite answers. 
“You,” “we,” and “us” are a little trickier.  Of course, I can’t legitimately claim to 
know what you, or therefore we, are actually doing or thinking or feeling at a given 
moment.  But I use these terms for a couple of reasons.  First, there’s no good way 
around it.  To write about politics is, by definition, to write about people, not about a 
person or persons.  (Or as Hannah Arendt puts it, more poetically if less inclusively, it’s 
to write about men and not man.)  The basic unit of politics is people, in their plurality 
and their relationships with each other.  Many political writers will get around the use of  
second-person-plural pronouns by talking about “people,” “men,” “the populace,” “the 
nation,” “society,” and so on.  But to use these kind of words, here, would be to miss a 
basic point:  we’re not talking about something over there, distanced, apart from us.  
We’re talking about us.  Here.  Now.  In using these vulgar second-person pronouns, I 
will no doubt make some unfounded assumptions about “you,” “we,” and “us.”  (Maybe I 
already have.)  But at least this way, they’re not shrouded in abstraction; they’re out in 
the open, for us to discuss, debate, and deal with. 
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Second, my use of these pronouns reflects one of the major arguments I’ll be 
making:  we’re not so different, you and I.7  Yes, we may have various differences—in 
our race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, ability, socioeconomic class, religion, regional 
background, education level, political positions, triggers, traumas, and Tumblrs, not to 
mention feelings about Star Wars versus Star Trek—but it’s easy, especially for us 
academic/activist/artist types, to make too much of them.8  (See what I did there?  
Sometimes, like just now, I’ll specify a “we,” which you may or may not belong to.  
Either way’s good.)  As important as our differences are, there’s no reason to assume our 
relationships have to be defined by them.  If it’s oppressive to assume “we’re all the 
same,” it’s also oppressive to assume “we’re all fundamentally different”—because it 
denies us the chance to work together out of the traditions and interests that we do share.  
At the very least, you and I speak a similar-enough language that I can write this and you 
can read it.  We probably share more than that, too.  In so far as our individual selves are 
socially produced, they bear the mark of the common culture and society that produced 
them.  We don’t share everything, but we do share some things, and they’re important.9  
                                                
7 See “Not So Different,” TV Tropes (website), 
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/NotSoDifferent (April 8, 2014); see also Shaun Munro, “10 
Most Overused Lines In Movie History,” What Culture, http://whatculture.com/film/10-most-overused-
lines-in-movie-history.php (April 8, 2014). 
8 Before you say it:  yes, I am absolutely a well-educated, well-off-enough, able-bodied straight(-ish) white 
U.S.-American cis-man.  I make no claims to be anything but.  I fully recognize that it’s easier for me to 
“look past our differences” than it is for many.  All I’ll say in my defense—if I’m even being attacked—is 
that this argument, like pretty much every argument in this dissertation, is something I’ve formulated in 
dialogue and collaborative work with people of all kinds of different backgrounds, including those with 
significantly less privilege.  (See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of privilege, including its 
relationship to oppression.)  Having said that, of course, I do not claim to speak for anyone but myself. 
9 There are a few other specific cases and reasons why I employ second-person pronouns.  Like a lot of 
rhetoric in this dissertation, I use them with varying degrees of seriousness, playfulness, and—if you will as 
it were—citationality.  I will often use them to indirectly (and often satirically) quote other people who 
make assumptions about “you,” “we,” and “us.”  I’ll also often use them idiomatically, to sound less stilted 
and formal—“you” or “we” often just sounds better, and more conversational, than “one” or “someone” or 
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But of course there will be times when my appeals to “you” and “we” and “us” 
will suggest some questionable assumptions about who my readers are.  In my ideal 
world, my readers are pretty much everyone.  I have spent a lot of effort to make this text 
something that pretty much anyone with enough patience and curiosity—and literacy, 
yes, but not necessarily the advanced-degree kind—can pick up and read.  You’ll notice 
that this prologue is the only place I refer to a “dissertation” rather than a “book.”  That’s 
very intentional:  I have written the four core chapters—but not this prologue—as the 
first draft of what might become a popular book.  (That technically makes the entire text 
of my dissertation a performance, but then again, isn’t that true of every text, anyway?)  
This intention should explain a lot of other rhetorical choices I’ve made, too.  I 
intentionally keep the sentences (relatively) short, the vocabulary (relatively) simple, and 
the language (relatively) colloquial.  I keep my explicit references to “theory” to a 
minimum—this text enacts a lot more theory than it cites—and I try to describe and 
explain every theory and theorist I do cite, so that no academic background is required to 
read it.  Finally, I try to keep the narrative flowing at a decent pace; I relegate a lot of the 
more technical talk to the footnotes.10      
                                                                                                                                            
“a person.”  Sometimes I am legitimately making a claim about pretty much all human beings:  “we” and 
“us” in the broadest sense.  And sometimes I am literally talking to you, the reader, and about us, literally 
the two of us, you and I.  I will try to make these distinctions clear, based on the context…except where a 
little performed ambiguity is part of the rhetoric. 
10 My use of footnotes, then, is a little unusual.  In some ways—and increasingly, as the book goes on and 
the theoretical and historical issues grow in complexity—the footnotes end up being a second book of their 
own.  (I imagine that they will become endnotes in whatever final published form this text may one day 
take, lest they seriously hinder the book’s visual accessibility; witness the page-and-a-half long footnote 
near the beginning of Chapter Four, for example; but I’ve decided to keep the footnotes as footnotes for 
now.  As a doctoral dissertation, I feel it’s important that the scholarship be easy to access.)  This “second 
book” in the footnotes is also intended to be legible by pretty much anyone with enough patience and 
curiosity; it just requires somewhat more patience and curiosity than the main text.  I imagine it will appeal 
mostly to academics, and to others with a vested interest in whatever topic is being discussed—philosophy, 
cyberpunk literature, the practice of broad-based community organizing, and so on.  It is also intended to 
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That being said, I know it won’t be read by everyone.  It will be read, at 
minimum, by the four professors on my doctoral committee:  Robin Brown, Sonja 
Kuftinec, Harry Boyte, and Michael Kuhne.  (All of whom, as you will see, also figure in 
the text itself in various ways.)  Beyond that, in its current incarnation it will be read by 
the handful of friends and colleagues who have asked to read it and whom I’ve been 
sending chapters to, and maybe by some others whom they chose to send it to, and 
perhaps the odd soul who finds it in the library.  These people are different in various 
ways—age, region, gender, sexuality, occupation, academic background (or lack thereof), 
and to a lesser extent race and class and political orientation—but I can be reasonably 
sure they have a few things in common.  They are fairly literate:  able and willing to take 
on large hunks of prose, if not always academic prose.  They are intellectual:  interested 
in ideas and comfortable with abstract thought.  (“Intellectual,” contrary to popular belief, 
does not mean “academic.”  There are many intellectuals who are not academics, and 
there are many academics who are not particularly intellectual.)  And they are, variously, 
political:  they are dissatisfied with “the way things are,” they believe that change is 
possible, and they are interested in being part of that change, in one way or another. 
These three basic descriptors—intellectual, literate, and political—pretty much 
describe my assumed audience.  Within those parameters, I hope to be as generous as I 
                                                                                                                                            
provide some of the “accountability” to different theoretical sources and positions within academic 
interpretive communities that is expected of work in my field—especially after the post-68 turn toward 
theoretical “rigor” (see Chapter Three)—without compromising the narrative flow for those who don’t care 
about such things.  I must give credit, here, to Brown University biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling, and 
specifically to her wonderful book Sexing the Body; I am using my footnotes very much as Fausto-Sterling 
does, in this book.  As she explains, the main text of the book is for an audience that just wants to 
understand the claims she makes; the endnotes, nearly as long as the main text itself, are for those 
interested understanding the primary and secondary evidence she marshals in support of those claims.  See 
Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body:  Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (New York:  
Basic Books, 2000). 
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can.  I hope in particular that, without being coy about my own political leanings, I have 
written a book that a dedicated right-wing conservative can read and appreciate, too, and 
maybe even sometimes agree with.  (To my right-leaning readers:  I know I sometimes 
use “we” as a stand in for liberal/leftist/progressive-type folks.  When I do that, I hope 
you understand that I’m just describing myself (sort of) and people whose views are 
(often) similar to mine—people who, I imagine, will make up the majority of the 
readership of this book.  I’m not trying to exclude you from the story, or to tell you that 
that’s what your political views should be.  As you’ll see, I’ll sometimes end up quite 
critical of left/liberal/progressive positions, and quite sympathetic toward some 
conservative ones.)  Outside those three parameters, though, there’s not much I can do.  I 
don’t try very hard to please people who are uncurious or apathetic; this isn’t the right 
genre or medium for it.  And though I’ve worked hard to make this text as accessible as 
possible to people with various kinds of literacies, I know I’ve had only limited success. 
But now to the most important question of “we”:  who is we, to me?  Whom do I 
see my own narrative bound up with, and with what results?  I want to answer this 
question in two ways.  In the first way:  I see myself as part of two broad communities 
(interpretive communities), which I’ll lay out in detail in Chapters Three and Four.  One 
of these big communities is academia and para-academia:  that vast constellation of 
educational institutions and (usually nonprofit) corporations, from arts centers to health 
centers to even some unions, that operate on the “service” model—i.e., whose basic goal 
is to provide services to external consumers, often consumers who are considered needy 
or lacking in some way.  The other big community is broad-based organizing, which 
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includes members of the four nationwide Alinskyan networks (IAF, Gamaliel, PICO, 
DART), as well as various unions, associations, collectives, agencies, and for- and 
nonprofit corporations that operate on the “power” or “agency” model—i.e., build power 
around themselves and their members, collectively and out of shared self-interest, to 
make structural change in the wider world. 
I have spent a lot of time in both of these interpretive communities, and I am 
writing, in a lot of ways, to members of both.  My sympathies, as you can already see in 
the title, lie more with the “power” people:  I find their theory more robust and their 
results more effective, and above all—feelings, as usual, precede abstract opinions—I’ve 
just felt better working with them (for reasons I’ll discuss later).  Having said that, the 
“service” community is extremely important.  For one, it’s a whole lot bigger, and it has a 
lot more resources.  For two, it’s much more connected with mainstream culture, and it 
gets a lot more media attention.  For three, it’s the point of entry into “politics” for most 
people:  most of us, before we get the chance to learn a politics based in power and self-
interest, we first learn a politics (for “power” people, a pseudo-politics) based in service 
and charity—which we must then un-learn, Yoda style, if we want to enter the “power” 
world.  
So I guess my audience, construed most narrowly, is myself, circa 2009:  in the 
moment where Chapter One begins.  Myself when I was fully ensconced in the “service” 
world:  two years into a doctoral program, on the board of directors of a nonprofit that 
does arts and education and activism, full of guilt at my various privileges, anxious to 
assert myself lest I get called out for those privileges, unaware of what it would even 
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mean to build power around myself, worried that if I did such a thing it would be 
somehow selfish, sick of feeling all this guilt and anxiety and self-hatred, unsure of how 
to feel otherwise, and prone to writing run-on sentences.  I’m writing the book that I wish 
I could offer to my 2009 self:  if I did, maybe I’d have gotten where I am now a little 
quicker, and with fewer bruises.  More importantly:  I’m writing the book I’d like to offer 
to people who are similar to my 2009 self, who might not have the dumb luck (as I did) 
to stumble ass-backwards into a bunch of brilliant, renowned, deeply generous  
organizers and public work scholars who wanted to work with me, make theater with me, 
live with me, and advise my doctoral dissertation.     
I’m also writing, a little more indirectly, for those in the “power” community:  
those organizers and others who just don’t get why everyone else just doesn’t get it.  Who 
don’t understand why homeless shelters are so condescending toward their “clients,” 
when that’s clearly not getting them to their goal of ending homelessness.  Who try to 
work with academics and can’t understand why they’re so obsessed with getting the facts 
and wording exactly right, when that kind of precision obviously won’t do anything to 
build the necessary relationships or move the necessary people to win the campaign.11  
Who feel, like the renowned IAF organizer Ernesto Cortes, that their organizations are 
“monasteries of democracy, surviving the dark ages of a degraded culture”12—or, like 
Alinsky and Chambers in the opening epigrams, that academics are irrelevant and Ph.D.’s 
can’t act.  It’s not that these guys don’t have a point.  It’s just that if they want to emerge 
                                                
11 Here, as in most other places where I seem to be writing “hypothetically,” I’m actually thinking of 
specific instances—in this case, two conversations I’ve had with friends who are professional organizers. 
12 See Harry C. Boyte, “Reinventing Citizenship as Public Work:  Citizen Centered Democracy and the 
Empowerment Gap” (Kettering Foundation, 2013), http://kettering.org/wp-content/uploads/Reinventing-
Citizenship.pdf (January 8, 2014), 16. 
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from their monasteries and broaden their base to include the huge numbers of people who 
speak service, including but not limited to academics, they need to learn their language.  
Calling out people for their flaws—and, implicitly, dismissing them—is no more 
productive for master IAF organizers than it is for my teenage students on Tumblr (see 
Chapter Three).  Inability to communicate is, always, a two-way street. 
The other way I want to answer the “we” question—about whom my own story is 
bound up with—is generational.  As I’ll discuss more in Chapter Two, I am at the older 
end of what’s become known as the “millennial” generation.  That designation does not 
fill me with joy.  According to Rush Limbaugh and Fox News, “millennials” are indolent 
slobs living in our parents’ basements and too busy updating our Instagram accounts to 
go out and get a job.  (I resent that.  I live in my parents’ attic, thank you very much.)  
According to NPR and MSNBC, on the other hand, we are the sexy, hipster-y, social 
media-driven wave of the future, sweeping away repressive governments (and industries) 
with a single Tweet, embracing (and commodifying) every possible difference in 
sexuality and nationality and lifestyle, and far too busy creating revolutionary startups to 
notice (or care) that we might never have Social Security or a steady job.   
Obviously, I have some feelings about this.  I don’t feel these stories are my story.  
Nor are they the stories of most other “millennials” I know.  Yes, we spend a lot of time 
on the Internet—but that’s partially because that’s where the jobs are, or because we’ve 
had to move far away to find a job and that’s the only way we can spend time with the 
people we care about.  Yes, we stay in school for a long time (maybe too long) and jump 
from job to job and often start our own little companies—but that’s partially because the 
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job market has been terrible for years, and a lot of times There Is No Alternative.  Yes, 
we might find a certain chic in poverty and joblessness—as have some youth from every 
modern generation—but I’ve never met a single “millennial” who is happy that we’ll 
probably be the first generation in modern U.S. history to make less than our parents. 
I’m not saying our lives are all gloom and doom.  What I am saying, though, is 
that the way we live often isn’t a conscious choice, or a desired one.  We’re a generation 
that’s experienced a lot of loss, and a lot of our lives are shaped by this loss.  We spent 
our entire childhoods living in a time of peace and relative, if unequal, prosperity.  This is 
the context where we developed our hopes and dreams and expectations for ourselves, 
and in where our parents and teachers and mentors developed their expectations of us.  
Then, just as we were coming of age, 9/11 happened—followed by several years when 
political agency, of all kinds, felt nearly impossible.  Then, just as we were becoming 
adults, the bottom fell out of the economy.  Worst recession since the Depression.  And 
this time around there was no FDR—and no Popular Front—to pick us up and enlist us in 
the Brains Trust, the Civilian Conservation Corps, or the CIO.  No, this time the agenda 
was being set by the neoliberals (of both parties):  cuts, not public commitment, were the 
order of the day.   
All this loss goes a long way, I think, to explain our generation’s interest in 
questions of agency:  questions of how we can “do something,” how we can make change 
in a world that’s clearly not functioning as we know it should.  For some of us, these 
agency questions have taken on a neoliberal form:  since “Washington is broken”—
government has failed to solve all our problems for us—we must turn to the only other 
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great source of agency:  “the market,” or its cyberpunk twin, “the Internet.”  (These are 
the members of our generation most likely to show up in news stories about us.)  But for 
many others, the same questions have taken us in a direction that’s more democratic 
(with a small d) and populist (in the good way).  The Occupy movement is the most 
obvious example here—it’s sufficiently individualist and technology-driven to fit the 
media narrative—but it’s only one among many others.  Unions, workers’ centers, 
neighborhood organizations, and faith-based and other organizing networks are filled 
with “millennials.” 
And I’m convinced a lot more of us would get involved, especially those in 
various reaches of academia and para-academia, if they just knew how.  This book is for 
those people (you?), in particular.  The remarks I made above, about the tension between 
the “power” and “service” communities, are particularly important for our generation.  
This is our world, which we’re going to inherit in the next decade or two.  The direction 
we take it has a whole lot to do with how, and how much, and how intentionally, we’re 
organized. 
 
The Story of Now 
Days before I started graduate school, back in August of 2007, I got an email 
from Professor Robin Brown—then my boss and Director of Graduate Studies, now my 
doctoral advisor, co-teacher and co-author, and close friend.  The email concerned mostly 
mundane matters of our TA appointments, but it started with Marx:  “the moment of 
labor defines everything that follows.” 
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Robin, like many of my best friends, is a Marxist.  I am not, for reasons I’ll 
discuss later.13  Regardless, this quote hit home.  When I think about everything that went 
into making this dissertation what it is, here and now, so much of it has to do with the 
different kinds of work I’ve done over the past many years—as a university instructor, a 
youth arts educator, a theater director, a choral singer, an organizer, and a nonprofit 
consultant.  Meaning no disrespect to all the books I’ve read and archives I’ve scoured, 
the “theory” that really matters here is theory in its most elemental sense:  the antithesis 
of practice, my reflections on the things I’ve done and made, reflections which have then 
(I think) allowed me to do and make better things, and then reflect on those things, and so 
on.14   
My work as a teacher, the bulk of my life for the past eight years, has been 
particularly important.  Both at the University of Minnesota, where I tested out most of 
the ideas I write about here, and at Appel Farm Arts and Music Center, where I learned 
how deep and loving the relationship between teachers and students can be—and where 
this book will end.  I want to mention, here, one particular discovery I’ve made through 
my teaching, and my reflecting on that teaching in my work with Robin and my reading 
of books by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and the Brazilian teacher Paulo 
Freire.  That discovery is:  I approach all teaching as literacy teaching.  All teaching, or at 
least all teaching that goes beyond the simple transfer of facts, is about learning a new 
language, of words and gestures.  It’s about getting the body to move differently—which 
                                                
13 For a discussion of the relationship between Marxism (and Marxist organizing) and the populist-derived 
tradition of broad-based community organizing at the core of this book, see Chapter Four. 
14 For a particularly useful explanation of this notion of theory (as part of what’s sometimes called praxis), 
see Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos, 30th anniversary ed. (New 
York:  Continuum, 2005), especially 87. 
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means creating a culture where we can play, laugh, and make mistakes, which is 
necessary to learn any new kind of movement.  And this learning always happens on both 
sides.  Your students are learning a new language—the language (of Chinese, of critical 
theory, of chemistry) that you’re teaching them—and so are you:  you’re learning that 
same language better, as you investigate it with them, and you’re also learning your 
students’ language, with their help, in order to work with them most effectively. 
Teaching, for me, is a very bodily affair.  The classes I teach involve a lot of 
interpersonal interaction, and literal movement, in the form of various kinds of physical 
games and exercises and role-plays and other kinds of play.15  Which all raised a difficult 
question for me, as I sat down to try to write a book.  How, absent the possibility of face-
to-face and body-to-body interaction, can I effectively teach someone something?  This 
conundrum stopped me from writing for a long time.   
I have not solved it, at least not entirely.  But while teaching rhetoric last spring, I 
at least found a temporary way forward.  I’m talking about Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of a 
“theory effect”:  a “pre-vision…[which] operates in the margin of uncertainty resulting 
from the discontinuity between the silent and self-evident truths of the ethos and the 
public expressions of the logos.”  That is, in those moments—such as our own—where 
there is a clear and widely-felt discontent, a gap (a “discontinuity”) between what feels 
                                                
15 Another contributor to this form of pedagogy is, of course, the great Marxist and Freirean theater director 
Augusto Boal, who codified a lot of these abstract principles (for better and worse) into a huge “arsenal” of 
concrete games and exercises.  See especially Augusto Boal, Games for Actors and Non-Actors, trans. 
Adrian Jackson, 2nd ed. (New York:  Routledge, 2002).  I have studied Boal and his work for many years; I 
worked with him briefly before he passed away in 2009, and I have worked with his son Julian and several 
other major practitioners of his Theatre of the Oppressed since (see Chapter Three).  There is, as you can 
imagine, a lot of overlap in how I teach theater and how I teach cultural studies—because it’s all literacy, 
embodied.  The difference is only on emphasis.  (You will find this argument very reminiscent of my 
claims about the differences among organizing, making art, and teaching—practiced as public work—in 
Chapter Four.)  
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right to many people (“the silent and self-evident truths of the ethos”) and what is 
possible given the current political situation (“public expressions of the logos”), it is 
possible for a new and different truth to emerge: 
Thus, it is true that one can trace (virtually as far back in history as one wishes) 
the first manifestations of class struggle…the fact remains that it is only after 
Marx, and indeed only after the creation of parties capable of imposing (on a large 
scale) a vision of the social world organized according to the theory of class 
struggle, that one could refer, strictly speaking, to classes and class 
struggle….Marxist theory…has exercised a theory effect unrivalled in history.16 
 
Bourdieu, himself active for many years within the French Communist Party and 
various other political organizations, has no illusions that Marx just wrote the Communist 
Manifesto and—presto!—classes and class struggle sprang into existence.  As he makes 
clear, it took a whole lot of intensive, face-to-face, body-to-body organizing work (“the 
creation of parties…”) for Marx’s “pre-vision” to become reality.  But at the same time, 
all this organizing work would not have created this new reality—pace Alinsky and 
Chambers—had Marx not also done the work of writing it down. 
So I guess that’s what I’m doing here.  In writing this book, I am doing part—an 
important part, but only one part—of the work necessary to produce a theory effect.  
What is the nature of that theory effect?  What new reality am I looking to enact?  That 
took me a little while to articulate.  I knew it, I felt what it was, but for a long time I 
didn’t know how to say it.  It finally became clear, thanks to another work-related event.  
I had left my teaching job in Minnesota (after six years), left Minnesota altogether, come 
back to live in Connecticut (after eleven years away), taken up work as a nonprofit 
                                                
16 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and 
Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1991), 132-133. 
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consultant—and, for the first time, found myself in need of a business card.  As I 
struggled to figure out what to put on it, the nature of my desired theory effect became 
clear.   
I needed to have “Research Consultant” on there; that was my job at present.  
“Arts & Humanities Educator” made clear sense, given my work at Minnesota and at 
Appel Farm.  But those two titles didn’t say it all.  Some important part of me was still 
missing, I felt:  the part that explained not just what I did, but how I did it.  The part that 
was different from how other people did things, the new thing I felt I had to contribute to 
the world.   
It took me several tries, but I think I finally got it:  “Rhetorician (Organizer).”   
A little affected, maybe, but it does the job.  Those two words, in parenthetical 
relationship to one another, sum up the pre-vision (or theory effect) that this book 
proposes:  rhetoric necessarily involves organizing.  To be a rhetorician—to effectively 
convince people of things—it’s not enough to write the right speech; you also have to be 
involved in the work of organizing people into communities where they’ll understand 
what you’re saying in the “correct” way (the way you want them to).17   
This pre-vision, this intended theory effect, may sound simple and almost stupid.  
Then again, you could say the same thing about class struggle:  people are divided into 
classes, and history is produced by those classes struggling with each other.  Duh.  
Except not.  Except it flew in the face of a ton of received beliefs about politics, the 
                                                
17 Essentially, I’m taking the argument that historian Charles Payne makes about the black freedom 
movement—that “more has been written about the role of oratory in the movement than about the role of 
organizing,” which for Payne represents a vital omission—and arguing that it applies much more generally.  
See Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom:  The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi 
Freedom Struggle (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1995), 237. 
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economy, and human nature.  The same applies here.  It feels obvious, to say that 
effective rhetoric always involves organizing, but it goes against assumptions about 
rhetoric that we’ve had since at least the time of the ancient Greeks, and that we very 
much still have today.  Go on Facebook or Twitter or Tumblr right now—or into a 
cultural studies seminar—and you’re sure to find arguments about whether  some movie 
or ad or song is or is not racist, homophobic, radically queer, or whatever.  If we’re 
serious about rhetoric necessarily involving organizing, then these kinds of arguments 
become utterly meaningless.  That movie/ad/song is nothing, in and of itself.  It only 
becomes racist or homophobic or radically queer, or not, within a certain community of 
people (large or small), when that community interprets it that way.  Is the Bible an 
oppressive text?  A revolutionary text?  Both, and/or neither.  The answer doesn’t lie in 
the Bible itself.  The answer lies in the communities that interpret it—and in the way 
those communities are organized (built, developed, maintained, changed, grown, shrunk, 
destroyed)—and, relatedly, in the work that this organizing requires. 
Here’s how Bourdieu explains all this—where “heretical discourse” means a not-
yet-fulfilled theory effect: 
Heretical discourse must not only help to sever the adherence to the world of 
common sense by publicly proclaiming a break with the ordinary order, it must 
also produce a new common sense and integrate within it the previously tacit or 
repressed practices and experiences of an entire group, investing them with the 
legitimacy conferred by public expression and collective recognition.  Indeed, 
since every language that makes itself heard by an entire group is an authorized 
language, invested with the authority of this group, it authorizes what it designates 
at the same time as it expresses it, drawing its legitimacy from the group over 
which it exercises its authority and which it helps to produce as such by offering it 
a unitary expression of its experiences.  The efficacy of heretical discourse does 
not reside in the magic of a force immanent to language, such as Austin’s 
‘illocutionary force,’ or in the person of its author, such as Weber’s ‘charisma’ 
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(two screen-like concepts which prevent one from examining the reasons for the 
effects which they merely designate), but rather in the dialectic between the 
authorizing and authorized language and the dispositions of the group which 
authorizes it and authorizes itself to use it.  This dialectical process is 
accomplished, in the case of each of the agents concerned and, most of all, in the 
case of the person producing the heretical discourse, in and through the labour of 
enunciation which is necessary in order to externalize the inwardness, to name the 
unnamed and to give the beginnings of objectification to pre-verbal and pre-
reflexive dispositions and ineffable and unobservable experiences, through words 
which by their nature make them common and communicable, therefore 
meaningful and socially sanctioned.  It may also be accomplished in the labour of 
dramatization, particularly visible in exemplary prophecy, which alone is capable 
of destroying the self-evident truths of the doxa, and in the transgression which is 
indispensable in order to name the unnameable, to break the censorships, 
institutionalized or internalized, which prohibit the return of the repressed; and 
first of all in the heresiarch himself. 
But it is in the constitution of groups that the effectiveness of 
representations is most apparent, and particularly in the words slogans and 
theories which help to create the social order by imposing principles of di-vision 
and, more generally, the symbolic power of the whole political theatre which 
actualizes and officializes visions of the world and political divisions.18 
 
My whole book, in a way, is an extended gloss on this passage.  “Heretical 
discourse” can indeed become acceptable and legitimate—changing the world in the 
process—but it doesn’t happen magically.  It happens through a whole lot of work.  First, 
there’s the labor of enunciation:  creating an effective piece of rhetoric.  Second, there’s 
the labor of dramatization:   finding or creating the appropriate situation in which to 
deliver or enact that piece of rhetoric.  Third, and most importantly, there’s the labor of 
the constitution (organizing) of groups—those groups that I, following the American 
literary theorist Stanley Fish, will keep calling “interpretive communities.”19 
                                                
18 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 129-130.  Some emphases added. 
19 See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1980), 
167-173.  I’ve been advised that I should say a few words about my choice of such unfashionable theory.  
The current trends on the market of academic theory would have us believe that Fish’s concept of 
interpretive communities is considerably outdated, having been replaced by more complex and delicate 
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So that’s the argument:  you can’t do rhetoric without doing organizing.  Plus a 
corollary:  when we start understanding rhetoric as essentially organizing-based, and start 
acting on this understanding, we will recognize our unrealized political potential.  (“We” 
Americans in general, and perhaps we “millennials” in particular.)  Specifically:  we will 
find that it’s possible, and maybe even easier than we think, to do politics in a way that’s 
not based in elitism, Manicheanism, and consumerism—what I call “culture war.”  And, 
                                                                                                                                            
theories of community such as Giorgio Agamben’s The Coming Community and Jean-Luc Nancy’s The 
Inoperative Community.  Bourdieu, likewise, usually just gets a passing reference these days (yes, habitus 
and field something or other), before moving on to more currently-valued theories, such as those of Jacques 
Rancière.  Rancière, a student of Louis Althusser, got a lot of recognition for accusing Bourdieu of 
legitimizing the very class inequalities he sought to undermine, as well as legitimizing his own role as 
teacher and analyst.  (For Rancière, basically, those inequalities don’t exist; the oppression is in thinking 
they exist.  Students can always teach themselves without much help, and teachers are oppressive for 
behaving otherwise; spectators are always already emancipated, and artists are oppressive for behaving 
otherwise.)  I won’t argue these claims have no merit.  (Rancière’s in particular, share a lot with—or, 
depending on your perspective, steal a lot from—Freire and Brecht, whose work is very important to mine.)  
Nor will I try to disprove or argue against them; I’m not even sure if this would be possible, as we’re more 
in the realm of faith-based political convictions than in the realm of empirically provable (or disprovable) 
hypotheses.  I’ll just make two claims of my own, to explain my preference for Fish and Bourdieu over 
these others.  First, whatever the veracity of these other theorists’ claims, they’re not very useful for 
organizing and building collective agency.  At most, they offer a weak theory of agency and organizing:  as 
things that are mostly done to us, not by us.  When their adherents engage in political practice, beyond 
writing more theory, it’s usually of the decentralized, un-strategic variety, without much potential to build 
organizations or structures that last (see Chapters Three and Four).  Second, conversely, the work of Fish 
and Bourdieu—put together in the particular way I do, here—is very useful in understanding and practicing 
organizing and building collective agency.  This is not necessarily Fish and Bourdieu as they’re usually 
read.  I’m performing a very specific synthesis—of Fish’s concept of interpretive communities, combined 
with Bourdieu’s concept of habitus / market (field) / cultural capital, both read through the American 
populist praxis of broad-based community organizing (codified in the writings of Alinsky and others)—that 
bring out an implied, but not stated, strong theory of agency and organizing in both of these theorists’ 
work.  My reading of Bourdieu brings out the implicit politics of Fish’s “interpretive communities”:  how 
they produce not just different ways of reading Milton, but also different ways people’s bodies move, and 
different ways that people understand and assign value to their world; and, maybe most importantly, how 
these communities can be (and are) intentionally organized and dis-organized.  My reading of Fish, on the 
other hand, brings out the non-fatalistic potential of Bourdieu’s “habitus,” “market,” and “cultural capital”:  
how they are not only tools of the oppressor to keep the poor man down, as he uses them, but also concepts 
that the oppressed (in many different configurations) can and do use to build new and different realities.  
For a more detailed description of this central synthesis of Fish and Bourdieu, the theoretical engine of the 
whole project, see Chapter One.  See also Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt 
(Minneapolis, MN:  University of Minnesota Press, 1993), Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 
trans. Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis, MN:  University of Minnesota Press, 1991), and Jacques Rancière, 
The Ignorant Schoolmaster:  Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation, trans. Kristin Ross (Stanford, CA:  
Stanford University Press, 1991) and The Emancipated Spectator, trans. Gregory Elliott (New York:  
Verso, 2009).   
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relatedly, to finally solve that central impasse of American politics that sometimes goes 
by the slogan, “What’s the matter with Kansas?”20 
It’s an argument I develop, necessarily, through stories.  Cases.  Experiences.  
And reflections on those stories and cases and experiences.  Which lead to different 
approaches to future stories, cases, and experiences.  Theory and practice, again, at their 
most elemental.  I try to be true to Alinsky’s dictum, to love people—all people.  I try my 
best to resist the temptation to divide people into categories:  good and bad, friend and 
enemy, oppressed and oppressor.  (“No permanent friends, no permanent enemies,” said 
Alinsky; it’s all about the task at hand.)  I try; I do not always succeed; but I keep 
trying.21  To criticize one’s colleagues, constructively, is a lot harder (and more 
spiritually taxing) than to demonize one’s enemies.  But if we’re going to get outside of 
the good/bad frame—i.e., out of the culture wars—we have no choice.22  
A lot of the people I criticize the harshest in this book are people I know, people 
I’ve worked with, people whom I deeply value.  Likewise with the institutions I criticize:  
                                                
20 See Chapter One, in particular.  About halfway through my process of planning this book, I realized that 
it was, in a sense, my “second book.”  My first, which I haven’t written, and may or may not ever write, is 
called Schools of Thought:  Frankfurt, Chicago, Birmingham—and, I might have recently added, 
Highlander.  This book would explore, in discrete and contrasting historical cases, the same synthesis of 
Fish and Bourdieu I’m making here, namely that the ideas that drive our cultural, political, and economic 
life need to be understood as the products of organization (they are organized ideas)—in this case, the 
products of the organization of very different, very influential “schools.”  It would be simple and controlled 
in structure and rigorous in research, the way a doctoral dissertation should be.  The book you’re reading, 
on the other hand, is neither simple or controlled:  like a good second book, it takes the same theoretical 
arguments from the first book and applies them on a far wider, more complex, and more ambitious scale.  
But there I am.  I’ve written my second book first—not by design, but simply because I didn’t figure this 
all out until it was too late to turn back.  Truthfully, I’m not sure if I would have wanted it any other way.   
21 I’m pretty good with the cultural conservatives in Chapter One, I think, and even with the neoliberals in 
Chapter Two.  I have the most trouble, probably unsurprisingly, in Chapter Three, where I’m talking about 
the people who are closest to me:  the academics and para-academics, and especially Louis Althusser and 
other “anarcho-liberals.”  To be a true, universally-loving radical, as Alinsky himself said, is an ideal to 
strive for, more than a reality to attain.  Thus I strive, and will continue to strive harder. 
22 Unless, of course, we just stop criticizing everything.  I will entertain this possibility, and ultimately 
argue against it, at the beginning of Chapter Four. 
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I’ve often worked for them, or in or with them, in very positive and productive ways.  I 
never mean my criticisms, serious as they are, to take away from these deeply valuable 
people and organizations.  On the contrary:  I aim to add to them.  I intend my criticisms 
as agitations:  the age-old organizing practice of showing the people we’re working with 
the gap between who they are and who they could be, and offering them a way to get 
there—as I hope and expect they will do for me, in turn—so we may both grow and 
further the important work we’re doing together.23 
Because there’s a lot of work to do.  If much of my generation has been spared the 
myth that some deus ex machina—be it a functioning government, a functioning social 
safety net, or a functioning market—will save us from all harm, it still falls on us to take 
that knowledge and act on it.  Spending our time calling each other out, including calling 
each other out for calling each other out, won’t do.  Nor will sequestering ourselves in 
insular communities of people just like us, however affirming they might feel.  We’ve got 
to go do the long, hard work of building a broad-base, over a long term, with people we 
will not always like, but must learn to love.  We can (and must!) have fun along the way.  
And we’ve got to start, and right soon. 
                                                
23 See Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
We, Other Kansans 
 
Quite honestly, there’s a lot of dumbfucks out there who THINK they know what 
they need but honestly have no clue. 
 
—Ben Fink, email to theater collaborators, 11/16/04 
 
A Tale of a Fail 
It was about 7:30 on a Sunday morning.  I was sitting in a laundromat in 
Minneapolis.  (And reading, of all things, Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed.)  As 
usual, I kept quiet.  I read my book and vaguely took in the TV and the sound of the 
machines and the voices of the handful of other folks who’d gotten up early that morning 
to do their laundry.  Not long after I put my clothes in the dryer, two of those voices grew 
more distinct.  I looked up and saw those voices belonged to two men, a white 
laundromat employee and a Latino customer.  They both looked to be working-class, in 
their late thirties or forties.  They were angry.  Angry about Barack Obama.   
It was September 13, 2009.  Obama had been elected president less than a year 
ago.  He had spent the summer promoting what he, too, would soon start calling 
“Obamacare.”  At stops across the country, he had been greeted by conservatives toting 
assault rifles and claiming to belong to something called the “Tea Party.”  And today he 
was coming to Minneapolis.  And the two men standing near me in the laundromat were 
not happy about it.  He was coming to “tell people what to think,” they kept saying, over 
and over.1  He was coming here to tell people what to think, and spending our tax money 
                                                
1 This is important language on its own, as we will discuss.  It may also contain other meanings, including 
racially-coded ones.  In late 2013, John Boehner refused to criticize birthers—conservatives who believe 
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to do it.  The previous day—the day of Glenn Beck’s “9/12” march—thousands of people 
had come to express their views, on their own time.  How dare Obama spend taxpayer 
money to tell them, or us, what to think.  He will never help us.  He’s always going to 
help the rich, because they’re the ones who give him lots of money and they’re the ones 
who run things.   
That was the gist of their conversation.  And it kept going, over and over, for 
nearly an hour.  I know, because that’s how long it took my laundry to dry—so I had to 
keep sitting there.  Sitting there, reading my Freire, grinding my teeth.  I wanted to do 
something, of course.  I wanted to say something.  I wanted to get up and walk over to 
them and introduce myself.  I wanted to tell them, truthfully, that I agreed with them, on 
so many things.  That yes, there is a powerful elite that doesn’t care what they think—
what we think—and that often tries to tell them—us—what to think.  That because of this 
elite, so many of us have lost so much of our dignity as workers and citizens, and our 
ability to play a meaningful role in creating the world we live in.  That I understood why 
they were so angry, and I was angry too.  And that if anything, the conspiracy is deeper 
and more complicated than they thought.  That yes, Obama’s health care law was a 
conspiracy to help the big corporations, but in the process it might give them free health 
care.  And that yes, Glenn Beck might sound like he’s standing up for our freedom 
against this government-corporate elite, but he might also be part of it.   
I wanted them to understand all this, so badly.  These two men, and millions like 
them, had so much to gain from the more just, equitable, and fair society that Obama—
                                                                                                                                            
Obama was not born in the United States and is therefore not a legitimate president—because “it’s not my 
job to tell people what to think.” 
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whatever his shortcomings—was trying to build.  And yet these same men, and millions 
like them, were rejecting it.  They were running headlong into the arms of their 
oppressors.  They had been fooled, betrayed, duped into acting against their own 
interests.  Instead of fighting for their right to good, affordable health care, they were 
fighting against it.   
But I didn’t say any of that.  I didn’t say anything.  I just sat there, frustrated and 
dismayed, with my nose in my book, as the most intractable and dangerous paradox of 
American politics played itself out right in front of me. 
Did I do wrong?  I don’t think so.  At the time, I was paralyzed; I’m not sure I 
could have gotten up out of my chair, even if I’d tried.  Even now, after years of 
reflecting and evaluating and analyzing, I’m still not sure there’s much I could have done.  
Sure, I could have gotten up and tried talking with them.  I could have tried to help 
explain things, or to ask them questions that could have guided them to their own, better 
understanding.  But I doubt they would have opened up to me.  They were pretty angry.  
If I tried to intervene, I thought, I might even make them more convinced that Obamacare 
was all about getting talked at by bespectacled professor-types like myself.  Even if 
they’d taken me seriously, I don’t think I could have convinced them of anything.  We’d 
both come too far down the road for that.  Our positions on Obamacare were far too 
bound up with our identities, our sense of who we were in the world.  There was no way 
they were going to change their minds and be able to live with themselves—anymore 
than they would have been able to change my mind, in the other direction. 
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No, I don’t think I did anything wrong.  And neither did they.  The fail wasn’t in 
our individual behavior, but in the culture we were all a part of, and actively participating 
in.  A culture that was causing them to actively resist the chance to get better and cheaper 
health care, for themselves and their families and millions of others.  A culture that was 
causing me to stay glued to my seat, thinking—and now writing—about them, but not 
with them.  A culture that separated us into an us and a them in the first place, and set us 
against each other, despite how much we share.  There were so many places we could 
have found common ground.  We all clearly wanted to be heard, wanted to think for 
ourselves, wanted to take control of our lives back from the elites that seemed to be 
taking over everything.  With a little conversation, we probably would have found even 
more common ground.  We probably were all looking for decent and meaningful work, a 
decent and affordable place to live, decent education for ourselves and the people we care 
about, and—yes—decent health care.  We might have even found a way to build 
something on this common ground, to work together out of our mutual self-interest to get 
closer to some of our common goals.   
But none of that happened.  I stayed sitting down, over here, and they stayed 
standing up, over there.  The divide was un-breached.  The connection was not made.   
 
The Culture Wars, and What it Would Mean to “Defeat” Them 
This book is about why.  Why so many of us, even though we want and need so 
many of the same things, tend to stay on our respective sides of the laundromat:  not 
talking together, not working together, and often positioned against each other.  And it’s 
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about how.  How it got to be this way, and how we—you, and I, and the people we know, 
and the people they know—can change it.   
   In academic language, it’s a book about rhetoric.  Nowadays, people tend to 
talk about rhetoric like it’s a bad thing.  “Oh, that’s just rhetoric.”  “Don’t give me 
rhetoric, I want the facts.”  “You’ve been manipulated by their rhetoric.”  But rhetoric, in 
its classic sense, is a lot more than this.  It’s the ancient art of convincing people of 
things, of making an effective appeal.  If we want to make things different from how they 
are now, we’ll need effective rhetoric.  Not to manipulate people, or to win arguments 
against them, but to break down the walls that divide “us” from “them” in the first place.  
Not to win the culture wars, but to defeat them. 
This might be a hard thing to wrap your mind around.  “Politics,” as it’s presented 
in election cycles and on cable news shows and on our Facebook feeds, is about winning.  
Winning the election.  Winning the news cycle.  Winning the issue.  Convincing “the 
public,” that huge, undefined amoeba out there, that we’re right, and they’re wrong.  
Which means we have to draw a very clear line between “us” and “them.”2  This way of 
doing politics is what I’m calling “culture war.”  Culture war is about a lot more than 
abortion, pornography, prayer in schools, or other religiously-tinged so-called “social 
                                                
2 The popular linguist Deborah Tannen calls this condition “agonism…a pervasive warlike atmosphere that 
makes us approach public dialogue, and just about anything we need to accomplish, as if it were a 
fight….Nearly everything is framed as a battle or game in which winning or losing is the main concern.”  
This is to be contrasted with the view of political theorists such as Chantal Mouffe, who would characterize 
this condition as “antagonism,” as opposed to “agonism” or “agonistic pluralism,” a more positive, 
deliberative negotiation among interests that’s seen as the basis for a more democratic political life.  I agree 
with the spirit of Mouffe’s critique but will argue, in the spirit of fellow “public work” theorists, that for 
this kind of deliberation to actually transform political life for the better, it cannot be its own sphere; it must 
be connected, intimately, to everyday life, and especially to work.  See Deborah Tannen, The Argument 
Culture (New York:  Random House, 1998), and Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (New York:  
Verso, 2000). 
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issues.”  Culture war is about the whole way we do politics.  And arch-conservative Pat 
Buchanan, who coined the term in his 1992 speech “The Cultural War for the Soul of Our 
Country,” knew it.  Culture war, he declared, “will quickly replace the old battles over 
the conduct of the Cold War.”3 
Buchanan was right.  Culture war is Cold War 2.0.  The actors may change, and 
are interchangeable, but the characters and plot stay the same.  On one side is “us,” the 
God-loving Americans, who are good, right, just, and true (all rolled into one).  On the 
other side is “them,” the godless Communists, who are bad, wrong, unjust, and false 
(likewise)—and will stop at nothing to impose their badness, wrongness, injustice, and 
falsehood upon us—unless we stop them.  And just like Cold War 1.0, these characters 
and this plot define the way pretty much every political issue gets dealt with, regardless 
of what side you’re on.  The main fight, as Buchanan said, “is about power.”  It’s about 
which people, groups, interests, norms, and values will organize our lives.  Culture war 
knows no difference between “social” and “economic” issues.  They’re all part of culture, 
how it’s organized, and who’s got the power to do that organizing. 
The term “culture war” may be only a couple of decades old, but Americans have 
been fighting culture wars for centuries:  at least since the early 1600s, when plantation 
owners in colonial Virginia discovered they could keep power by turning their poor 
Anglo workers against their poor African and indigenous workers, and along the way, 
invented modern racism.4  (Skin color, like point-on-the-compass and point-on-the-
political-spectrum, provides a particularly easy way to separate “us” and “them.”)  You 
                                                
3 Patrick J. Buchanan, “The Cultural War for the Soul of America,” http://buchanan.org/blog/the-cultural-
war-for-the-soul-of-america-149 (September 10, 2013)—better known as the “culture war speech.” 
4 This history will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
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might think about culture war as a genre:  a set of expected conventions and formal 
elements.  We turn on a Western and know we’ll see warring cowboys and Indians; we 
turn on CNN and know we’ll see warring liberals and conservatives.  But I’ll be talking 
about it, mostly, as a frame:  a metaphor (politics = conflict), combined with a story (we, 
the good/right/just/true must stop them, the bad/wrong/unjust/false, from taking over 
everything), which structures the way we understand things.  Like a picture frame, culture 
war is something made by people, which gives us a particular view of a portrait or 
landscape.  Depending on its shape, size, and placement, it makes some things big and 
important, other things small and unimportant, and other things still not visible at all.5   
Cognitive scientists argue that everything we know, we know through a frame.  
We can see this in our everyday lives.  Think about the last time you misplaced your 
keys.  Did you see this event through the successful-person-makes-momentary-mistake 
frame, or the one-more-step-on-the-road-to-senility frame?  Or another frame entirely?  
There’s no such thing as un-framed knowledge; we wouldn’t know what to do with it, or 
how to process it.  So however we look at something, big or small, we’re looking at it 
through one frame or another.  And the frame we choose—or the frame that’s chosen for 
us—determines the story we’re telling, and the part we and others play in that story.   
                                                
5 The most relevant theorist of genre—and its companion terms, conventions and formations—is Raymond 
Williams, the Welsh drama professor, literary critic, and sociologist who arguably invented the field of 
cultural studies.  (See Raymond Williams, Drama From Ibsen to Brecht (New York:  Penguin, 1973), 
especially the introduction, and Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford, UK:  Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 173-185).  Framing, as a concept, was pioneered by the sociologist Erving 
Goffman (see Goffman, Frame Analysis:  An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Lebanon, NH:  
Northeastern University Press, 1986) and brought into the fields of linguistics, cognitive science, and 
progressive politics by the linguist George Lakoff (see, most recently, The Political Mind:  Why You Can’t 
Understand 21st-Century Politics with an 18th-Century Brain (New York:  Viking, 2008)).  It is currently 
practiced most explicitly by the FrameWorks Institute, a progressive D.C. think tank 
(www.frameworksinstitute.org)—though I would argue, following Lakoff, that it’s being practiced 
implicitly all over, and often better by non-progressives.   
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So what about the culture-war frame?  Well, it’s got its perks.  It allows us to 
understand a wide range of facts and issues, quickly and efficiently.  See how many ways 
you can complete the phrase “The War on ______” in the next ten seconds, and you’ll 
see what I mean.  Buchanan, in that one speech in 1992, managed to throw together 
abortion, homosexuality, race, pornography, history, the environment, education, the LA 
riots, national holidays, popular movies, and classical painting into a single argument.  
And a powerful one at that:  every effective politician knows that invoking culture war 
can net a lot of popular passion, a lot of fundraising dollars, and a lot of volunteer hours 
in a hurry.  The culture-war frame is also attractive in the way it solidifies our identity:  it 
gives us a quick and clear sense of where we stand, who our allies and enemies are, and 
even of who we ourselves are.6  And, of course, it’s profitable.  Aside from generating 
campaign contributions, it keeps the books moving off the shelves, it keeps people tuned 
in to Fox and MSNBC (and more recently, Facebook and Tumblr), and it’s the backbone 
of the entire talk-radio industry and a good slice of the Internet.  For media profits, 
culture war is a very good thing.   
The problem is, it’s death.  Specifically:  the death of public life.  To risk stating 
the obvious:  it’s really hard to have a meaningful discussion, let alone build meaningful 
relationships that allow for meaningful work and change, when half the people in the 
room are trying to obliterate your way of life, and the other half is spending all its energy 
defending you against the first half.  (Exhibit A:  the 112th and 113th Congresses.)  The 
                                                
6 An old Borscht-belt joke solidifies this point.  Saul, a generic old Jewish man, is stranded on a desert 
island for many years.  When he is finally rescued, his rescuers are surprised to find that among the many 
things he has built on the island are not just one but two synagogues.  Dumbfounded, they ask him:  “Saul.  
You’re the only one here.  Why did you build two synagogues?”  Saul answers without missing a beat:  
“It’s very simple.  This is the one I go to…and this is the one I wouldn’t set foot in!” 
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dominance of the culture-war frame has caused a whole lot of Americans to turn away 
from “politics” altogether.  And who could blame them?  Why would anyone want to be 
involved with something so frustrating, so useless, and so downright unpleasant—
especially when it feels so far away and so distant from the things that matter in our 
everyday lives?7  And for masochists like me, who for one reason or another still manage 
to care about politics, the culture-war frame has led to an impasse.  A confused, grinding, 
intolerable standstill.  It has led, ultimately, to the laundromat.  To the place where I 
found myself sitting, uncomfortably trying to read my Freire, watching those two men 
rail against their own affordable health care, knowing there’s nothing I could say to stop 
them, and asking myself why.  Why do they act against their own interests?  And why 
won’t they talk to me? 
These seem to be two separate questions—one about politics and economics, the 
other about culture and communication.  But the more I discussed them with friends and 
colleagues, the more I’ve come to think of them as part of the same question.  For two 
reasons, one structural and one psychological.  The structural reason:  the culture war of 
the laundromat had two clear sides, but only one side gets to tell this story.  Me.  I get to 
define who they were, what their interests were, and how they acted on them (or didn’t).  
I’m not saying I made this stuff up.  It’s true, as far as I can recollect.  All I’m saying is 
that when I ask why they acted against their interests, that implies that I know what their 
interests were.  But I don’t, not really.  I saw them once, I never spoke a word to them, 
and I have never seen or heard from them again.  And it’s not likely we’ll ever hear their 
                                                
7 For an elaboration of this argument, see Chapter Four; see also E. J. Dionne, Why Americans Hate 
Politics, reprint ed. (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2004). 
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side of the story:  they probably won’t be writing a book, about themselves or about me, 
anytime soon.8   
Which leads us to the second, psychological reason:  given that I’m representing 
both sides of the story, any honest analysis of them and how they might be acting against 
their interests has got to include an analysis of me, and what my interests are—because 
my interests will always affect the way I define their interests.  It’s very important to me, 
it’s in my self-interest, to think about myself as a good American organizer in the 
tradition of Saul Alinsky.  Which means, I should be able to talk with anyone.  But here, I 
couldn’t, and didn’t.  My image of myself was challenged.  I got anxious.  And in this 
anxiety, I may have unconsciously taken the scary question “Why can’t I talk with 
them?” and distorted it into something less scary, less likely to compromise my 
understanding of myself.  First I turned it around, and made it:  “Why won’t they talk 
with me?”  Then I added a level of abstraction, another layer of comforting distance, and 
made it:  “Why are they acting against their interests?”  A classic Freudian defense 
mechanism. 
For what it’s worth, I don’t think I’m the only one who does things like this.  Try 
it yourself.  Why do you think (other) people vote against their interests?  Or maybe let’s 
add an abstraction-cushion:  why do people you know think (other) people vote against 
                                                
8 This is a classist statement, which reflects a classist reality.  Journalist and author Barbara Ehrenreich (of 
Nickel and Dimed fame) observes the oft-overlooked obvious, that those people “invited to opine” on 
“matters of general interest or national importance” are nearly all “well fed, well educated, and employed 
in physically restful occupations such as journalism or college teaching.  [Guilty on all counts.]  When we 
see a man in work clothes on the screen, we anticipate some grievance or, at best, information of a highly 
local or anecdotal nature.”  In other words, to borrow from science scholar Donna Haraway, only people 
like me, not they, get to play the “God-trick”:  to speak with an assumption of neutrality and universal 
knowledge, including about “them.”  See Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling:  The Inner Life of the 
Middle Class (New York: HarperPerennial, 1990), 4.   
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their interests?  The people I know, for the most part, tend to answer with some variant 
of:  “Because they’re dumb.”  Or maybe slightly more delicately:  “Because they’re 
ignorant.”  Or slightly more generously:  “Because they’ve been duped.”  When I’ve 
challenged them on this interpretation, they’ve tended to get defensive, fast.  I learned 
this a few years ago, when I heard a brilliant lecture by theater historian John Fletcher, a 
former colleague of mine at the University of Minnesota.  He was talking about the 
Christian Right and the ways they read and teach postmodern theory:  he argued that 
contrary to what we may believe about our own open-mindedness compared to theirs, 
they seem a lot more interested in learning about us than the other way around, and that 
we need to change this.9  When I left the session and excitedly told a friend about it later 
that day—an accomplished young art historian with a serious interest in progressive 
change—she stopped me cold:  “I have no interest in talking with those people.” 
These kinds of defense mechanisms—mine or hers—don’t make us bad people.  
They’re the product of trauma, the real pain and real oppression we’ve all experienced as 
our social selves got formed in the context of constant culture war.  But if we want to go 
beyond these kinds of gut reactions, we need to deal with them.  We won’t be able to 
understand why they’re messed up, why they go out of their way to get rid of their own 
affordable health care, without also understanding why we’re messed up. 
More recently, while working on the first draft of this book, a New Yorker friend 
of mine asked me what it was about.  I started explaining how it’s a problem when 
                                                
9 For a good introduction to Fletcher’s work navigating and questioning the boundaries of us and them, see 
“Sympathy for the Devil:  Nonprogressive Activism and the Limits of Critical Generosity,” in Theater 
Historiography:  Critical Interventions, ed. Henry Bial and Scott Magelssen (Ann Arbor:  University of 
Michigan Press, 2010), 110-122. 
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Democrats call working-class Republicans dumb, when she interrupted and asked, with 
classic New York sensitivity:  “Well, aren’t they?”  I surprised myself by cooling my 
knee-jerk outrage, taking a breath, and taking her question seriously.  Are working-class 
Republicans dumb?  In my experience, not at all.  But for a moment, let’s assume they 
were:  dumb, duped, and uninformed.  It still wouldn’t matter.  We live in a democracy, 
or at least in a system of representative government that we might someday be able to 
turn into a democracy.  Making that happen—not winning a given issue, or finding the 
absolute truth about a political party’s mental capacity—is the point.10  To learn to talk.  
To better understand ourselves, and other kinds of people, and our various interests, and 
where those interests might overlap.  To find ways to work together, in pursuit of those 
overlapping interests, to make a better world for all of us.  That’s what’s necessary, if the 
goal isn’t simply to “win” the culture wars but actually to defeat them. 
Pollyannaish?  Maybe.  Possible?  Definitely.  Easy?  Not at all. 
 
The Matter With (The Matter With (The Matter With)) Kansas 
You go into some of these small towns in Pennsylvania, and like a lot of small 
towns in the Midwest, the jobs have been gone now for twenty-five years and 
nothing’s replaced them.…And it’s not surprising they get bitter, they cling to 
guns or religion or apathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant 
sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.11   
 
                                                
10 This is why I’m suspicious of all of those studies that try to prove that there is a natural, unassailable, 
even biological difference between culture-war factions (liberals vs. conservatives, gays vs. straights, 
northerners vs. southerners, etc.)—such as Ryota Kanai, et al, “Political Orientations are Correlated with 
Brain Structure in Young Adults,” Current Biology 21 (2011):  677-680—which, like many articles of its 
kind, got cited widely and popularized by pundits across the liberal-conservative spectrum.  There may well 
be demonstrable differences—but who cares?  We’re not going to get around the need for pluralism 
anytime soon, so we might as well accept it. 
11 Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive:  The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York:  The 
New Press, 2010), 368. 
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So declared candidate Obama, a year before his presidential appearance in 
Minneapolis, before a wealthy audience at a closed-door California fundraiser.  When his 
comments got leaked, both sides responded as expected.  According to conservatives, 
Obama was an elitist.  According to liberals, Obama was telling the truth.12  According to 
labor historian Jefferson Cowie, who has studied culture wars extensively, they were both 
correct:  Obama’s facts were more-or-less right, but his rhetoric was very wrong.  “While 
the displacement of material concerns onto cultural questions was not an unreasonable 
interpretation of the politics of the heartland, there was an inescapable condescension 
when it came to speaking about other people rather than to them, which perpetuated the 
problem of the ‘liberal elite’ who discussed and dissected working people but actually 
knew precious few.”13 
This is an age-old rhetorical problem.  I’ve seen it more often among left/liberal 
types, but there are definitely right-wingers who are guilty of it, too.  We get frustrated 
that other people don’t agree with something that seems obvious and apparent to us, and 
rather than talk with them—listen to them, understand where they’re coming from, etc.—
we talk about them, with people who agree with us.  We marvel at how dumb “the 
masses” (or more recently, “the sheeple”) can be, and we accuse them in absentia of 
things like “false consciousness” and “repression.”  (We the accusers, of course, are 
always rational, independent thinkers.)  This kind of elitist-critical rhetoric has been 
especially common since 1968, when radical-ish traditions stemming vaguely from Marx 
                                                
12 Four years later, almost exactly the same thing happened again—to the other side.  Mitt Romney was 
caught on tape at another closed-door fundraiser, disparaging the “47 percent” of Americans who 
supposedly paid no taxes and were freeloading off government largesse.  His facts were correct, at least if 
you interpret them a certain way, but his rhetoric cost him a lot of votes. 
13 Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 368. 
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and Freud got mashed together and variously integrated into pop culture.  Over time the 
radicalism faded, but the corrosive criticism remained.   
My own intellectual tradition, cultural studies, followed this exact course.  Once 
an adult-education movement that worked directly with working-class folks in Britain, by 
1968 it had found its way into the university, where it would remain.  The central, critical 
question remained unchanged:  how did the lower classes of Britain get convinced to give 
up their own “popular culture” (what we’d call folk or indigenous culture) and willingly 
embrace a corporate-produced “mass culture” that was making them act against their 
interests?  Only now, people actually from these lower classes no longer took part in the 
discussion.  Ten years later, cultural studies would give up the question altogether.  By 
the time cultural studies came to the United States in the 1980s, it was entirely off the 
agenda.  It hadn’t been solved.  It just got abandoned, as the culture wars intensified (both 
inside academia and out) and cultural studies folks felt pressed to spend more and more 
of their time defining and defending “us”—women, minorities, and the otherwise 
oppressed and underprivileged—against an encroaching, re-energized “them.”   
So in a sense, this book is an excavation project.  It seeks to dig up, dust off, and 
resuscitate the oldest questions in rhetoric—how do you convince people of things?—and 
cultural studies—how did the 1 percent make the 99 percent take it, and like it?14—both 
of which have never really been answered, and desperately need to be.   
                                                
14 A quick note on terminology:  the Occupy movement did not, contrary to popular belief, coin “the 99 
percent” and “the 1 percent.”  Recall Al Gore’s discussion of the “wealthiest one percent” during the 2000 
debates—for which he was widely mocked across the pundit class, and on Saturday Night Live.  These are 
old populist terms, which express a basic truth using a broad, perhaps overgeneralizing brush:  that there is 
a small number of people (actually more like the 0.1 percent) that have an immense amount of concentrated 
wealth, power, and influence—versus the vast majority of the population (the 99(.9) percent), which does 
not.  “The haves and the have-nots” expresses the same basic sentiment.  What the Occupy movement did, 
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I’m not the first to attempt this kind of project.  My most important forebear is a 
fellow cultural studies renegade:  the historian-turned-pundit Thomas Frank.  Frank 
started his political writing career as founding editor of the magazine The Baffler, where 
he spent years taking witty potshots at mass culture and probing the question of how 
we’d all become willing slaves of the consumer capitalist market.  (The titles of Frank’s 
book-length Baffler compilations—One Market Under God, Commodify Your Dissent!, 
Boob Jubilee—give you a sense of what you’re in for.)  Frank’s first “serious” book, The 
Conquest of Cool, is a very insightful and under-read analysis of corporate culture in the 
wake of the 1960s.  Frank argues that during the 1960s advertising executives, no less 
than hippies, caught the counterculture bug—and countercultural rhetoric remained a 
central part of corporate culture and advertising ever since.15   
Then in 2004, Frank hit pay dirt.  He published What’s the Matter with Kansas? 
in June of 2004.  In the wake of the election five months later, it felt prophetic.  Frank 
seemed to ask, and answer, the question that burned hottest in the hearts of liberal 
America:  how could George W. Bush, a swaggering scion of the 1 percent, get not only 
elected but re-elected by a sizeable portion (even if not an actual majority) of that 99 
percent?16  His book skyrocketed up the New York Times bestseller list; liberals across the 
country—myself very much included—cheered Frank on as he spun our outrage into 
diatribes that bordered on the poetic: 
                                                                                                                                            
critically, was to popularize and legitimize these old populist terms for our moment.  These days, when you 
use them, you get taken seriously. 
15 Thomas Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip 
Consumerism (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
16 Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?:  How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New 
York:  Metropolitan Books, 2004). 
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From the air-conditioned heights of a suburban office complex this may look like 
a new age of reason, with the Web sites signing each to each, with a mall down 
the way that every week has miraculously anticipated our subtly shifting tastes, 
with a global economy whose rich rewards just keep on flowing, and with a long 
parade of rust-free Infinitis purring down the streets of beautifully manicured 
planned communities.  But on closer inspection the country seems more like a 
panorama of madness and delusion worthy of Hieronymous Bosch:  of sturdy 
blue-collar patriots reciting the Pledge while they strangle their own life chances; 
of small farmers proudly voting themselves off the land; of devoted family men 
carefully seeing to it that their children will never be able to afford college or 
proper health care; of working-class guys in midwestern cities cheering as they 
deliver up a landslide for a candidate whose policies will end their way of life, 
will transform their region into a “rust belt,” will strike people like them blows 
from which they will never recover.17 
 
All they have to show for their Republican loyalty are lower wages, more 
dangerous jobs, dirtier air, a new overlord class that comports itself like King 
Farouk—and, of course, a crap culture whose moral free fall continues without 
significant interference from the grandstanding Christers whom they send 
triumphantly back to Washington every couple of years.  By all rights the charm 
of Republicanism should have worn off for this part of the conservative coalition 
long ago.18 
 
The ills described here…have been going on for ten to twenty years now.  
Nobody denies that they have happened, that they’re still happening.  Yet Kansas, 
that famous warrior for justice, how does it react?  Why, Kansas looks its 
problems straight in the eye, sets its jaw, rolls up its sleeves—and charges off 
exactly in the wrong direction…[attacking not the corporations and their 
Republican enablers but] an overeducated ruling class that is contemptuous of the 
beliefs and practices of the masses of ordinary people….despicable, self-
important show-offs.  They are effete…they are arrogant.  They are snobs.  They 
are liberals.19 
 
 
Maybe the most appealing part of Frank’s book—and certainly what’s given it its 
cultural staying power—is the clear answer it gives.  Why have the good working people 
of Kansas done such an illogical thing?  Why have they sided with their Republican 
oppressors against the very liberals who might save them?  Basically, Frank argues, 
                                                
17 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 10. 
18 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 136. 
19 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 68, 115. 
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because they’ve been duped.  “Cultural anger,” about abortion and evolution and all those 
Buchanan-style, religiously-tinged “social” issues, “is marshaled to achieve economic 
ends.”20  This “marshalling” is done by those Kansans who, unlike the working-class 
dupes, “suffer no derangement, the people who know precisely where their interests lie 
and who go directly about getting what they want.”  Namely, the rich—the CEO class of 
sub- and exurban Kansas City—and the opportunistic Republican politicians who serve 
them, who have learned to mouth the culture-war talk well enough to ignite the fury of 
the unwashed and un-jobbed masses, get their votes, and then continue to govern at their 
expense.21  These people make little effort to hide their duplicity—McCain’s seven 
(eight?) houses and Limbaugh’s four wives on down—“and yet the suspicions of the rank 
and file are not aroused.  The power of their shared vision of martyrdom is sufficient to 
overcome any set of facts that are merely material, merely true.”22   
The tragic result is “a populist uprising that only benefits the people it is supposed 
to be targeting…a working-class movement that has done incalculable, historic harm to 
working-class people.”23  And it shows no signs of stopping.  There is no hope in sight.  
The ending of What’s the Matter with Kansas? isn’t just pessimistic; it’s literally 
apocalyptic: 
As you cast your eyes back over this vanquished Midwest, this landscape of lost 
brotherhood and forgotten pride, you can’t help but wonder how much farther it’s 
all going to go.  How many of those old, warm associations are we willing to 
dissolve?  how much more of the “garden of the world” will we abandon to 
sterility and decay?  
                                                
20 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 5. 
21 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 36-38. 
22 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 236. 
23 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 109, 6.  
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My guess is, quite a bit.  The fever-dream of martyrdom that Kansas 
follows today has every bit as much power as John Brown’s dream of justice and 
human fraternity.  And even if the state must sacrifice it all—its cities and its 
industry, its farms and its small towns, all its thoughts and all its doings—the 
brilliance of the mirage will not fade.  Kansas is ready to lead us singing into the 
apocalypse.  It invites us all to join in, to lay down our lives so that others might 
cash out at the top; to renounce forever our middle-American prosperity in pursuit 
of a crimson fantasy of middle-American righteousness.24 
 
That, in brief, is Frank’s argument.  And a powerful and important one it is.  This 
is important to acknowledge, given that I’m about to spend some serious time criticizing 
it.  I don’t want to perpetuate a culture war, to turn Frank into a “them” that I’m 
marshalling you, reader, to fight against.  Frank wrote a good book.  A very good book.  
He raised some critically important questions.  If there are some problems with his 
answers—if they aren’t always as complete or as generous as I wish they were—at the 
very least they break a lot of important ground, upon which I can only hope to build.  
Frank, as he works get to the bottom of the conservative movement in Kansas, sets up all 
the big questions that will concern us for the rest of this book.  It is through 
understanding the matter with Kansas, and the matter with the matter with Kansas, that 
we will catch our first glimpse of how the culture wars might be defeated. 
The basic problem with Frank’s argument is that he gets self-interest wrong.  He 
makes the same mistake Obama made at the fundraiser, and I did at the laundromat:  he 
decides what the self-interest of working-class Kansans should be, without consulting 
them in the matter, and then he criticizes them for not following it.  Larry Grossberg, 
dean of American cultural studies, seizes on this error as a reason to throw out the whole 
book:  “The answer to Frank’s question—what’s the matter with people living in the so-
                                                
24 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 250-251. 
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called ‘red’ states?—is—nothing.  The fact that they disagree with progressives does not 
mean there is something wrong with them.”25  True.  But Grossberg either 
misunderstands Frank’s argument, or else he’s being a little smug.  It’s not that working-
class Kansans just “disagree with progressives.”  It’s that they’re actively working—
voting, campaigning, fundraising, going to jail, taking out new mortgages on their 
houses—for the very movement that, over the past two decades, has objectively ruined 
their way of life.  And from the looks of it, many of those same working-class Kansans 
are doing everything in their power to ensure many decades more of the same:  they are 
actively working to impoverish themselves.  Something, clearly, is the matter. 
For Kansas senator-turned-governor Sam Brownback, the answer is simple:  
“Kansans just don’t care about economic issues.”26  Frank, despite obvious political 
differences with Brownback, seems to agree—he just thinks it’s due to false-
consciousness, rather than Kansans’ genuine self-interest.  But is it true?  Do Kansans 
actually not care about economic issues?  According to political scientist Larry Bartels:  
no.  Bartels subjected Frank’s claims to some quantitative analysis, in a review 
irresistibly entitled “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with Kansas?,” and he 
found some problems.  If “working-class” means white people with incomes in the 
bottom third, then Frank is simply wrong:  over the past fifty years, “contrary to Frank’s 
assertions, white voters in this group had not become less Democratic in their voting 
                                                
25 Lawrence Grossberg, “Does Cultural Studies Have Futures?  Should It?  (Or What’s the Matter with New 
York?),” Cultural Studies 20, no. 1 (January 2006):  1-32, 26.  Grossberg continues, by way of explaining 
his title:  “On the other hand, there may be something wrong with people in the so-called ‘blue’ states if 
they think that there is something ‘wrong’ with conservatives (in Kansas) simply because they vote or think 
differently.” 
26 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 68.  
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behavior or less [sic?] conservative in their views about economic or social issues.  Nor 
could I find any evidence that they cared more about social and cultural issues than about 
bread-and-butter economic issues.”27  If “working-class” means “white voters without 
college degrees”—as Frank suggested in a response to Bartels—then there is indeed a 
steady, if slow and uneven, rightward shift.  But there are two complications.  First, it’s 
only true if we accept “the assumption, implicit throughout Frank’s account but never 
stated, that he is writing about the white working class.”  When non-whites without 
college degrees are included, there is “a two-point increase in Democratic support among 
the working class as a whole over the past half-century.”  Second, it masks the fact that 
“white voters without college degrees were actually more likely to have incomes in the 
top third of the income distribution than in the middle third, much less the bottom 
third”—hardly “working-class” as it’s commonly understood.28  To add a final twist, 
these higher-income but lower-education white voters “see themselves as closer to the 
Democratic Party on social issues like abortion and gender roles but closer to the 
Republican Party on economic issues”29—so if anything, they seem to support 
Republicans not in spite of economic issues, but because of them.  
Even if Bartels is right, and being Republican does directly correlate with income 
even in Kansas, there’s still far more than one percent of voters who support the party of 
the One Percent.  And as Bartels demonstrates, it’s not because they don’t care about 
economics.  Nor is it because they’re dupes.  Though this is what Frank ends up arguing, 
                                                
27 Larry M. Bartels, “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with Kansas?,” Quarterly Journal of 
Political Science 1 (2006):  201-226, 204. 
28 Bartels, “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with Kansas?,” 205-206. 
29 Bartels, “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with Kansas?,” 201. 
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along the way he provides much evidence to the contrary.  He observes that the writings 
of right-wing favorites like Limbaugh and Coulter may be “jam-packed with errors and 
omissions and preposterous interpretations,” but “readers don’t mind; theirs is an 
intensely personal politics, concerned far more with the frustrations and indignations of 
everyday life than with scholarly rigor or objective material interests.”30   
It’s not that Kansans don’t know that these errors are there.  It’s that they don’t 
care.  Despite the lies and the errors and the tortured logic, these texts are giving Kansans 
something, something that helps them through the frustrations and indignations of 
everyday life, in a way that nothing else seems to.  That is, their conservatism is in their 
self-interest; it might just not be in the economic part of their self-interest.  And before 
you call it “the opiate of the masses,” note that it seems to work just as well for the elites.  
Consider the curious tale that Frank hears from Kansas “archconservative” leader Dwight 
Sutherland, Jr.: 
A friend of mine who’s a millionaire…told me in all seriousness that he couldn’t 
vote for [George H. W.] Bush’s reelection because Bush was less than committed 
to a woman’s right to choose.  Of course in ’93 this guy’s taxes go up, hundreds 
and hundreds of thousands of dollars, and he’s screaming and yelling about 
Clinton and the Democrats, and I said, “Yeah, but you made the symbolic choice 
and repudiated those nasty pro-lifers, and that’s worth it in psychic income 
alone.”31 
  
Here we see Frank’s own argument in hilarious, ironic reversal:  Sutherland, a 
conservative critic, criticizes a millionaire friend for his “false consciousness” (yes, 
                                                
30 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 137.  Frank continues:  these writers “understand this, and they 
have developed an elaborate theoretical system of generating the policitized anger that is so much in 
evidence these days and for diverting this resentment from its natural course.”  Who died and left Frank 
arbiter of the natural remains unexplained. 
31 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 160-161. 
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Sutherland actually used that Marxist term) because he voted Democratic against his 
economic self-interest.  And why?  Because of something as hippie-dippy-sounding as 
“psychic income.”  “Psychic income” not only exists, Sutherland is forced to admit, but 
it’s also powerful:  powerful enough to make this sad dupe of a millionaire part with 
“hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars.” 
Frank doesn’t seem sure what to make of all this, and he moves on quickly.  
Which is a shame.  Had he lingered a little longer, he might have discovered that 
Sutherland, someone who purportedly stands on the “wrong” side of every culture war 
one can imagine, had just given Frank the missing piece of his own argument.  If Bartels 
demonstrates that working-class Kansans are often more in touch with their economic 
self-interest than Frank suggests, Sutherland demonstrates the converse:  that upper-class 
Kansans are not always so single-mindedly rational.  Taken together, the two of them 
suggest that neither working-class nor upper-class Kansans are driven by economic self-
interest alone.  Self-interest turns out to be a little more complicated.  If you measure it 
by sheer economics, then every Kansan is a dupe.  But when you factor in what 
Sutherland called “psychic income,” their behavior, and ours, starts to make a lot more 
sense. 
 
The Nature of Self-Interest 
Frank, like most of us, sometimes falls prey to nostalgia.  Once upon a time, he 
laments, the world was clearer.  “One problem the old left didn’t have was explaining 
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how the world worked…The answer was always money…But drain economics out of the 
world, and you’re left with few tools for explaining anything.”32   
We know from Bartels that reports of the death of economic-based reasoning have 
been somewhat exaggerated.  But what has died, among all but the most reactionary 
Marxists and Econ 101 professors, is the idea that self-interest is all about money.  
Behavioral economist and Internet sensation Dan Ariely spells this out:  “Standard 
economics,” otherwise known as neoclassical economics, developed in the mid- to late-
nineteenth century and still taught in economics departments to this day, “assumes that 
we are rational—that we know all the pertinent information about our decisions, that we 
can calculate the value of the different options we face, and that we are cognitively 
unhindered in weighing the ramifications of each potential choice.”  But in fact, Ariely 
contends, “we are all far less rational in our decision making than standard economic 
theory assumes.”  Ariely’s books and talks provide a near-endless supply of amusing 
examples of our “irrational” economic behavior, from his own research and that of 
others.  We’re much less likely to cheat on a test if we think about the Ten 
Commandments first, regardless of how religious we are.  We’re much more likely to be 
organ donors, or contribute to a 401(k), if “yes” is the default option on the registration 
form.  We’re much more likely to feel relieved of our pain if we had to pay 50 cents for 
our Aspirin, instead of a penny.33   
Ariely and his 2008 book Predictably Irrational are but one example of many 
recent popular books, in the “according-to-a-recent-study” genre, that debunk the 
                                                
32 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 131-132. 
33 See Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational:  The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions (New York: 
Harper Collins, 2008), 239. 
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assumption that humans are rational, utility-maximizing machines.  The linguist George 
Lakoff, of “frames” fame, gave us The Political Mind, in which he observes that 
“meaning is embodied,” quite literally, as “the brain extends throughout the body via the 
nervous system,” and argues that the rational mind, as separate from the emotional body, 
is a myth.34  Economic psychologist Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow 
contends, along the same lines, that while we have the capacity to reason analytically 
(what he calls “System 2” thinking), it’s a slow process that takes a lot of time.  Most of 
the time, we default to the judgment of feelings and intuition (“System 1” thinking), 
which is much quicker and often necessary (think about driving), but also often wrong 
(think about stereotypes).35  Finally, there’s moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt, whose 
The Righteous Mind claims that “an obsession with righteousness (leading inevitably to 
self-righteousness) is the normal human condition.  It is a feature of our evolutionary 
design, not a bug or error that crept into minds that would otherwise be objective and 
rational”—or more bluntly:  “we are all self-righteous hypocrites.”36  Many of these 
books cite neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s studies of patients with damage to the part 
of the brain that processes emotion (the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), which he wrote 
up in a book called Descartes’ Error.  Damasio’s conclusion:  there is no meaningful 
difference between “reason” and “emotion.”  In fact, emotions are necessary in order to 
reason effectively.37   
                                                
34 Lakoff, The Political Mind, 232. 
35 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York:  Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 
36 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind:  Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion (New 
York:  Vintage, 2012), xix-xx, xxiii. 
37 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error:  Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, reprint ed. (New York:  
Penguin, 2005). 
   53 
 
There are, several of these authors point out, some humans who do reason without 
emotion.  They, and maybe they alone, are not self-righteous, hypocritical, or self-
contradictory.  They can weigh costs and benefits coolly and objectively in any situation; 
their self-interest conforms nearly perfectly to the nineteenth-century “standard” 
economic ideal.  These humans are known as psychopaths.  It should come as no surprise, 
then, that capitalism and psychopathy seem to fit hand-in-glove.  British journalist Jon 
Ronson has claimed that “the way that capitalism is structured really is a physical 
manifestation of the brain anomaly known as psychopathy”—and compiled data 
suggesting that “the incidence of psychopathy among CEOs is about 4 percent, four times 
what it is in the population at large.”38  Joel Bakan, creator of the book and documentary 
film The Corporation, has likewise suggested that if a corporation is in fact a person, as 
the Supreme Court recently affirmed, that person “would probably qualify as a full-blown 
psychopath.”39 
Given all that, let’s pause for a moment and meditate on the absurd situation we 
find ourselves in.  It appears that Thomas Frank, avowed leftist and foe of capitalism, 
finds himself longing for a far-right capitalist utopia, in which everyone is a psychopath.  
That is, in desiring a world where people always act according to their interests, Frank 
ends up acting against his own interests!  Which is simply to say:  he’s acting like a 
normal, non-psychopathic human.  It’s not that he, or his Kansans, don’t know how to 
reason.  They do—we do—and we do it well and often.  It’s just that because we’re not 
                                                
38 Jeff Bercovici, “Why (Some) Psychopaths Make Great CEOs,” Forbes (June 14, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2011/06/14/why-some-psychopaths-make-great-ceos/ 
(September 19, 2013). 
39 Simon Caulkin, “Portrait of a Corporate Psychopath,” The Guardian (October 23, 2004), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2004/oct/24/politics.money (September 19, 2013). 
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psychopaths, we tend to reason “in support of [our] emotional reactions,” not the other 
way around. 40  We all—Frank, the Kansans, and the rest of us—may be irrational, but as 
Ariely’s book title suggests, we’re “predictably irrational.” 
This might sound complacent.  (They’re irrational; we’re irrational; everyone’s 
irrational together!  Cue the “Kumbaya.”)  This kind of naïve whiggishness is in fact a 
big danger of the “according to a recent study” genre.  Read enough Malcolm Gladwell, 
Thomas Friedman, or David Brooks, and you might start believing that every political 
problem is actually a mere question of engineering.41  If Frank’s pessimism can be 
stifling, so can Jonathan Haidt’s relentless equivocating:  “Liberals sometimes say that 
religious conservatives are sexual prudes for whom anything other than missionary-
position intercourse within marriage is a sin.  But conservatives can just as well make fun 
of liberal struggles to choose a balanced breakfast—balanced among moral concerns 
about free-range eggs, fair-trade coffee, naturalness, and a variety of toxins, some of 
which (such as genetically modified corn and soybeans) pose a greater threat spiritually 
than biologically.”42   
Yes, both sides are irrational.  Yes, the Kansans are no more irrational than we 
are.  But that doesn’t let any of us off the hook.  Literally minutes after I finished the first 
draft of this chapter, in the fall of 2013, the government shut down—over the very same 
health care law the laundromat guys were talking about back in 2009.  In the weeks that 
followed, the global economy came close to collapse.  Something’s definitely the matter.  
                                                
40 Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 29. 
41 This dangerous position, with deep roots in the Enlightenment and modernism, is what critic Evgeny 
Morozov calls “technological solutionism.”  See Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here:  The 
Folly of Technological Solutionism (New York:  PublicAffairs, 2013). 
42 Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 15. 
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And it’s urgent to figure out what it is.  Dwight Sutherland, unwittingly, provided an 
important clue.  He recognized that his friend voted Democratic, even though he knew it 
meant paying hundreds of thousands of dollars more in taxes, because of the positive 
feelings he got (the “psychic income”) when he symbolically repudiated the pro-lifers.   
If we accept that what’s true for Sutherland’s rich friend is equally true for others, 
such as Frank’s Republican-voting workers and my health care-opposing laundromat 
compatriots, than we see the huge importance of what Sutherland called our “symbolic 
choices.”  These are choices we all make, not to make us richer (indeed they often make 
us poorer), but to let us feel like we can live with ourselves, to make us feel like the 
people we see ourselves as, and/or want to be.  You choosing to give your hard-earned 
money to charity.  Me choosing low-paying do-gooder jobs instead of a well-paying 
corporate gig.  Our friends who went to their awful family reunion last weekend.  
Everyone, you could even say, who has ever chosen to have children.  These are not 
choices we make because they make us wealthier, or even always happier.  They are 
choices we make because…they’re what feels right. 
Rhetoricians, unlike most economists, have developed a way of understanding 
these non-money (but very real) dimensions of self-interest.  It’s a method derived from 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.  On one hand, Bourdieu was a committed Marxist, 
who took economic self-interest very seriously.  On the other hand, he was a sociologist, 
who understood that most people (everyone except psychopaths) don’t experience their 
economic situation in a detached, rational way.  Generally, moment by moment, we just 
do what feels right.  But how, Bourdieu asks, do some things come to feel right (such as 
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voting Republican if you’re a working-class Kansan, or voting Democratic if you’re 
Sutherland’s rich friend), while others (such as the reverse) don’t?   
Like a good French academic, Bourdieu starts by giving this sense of “what feels 
right” a technical, foreign-sounding name:  he calls it a “habitus.”  Everybody’s got one.  
Our “habitus” is the sum-total of all our various “dispositions”:  those things that we’re 
disposed to do, that feel right/natural/comfortable when we do them.  (Roughly:  our 
habitus = all of our habits.)  Every habitus is different.  Some of us have a habitus that 
includes dispositions to, say, camp in the woods, dance at clubs, and/or speak in front of 
crowds.  Others of us don’t.  We can’t decide what kind of dispositions are in our habitus, 
any more than we can decide what kind of foods we like.  We just feel it in our bodies.  
These dispositions usually feel natural, but a minute of thought will prove otherwise.  For 
many of us, our habitus includes the dispositions required to drive a car:  we jump in and 
do what feels natural, without needing to give it much thought.  But is that how it felt the 
first time we did it?  No way.  The disposition to drive, like (almost) all the dispositions 
in our habitus, are learned.  And this learning often doesn’t come cheap.  Think about 
what it takes to learn to drive:  all the time and money it takes to get a car, to take lessons, 
to practice, and to repair the car after a few initial…mishaps. 
Not everybody has this kind of time and money.  The makeup of our habitus, the 
kind of dispositions that are in it, has a lot to do with our socioeconomic class.  (And, 
relatedly, to our race, gender, region, occupation, and every other form of social 
distinction.)  It’s usually a lot easier for people of higher classes to speak “properly” and 
behave “correctly” at fancy dinner parties, job interviews, university seminars, and other 
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high-class functions—because their bodies have been trained for it since birth.  At the 
same time, the dispositions that are highly valued these kinds of situations won’t get you 
very far in a fistfight—and vice-versa.  Every habitus has a value, and that value depends 
on the market it’s being valued on.43   
“Value” and “market” are not metaphors.  Start trash-talking and punching people 
in a corporate meeting, and you’ll probably lose your high-paying job:  your low-value 
habitus will lead to a large loss of cash—what Bourdieu calls “fiscal capital.”  Try to 
have a refined business discussion during a fistfight, and you might not lose actual money 
(except in medical bills), but you’ll still lose value in the form of lost standing and a bad 
reputation—what Bourdieu calls “cultural capital.”  Cultural capital doesn’t come in 
dollars and cents, but that doesn’t make it any less real:  just like fiscal capital, it 
circulates on markets; you can build it and invest it and gain and lose it; and it affects the 
kinds of things you’re able to do, places you’re able to go, and person you’re able to be.  
And in a lot of cases, the two are exchangeable:  we invest fiscal capital (tuition) into 
building cultural capital (getting a degree), and then draw profits off that cultural capital 
(the degree) in the form of money (a higher-paying job).44 
                                                
43 In Bourdieu’s words:  “The definition of acceptability is found not in the situation [itself] but in the 
relationship between a market and a habitus, which itself is the product of the whole history of its relations 
with markets.”  For a good and concise (if not terribly readable) description of habitus and market, see 
Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 81-89.  In many of his other writings, Bourdieu calls markets 
“fields”—a far less helpful term in understanding the relationship between culture and economics.  But 
both terms refer to the same concept. 
44 See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction:  A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice 
(Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1984), 70-71:  “this initial status-derived capital [of being 
born into a high socioeconomic class] is enhanced by the advantages which precocious acquisition of 
legitimate culture gives in learning cultural skills, whether table manners or the art of conversation, musical 
culture or the sense of propriety, playing tennis or pronunciation.  The embodied cultural capital of the 
previous generations functions as a sort of advance (both a head-start and a credit) which, by providing 
from the outset the example of a culture incarnated in familiar models, enables the newcomer to start 
acquiring the basic elements of the legitimate culture, from the beginning, that is, in the most unconscious 
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It’s unlikely that Dwight Sutherland, Jr. has read Bourdieu.  Nonetheless, he is 
thinking along the same lines.  His poor (rich) friend finds himself in a bind.  He knows 
that to maximize his value on the fiscal-capital market he should vote for the tax-cutting 
Republican.  But his habitus, formed on a cosmopolitan suburban cultural-capital market 
that deeply values a woman’s right to choose, won’t let him do it.  Does this mean he 
acted against his self-interest?  Not at all.  It just means he gave up some of his economic 
well-being so that he could live with himself.  (I do the same, when I give money to a 
homeless person on the street.)  Had his habitus been formed on a different market, one 
that valued women’s rights less and, maybe, patriarchal religion more, he might have 
acted very differently.  (The concept of cultural capital provides a much more precise 
way of understanding what it means to act based on our “values.”) 
Run this same argument in reverse, and we can understand Frank’s Republican-
voting working-class Kansans.  They might know that to maximize their value on the 
fiscal-capital market they should vote for the (somewhat) wealth-distributing and job-
protecting Democrat.  But their habitus, formed on a homogenous exurban (more often 
than rural) cultural-capital market that deeply values evangelical Christianity and the 
rhetoric of self-reliance, won’t let them do it.  Does this mean they are acting against their 
self-interest?  Not at all.  It just means they give up some economic well-being so that 
they could live with themselves.  And no, they can’t just talk Republican in public and 
then vote Democratic in the anonymity of the voting booth.  That’s not how habitus 
                                                                                                                                            
and impalpable way…a social power over time which is tacitly recognized as the supreme excellence.”  
Bourdieu uses various terms at various times to get at this same idea:  “cultural capital,” “social capital,” 
“symbolic capital,” “educational capital,” etc.  The difference among these terms is slight, and I am not 
writing a work of Bourdieu scholarship, so I will follow convention and use “cultural capital” as a catch-all 
term for non-fiscal capital, stored in the bodily habitus. 
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works.  They couldn’t live with themselves if they voted Democratic—even if no one 
knew—any more than I could live with myself if I secretly drove a Hummer.  When your 
habitus is Republican, you don’t just talk Republican, or act Republican; you are 
Republican.  “After a lifetime of inculcation from all aspects of our everyday lives,” my 
colleagues Robin Brown and Carl Herndl explain, “our habitus is us.”45 
This is a pretty radical way of understanding people’s political behavior.  It 
undercuts a whole lot of traditional theories, such as rational choice, ideology, and the 
distinction between objectivity and subjectivity.  It suggests that our political beliefs are 
less like rational, well-thought-out opinions and more like our tastes in fashion and 
food—which, in turn, turn out to be more political than we usually assume, tied closely to 
money, labor, and class.  And it makes self-interest a much, much more complicated 
thing.  Not just for them but also for us—as I discovered, all too well, while writing this 
chapter.  I was living with my parents, marginally employed, and without good health 
insurance, all for the first time in my adult life.  I got a bad cough.  I knew I needed to get 
it checked out.  My parents said they’d pay for a doctor.  But I couldn’t make myself go.  
I had been independent and self-reliant for so long—or at least I’d felt that way—that I 
just couldn’t bring myself either to “waste” a lot of my own money or rely on my 
parents’ “charity.”  It just felt wrong.  It wasn’t who I was.  A week later I finally went to 
the doctor (or rather, the Minute Clinic), but I insisted on paying. 
I was, it turns out, exactly like the two men in the laundromat.  I had access to 
free health care.  And I turned it down—I acted against my economic (not to mention 
                                                
45 Robert L. Brown and Carl G. Herndl, “Beyond the Realm of Reason,” in Green Culture:  Environmental 
Rhetoric in Contemporary America, ed. Carl G. Herndl and Stuart C. Brown (Madison, WI:  University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1998), 213-235:  223. 
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medical) self-interest—because my habitus wouldn’t let me accept it.  You want to get 
up, walk over here, and tell me I’m a dupe?  Go ahead and try.  I don’t think I’m a dupe.  
And I’m not interested in talking with someone who thinks I’m  a dupe.  (How about 
you?) 
Right-wing rhetoricians seem to understand these complicated, contradictory 
feelings better than liberal or left-wing rhetoricians—and they are skilled at exploiting 
them.  Take a look at The Battle, the 2010 anti-Obama tract written by Arthur C. Brooks, 
president of the American Enterprise Institute.  Brooks’s arguments are pretty boilerplate.  
He lays out a sweeping right-wing economic and social agenda, and he explains it 
through the frame of culture war.  “We” are the seventy percent of Americans who, 
according to various dubiously-worded polls, believe in “free enterprise.”  “They,” who 
don’t, are what he calls “the 30 percent coalition.”  We good, they bad; join us, fight 
them.46 
What makes The Battle interesting, and worth a look, is how Brooks 
communicates this message.  He addresses his readers in a very particular way.  Here are 
all the moments in Chapter Two (entitled “A Bill of Goods:  The 30 Percent Coalition’s 
Story of the Financial Crisis”) when Brooks addresses the reader directly:   
“Imagine you bought a home in June 2006 for $400,000…” 
“Say you are an investment firm with $1 million in capital…”   
“How much has [the bailout] cost you, the taxpayer?…” 
“Congress members…are working to make sure that the repaid [TARP] money is 
directed to people more deserving than you…” 
                                                
46 Arthur C. Brooks, The Battle:  How the Fight Between Free Enterprise and Big Government Will Shape 
America’s Future (New York:  Basic Books, 2010).  Romney’s “47 percent” comments no doubt owe a lot 
to arguments like this. 
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“Anybody surprised by [the housing defaults] was either willfully ignorant (your 
congressman) or was unable to follow what was really going on (most of the 
general public)…”47 
   
Brooks is telling “you” a very specific, very compelling story about yourself:  you 
are wealthy and successful (you have a $400,000 home and a $1 million investment 
firm).  Your wealth and success is being threatened by the government, which is taking 
money from you and your business and giving it to someone else, whom the government 
values more than you.48  And then, after taking your money, the government couldn’t 
even solve the problem, because neither they nor the people that elected them are as 
intelligent or well-informed as you.  (Brooks takes care to distinguish “you” from “most 
of the general public.”) 
It is, of course, unlikely that you are one of those few Americans who (1) owns a 
$400,000+ house, (2) owns an investment firm with $1 million in capital, and (3) 
perfectly understood and predicted the housing crisis.  It’s much more likely that you, 
like I, live in a less valuable abode, have had less success in business, and/or were quite 
perplexed by the housing crisis.  So when you read Brooks, you’re faced with an identity 
crisis:  do you accept the higher fiscal- and cultural-capital identity that Brooks has 
ascribed to you?  Do you follow Brooks, who tells you that you are reasonable, smart, 
                                                
47 Brooks, The Battle, 30, 40, 42, 66, and 39, respectively.  Order altered, slightly, for dramatic effect.  Note 
how in the first two quotations, Brooks provides the reader with what Lakoff calls a “hedge”—“imagine 
you bought…,” “say you are…”—to ease readers’ transition from their objective class position to the 
higher position that Brooks is ascribing to them.  Without these hedges, readers might be much more likely 
to conclude, correctly, that Brooks’s economic proposals are beneficial only to people considerably 
wealthier than themselves. 
48 This is another probable instance of race-based code language:  “people more deserving,” in this context, 
often means non-white folks. 
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well-informed, and about to get rich?49  Or do you turn away and follow Thomas Frank, 
who tells you that you are ignorant, deluded, uninformed, and probably going to stay 
poor forever?50   
For most of us, it’s a no-brainer.  (Near-literally:  it doesn’t arise as a conscious 
choice.)  Frank, tragically, doesn’t get this.  He cannot understand why so many Kansans 
are “devoted to something like Fox News, a network that offers its viewers nothing but 
torture—endless images of a depraved world that, it tells them, they are powerless to 
correct.”51  He can’t see that for a person with a certain kind of habitus, Fox is far from 
torture.  It affirms who they are, which feels good.  Frank is likewise baffled by the 
appeal of Kansas pundit Blake Hurst, who says things like:  “Into the ghettoes, kids, 
we’re not wanted in polite society….I’m stupid, and if you’re reading this, you probably 
are too.”  He doesn’t seem to understand that Hurst isn’t calling himself or his readers 
stupid; he’s building solidarity among the oppressed.  Like Fox, he’s not insulting but 
                                                
49 Brooks insists, with a straight face, that taxes over the next two years (2011-2012) will increase for all 
Americans, not just for the richest 1%, as Obama and the liberals insist.  “The biggest reason for this,” he 
explains, “is that as incomes increase, millions of low- and middle-income Americans will be forced into 
higher tax brackets.”  In other words:  you’re gonna get rich soon, and when you do, you won’t want to be 
taxed either!—a mainstay of Republican-party rhetoric since 1896.  (Brooks, The Battle, 60.) 
50 Bourdieu might call Brooks’s rhetoric a “strategy of condescension”—which is a misleading term.  
Brooks is not being “condescending” in the normal sense of the word.  He’s not “talking down to” his 
audience, but exactly the opposite:  he addresses them in a way that seems to assume they have more 
cultural (and fiscal) capital than they actually do, not less.  But through doing so, Bourdieu suggests, 
Brooks—who has greater fiscal and cultural capital than his readers—manipulates them:  he appears to 
negate the hierarchy that exists between them (suggesting they’re as smart and rich and successful as he is), 
but he does so only symbolically:  readers know (at least tacitly) they don’t actually have the knowledge 
that Brooks does, and they are grateful to Brooks for treating them, they who thus acknowledge that they 
are lesser, as though they were greater.  Brooks can thus “combine the profits linked to the [in reality] 
undiminished hierarchy with those derived from the distinctly symbolic negation of the hierarchy—not the 
least of which is the strengthening of the hierarchy implied by the recognition accorded to the way of using 
the hierarchical relation.”  In other words, Brooks wins all around:  he’s still higher up than them, and they 
know it; only now they like him better and are less likely to oppose him.  See Bourdieu, Language and 
Symbolic Power, 68-71.  
51 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 237. 
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affirming.  You could accuse him of making a straw-man argument—except that people 
like Frank actually are calling him and his readers stupid.   
Frank and his fellow liberal pundits thus end up playing a crucial, unwitting role 
in propping up their conservative counterparts.  In the throes of the culture wars, it is all 
too easy for Hurst, and Brooks, and Fox and Limbaugh and Coulter and Beck and the rest 
of them, to step in, rescue the persecuted conservatives, and give them something that is 
in all of our self-interests:  a place where we belong, a place where we can feel good 
about ourselves.52  And it appears to be working quite well:  according to Pew 
Foundation reports released in the years after Frank’s book, Republicans are considerably 
happier than Democrats.  Across the board.  Even when you control for income, and 
every other variable researchers could think of.  It might be hard for Frank (or me) to 
understand, but something’s clearly working for these folks.53 
                                                
52 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 120.  I am indebted to Robin Brown and Carl Herndl for 
developing the concept of rhetoric as a place, and specifically as a place to belong:  “When we enter our 
favored…rhetoric as native speakers, we reenter a world of mirroring wholeness—one we worked hard for, 
and one we’re good at.  As we hear familiar words, familiar references, familiar names, we’re accepted.  In 
a way, rhetoric can be the enfolding, supporting place where we feel safe, complete, at home.”  In terms of 
object-relations theory (a branch of psychoanalysis), “rhetoric…can serve as a self object,” an object in 
relation to which we develop our habitus, our very self.  Like other self-objects, such as our parents and 
trusted friends and mentors, this rhetoric can become, in a very real way, a part of who we are.  To part 
with it, to change it, makes about as much sense as cutting off our arm.  See Brown and Herndl, “Beyond 
the Realm of Reason,” 228-230.   
53 The original data comes from a general Pew happiness survey called “Are We Happy Yet?” (Pew 
Research Center, February 13, 2006), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2006/02/13/are-we-happy-yet/ 
(April 17, 2014).  The follow-up report, on Republicans in particular, claims (with survey data) that they 
are happier because “they have more money, they have more friends, they are more religious, they are 
healthier, they are more likely to be married, they like their communities better, they like their jobs more, 
they are more satisfied with their family life, they like the weather better, they have fewer financial worries, 
they’re more likely to see themselves doing better in life than their parents did, they’re more likely to feel 
that individuals—rather than outside forces—control their own success or failure, [and] they have more of 
what they most value in life. (No, it’s not money.).”  That is, all in all, their habitus is far better attuned to 
the market it’s on.  See Paul Taylor, “Republicans:  Still Happy Campers” (Pew Research Center, 
November 11, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2008/10/23/republicans-still-happy-campers/ (April 
17, 2014). 
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So to conclude:  no one’s a dupe.  Or everyone’s a dupe.  If we define self-interest 
as a detached calculation of what will maximize our economic utility, pretty much no one 
acts according to self-interest.  If we define self-interest as acting based on an intuitive, 
bodily feeling of “what feels right,” based on a habitus whose dispositions include but 
are not limited to the acquisition of wealth, then pretty much everyone acts according to 
self-interest.  When we see people who appear not to be acting in their self-interest, 
Kansans for instance, it usually means we don’t sufficiently understand their self-interest.  
Most likely, we don’t entirely understand the value of the cultural capital they’re carrying 
around in their bodies, on the markets they participate in.   
Again we face the threat of Pollyanna.  If we’re all acting in our self-interest all 
the time—what’s the problem?  The problem is the Kansans are still voting themselves 
into poverty and economic destruction—and 99 percent of us keep tacitly supporting an 
economic system that doesn’t benefit us—and as long as our political life is framed 
almost entirely in terms of culture war, it’s unlikely either of these things will ever 
change.  Thus far, we haven’t solved the problem; we’ve just found a more useful way to 
pose it.  There’s nothing the matter with Kansas, or Kansans, or any other kind of them, 
no matter who they are.  They, like we, are just doing what feels right, based on their 
particular habitus and the cultural-capital market it’s been formed on.  But how did so 
many self-destructive behaviors (voting and otherwise) come to feel right?   
That’s the question.  The question that Frank calls “what’s the matter with 
Kansas?”—which will concern us for the rest of this book—is better (if less poetically) 
phrased:  “why are there so many powerful cultural-capital markets out there, which 
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place such high value on so many destructive and self-destructive dispositions, and 
therefore make developing a habitus that includes those dispositions in so many people’s 
self-interest?  Who maintains them, and how?  And how did they get built, in the first 
place?” 
 
Organized Ideas 
For built they have been.  Cultural-capital markets don’t occur naturally, any 
more than the New York Stock Exchange or the Minneapolis Farmers Market do.  If 
markets exist, it’s because some group of people built them.  (Or, socially-constructed 
them.)  None of the infrastructure, none of the rules and systems of exchange or value-
setting, occurred by accident; they are the way they are because a group of people, 
working together, made them that way.  But the group that constructs a market will not 
always be the same people that will use it—nor will they necessarily construct it with 
these users’ best interests in mind.54 
This situation explains, among other things, one of the stranger phenomena in 
contemporary politics:  the populist conservative craze for Ayn Rand.  Ayn Rand, the 
Soviet expat novelist and hyper-capitalist, is also a consummate elitist:  her flagship 
mega-novel Atlas Shrugged is the story of a godlike corporate elite that frees itself from 
                                                
54 We could thus translate Karl Marx’s famous declaration—“Men make their own history, but they do not 
make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
existing already”—as:  people make their own habitus, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it on a self-made market, but on a market existing already.  See Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Bonaparte (1852), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm 
(March 12, 2014). 
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the fetters of the masses of idiotic, conformist, helpless ordinary Americans.55  So it may 
seem odd that many within the Tea Party movement, which places great value on being 
ordinary Americans, have embraced her and her book.  I’m tempted to call them dupes, 
of course, but as always, there’s a better and more useful explanation.  They have simply 
developed a way of reading Rand that resolves this contradiction:  when they read Atlas 
Shrugged, they don’t see themselves as one of the ordinary Americans that Rand 
pillories.  No, they see themselves as member of John Galt’s elite, or maybe even as Galt 
himself.  Is this a correct reading?  I don’t think so.  But here’s the frustrating part:  it 
doesn’t matter what I think.  They have built a market, where a certain way of reading 
Atlas Shrugged is valued, and I say, or you say, will change that.   
Besides, it’s not entirely clear what it means for a reading to be “correct” or 
“incorrect” in the first place.  Atlas Shrugged, on its own, without any people to read it, 
doesn’t mean anything.  It’s just literally a bunch of paper and ink and glue sitting on a 
shelf.  It only starts to mean something when people pick it up, read it, and start making it 
mean something.  But these people, like all people, come with baggage.  The way they 
approach the text, and the meanings they make out of it, will have a lot to do with their 
habitus, and with the values of the market it was formed on.  In the slightly convoluted 
language of literary scholar Stanley Fish:  readers always approach a text with a 
“disposition” toward certain “interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional 
sense) but for writing texts.  In other words, these strategies exist prior to the act of 
reading and therefore determine the shape of what is read rather than, as is usually 
                                                
55 Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged (New York:  Signet, 1991).  For a (relatively) quick introduction to Rand’s 
writing style, philosophy, and general outlook, skip right to John Galt’s speech, on pages 915-979. 
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assumed, the other way around.”  Different readers, with a different habitus, will be 
disposed toward different interpretive strategies.  Fish gives a name to groups of readers 
who share the same interpretive strategy when approaching a given text:  he calls them 
“interpretive communities.”56 
Meaning-making, Fish argues strongly, is only possible within interpretive 
communities.  And if an interpretive community develops the right interpretive strategies, 
it can pretty much make a text mean…whatever it wants to.  There’s evidence of at least 
one interpretive community in which Stephen Colbert is a subtle and uniquely effective 
conservative commentator, whose pseudo-satire has duped all the liberals into following 
him.  (Note I don’t say that this community “believes” this about Stephen Colbert.  If 
you’re in that interpretive community, it’s the truth.)57  There is another interpretive 
community—started 1500 years ago by St. Augustine and still including over a billion 
people around the globe—in which every text and experience, when properly read, is a 
sign of God’s love for us and our responsibility to love each other.  (If you see something 
that’s not a sign of God’s love for us and our responsibility to love each other, you’re 
reading it wrong.) 
                                                
56 Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, 167-173—the last pages of his essay “Interpreting the Variorum,” 
subtitled “Interpretive Communities.”  Interpretive strategies are often learned, Fish points out, but they 
“can also be forgotten or supplanted, or complicated or dropped from favor (‘no one reads that way 
anymore’).”  Which, ironically, is exactly what’s happened to Fish’s own theory.  No one in academia talks 
much about interpretive communities anymore—though a few decades ago, they were vey much in style.  I 
am thus intentionally and heroically compromising my own cultural capital, on the academic market at 
least, by dusting off this highly unfashionable concept.  Not for hipster cred, but simply because no other 
adequate concept has been invented in the decades since—to articulate the connection between ideas and 
social groups—so it’s high time we revisit this one. 
57 See Heather L. LaMarre, et al, “The Irony of Satire: Political Ideology and the Motivation to See What 
You Want to See in The Colbert Report,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 14, no. 2 (April 
2009):  212-231. 
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Interpretive communities can be bigger than nations, or smaller than families—
think about the private language shared by siblings or avant-garde art movements, which 
everyone else “doesn’t get.”  Most of us belong to a number of different interpretive 
communities, and we’ve learned different interpretive strategies from each.  (When I was 
in eighth grade I encountered an interpretive community whose primary interpretive 
strategy was positively Augustinian in its singular, world-encompassing simplicity.  As I 
worked to learn this strategy, and thus to become a part of this community, I acquired a 
whole new understanding of objects whose shape was cylindrical or spherical, and of 
previously-innocent words such as “long,” “hard,” and “come.”) 
It would be pleasant to imagine a world full of diverse interpretive communities, 
each understanding texts in ways that make sense to them, fulfilling their own material 
and spiritual needs.  Alas, interpretive communities are in constant conflict with each 
other.  “The assumption in each community will be that the other is not correctly 
perceiving the ‘true text,’” Fish explains—an assumption that has caused…a fair bit of 
conflict.  It’s hard to convince members of a different interpretive community to change 
their interpretive strategies—not least because they will use their same alien interpretive 
strategies to interpret the very words you’re using to try to convince them.  That’s fine 
when we’re interpreting a poem.  It’s less fine when we’re interpreting Obama’s birth 
certificate, or the evidence that climate change and the Holocaust are real. 
And so, again, we’ve reached the same impasse from back in the laundromat.  
How do I convince them they’re wrong?  Go over and tell them?  Present a well-reasoned 
argument?  Yell at them until they listen?  Publish a well-documented article in a peer-
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reviewed journal?  Go on TV and denounce them as idiots, or appeal to them as well-
meaning but misguided friends?  None of it seems to work.   
The discipline of classical rhetoric doesn’t offer much help here, either.  What 
may be an “effective appeal” to members of one interpretive community may be entirely 
ineffective at convincing members of another—and vice-versa.58  I could give the 
greatest speech in the world, but if each interpretive community just “perceives the text 
(or texts) its interpretive strategies demand and call into being,” then it doesn’t matter 
what I say; each interpretive community will hear what its interpretive strategies let it 
hear.  There’s still always a chance of breaking through:  most people’s habitus includes a 
tangled mess of overlapping and often contradictory interpretive strategies, from all the 
different interpretive communities they’ve been part of, so people’s differences are not 
absolute.  And a good speaker will know something about the interpretive communities 
s/he’s speaking to, and what kind of language will command the most value on their 
markets.  Still, if you make me watch a speech by Rand Paul or Sarah Palin, I don’t think 
I’ll be convinced—no matter how good a speech it is.   
No, to understand what really constitutes an effective appeal, we can’t just focus 
on the speech itself.  We need to look at what happened long before the audience ever got 
into the room, or in front of the screens.  We need to look at the interpretive communities 
themselves—how they function, what kind of interpretive strategies they use, and 
especially how they got built.  It’s precisely here, on this most crucial point, that Fish’s 
                                                
58 Fish seems to conflate two definitions of interpretive communities:  (1) self-conscious, variously 
cohesive groups of people who share and teach interpretive strategies, and also (2) the set of all people in 
the world, who may or may not have any idea of the others’ existence, who happen to share an interpretive 
strategy.  For my purposes here, working toward the central concept of “organized ideas,” I privilege the 
first definition. 
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account gets thin.  He observes that on one hand there’s “a stability in the makeup of 
interpretive communities,” and at the same time “interpretive communities grow larger 
and decline, and individuals move from on to another,” but that’s about it.59  He doesn’t 
say much about how and why interpretive communities grow and shrink, or get created or 
destroyed, or gain or lose members.  He seems to assume it’s a natural process, like the 
weather—and according to many, like the economy. 
It’s not true.  Interpretive communities, including that very large interpretive 
community called “the economy,” exist because they have been organized.  Behind every 
interpretive community is some collection of people that’s poured time, money, and labor 
into making that community exist in the ways that it does—or, in some important cases, 
into making that community cease to exist.  We know this from our everyday lives.  
Think about the time, money, and labor we put into building and maintaining our smallest 
interpretive communities:  our relationships with our closest friends, family, colleagues, 
and significant others, which literally give meaning to our lives.  Now think about the 
time, money, and labor that goes into the maintenance and growth of our larger 
interpretive communities:  social groups, workplaces, places of worship.  Now just think 
about how much more time, money, and labor must go into maintaining a university, a 
professional network, a political party, a nation.  None of it happens by accident. 
                                                
59 Astute cultural theorists might hear echoes of Italian Marxist organizer Antonio Gramsci here, especially 
his notion of a “leaky” hegemony.  Hegemony and interpretive communities have a lot to do with each 
other, even though Fish’s and Gramsci’s own interpretive communities don’t overlap much.  One could 
even argue that hegemonic language itself is a large, well-policed interpretive community.  From this 
perspective, what I’m trying to do is bring Gramsci’s sense of politics and organizing into Fish’s concept of 
community and interpretation.  For more on Gramsci and his relationship to organizing, see Chapter Four. 
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So who built the ever-growing interpretive community of lower-income people 
who read Atlas Shrugged and understand themselves to be John Galt, not part of Rand’s 
idiot masses?  Tough to say.  But we know it’s been around for a long time:  it’s 
essentially the same interpretive community that embraced Horatio Alger; the same 
interpretive community that buys lottery tickets year after year and expects one day to 
win; the same interpretive community that, against all odds, dares to open a business, or 
emigrate across the world, or revolt against the British Empire.  It’s an interpretive 
community that’s distinctly, frustratingly, beautifully American. 
Which isn’t to say nothing has changed.  Consider Frank’s epigram to What’s the 
Matter with Kansas?: 
Oh, Kansas fools!  Poor Kansas fools! 
The banker makes of you a tool. 
  —Populist song, 189260 
 
There are at least two things we can learn from this epigram.  First:  this same 
interpretive community, which makes people recklessly entrepreneurial and aspirational 
in the face of their actual economic interests, was around back then, too.  Even back in 
the heyday of Midwestern Populism, it seems, the banker was still making a tool of the 
“Kansas fools.”  But second:  back then, this interpretive community wasn’t the only 
game in town.  There was at least one other important interpretive community:  the one 
that led people, including working-class Kansans themselves, to write catchy, popular 
songs that analyzed their own oppression.  This other interpretive community let Kansans 
understand their economic desperation not as something natural, or as a result of personal 
                                                
60 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, v.  For full music and lyrics, see “Kansas Fool,” Digital 
Tradition Mirror (website), http://sniff.numachi.com/pages/tiKSFOOL;ttKSFOOL.html (March 13, 2014). 
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failure, but as a result of the greed of a corporate class that they can, and must, fight 
together.   
This explains why back in the 1890s, when Kansas was “a reliable hotbed of 
leftist reform,” some farmers and workers could proudly understand themselves as part of 
the masses of ordinary Americans—not as John Galt—and direct their righteous anger 
against the real elite:  the big banks and the corporations that were fleecing them.61  This 
versus today, when “Kansas has got the hell-raising farmers and the class-conscious 
workers, all right…but when they come sweeping through the state legislature, clearing 
out the old guard, what they are demanding is more power for Wall Street, more 
privatization, and the end of Progressive Era reforms like the estate tax.”62  “By all 
rights,” Frank insists, “the people in Wichita and Shawnee and Garden City should today 
be flocking to the party of Roosevelt, not deserting it.”  But then he adds, with atypical 
insight:  “Culturally speaking, however, that option is simply not available to them 
anymore.”63 
What’s the matter with Kansas?  That’s the matter with Kansas.  And with a great 
deal of America, and increasingly of the rest of the Western (and eventually non-
Western) world.  It’s not that Kansas has changed all that much.  The basic habitus, with 
its characteristic disposition toward loud, aggressive activism against the elite, is the 
same as it was at the height of Populist power.  What’s changed, with tragic results, is the 
choice of available interpretive strategies through which Kansans can express this 
disposition.  Frank wonders aloud, near the beginning of his book, why working-class 
                                                
61 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 9. 
62 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 71, 80. 
63 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 245. 
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voters have abandoned the Democrats:  “the party of workers, of the poor, of the weak 
and the victimized.”  But near the end, he inadvertently answers his own question:  
“What politician in this success-worshipping country really wants to be the voice of poor 
people?”64  Or by the same logic:  what poor or working-class person, in a culture where 
success-worshipping is the only interpretive strategy left standing, wants to understand 
him- or herself as part of “the poor, the weak, and the victimized”? 
 “Not too long ago,” Frank asserts, “Kansas would have responded to the current 
situation by making the bastards pay.”65  And they still do.  All that’s changed is the 
available selection of bastards.  What Frank observes about Kansas conservatives is also 
true for most Americans:  “the operations of business are simply not a legitimate subject 
of social criticism…business is natural; it is normal; it is beyond politics.”66  This is the 
position not only of Sam Brownback but also of NPR’s Marketplace, of all but the most 
unfashionably populist of TV and Internet pundits, and of nearly every academic 
discipline:  from the conservatives of the economics department, who will present the 
radically free market as a wonderful and natural fact, to the liberals of the humanities, 
who will make a perfunctory nod toward the inevitable crushing forces of “capital” or 
“neoliberalism” before turning back to the more workable issues of language and 
representation.  No matter how much the workings of business and finance are hurting us, 
if every interpretive community and interpretive strategy we have makes us understand 
“the economy” as out of our control, then we’d be idiots to waste our time trying to fight 
it.  We might as well launch a political campaign against the weather.  Kansans, 
                                                
64 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 1, 243. 
65 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 67. 
66 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 128.  
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rationally enough, choose to devote their undying populist energy to problems they might 
be able to solve, such as abortion and evolution. 
It is here that we find our glimmer of hope—the hope that will propel us through 
the next three chapters.  “The economy” is not, in fact, an unstoppable force of nature.  
And people haven’t always thought about it that way.  “The economy” is an idea, hatched 
in the mind of a human.  If it appears natural and inevitable, that just demonstrates how 
effective the rhetoric has been.  And by rhetoric, I’m not talking about speechifying—
though that plays its part.  I’m talking about organizing:  the long, hard labor of bringing 
interpretive communities into existence.  About the work of constructing, maintaining, 
and growing interpretive communities that enable certain understandings of politics and 
economics, of ourselves and the people around us, and of what is possible and impossible 
to do.  And, just as importantly, about the work of weakening, dismantling, and 
destroying other interpretive communities, which challenge those  understandings. 
How do you organize an interpretive community?  The same way you organize 
any community:  by building power.  This is the basic wisdom of broad-based 
community organizing, one of the most important and least-understood traditions in 
American political life.  It has its roots in the Popular Front of the 1930s, the black 
freedom movement, and the work of Saul Alinsky.  It continues to make lasting, 
institutional change in cities and towns across the United States today.  Its adherents 
work in the White House, and the Tea Party, and many, many places in between.67  
                                                
67 Yes, the Tea Party.  New York Times reporter Kate Zernike attended a Tax Day protest in 2010 and heard 
a speech by young Tea Party leader Brendan Steinhauser, who “could quote from the classics of Austrian 
economic theory but included among his heroes Bayard Rustin, the gay black civil rights leader.”  Zernike 
observed Steinhauser as he convinced a gathering of hundreds of Tea Party insiders, initially skeptical, that 
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Power, observes longtime New York organizer Michael Gecan, is the universal truth of 
politics.  For a very simple reason. With power, you can make things happen.  Without it, 
you can’t:   
Without power, you can only be a supplicant, a serf, a victim, or a wishful thinker 
who soon begins to whine.  Power in the new millennium is the same as power 
when Thucydides was writing about the Melians and the Athenians.  It’s still the 
ability to act.  And it still comes in two basic forms—organized people and 
organized money….How do you think new and better schools will be built?  
Because they are desperately needed?  Because it’s a good idea?  Because the 
honchos at the Board of Education wake up in the morning and decide to do the 
right thing?  Because the city is appalled by the chronic overcrowding?  No, new 
and better schools will be built when you have the power to force them to build 
them….You’re going to have to have enough organized people and enough 
organized money, enough discipline and enough luck, to make it happen.  That’s 
the way it works in the world as it is.68   
 
This is the standard formula.  When you get trained as an organizer—as I have—
you get this formula drilled into you.  And for good reason:  it cuts through a whole lot of 
bullshit.69  Do-gooder liberals, utopian idealists, and overthinking academic types need 
not apply.  The goal is to build power.  And power equals organized people plus 
organized money.  “Period.”70  Got a problem with that?  Maybe you find this ideological 
construct to be problematic?  Get over it, or get out of the way.  The work we’re doing is 
too important.   
                                                                                                                                            
“true community organizers are what this movement is all made of.  We don’t like that term because now 
we have a Community Organizer-in-Chief who got his lessons from Saul Alinsky.  I say, let’s read Saul 
Alinsky, let’s read [his most famous book] Rules for Radicals, and let’s use it against them!”  See Kate 
Zernike, Boiling Mad:  Inside Tea Party America (New York:  Times Books, 2010), 2-3. 
68 Michael Gecan, Going Public:  An Organizer’s Guide to Citizen Action (New York:  Anchor Books, 
2002), 36-37. 
69 A defining feature of organizer-speak is the liberal use of profanity.  I would be remiss not to follow suit. 
70 To quote one of my own trainers.  For a much deeper, critical discussion of these concepts and the 
tradition of broad-based community organizing, see Chapter Four. 
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But in recent years, some organizers have questioned this formula—in a small, yet 
crucial way.  At a training I attended in 2011 at TakeAction Minnesota, organizing 
director Pamela Twiss told us there was an “esoteric debate” going on within the field of 
organizing, about whether we need a third term in the power equation, next to “organized 
people” and “organized money.”  Namely:  “organized ideas.”   
Given the title of this book, you can guess where I stand.  The concept of 
“organized ideas” is critically important, both for understanding how we’ve gotten where 
we are (for good and ill), and for understanding where we can go from here.  Three 
decades ago it was possible to debate a full-employment bill on the floor of Congress.  
Now even the most “liberal” of pundits would laugh it out of the room.  If we don’t 
organize ideas, other people will.   
At the same time, I understand why some organizers are against it.  Having spent 
many years in the network of institutions I will call academia and para-academia, I share 
their concern that “organized ideas” could be a back door through for all kinds of wishy-
washy idealism.  Above all, for that most dangerous of all academic and para-academic 
myths, which has spelt doom for so many well-intentioned efforts toward social change:  
that the truth, by itself, will set us free.  “Organized ideas” is a necessary but risky 
concept.  For it to function effectively in building power, it needs to be defined and 
understood as precisely as possible.   
That is one goal of this book:  to provide my colleagues in broad-based 
community organizing with a workable definition of organized ideas and an 
understanding of how organized ideas are, have been, and can be used to build power.  
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Another goal, the broadest, is to defeat the culture wars—or at least, to lay down a 
conceptual plan for their defeat.  I have a few other intermediate goals, too.  One is to tear 
down the wall between the interpretive communities of broad-based community 
organizing on one side and academia and para-academia on the other:  we have too much 
to learn from each other to stay apart.  Another is to probe the notion of self-interest, the 
other key concept in broad-based community organizing (besides power), more deeply:  I 
am convinced that there are at least a few key places where all of our self-interests may 
actually align, and I wonder about the possibilities for new, trans-partisan and trans-
cultural organizing based on this overlooked alignment.  And a final goal—the one I 
usually tell people when they make the mistake of asking “what’s your book about?”—is 
to finally get to the bottom of the matter with Kansas:  why, when so much of our 
government and economy serves only the most well-off, do the rest of us willingly go 
along with it? 
 
A few more words about this last question will explain where I’ll be going in 
Chapter Two.  What is Frank’s final answer?  Why has the structure of interpretive 
communities in Kansas shifted so drastically since the 1890s—or even since the 1980s—
to the point where the only option available to legitimately-disgruntled Kansans is self-
destructive culture-war conservatism?  Frank ends up blaming it mostly on the 
Democrats:   
While the Wichita Cons[ervatives] worked hard to build their movement, they 
would not have succeeded so extravagantly had it not been for the simultaneous 
suicide of the rival movement, the one that traditionally spoke for working-class 
people.  I am referring, of course, to the Clinton administration’s famous policy of 
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“triangulation,” its grand effort to minimize the differences between Democrats 
and Republicans on economic issues….While the Cons were busily polarizing the 
electorate, the Dems were meekly seeking the center.  In Wichita Republicanism 
appeared dynamic and confident; the Democrats looked dispirited, weak, 
spent….If basic economic issues are removed from the table, [local conservative 
leader Mark] Gietzen has written, only the social issues remain to distinguish the 
parties.71 
 
My liberal heart broke when I read further down the page and met the union 
worker at Boeing who, like all his friends, was a lifelong Democrat but couldn’t bring 
himself to pull the lever after Clinton endorsed NAFTA.  But here, as usual, Frank raises 
a tantalizingly important question and then leaves it agonizingly unexplored.  In this case, 
he skips over the question of agency—the academic word for the ability to make things 
happen.  (Power, the product of organized people and money and ideas, is one specific 
type of agency.)  Who had the agency to change the game in Wichita?  The way Frank 
tells it, it was the Democrats.  They had labor in their pocket.  They were golden.  Then 
they made a strategic miscalculation:  out of a desire to appeal to socially-liberal rich 
people, they abandoned the “Archie Bunker types” and gave up the pro-labor, anti-
corporate rhetoric that compelled them.  And it brought the whole house down.   
The truth is a little more complicated.  Clinton may have made some bad moves, 
but by the time he came into office, organized labor had been decimated for nearly 
twenty years—by structural shifts in the economy, and also by an organized campaign 
from the right that took advantage of those shifts.  The “Archie Bunker types” had been 
wooed away from the Democratic party ever since Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act—
by another related, organized campaign from the right.  Even within the Democratic 
                                                
71 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 175-176. 
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party, the move to the center was not a conscious, unified decision but the result of a 
prolonged conflict among organized party factions (i.e., interpretive communities).  And 
as Frank himself points out, the winner of this conflict, Clinton’s centrist Democratic 
Leadership Council, was itself partially funded by the right—the Koch brothers and the 
Cato Institute, among others.72   
I’m not saying the radical rightward realignment of interpretive communities in 
Kansas was the result of a conspiracy of a few super-rich men on the far right.  But I’m 
also not not saying that.  It’s easy to overestimate the role of intentional organizing (i.e. 
conspiracy theories) in these kinds of major cultural shifts.  But it’s also easy, and much 
more common, to underestimate it.  The Koch brothers, among the most adept and 
effective organizers of ideas in current U.S. politics, definitely had some agency in the 
process.  As did other funders and leaders of the DLC, and of the Democratic Party as a 
whole.  As did the organizers in politics, business, and academia, who crippled the labor 
movement and drove a culture-war wedge between workers of different races, religions, 
and regions.  And of course, as did the conservative organizers on the ground in Wichita.   
The agency is spread around.  It’s messy and complicated.  But it’s also traceable.  
This “middle space” can feel uncomfortable.  Most of us are accustomed to 
understanding agency as either very concentrated—an event is the result of one powerful 
person or group of elites that flips the switch, and “the masses” follow—or hopelessly 
diffuse—an event is the result of “society,” “market forces,” or some other intangible, 
inhuman entity.  Neither one explains Wichita, or most actual political conflicts—which 
tend to be the result of clashing interpretive communities, of organized people, money, 
                                                
72 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 82. 
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and ideas being pitted against each other in ways that are complicated but legible, if we 
take the time to understand them.   
Our political future is not predetermined, either by the market or The Man.  It was 
commonplace in Kansas, Frank shows, to find underfunded radical conservatives who 
defeated more moderate Republicans with lots more money and ads and airtime.  And it 
cuts the other way, too.  Even at the dawn of the twenty-first century, after the labor 
movement had been decimated for decades, it still had immense agency: 
Take your average white male voter:  in the 2000 election they chose George W. 
Bush by a considerable margin  Find white males who were union members, 
however, and they voted for Al Gore by a similar margin.  The same difference is 
repeated whatever the demographic category:  women, gun owners, retirees, and 
so on—when they are union members, their politics shift to the left.  This is true 
even when the union members in question had little contact with union leaders.  
Just being in a union evidently changes the way a person looks at politics, 
inoculates them against the derangement of the backlash.  Here [culture-war] 
values matter almost least of all, while the economy, health care, and education 
are of paramount concern.73 
 
No wonder the Right goes after organized labor so hard.  Unions haven’t just 
given workers weekends and the forty-hour workweeks and the eight-hour workdays; 
they’ve also created a powerful interpretive community.  Powerful not just in how they 
can organize people and money—which they do, in large amounts—but also in how they 
can organize ideas.  Busting a union means a lot more than depriving some workers of a 
chance to bargain for better wages and shorter hours, or depriving a Democratic 
candidate of some campaign cash and turnout.  It means depriving those workers of the 
interpretive strategies that give them agency.  To bust a union is to bust an interpretive 
community.  To bust a world where we can participate, as actors and agents, and to 
                                                
73 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 246. 
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replace it with a world where we are just spectators, without much power to improve, 
change, or transform it. 
No one likes feeling powerless.  In fact, I will argue that agency, the ability to 
work with the people around us to make the world we live in, might be a universal human 
need.  We’re united both in our need for agency and, for the most part, in our lack of it.  
That goes for the three of us in the laundromat, for sure.  We might have had different 
positions on health care reform, but we were all frustrated by our lack of agency.  The 
two other men felt powerless against a government and corporate elite that “told them 
what to think” and was taking away their freedom.  I felt powerless against an 
incomprehensible working-class culture that duped people out of following their own 
interests.  We all got some of our facts wrong.  But our shared feelings of powerlessness, 
and of anger at that powerlessness, were all too real.  
We shared more than these feelings, though.  We also shared a basic self-interest:  
a desire to take part in making our world, rather than letting someone else do it for us.  In 
a different reality, we could have entered into a beautiful Freire-inspired dialogue, 
challenging and learning from each other as we built solidarity born out of the shared 
experience of the same oppression.  But we couldn’t do that.  We couldn’t even talk to 
each other.  Not because we disagreed on an issue—we all can talk with lots of people we 
disagree with—but because we’d been organized into interpretive communities that made 
us hostile aliens to each other:  not just in how we voted, but right down to how we 
talked, walked, sat, ate, and gestured.  The culture-war frame had organized our ideas for 
us—the way we thought about Obama, about the health care bill, about each other, and 
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about ourselves—before we even knew what was happening.  It had built a wall between 
us that seemed impregnable.  And none of us felt we had the agency to do anything about 
it. 
That’s the question.  What can we do about it?  And how?   
And who, exactly, is we? 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Cyberpunk Neoliberalism 
 
This got me thinking: how could you translate the principles of a union into 
current technology? That's not to say unions are inherently antiquated or 
anything - but if you were to re-invent unions for the digital age, would it be 
possible to somehow make them more effective? The internet is the single biggest 
change to our ability to act collectively in human history, you'd *think* something 
could be done with that.  [11:26 A.M.]   
 
I’m afraid I don’t really know jack about unions.  [3:56 P.M.] 
—A computer programmer-friend, Facebook comments, 9/24/13  
 
 
The conclusion was also reached that under the influence of education we could 
leave the result to the people. 
 —Mark Hanna, Republican Party strategist, 11/10/18961 
 
 
A Tale of a Fail 
In the fall of 2010, I was co-teaching an introductory cultural studies course at the 
University of Minnesota.  We had given our two hundred students a brilliant assignment, 
or so we thought:  to change another student’s mind.  Specifically, about labor politics.  
We started by administering a ten-question, Cosmo-style quiz (e.g., “workers should 
always have the right to organize”:  0 points if you agree, 1 point if you disagree), and 
asking them to arrange themselves on a spectrum, from 0 to 10 points—literally, from left 
to right.  We got the predictable, more-or-even spread, and we asked them to find a 
partner roughly 5 points away from themselves, to get a maximum difference in each 
pair; then we gave these pairs some time to talk and get to know each other and write 
about each other’s background, especially about their personal relationship to issues of 
labor and work.  We then watched Harlan County, USA, Barbara Kopple’s Oscar-
                                                
1 See William T. Horner, Ohio’s Kingmaker:  Mark Hanna, Man and Myth (Athens, OH:  Ohio University 
Press, 2010), 211. 
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winning documentary about the 1972 miners’ strike in Harlan County, Kentucky, which 
depicts the extreme plight of mine workers and their struggle against the bosses in brutal, 
graphic, unapologetically pro-labor terms.  Finally, the main part of the assignment:  (1) 
write something to your partner, to try to get her/him to see the film as you do, and then 
(2) write a response to whatever your partner sent you. 
We expected a culture war.   
What we got was near-perfect consensus.   
Most students, regardless of where they’d stood on the spectrum, expressed 
feelings very similar to these five samples (all direct quotes): 
The workers are complaining about how bad their job is, yet they fight to have 
their jobs back with a little more money/benefits. I would rather be looking for 
another job than be protesting everyday to get my ‘shitty’ job back…the strike 
was not handled in the right way, and could have been hastened by harder work or 
by changing their lifestyle. 
 
The policeman [whom the miners talked with] was making much more, but not 
doing as much work. It is possible that the mine workers could be in that 
situation, if they would have searched out those other jobs. 
 
The thing that I don’t understand about these people is why they don’t go try and 
get a different job, and why they are wasting their time (9 months, they said in the 
movie I believe) going on strike when they could just go and find different jobs. 
 
As long as there are humans working in the mines, accidents are inevitable. New 
technology, such as respirators, improved mining tools, and much safer mine 
tunnels improved conditions exponentially. These new technologies, however, 
were NOT implemented developed [sic] by the unions. They are the product of 
modern science and engineering. Really, the only way to improve conditions is to 
discover new technologies to improve miner conditions even further, until all the 
mines are completely automated (which will probably occur in the not so distant 
future).  
 
I believe that the government raising the minimum wage would be more 
beneficial than negotiating higher wages through a union because that helps all 
American workers, not just those in a union. 
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Deep breath.  Okay, so it’s not that most students were pro-corporate and anti-
worker, at least not exactly.  Many of them, elsewhere in their writing, claimed to be very 
sympathetic with the workers’ cause—and from the spectrum exercise, it was clear that a 
good number were pro-union in their conscious political beliefs.  No, it’s something more 
diffuse, something harder to get at.  A generalized sense of detachment.  A removed, 
defeatist feeling that while unions might be a nice idea, they don’t really work.  An 
abstract, cold assurance that action based on solidarity and confrontation doesn’t really 
make sense, and that technology is going to make it all irrelevant anyway.  And an 
unquestioning conviction that if you want a better life, there’s no point in working 
together with the people around you to fight your oppressors and make a better world.  
No, you just need to work harder, or to better yourself as an individual, or—the most 
common response of all—to  just leave. 
As I read these responses, I got outraged, in all the predictable ways.  My students 
had missed the fact that these workers can’t just leave.  They can’t quit and go find a 
better job—there were no better jobs.  They were broke and in the middle of a recession 
and couldn’t even afford to move if they wanted to.  (And unlike some people I could 
mention, I thought in my less generous moments, they couldn’t just go ask mom and dad 
for some money to go to college, and do some unpaid internships while they networked 
their way into an entry-level corporate job.)  Besides, did my students really expect these 
people to leave behind their whole livelihoods, and their whole lives?  Leave everyone 
and everything that made them who they are, the community they’d spent their whole 
lives building, the fight they’ve spent their whole lives working to win?  Leave their 
coworkers and neighbors and friends there to suffer, as if they never mattered at all?  And 
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then, of course, there was my students’ adorable faith in our high-minded government to 
raise the minimum wage out of the goodness of their hearts….   
More than outraged, I was disgusted.  Disgusted at my students’ insensitivity, at 
their unchecked privilege, and above all, at their lack of any sense of solidarity.  I didn’t 
know what to do with all these feelings, so I did what felt natural.  I complained.  I talked 
about it with my grad-student colleagues, who were all too happy to affirm my feelings 
and contribute their own stories about their students’ illiteracy and ideological 
backwardness.  My students, I exclaimed any chance I got, had become so obsessed with 
individualism, so addicted to the romance of mobility (upward class mobility and 
mobility across space) that they no longer saw themselves as in any way connected to the 
people around them.   
It took almost two years for the other shoe to drop.  It happened in the spring of 
2012, when the long campaign to organize the graduate assistants at the University of 
Minnesota into a union ended disastrously.  I had worked on this campaign.  I knew all 
the main organizers; many were friends.  I was deeply invested in the issues.  I’d worked 
at the University for a half-decade.  I knew what low wages, exorbitant student fees, and 
an indifferent administration felt like.  This mattered to me.  And when we lost the vote, 
by an embarrassingly wide margin, I was crushed.  I felt like I’d been personally slapped 
in the face and told my work, what I’d been doing for the past five years, wasn’t worth 
anything.   
So what did I do?  Did I regroup, stay connected with my fellow workers, and 
keep working to build solidarity?  Nope.  I did the same thing I did after reading my 
students’ writing on Harlan County:  I complained.  (The disposition to complain clearly 
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enjoys a comfortable place in my habitus.)  I didn’t complain strategically, as good 
organizers do together when they evaluate a failed action in order to learn from it.  I 
complained randomly.  To anyone who would listen.  I complained about how bad the 
union was, how poorly-run the campaign was, how apathetic and misguided my fellow 
grad workers were.   
And then, not long afterward, I just left.  This was no act of false-consciousness; I 
knew what I was doing, the whole time.  I knew I was betraying my principles.  I knew I 
should stay and keep up the fight, in solidarity with my comrades.  But…I just couldn’t 
make myself do it.  It just felt so wrong.  Intolerable, even.  I imagined what it would feel 
like to stay and fight, and I couldn’t bear it.  It felt like being trapped, sucked in, barred 
from living the life I wanted to live and doing the things I wanted to do, kept from 
fulfilling my potential in the world.  And I didn’t just have negative feelings about 
staying.  I had positive feelings about leaving.  It felt good.  It felt right.  Most of all, it 
felt like the only viable option—to paraphrase Margaret Thatcher, like there was no real 
alternative.   
So I did it.  Greetings from West Hartford, Connecticut, where I am writing this 
book while living rent-free with my wealthy (enough) parents, employed precariously as 
a contracted research consultant, in solidarity with no one—and, honestly, much happier 
for it.  Empowered, even.  If my students had proven themselves insensitive, blindly 
privileged, and unable to feel any deep sense of solidarity with their fellow suffering 
workers, then so had I. 
Epic fail. 
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Neoliberalism:  The Conspiracy to Turn Us Into Consumers 
So what to do?   
First, of course, I can take a moment to flagellate myself. 
Okay, I’m done. 
Guess that feels a little better.2 
Now for the important question.  How did I—how did we—get here?  To the 
point where this kind of utterly antisocial behavior feels normal, natural, even good—
and, most importantly, like the only viable possibility?   
I argued in Chapter One that working-class conservatives are neither dumb nor 
dupes.  They’re just people, doing what feels right to them in the situations they’re in.  If 
they’re acting in ways that seem contradictory or self-destructive, we can understand this 
behavior by understanding how certain things have come to feel right to them:  by 
understanding the market on which their habitus has been formed, and the interpretive 
communities they’ve been organized into.  In this chapter, I aim to extend this same 
generosity to myself, my students, and all the rest of us who are guilty of this same kind 
                                                
2 I don’t mean this (entirely) as a joke.  Given how important habitus is to this discussion, it’s important to 
be in a place where we feel okay—okay enough, at least, to proceed.  If self-flagellation is a way to get 
there, then amen to that.  Too often, though, self-flagellation can be paralyzing; it can perpetually keep us 
in a place where we don’t feel okay enough to proceed, and even make us feel that given all the privilege 
and other sins we’re flagellating ourselves for, it would be more moral and righteous to do nothing.  This 
pervasive feeling, which I’ll discuss at greater length in Chapter Three, is one of the major limits on 
political agency in the twenty-first century West.  The response to this feeling that I am arguing for, and 
attempting myself to enact, was laid out by pragmatist philosopher John Dewey:  “For [Dewey] what 
makes us moral beings is that, for each of us, there are some acts we believe we ought to die rather than 
commit.  Which acts these are will differ from epoch to epoch, and from person to person, but to be a moral 
agent is to be unable to imagine living with oneself after committing these acts.  But now suppose that one 
has in fact done one of the things one could not have imagined doing, and finds that one is still alive.  At 
that point, one’s choices are suicide, a life of bottomless self-disgust, and an attempt to live so as never to 
do such a thing again.  Dewey recommends the third choice.  He thinks you should remain an agent, rather 
than either committing suicide or becoming a horrified spectator of your own past.  He regards self-loathing 
as a luxury which agents—either individuals or nations—cannot afford.”  See Richard Rorty, Achieving 
Our Country:  Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 
1998), 33. 
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of awful behavior.  What, I will ask, is the nature of this sick, twisted interpretive 
community that my students and I all seem to have been organized into together?  Where 
did it come from?  Who organized it?  How did it get to be so big, and so powerful, and 
so seemingly-inevitable? 
My opening fail provides some initial answers.  It’s an interpretive community 
that seems to skew young, white, and educated, though there are exceptions to all of 
these.  It transcends all kinds of traditional barriers of culture, ideology, and identity—my 
students and I are all over the map in terms of the political spectrum and the culture wars, 
and yet we all ended up feeling the same way about our work-lives and our relationship 
to our fellow workers.  And it’s defined by some basic interpretive strategies, which we, 
as members of that interpretive community, use to understand ourselves and our world.  
We are, basically, isolated individuals.  We pursue our own individual paths, toward 
well-being and away from suffering.  We connect ourselves with other people only 
provisionally—sometimes right down to our families and closest friends and colleagues.  
We feel we have the right and the privilege and maybe even the responsibility to sever 
these connections, when they no longer serve our needs.  We are, basically, mobile.  We 
are no more connected to a place, even the place we’re from, than we are to other people.  
We have the right and the privilege to move where we want to, when we want to.  We 
are, basically, risk-averse.  We do what we can, whenever we can, to maximize our own 
individual well-being and minimize our own individual suffering.  We may wish to 
increase the pleasure or reduce the suffering of others—and we sometimes work very 
hard to do so—but we understand this work as altruism, as charity toward others.  We do 
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not understand their suffering, or their pleasure, as fundamentally bound up with our 
own.  
Human nature?  Not in any simple sense.  Humans exist, everywhere we’ve ever 
been and for as far back as we’ve been able to trace, in groups—families, tribes, 
religions, nations.3  This impulse toward hyper-individualism and mobility is much, much 
newer.  We aren’t built for it, evolutionarily, and we often don’t like it.  But we believe, 
feel, know deep down in our guts—i.e., have been convinced—that that this is just the 
way the world works.  That, again in Thatcher’s words, “there is no alternative.”  (Or, as 
popularly abbreviated, “TINA.”  Hence my references, below, to the “TINA interpretive 
community.”) 
Thatcher didn’t coin this phrase.  Wikipedia traces it back to the great nineteenth-
century social Darwinist Herbert Spencer, who did a great deal to legitimize and 
popularize this kind of individualism.4  But what distinguishes Thatcher from earlier 
radical individualists such as Spencer is that she did not simply believe TINA was true; 
she actively built and used her power to make it true.  Like her compatriot across the 
pond, Ronald Reagan, Thatcher employed the organized people and money of the nation 
she governed to promote and build the TINA interpretive community:  through speeches 
and propaganda, through new laws and new law enforcement, and through direct action 
to bust any and all other interpretive communities that stood in its way, from trade unions 
                                                
3 For a recent, readable, and well-cited (if also controversial) introduction to the huge amounts of 
anthropological research that support this claim, see Christopher Ryan and Cacilda Jetha, Sex at Dawn:  
The Prehistoric Origins of Human Sexuality (New York:  Harper, 2010). 
4 “There Is No Alternative,” Wikipedia,  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_is_no_alternative (October 23, 
2013). 
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to entire national governments.  (This is a process Pierre Bourdieu called the “unification 
of the market.”)5   
In other words:  the triumph of TINA was no accident.  It was not simply the 
winner on some impartial “cultural field” or “marketplace of ideas,” as its apologists and 
even many of its detractors will claim.  It was, rather, the result of a massive organizing 
effort, which propelled people like Thatcher and Reagan to power.  It started in the 
1930s, got institutionalized in the 1940s, took control of a major academic discipline in 
                                                
5 The details:  unification of markets usually happen in the context of nation-building.  It is the formation of 
an “official” language, which alone will value on the “official” national markets that are being built:  the 
markets of government, business, and formal education.  And for Bourdieu at least, it’s not a happy thing.  
To unify a market means, practically speaking, to destroy all competing markets.  This is what Bourdieu 
means by “symbolic violence.”  It’s an unfortunate term, which has given rise to all kinds of misuse (in 
which “symbolic violence” can be everything from assigning a book written by a dead white male to 
mistakenly referring to a person by an incorrect gender pronoun).  But Bourdieu means something a lot 
more precise:  symbolic violence is the process of destroying local and regional markets that might be in a 
position to compete with the new, dominant market.  When certain groups (often, rich white guys) build a 
nation around themselves, a big part of the process is subjugating other groups (often less rich and/or less 
white folks).  This subjugation happens through physical violence, wrought by police and military and 
paramilitary groups (e.g. the KKK), and through economic violence, wrought by redlining and 
discrimination (to devalue their fiscal capital) and regulating subjugated groups’ language (to devalue their 
cultural capital).  It is through this violent process of unification that bigger markets—regional markets, 
national markets, global markets—are formed.  People do not voluntarily devalue their own culture’s 
language, any more than they voluntarily devalue the currency in their own wallets.  As Bourdieu writes, 
describing speakers of non-standard French dialects:  “To induce the holders of dominated linguistic 
competences to collaborate in the destruction of their instruments of expression by endeavoring for 
example to speak ‘French’ to their children or requiring them to speak ‘French’ at home, with the more or 
less explicit intention of increasing their value on the educational market, it was necessary for the school 
system [which valued only standard French] to be perceived as the principal (indeed the only) means of 
access to administrative positions.”  Bourdieu implies, but does not outright say, that to successfully 
organize this idea—the idea that you can only succeed by forsaking your own way of speaking and taking 
up the standard French of the school system, to the point where people will willingly collaborate in the 
destruction of their own language out of sheer self-interest—a whole lot of other organizing has to happen, 
too.  Most importantly:  organizing the people and money and ideas necessary to dis-organize all of the 
other markets, the ones that could compete with the school system and the central administrative 
bureaucracy it serves.  To unify the national market, these competing markets had to be destroyed.  Or at 
least, very badly burned.  That process of organized, systematic destruction, is a critical part of organizing a 
dominant interpretive community.  When Bourdieu talks about unifying a linguistic market, he means 
“language” in the narrow sense, of French peasants giving up their traditional rolled-r in favor of the 
Parisian uvular-r, in order to get better-paying jobs on a market whose values are set—always—by the 
dominant class.  I propose we can use the same analysis to analyze language in a wider sense:  in the sense 
of interpretive strategies.  No less than the “correct” pronunciation of a consonant, the “correct” interpretive 
strategies for making sense of an issue (such as workers’ rights), a historical event (such as a strike), or a 
group of people (such as a union…or a group of students) depend heavily on how—and by whom—a 
market was unified.  And in both cases, once a market is successfully unified, those who wish to succeed 
on it will find themselves adjusting their habitus accordingly, if not always consciously.  See Bourdieu, 
Language and Symbolic Power, 46-61. 
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the early 1970s, started taking control of national governments in the late 1970s, and 
continues to grow to this day.  It is directly responsible for a great deal of the cultural and 
political environment of the past forty years—including a whole lot of events and 
phenomena we’ve assumed to be random, spontaneous, and natural.  This organizing 
effort, commonly known as “neoliberalism,” is one of the most powerful organized ideas 
in the contemporary world. 
And yet, like all organized ideas, it is still human-made.  Humans organized it; 
humans also can dis-organize it.  Powerful as it’s become, it is not the Sauron many 
scholars have made it out to be:  a superhuman force, a shadow eclipsing the landscape, 
crushing all attempts to resist it.  It’s just a well-organized, real-life conspiracy.  Not a 
diabolical conspiracy, à la late-night-AM-radio or Pinky and the Brain, but a normal, 
everyday kind of conspiracy—the kind described by the world’s greatest conspiracy 
theorist, Adam Smith:  “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for 
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or 
in some contrivance to raise prices.”6  If neoliberalism is a scheme to conquer the 
world—and it may well be—it’s still born out of the same simple self-interest that leads 
two fruit sellers to get together and fix prices:  through secret collaboration, the 
conspirators can make more money than they could through market competition alone.  
Like these hypothetical fruit sellers, neoliberals argue in public that markets are natural 
and occur spontaneously, but in private they know better:  they conspire, very 
intentionally, to organize those so-called natural markets.   
                                                
6 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter VIII, http://www.adamsmith.org/quotes (March 
13, 2014). 
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This chapter shows how it was done.  It tells the story of how the political 
campaign called neoliberalism was organized, and how it succeeded in organizing an 
interpretive community that has conquered large parts of the world.  It also tells the story 
how a certain literary subgenre emerged, just as neoliberalism was taking over the 
governments of the English-speaking world, that allowed the TINA interpretive 
community to spread far wider than its organizers could ever have thought possible.  This 
conspiracy and this coincidence, combined, produced the historical and cultural 
formation I’m calling “cyberpunk neoliberalism.”7   
Cyberpunk neoliberalism, ultimately, may be the matter with Kansas—and with 
much besides, right down to my students’ writing.  Student writing, I’m convinced, is a 
vast and unexplored archive, a pipeline into understanding cultural-capital markets and 
interpretive communities.  I’m especially interested in the “bad” kind, the writing we 
teachers hate the most, the kind that’s hasty, uninformed, and filled with clichés.  It 
comes right from the habitus.  Students write this way when they don’t understand the 
assignment, or they don’t feel like they can fulfill its requirements—so they write 
something that feels right, something that’s worked for them on other formal markets 
(especially in high school), something they feel their instructor will value.  They usually 
fail in their efforts to impress, but their attempts speak volumes about the dispositions 
and interpretive strategies they’ve learned.8   
                                                
7 I’m again indebted to drama professor, sociologist, and cultural studies founder Raymond Williams for 
his concept of “formations.”  For an introduction, see Williams, Marxism and Literature, 115-120—and, 
for a discussion of the related concept “structures of feeling,” 128-135. 
8 A key part of Bourdieu’s theory of the habitus is that the dispositions in a given habitus represent both 
what feels right and what it seems like the market-setting authority will value highly—both, at the same 
time.  In technical terms, what a habitus does is anticipate profits on a given market.  The more cultural 
capital (on that market) that a habitus possesses, the more accurately it will be able to anticipate what 
words, gestures, expressions, opinions, etc. to use on that market, to receive the most profits (higher social 
esteem, higher grades, greatest prospects for employment and advancement and other awards).  So, the 
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About three years into my university teaching career, I developed a handout for 
students, with some basic writing tips.  I included a few “greatest hits” of bad student 
writing, as an example of the kind of things not to write:     
“Every individual is different.”   
 
“People need to think for themselves.”   
 
“We have to look at both sides.”   
 
“Our society is always advancing.”   
 
Look familiar?  If you’ve ever read student writing—or even been a student 
yourself—you might be groaning with me.  These are the kind of things students say 
when they don’t know what to say.  They don’t seem “political,” or “ideological” or 
otherwise controversial at all.  Just common sense, obviously true, vaguely wise- and 
mature-sounding.  But now think about the coherent habitus they imply.  It’s a habitus 
you could almost call liberal—with its vague respect for difference and belief in 
progress—but above all, it’s blasé.  Resigned.  Disposed to disengage.  It treats all 
politics and public affairs the way Frank’s Kansans (and many others) treat the economy:  
as something we can’t possibly have any agency in, and maybe shouldn’t, so why bother 
trying?  It is the basic habitus of TINA:  disposed to interpretive strategies that make us 
isolated individuals, with no basic solidarity with each other, who should strive to remain 
                                                                                                                                            
more attuned a habitus becomes to a given market, the less distinction there is between “what you’re 
supposed to say/do/want” and “what you really say/do/want.”  A person actively working to develop a 
highly-valued habitus on a given market, such as a university student, will often repress this distinction, to 
the degree that s/he doesn’t actively feel it.  See Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 66-89 (the 
chapter entitled “Price Formation and the Anticipation of Profits”).  For valuable research and information 
on how students read and interpret assignments, see the “Writing Matters” series on the website of the 
Writing Program at the University of Manoa, Hawaii, especially the first entry:  
http://manoa.hawaii.edu/mwp/program-research/writing-matters/wm-1 (March 13, 2014). 
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disinterested (if not uninterested) in all public issues, and who stand by, agency-less, as 
“our society” progresses along its predetermined, alternative-less path.    
Again, I’m not sure my students like this habitus.  I’m not even sure they think the 
things they’re saying are true.  They say them because that’s what they feel they’re 
supposed to say, what they have to say, if they want their habitus to be valued on the 
market of academia, so they can accumulate cultural capital in the form of teacherly 
approval, higher grades, awards, and internships, and ultimately fiscal capital in the form 
of high-paying jobs.  This is how social reality gets made:  we say or do certain things, 
and the more we get rewarded for saying or doing them, the more we keep saying or 
doing them.  Somewhere along the way, we start believing them.  Multiply that by an 
entire culture and these things actually start to be true.  Not always a bad thing.  It can 
work productively, as in sociologist Jürgen Habermas’s “cognitive dissonance”:  put 
someone with a habitus with an unwanted disposition (say, racial prejudice) onto a 
market where that disposition is not valued, and slowly that disposition will start to 
change.  But all you need to do is imagine this scenario with the terms reversed—a 
habitus without an unwanted disposition goes onto a market where that disposition is 
valued—to see that this process can just as easily be destructive.  And in the case of the 
TINA habitus, that’s more often the direction it goes.   
How widespread is this habitus?  Well, consider a piece of Hollywood trivia.  For 
much of the twentieth century, the most common scripted line in all mainstream films 
was:  “Let’s get outta here.”9  (My students and I, it seems, were not alone in our desire to 
just leave.)  More importantly, consider my source for this trivia:  a book called Words 
                                                
9 Frank Luntz, Words That Work:  It’s Not What You Say, It’s What People Hear (New York:  Hyperion, 
2007), 107n. 
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That Work, by Frank Luntz, the celebrated pollster and Republican strategist, and my 
one-time neighbor.10  Between gigs for Newt Gingrich and other conservative leaders (he 
coined the phrases “tax relief” and the “death tax,” among many others), Luntz spends a 
lot of his time and talents “on the corporate side of labor disputes.”11  That is, he is a 
union-busting consultant.  Take a look at his strategies for busting unions—the ways he 
tells managers to talk with their workers, to convince those workers to voluntarily give up 
their agency and often accept lower wages and benefits—and you’ll see that they all 
depend on a workforce that’s already oriented toward “getting outta here.” 
Luntz’s main directive:  shift the language of labor disputes “from ‘employee 
strike’ to ‘employee satisfaction.’”  A world of difference lies between these two terms.  
A strike is an expression of collective agency.  It implies that workers are producers, who 
work together—through a union they’ve built and they own—to build the necessary 
power to improve their work environment.  Satisfaction, on the other hand, is an 
expression of passive contentment.  It implies that workers are consumers, isolated 
individuals who are each deciding for themselves on which of two products is superior:  
the product offered by management, or the other produced by the union.  The union, in 
this latter scenario, is not something by or of the workers, but something external to them:  
just another corporation, offering them another consumer good.12 
To bust a union, Luntz says, first you’ve got to make sure workers are thinking of 
themselves as individual consumers, not a collective producer—and then make sure you 
                                                
10 Luntz and I both grew up in West Hartford, Connecticut, and graduated from William H. Hall High 
School (he in 1980, I in 2006), barely three miles from where I currently sit. 
11 Luntz, Words That Work, 140. 
12 Hence the anti-union video Target apparently shows its employees, which insists not only that unions 
will strip workers of right to express themselves as individuals, but that “a union is a business.”  See 
Hamilton Nolan, “Behold, Target’s Brand New Cheesy Anti-Union Video,” Gawker (website), 
http://gawker.com/behold-targets-brand-new-cheesy-anti-union-video-1547193676/+hamilton_nolan 
(March 25, 2004). 
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provide them with a better product than that other business, the union, can offer.  He 
encourages employers to ask workers consumer-framed questions like, “Are you getting 
value for the dues you’re paying?  What do your dues actually pay for?  Is your union 
paying attention to YOUR needs and YOUR priorities?,” and “No one wins in a 
strike…but union leaders continue to get paid.  Is that really fair to you?”  Then, with the 
rift between leaders and members established, management can rush in and fill the gap:  
“Employees tend to accept the arguments of the side that made them first, particularly 
when they are made with a personal and passionate tone.”  For example:  “In a looming 
strike situation with a Denver supermarket chain…the response was so quick and spread 
so effectively that employees actually found management more credible and responsive 
to their questions and concerns than their own official union representatives.”  (Of 
course, management’s extra funds and sway over workers’ livelihoods probably played a 
role, too.)  Finally, Luntz tells employers to promise workers “accurate, unbiased 
information” and “full disclosure,” and to remind them—in language you’ll recognize—
that “you have a right to hear all sides.”13   
Luntz’s union-busting rhetoric, in other words, relies on workers coming into a 
labor dispute with a well-formed TINA habitus.  This doesn’t mean Luntz isn’t worth the 
many millions of dollars he’s been paid.  It just means that no piece of language, however 
excellent, can ever organize (or dis-organize) an interpretive community on its own.  Like 
Thatcher and Reagan, Luntz owes a great deal of his success to an organizing campaign 
that started long before he was born.  If he’s able to convince workers to give up their 
collective agency and become passive consumers, it’s only because they were already on 
their way there long before they came on the job.  We know this.  We’ve read what they 
                                                
13 Luntz, Words That Work, 140-146. 
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wrote as students.  When “every individual is different” is deep in your habitus, you’ll be 
disposed to understanding “your needs and priorities” as separate from those of your 
fellow employees, let alone those of “the union.”  When you reflexively know that 
“people need to think for themselves” and “we have to look at both sides,” you’ll be more 
likely to go to management’s “conversations” and take what they say seriously—
especially given their management’s bias toward the “free” individual and their subtle, 
Luntz-inspired suggestions that the union is a conformist conspiracy trying to put one 
over on you and suppress your individual greatness.  And since “our society is always 
advancing,” you’ll want to be part of that advance, and opposed to things—like strikes—
that seem to stand in its way. 
It’s a mighty bill of goods that TINA has sold us.  When we understand ourselves 
as producers, we have agency:  we have control over our own lives, and the ability to 
work together with the people around us to make the world we live in more like we’d like 
it to be.  When we understand ourselves as consumers, we don’t have agency:  our only 
freedom is Milton Friedman’s famous “freedom to choose,” the freedom to consume any 
one of several products, made by others.  The difference between being a producer and a 
consumer is the difference between being able to do something about it when our boss is 
screwing us over, and not.  Between having some control over our lives and our world, 
and relinquishing that control to “the market.”  Between forming close, productive 
relationships with the people around us, and remaining isolated.  And to risk stating the 
obvious:  most of us don’t like being powerless, out of control, and isolated.  Think, just 
for a moment, about the number of songs, poems, movies, stories, TV shows, and plays 
that are about the search for community, for connection, for belonging.  If it’s not the 
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number-one theme among all bestselling American art and cultural production, it got to 
be up there.  We know, on some level, that understanding ourselves as consumers is, 
well, consuming us.   
So why do we do it?  Because “there is no alternative,” say the neoliberals—and 
the more power they build, the truer that statement becomes.  The fewer and further-
between the alternatives get, the harder they are to seek, find, and keep.  Thanks in no 
small part to the neoliberals, and the union-busting consultants like Luntz who followed 
in their wake, organizing a union is infinitely harder now than it was thirty years ago.14  
And besides, unions are old, outdated things that don’t really work anyway, not in 
today’s technology-driven economy.  And besides, we’re probably going to just leave 
soon anyway—because we’re free and mobile individuals and you can, and/or because 
we’re one of the increasing number of workers without job security—so why bother? 
In this context, it may not surprise you to hear how hard it is to organize graduate-
student workers.  We might be working for peanuts for five years, or more like ten in the 
humanities, but we’re always focused on that prestigious, high-paying professorship 
we’re going get; there may be ever fewer of them, as the neoliberals destroy full-time 
jobs and replace them with temps and adjuncts and online classes, but that’s all the more 
reason to keep working hard now and out-compete our colleagues and not get distracted 
by soul-sucking things like unions.  What might surprise you more, though, is how 
widespread this same mentality has become, even far outside the so-called “knowledge 
economy.”  My friend Peter Marincel, an organizer with the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU), once told me about his experience organizing security guards 
                                                
14 See Rick Fantasia, Cultures of Solidarity:  Consciousness, Action, and Contemporary American Workers 
(Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1988), 65-72. 
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in downtown Minneapolis.  Yes, they know their wages and working conditions are bad.  
But no, they don’t want to join a union.  Why?  Because they’re about to leave this awful 
job and become cops.  Pete nods, leaves, and comes back a year later.  They’re still there.  
Want to join a union now?  No, no, for real they’re about to leave this job and become 
cops….   
This may be the neoliberals’ most dangerously effective rhetorical strategy.  It’s 
not the despair of aloneness and isolation—that, at least, can inspire us to act.  It’s the 
opposite; it’s  Pandora’s last and worst curse:  hope.  The excited, almost erotic pursuit of 
the one kind of agency that we feel is still possible:  the kind that comes from individual, 
heroic action, rising above the masses and riding the wave of “our society’s” perpetual 
progress to reach “a level of proficiency exceeding anything [we’d] known or imagined.  
Beyond ego, beyond personality, beyond awareness.”  A transcendent, Christ-like 
agency, at once individual and universal, humble and world-altering, and fueled, always, 
by technology.  This is the agency of Case, the lone, emaciated hacker who 
singlehandedly destroys one of the most powerful corporate empires in the world from 
behind a computer and, simultaneously, alters the future of all information-exchange on 
planet Earth—as described by William Gibson in the final pages of Neuromancer, a 
novel that very well may have altered the future of all information-exchange on planet 
Earth.15 
  
                                                
15 William Gibson, Neuromancer (New York:  Ace Books, 1984), 262. 
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Madison, 2011:  Cyberpunk Agency—or, How We Learned to Stop Organizing and 
Love TINA 
In February of 2011, tens of thousands of Wisconsinites had occupied the state 
capitol in Madison, in a move that anticipated the Occupy movement several months 
later.  Their goal:  to stop Tea Party governor Scott Walker and his campaign to severely 
restrict the collective-bargaining rights of public-sector unions.   
They would not succeed.  Membership in public-sector unions would decline by 
60 percent in the following three years.16  But in the process, they did drive Rush 
Limbaugh to finally admit what many had suspected for years:  that he doesn’t like 
workers.   
Or more precisely, that he doesn’t like “workers,” as a term:   
There's nothing to me sacred about a union just because it is a union, just because 
it may be the location of, quote, unquote, “the workers,” which is a Marxist term I 
also object to when being applied to people who go to work in this country.  We 
have entrepreneurs.  We have employees.  We have associates.  Workers exist in 
China, in the old Soviet Union, in Korea and in Cuba.17 
 
In this claim, right out of the Luntz playbook, we can see the entire neoliberal 
agenda.  It’s not just about union-busting.  It’s not just about deregulating and 
globalizing.  It’s about making a radically new world, where everything, everything, is 
                                                
16 See Steven Greenhouse, “Wisconsin’s Legacy for Unions,” New York Times (February 22, 2014),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/business/wisconsins-legacy-for-unions.html?_r=0 (March 14, 2014). 
17 Rush Limbaugh, “Public Sector Unions:  Monopolies Organizing Against the Taxpayers,” The Rush 
Limbaugh Show, February 17, 2011, 
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2011/02/17/public_sector_unions_monopolies_organizing_against_th
e_taxpayers (March 25, 2014).  In the same segment, Limbaugh elaborates:  “when you as an individual 
join a union, you are essentially saying good-bye to yourself as an individual. You can work as hard as you 
want, you can be better than the next person on the line, better than the next teacher.  It isn't gonna matter. 
You're all going to make the same amount of money. The difference is maybe you can become a foreman, 
maybe you can become somebody gets more overtime than someone else, but the basic wage is gonna 
remain what it is for whatever that contract says no matter how well you do your job—or no matter how 
poorly.” 
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subsumed under one unified corporate-capital market (“the Market”); where unions, and 
government, and families, and religions, are just other kinds of businesses; and where 
“workers,” as Limbaugh prescribes, are just other kinds of entrepreneurs.   
Let’s take a second to reflect on how radical this position is.  It’s very different 
from classical liberalism—the philosophy of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill and the 
Founding Fathers—which understood government, civil society, and the marketplace as 
separate “spheres,” whose separateness was key to a free and well-functioning society.  
(Corruption, the quintessential liberal vice, happens when one of those spheres intrudes 
into another:  the marketplace into government, civil society into the marketplace, and so 
on.)18  The marketplace itself, further, was defined by the interaction of two distinct 
interpretive communities:  labor and capital, workers and entrepreneurs.19  This was not a 
controversial position, until recently.  (Yes, Karl Marx wrote about it, but so did 
Abraham Lincoln.)20  Labor and capital both exist together on a fiscal-capital market 
(what we normally mean by “the market”), but they have always developed their habitus 
on two separate cultural-capital markets.  The laborer’s (or worker’s) habitus is defined 
by the disposition to make enough to get by—or in its middle-class variant, to make a 
decent living.  The capitalist’s (or entrepreneur’s) habitus, on the other hand, is defined 
                                                
18 For an introduction to “liberalism” in its various forms, see Stuart Hall, “Variants of Liberalism,” in 
Politics and Ideology, ed. James Donald and Stuart Hall (Philadelphia, PA:  Open University Press, 1986), 
34-69. 
19 In this chapter, where I’m writing about “labor” and “work” exclusively in the context of capital-based 
markets, I use the two terms interchangeably.  On a capital-based market, there is no difference between 
them; in English translations of Marx, it’s all “labor.”  (Marx used the word Arbeit, which can be translated 
both ways.  Werk, the literal translation of “work,” is only used in the noun form, to describe works of art 
or literature; it’s not used as a verb in modern German.)  In Chapter Four, where I discuss “labor” and 
“work” in a wider context—roughly along the lines of philosopher Hannah Arendt—I will make a clear and 
important distinction between the two. 
20 “Labor is prior to and independent of capital.  Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have 
existed if labor had not first existed.  Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher 
consideration.”  Abraham Lincoln, “First Annual Message, December 3, 1961,” The American Presidency 
Project (website), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29502 (March 14, 2014). 
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by a disposition to accumulate as much wealth as possible.  This doesn’t mean capitalists 
are greedy.  (Some are, some aren’t.)  It’s just the structure of capital-based markets.  No 
one invests money without expecting to get back more than they put in; and if no one 
invested money, the market would collapse.  This also explains why capitalist markets, 
unlike other kinds of markets, must keep expanding in order to survive.  Which in turn 
explains why capitalist countries, sooner or later, tend to start fighting imperialist wars.21 
Most of us, most of the time, are laborers—workers.  We might play capitalist on 
the side, investing money in “the market,” but we make our living from our paychecks.  
Our interests aren’t necessarily opposed to the capitalists—we all want a healthy, 
growing market—but neither are they necessarily the same.  Again, this is not because 
capitalists are bad people; it’s just the structure of the market.  Workers are looking to get 
hired and paid a decent wage; capitalists are looking to hire as few workers as possible 
and pay them as little as possible.  (Hence the political cartoon where a manager hands a 
worker a pink slip and tells him:  “As a shareholder, you should be happy!”)   
Both kinds of interpretive communities tend to organize, in order to make 
members aware of their particular interests and to act on those interests, collectively.  
Communities of workers, when organized, tend to look like unions or workers’ centers 
(the latter are particularly common among undocumented workers).  Communities of 
                                                
21 Marx didn’t invent the distinction between labor and capital, but he might have explained it in the most 
detail.  Laborers, he explained, participate in the economy through what he called the “C-M-C” cycle, 
where “C” stands for “commodity” and “M” stands for “money.”  Laborers start with a commodity:  their 
labor.  They sell that commodity, to an employer, to make money.  They then use that money to buy the 
things they need to live, at whatever level of comfort, and above all, to their sellable commodity—their 
labor—in good enough shape that they can keep selling it.  Capitalists, on the other hand, participate in the 
economy through the “M-C-M” cycle, or more precisely, the “M-C-M’” cycle, where M’ must always be 
kept larger than M.  Capitalists start with money, or capital.  They then spend, or invest, that money in 
commodities—not for their own use, as when workers by commodities—but in order to re-sell them for 
more than they paid for them, thus making a profit.  See Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, Chapter Four (“The 
General Formula for Capital”), http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch04.htm (October 
24, 2013). 
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capitalists, when organized, tend to look like trade or managers’ associations—the kind 
of groups that hire firms like Luntz’s—or para-academic associations like the Mont 
Pelerin Society, about which more below.  The interaction between these two kinds of 
organized groups, sometimes cooperative and sometimes tense, has been a part of capital-
based markets since these markets’ origins.  Economists, policymakers, and historians 
have traditionally this interaction a vital part of a well-functioning capital-based market:  
they keep the economy healthy, active, and responsive to the people it serves.   
What distinguishes neoliberals is (1) they totally reject this viewpoint, and (2) 
they act on this belief.  Neoliberals believe that there is, and therefore should be, no 
tension among interpretive communities within “the Market” (with a capital M)—we’re 
all entrepreneurs selling things, including but not limited to our own labor (as per 
Limbaugh), and we’re all consumers, buying and using things of our choice to lead happy 
lives (as per Luntz).  And they build and use all available power, including state power, 
to create this reality:  above all, to destroy interpretive communities in which people 
understand themselves as anything but entrepreneurs and consumers.22   
                                                
22 The economist Philip Mirowski, a leading historian of neoliberalism, has identified eleven basic positions 
that neoliberals have tended to take, some in pronouncement and some in practice.  Like the positions of 
any political campaign, these have shifted over space and time, but this is a helpful rough guide.  I 
paraphrase these eleven positions as follows:  (1) “Free” markets do not occur naturally.  They must be 
actively constructed through political organizing.  (2) “The market” is an information processor, and the 
most efficient one possible—more efficient than any government or (so-called) public sphere ever could be.  
(3) Market society is, and therefore should be, the natural and inexorable state of humankind.   (4) The 
political goal of neoliberals is not to destroy the state, but to take control of it, and to redefine its structure 
and function, in order to create and maintain the freedom of corporations.  (5)  There is no contradiction 
between public/politics/citizenship and private/ market/entrepreneur-and-consumerism—because the latter 
does and should eclipse the former.  (6) The most important virtue—more important than justice, or 
anything else—is freedom, defined “negatively” as “freedom to choose” (in Milton Friedman’s famous 
phrase), and most importantly, defined as the freedom of corporations to act as they please.  (7) Capital has 
a natural right to flow freely across national boundaries—labor, not so much.  (8) Inequality—of resources, 
income, wealth, and even political rights—is a good thing; it prompts productivity, because people envy the 
rich and emulate them; people who complain about inequality are either sore losers or old fogies, who need 
to get hip to the way things work nowadays.  (9) Corporations can do no wrong—by definition.  (10) The 
market, engineered and promoted by neoliberal experts, can always provide solutions to problems 
seemingly caused by the market in the first place:  there’s always “an app for that.”  (11) There is no 
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A total neoliberal victory wouldn’t just mean the end of organized labor; it would 
mean the end of organized everything—except capital.  It would mean workers would 
(have no choice but to) understand themselves as entrepreneurs, who would presumably 
share their fellow entrepreneurs’ interest in deregulating and privatizing and cutting 
everything that stands in the way of corporate profit…because they themselves would 
understand themselves as corporations.  These newly-christened “entrepreneurs,” no 
longer “bound” by wages and contracts and collectives, would be “free” to pursue any 
opportunity, come and just leave whenever they please—and, often, to starve.  Which, as 
my students would have it, would be their own fault.  They should have been better 
entrepreneurs.  The Market hath spoken. 
We’re not that far off.  If Luntz tells managers, “don’t call them workers any 
more—a worker is a lower valued job,” that must mean that, in his extensive focus-group 
testing, he has found that workers themselves believe it.23  The rise of contract labor, in 
the place of long-term employment, has meant that many of us have been forced to start 
understanding ourselves as corporations—myself, alas, included.  And our popular 
culture is following suit.  Consider our current crop of celebrities:  barely a worker, 
employee, or professional among them.  Other than politicians and entertainers—who’ll 
never go away—they’re pretty much all entrepreneurs:  Steve Jobs.  Bill Gates.  Even 
Mark Zuckerberg.  Where’s our Clarence Darrow?  Our Marie Curie?  Our Frank Lloyd 
                                                                                                                                            
difference between is and should be:  “free” markets both should be (normatively) and are (positively) 
most the efficient economic system, and the most just way of doing politics, and the most empirically true 
description of human behavior, and the most ethical and moral way to live—which in turn explains, and 
justifies, why “free” markets should be, and as neoliberals build more and more power, increasingly are, 
universal.  See Philip Mirowski, “Postface,” in The Road from Mont Pelerin, ed. Philip Mirowski and 
Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2009):  417-455; see especially 434-440. 
23 Luntz, Words That Work, 146. 
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Wright?  Our Thurgood Marshall?  Nowhere in sight.  Entrepreneur-mania has, literally, 
cornered the market. 
The center of this growing, neoliberal über-market is Silicon Valley.  Not 
necessarily the place, but the signifiers it represents.  There are lots of people who are 
still skeptical about the inevitability of “the Market” taking over everything:  witness 
politicians in both parties railing against “Wall Street” in favor of “Main Street.”  But 
start talking tech, and suddenly reasonable, rational, Democratic-voting folks start talking 
like far-right neoliberals.  “Policymakers should work with the grain of the Internet rather 
than against it,” argues Google CEO Eric Schmidt.  “Without a major upgrade, [our] 
political system will continue producing legal code that is Internet-incompatible,” insists 
popular tech blogger Rebecca MacKinnon.  We need to “learn from the way the Internet 
has been organized, and apply those principles to help improve the way city governments 
worked, or school systems taught students,” declares science writer Steven Johnson.24   
These are radical statements—no less radical for being so commonplace they’re 
almost banal.  “The Internet,” the way a lot of pundits talk about it, becomes (in the 
words of critic Evgeny Morozov) “the avatar of everything modern and progressive.”25  
It is good and real and inevitable; we must follow it, or at least get out of its way:  “We 
can just stand back and watch; ‘the Internet’ will take care of itself—and us.”26  But what 
would it mean, exactly, to “work with the grain of the Internet,” to produce laws that are 
“Internet-compatible,” to “learn from the way the Internet has been organized”?  
Basically, it would mean the same thing as if you took each of these quotes and replaced 
                                                
24 Quoted in Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here, 23, 25.  Morozov calls these kind of people 
“geeks,” but I think “pundits” or “commentators” is more accurate.  In my experience, the geeks 
themselves—the people doing the programming—tend to be a more mixed bag. 
25 Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here, 38. 
26 Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here, 24. 
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“the Internet” with “the Market.”  (In this context, they pretty much mean the same 
thing.)  It would mean giving up on democracy altogether.  It would mean abandoning 
any chance of working together to make our world, and willingly surrendering our 
agency to inhuman entities beyond our control or comprehension (“the Market” / “the 
Internet”)—and, practically, to the humans who claim to understand and represent these 
entities. 
Some tech-commentators are just plain-old anti-democratic.  Witness Occupy 
leader-turned-Google engineer (and self-described troll) Justine Tunney, who recently 
(and apparently unironically) circulated a petition to “(1) Retire all government 
employees with full pensions.  (2) Transfer administrative authority to the tech industry.  
(3) Appoint Eric Schmidt CEO of America.”27  Or writers Parag and Ayesha Khanna, 
darlings of the TED-talk circuit, who (again according to Morozov) “warn world leaders 
that democracy might be incompatible with globalization and capitalism. And that the 
West needs to be more like China and Singapore.”  That these nations, along with others 
they praise such as Russia and the United Arab Emirates, are repressive authoritarian 
regimes, does not seem to cross their mind, or maybe even to matter much:  “politics 
slows things down; but technology”—individual, entrepreneurial, apolitical—“speeds 
things up.”28 
But a lot of others either don’t have an explicit politics, or even explicitly oppose 
anti-democratic states.  Such is the case with William Gibson, whose first piece of 
                                                
27 Alex Hern, “Occupy Founder Calls on Obama to Appoint Eric Schmidt ‘CEO of America,’” The 
Guardian (March 20, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/20/occupy-founder-
obama-eric-schmidt-ceo-america (March 25, 2014). 
28 Evgeny Morozov, “The Naked and the TED,” The New Republic (August 2, 2012),   
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/magazine/105703/the-naked-and-the-ted-khanna 
(October 24, 2013). 
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nonfiction, written a decade after Neuromancer on assignment for Wired magazine, was a 
brutal takedown of Singapore and its repressive government.29  And yet, the world 
Gibson creates in books like Neuromancer has nothing to do with democracy—it’s a 
veritable neoliberal paradise: 
Night City was like a deranged experiment in social Darwinism, designed by a 
bored researcher who kept one thumb permanently on the fast-forward button.  
Stop hustling and you sank without a trace, but move a little too swiftly and you’d 
break the fragile surface tension of the black market; either way, you were 
gone….Biz here was a constant subliminal hum, and death the accepted 
punishment for laziness, carelessness, lack of grace, the failure to heed the 
demands of an intricate protocol.30 
  
You’d be forgiven for thinking this is a dystopia—that is, that Gibson is 
describing a world he doesn’t like very much.  There is a lot about Neuromancer that 
would seem to place it in the genre of books like 1984 or Fahrenheit 451, or even like 
The Hunger Games or Divergent:  it’s set in the near future (the 2030s, Gibson has said in 
interviews), in the aftermath of a massive war (presumably the Cold War gone hot), in a 
social and political universe where the dignity of human life is a lot less respected than it 
is now (which is saying something); its protagonist is a lone, socially isolated agent who 
struggles to navigate this brutal social and political universe; and its plot centers on a life-
or-death battle with a powerful authority figure, with the potential to upend the whole 
world order.  Much more simply, Gibson’s world of hustle-or-die just doesn’t sound like 
a very appealing place to live.   
Except that, for a lot of people, it apparently does.  The reviewer from the San 
Francisco Chronicle, featured on the back cover of the trade edition, wrote:  “It made me 
                                                
29 William Gibson, “Disneyland with the Death Penalty,” Wired 1, no. 4 (September/October 1993),   
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.04/gibson.html (October 25, 2013). 
30 Gibson, Neuromancer, 7. 
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want to live in its world.”  Surely no one has ever said this about Orwell’s Oceania or 
Collins’s District 12—or at least, no one a publisher would want to feature on the back 
cover.  Yet this reviewer is far from alone.  Huge numbers of people, in the three decades 
since Neuromancer ushered in the world of cyberpunk, have actively sought to live in its 
world, and even to remake the rest of the world in its image.  I’m not talking about sci-fi 
and fantasy nerds, LARPing their way into Middle-Earth, or even self-conscious 
cyberpunks, proudly dressing and living in the style of Blade Runner.  I’m talking about 
modern (or if you prefer, postmodern) technology itself, as it’s played out in the three 
decades since Neuromancer’s publication.  The Internet, and much of the world it 
wrought, is a literary formation as much as a technical one.  Long before the Bay Area’s 
venture capital-fueled tech startups were a glimmer in Thomas Friedman’s eye, this 
world was being formed in the living rooms of a novelists—at least one of whom, Gibson 
himself, would not even own a computer until well into the next century.31 
I’m not speaking in metaphor or allusion.  I’m talking about that rare and elusive 
thing:  actual literary agency.  A book that really, truly changed things.  Neuromancer 
                                                
31 For a brief, thoughtful introduction to the history and socioeconomic context of cyberpunk—which 
anticipates several of the arguments I make here—see Paul Youngquist, “Cyberpunk, War, and Money:  
Neal Stephenson’s Cryptonomicon,” Contemporary Literature 53, no. 2 (Summer 2012):  319-347.  
“Cyberpunk,” Youngquist writes, “appears shockingly short-lived,” starting with Neuromancer in 1984 and 
lasting only until “Neal Stephenson dealt the genre a killer blow with his virtual swift sword in Snow Crash 
(1992).”  He suggests that “cyberpunk, the sci-fi subgenre that gave us cyberspace, now seems a thing of 
the past, an old dystopian dream of Reaganomics gone global,” but at the same time, it “is certainly the 
brainchild of the economic history that fulfills itself in globalization.  Frederic Jameson got that much right 
when he called it the literary genre of transnational corporate capitalism.  But I want to suggest that its 
popular force arises from its capacity less to disrupt than to consolidate that history.  Cyberpunk confirms 
the arrival of a world built by cybernetics, sustained by info-tech, and driven by global capital flows,” and 
Stephenson’s “own demolition of cyberpunk, Snow Crash…answers corporate domination with free 
enterprise.”  In other words, cyberpunk as literary subgenre only lasted for eight years—because at the end 
of those eight years, its mission was accomplished.  No more actual cyberpunk novels were needed; the 
economic history of the world, thenceforth, would itself be a cyberpunk novel.  Youngquist’s chronology 
also largely explains my decision to focus almost exclusively on Neuromancer and Snow Crash in the 
analysis to follow:  they are the beginning and end, the alpha and omega, as well as probably the two 
widest-read and referenced books in the subgenre. 
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alone, back in 1984, gave the world the terms “cyberspace,” “microsoft,” and “the 
matrix.”  It quickly became a must-read for the same young engineers and entrepreneurs 
who would soon bring these concepts to life.  Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash, in 1992, 
ushered in the next wave of innovation by inventing the “Metaverse”:  not just a hangout 
for nerdy hackers, as in Neuromancer and other earlier stories, but a space for ordinary 
first-worlders to meet, to be entertained, and above all, to consume.  Stephenson’s 
Metaverse, along with his coinage of “avatar” (in its modern, Internet usage), laid the 
foundation on which software engineers, including many avowed Stephenson fans, would 
later build programs such as Second Life and Google Earth. 
Gibson and Stephenson gave us more than just technology.  Interspersed with 
their prophetic technical innovations is a compelling and downright seductive vision of a 
social, political, and above all economic future.  A future where, it seems, any individual 
with enough technological know-how could attain the same kind of singlehanded, world-
changing agency that these authors themselves had attained.  And a future where the 
pursuit of any other kind of agency—especially the collective, political kind—was utterly 
futile.  This is not to say that either author had an intentional political agenda.  
Stephenson goes out of his way to insist he cares about the technology, not the “social 
message,” and there’s no reason to believe Gibson is any different.32  There’s certainly no 
                                                
32 Stephenson, in a 2012 interview for a SF fan site, was prompted:  “One of the examples you mention in 
the book [Some Remarks] is…about Gibson and cyberspace, and how that kick-started the whole dot com 
thing, and he’s always been intentionally quite sketchy on the science side of things. And another example 
that springs to mind is Snow Crash—with how it obviously inspired Google Earth and Second Life. Now I 
don’t like to use the term dystopian for either of those books, but neither of them are particularly optimistic 
books either.”  He responded:  “Yeah. I mean in a narrow sense they are optimistic—optimistic about what 
people could do with the science. The social message isn’t necessarily optimistic. But that’s alright, really 
what I’m more thinking of is the technical side, of getting things built.”  See Tim Maughan, “Geeks, 
Swords and the Snow Crash Movie:  Neal Stephenson in Conversation,” Tor.com (website) (September 19, 
2012), http://www.tor.com/blogs/2012/09/geeks-swords-and-the-snow-crash-movie-neal-stephenson-in-
conversation (March 26, 2014). 
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evidence (that I know of) linking Gibson or Stephenson, or any other cyberpunk author 
for that matter, to the neoliberal campaign.  Yet their writings, intentionally or not, 
provided the neoliberals with some of their most compelling and widely-distributed 
rhetoric—at the exact moment when, after nearly fifty years of organizing, they were 
finally taking state power.  To live in the world of cyberpunk, as so many of us 
apparently want to do, is to live in a world where there is truly no alternative—and what a 
wonderful thing that is! 
A quick note, before I go further.  Back when I was in college, the great 
University of Chicago historian of science Robert J. Richards once suggested, lovingly, 
that when I write literary criticism I sound a little like Robespierre—a moral crusader, 
inveighing against authors’ moral and political impurities, with a will to send them to the 
guillotine.  I fear he may be right.  So let me be clear:  I like cyberpunk.  I find it smart, 
lyrical, thought-provoking, fun to read, and in many ways, beautiful.  If I put such things 
on Facebook, I’d definitely list Gibson and Stephenson as two of my favorite authors.  I 
met Gibson once, and I found him to be gentle, modest, and utterly charming.33  (I 
imagine I’d like Stephenson, too, egotism notwithstanding.)  I’m not looking to “take 
down” or “call out” or “debunk” cyberpunk:  I wouldn’t send it to the guillotine, even if I 
                                                                                                                                            
 
33 (Yes, that’s me in the goofy trench coat and hat:) 
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could.  I’m just looking to explain how this strange formation called cyberpunk 
neoliberalism came to exist—how so many of us workers have willingly and even 
happily given up our own interpretive community, and the agency we had there, in order 
to identify ourselves instead with the capitalists/“entrepreneurs,” who extend us no 
particular sympathy in return.34 
Snow Crash, like Neuromancer, starts with a pretty brutal work situation.  The 
Deliverator, whom we will later know as Hiro Protagonist (natch), has a job delivering 
pizzas for the Mafia—which, in Stephenson’s anarcho-capitalist near-future America, has 
become a legitimate corporation (or as legitimate as any organization in a country 
without laws).  Their promise:  “Your pie in thirty minutes, or you can have it free, shoot 
the driver, take his car, file a class-action suit”—and have Uncle Enzo, head of the “Our 
Thing Foundation,” personally come to your house and apologize.  You really, really 
don’t want this to happen: 
The Deliverator does not know for sure what happens to the driver in such cases, 
but he has heard some rumors.  Most pizza deliveries happen in the evening 
hours, which Uncle Enzo considers to be his private time.  And how would you 
feel if you had to interrupt dinner with your family in order to call some 
obstreperous dork in a Burbclave and grovel for a late fucking pizza?  Uncle Enzo 
has not put in fifty years serving his family and his country so that, at the age 
when most are playing golf and bobbling their granddaughters, he can get out of 
the bathtub dripping wet and lie down and kiss the feet of some sixteen-year-old 
                                                
34 In doing this kind of analysis, I’m consciously following in the footsteps of cultural studies pioneers such 
as Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson, who sought to understand the improbable cultural formations 
of particular historical moments through the close reading of particularly important literary works.  Classic 
examples of this work, done at far greater length and rigor, include Williams’s The Country and the City 
(New York:  Oxford University Press, 1975) and The Long Revolution (New York:  Pelican/Penguin, 
1965), and Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class (New York:  Vintage, 1966).  Gibson’s 
Neuromancer and Stephenson’s Snow Crash, though by no means the be-all-and-end-all of cyberpunk, are 
nearly ideal texts for such analysis:  they are equal parts typical and prototypical, examples and exemplars.  
Pick up any study of cyberpunk, such as Youngquist’s (op cit), and it’s likely to discuss one or both of 
these novels.  For more on the limits and dangers of “debunking” as a critical model, see Bruno Latour, 
“Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?,” Critical Inquiry 30, no. 2 (Winter 2004):  225-248—and my 
detailed discussion of Latour’s article in Chapter Three. 
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skate punk whose pepperoni was thirty-one minutes in coming.  Oh, God.  It 
makes the Deliverator breathe a little shallower just to think of the idea. 
But he wouldn’t drive for CosaNostra Pizza any other way.  You know 
why?  Because there’s something about having your life on the line.  It’s like 
being a kamikaze pilot.  Your mind is clear.  Other people—store clerks, burger 
flippers, software engineers, the whole vocabulary of meaningless jobs that make 
up Life in America—other people just rely on plain old competition.  Better flip 
your burgers or debug your subroutines faster and better than your high school 
classmate two blocks down the strip is flipping or debugging, because we’re in 
competition with those guys, and people notice these things.  
What a fucking rat race that is.  CosaNostra Pizza doesn’t have any 
competition.  Competition goes against the Mafia ethic.  You don’t work harder 
because you’re competing against some identical operation down the street.  You 
work harder because everything is on the line.  Your name, your honor, your 
family, your life.  Those burger flippers might have a better life expectancy—but 
what kind of life is it anyway, you have to ask yourself.  That’s why nobody, not 
even the Nipponese, can move pizzas faster than CosaNostra.  The Deliverator is 
proud to wear the uniform, proud to drive the car, proud to march up the front 
walks of innumerable Burbclave homes, a grim vision in ninja black, a pizza on 
his shoulder.35 
 
There’s a lot here.  But maybe what’s most important is what’s not here:  any 
trace of a workers’ interpretive strategy.  If you’ve ever worked in the service industry, or 
known anyone who’s ever worked in the service industry, or read anything about people 
who work in the service industry, you’ll know that most people who work in the service 
industry feel some pretty intense discontent and disconnect in their jobs.  They’re at the 
bottom of the totem pole, without much in the way of pay or dignity, and they know it.36  
Not Hiro.  He may be a lowly pizza delivery boy, but he understands himself, completely 
                                                
35 Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash (New York:  Spectra, 2000), 3, 5. 
36 The classic account of these kinds of feelings is Studs Terkel’s Working:  People Talk About What They 
Do All Day and How They Feel About What They Do, reprint ed. (New York:  The New Press, 2004).  
Marx called these feelings Entäusserung:  estrangement, or alienation.  According to Marx, it is one of the 
basic experiences of being a wage-laborer in a capitalist economy.  In the language of Bourdieu, himself a 
committed Marxist, we can describe estrangement as the reaction of a habitus formed on a market built by 
an interpretive community of workers (C-M-C), when it is forced by economic and/or political 
circumstance to leave this market and seek value on another, one built by the dominant interpretive 
community of capitalists (M-C-M’).  See Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 
Chapter 22 (“Estranged Labor”), 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm (October 25, 2013). 
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and totally, as a capitalist.  He does not flinch at the idea that he could die for delivering a 
pizza a few seconds too late:  like Case in Neuromancer, he accepts “death [as] the 
accepted punishment for laziness,” because he knows it’s good for business.  He shudders 
not at the thought of his own death, but only at the inconvenience he’d cause his boss—
er, fellow entrepreneur—Uncle Enzo.   
Hiro does not see himself as exploited or oppressed at all.  This is precisely the 
kind of life he wants, in the most existential sense:  it’s clear, simple, exhilarating, 
satisfying, immediate, all-or-nothing, and utterly individual.  And what he lacks in pay 
and dignity (and, you know, safety) he makes up for in “psychic income”:  he knows he’s 
better than all of those people.  Those people with their “meaningless jobs,” who have to 
rely on “competition” in the traditional sense—slow, boring, collective.  “If life were a 
mellow elementary school run by well-meaning education Ph.D.s, the Deliverator’s 
report card would say:  ‘Hiro is so bright and creative but needs to work harder on his 
cooperation skills.’”37  Hiro, young and hip and multiracial though he is, represents 
Limbaugh’s ideal of the worker-qua-entrepreneur, the perfect self-denying proletarian.  
One who will soon save the world—and get quite rich while doing so. 
This neoliberal perspective on work, more than anything else, is the mark of the 
cyberpunk protagonist.  Cyberpunk heroes perceive no difference between their wage-
labor and their life-purpose.  When Hiro’s skateboarder sidekick Y.T. complains, “The 
problem with you hackers is you never stop working,” Hiro responds:  “That’s what a 
hacker is.”38  And for Case, in Neuromancer:  “This was it.  This was what he was, who 
he was, his being.  He forgot to eat….Sometimes he resented having to leave the deck to 
                                                
37 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 3.  Emphasis in original. 
38 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 129. 
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use the chemical toilet they’d set up in a corner of the loft.”  And for Case’s own sidekick 
Molly—the leather-clad, razor-clawed femme fatale who first appears in Neuromancer 
and travels through subsequent cyberpunk stories like a verse through old folk songs 
(appearing most famously as Trinity in The Matrix, whose title is also a steal from 
Gibson).  “Her being, like [Case’s], was the thing she did to make a living.”  And it 
doesn’t much matter to her how good that living is:  “I’m an easy make….Anybody good 
at what they do, that’s what they are, right?  You gotta jack, I gotta tussle.”39 
This is exactly the kind of language we often hear about so-called “millennials.”  
“Work and life are not different for this generation.  Work is not just work for these 
people.  It is their life.”  So proclaims Jim Deters, founder of the Denver workspace 
Galvanize, home to the online music service Pandora, the online car service Uber, and 
over 100 other tech startups.  “The 30,000-square-foot space is converted from an old 
bank note building,” explained NPR’s Elise Hu on Morning Edition; it was retrofitted to 
                                                
39 Gibson, Neuromancer, 59, 56, 50.  There is a whole other article to be written about the gender dynamics 
of these cyberpunk protagonist-couples, which tend to remain constant across the genre.  In some ways 
they seem to oppose traditional gender roles:  the men tend to be weaker, more home-bound, and 
comparatively cowardly, while the women are strong, mobile, and fearless.  But in other ways, more 
important ways I think, they reassert gender roles that border on the reactionary.  The men are always the 
chief protagonists, the heroes, the ones who do the great deeds.  The women do plenty of work, but it is 
ultimately to serve the men.  And in a weird way, given how agency in cyberpunk stories is so much about 
sitting in front of a computer and transfiguring your body into the endless virtual space of the Internet, the 
women’s greater physical prowess may be a strike against them:  as in so much of Western mythology, the 
women remain bound to earth while the men ascend into heaven.  Racial issues receive a similar treatment.  
Nearly all of the main characters in both books are white—and their whiteness is rarely-if-ever discussed.  
The major exception is Hiro Protagonist himself, who is half-black, half-Japanese—but more importantly, 
the narrator assures us, he is an Army brat who grew up without any of the normal oppressions associated 
with racial minority.  There is also a striking amount of casual racism in Snow Crash—slurs, stereotypes, 
and outright violence—that usually goes unexplained.  It sometimes seems to have something to do with 
the lack of a government, which supposedly kept these impulses in check, but that’s about it.  And given 
the level of South Park-ish meta-irony on which the whole novel operates, it’s impossible to determine the 
extent to which Stephenson is commenting on this racism, as opposed to simply indulging in it.  Not that 
any of this is likely to be intentional.  As with the class and labor issues I’m focusing on, I don’t see any 
evidence that Gibson or Stephenson particularly cared about questions of race or gender, one way or the 
other.  As far as I can tell, and as Stephenson suggests in that Tor.com interview (see note 32), the story 
they wanted to tell was about the technology—and everything else just habitually, conventionally fell into 
place. 
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include a giant atrium, a café with full bar, and glass-walled offices “where midstage 
startups rent space next to one another but don’t get tied to long-term leases.”  Her story, 
as per usual, is one of triumph and liberation:  this is “what the future of work feels like 
for lots of young entrepreneurs.  A place without walls, all kinds of freedom and fueled 
by coffee and beer.”40 
It’s a future very much foretold in Neuromancer and Snow Crash.  Their heroes’ 
work-lives are always precarious, short-term, and unstable—and they wouldn’t have it 
any other way.  Molly has been working her current gig for a “couple of months.”  “What 
about before that?” Case asks.  “For somebody else.  Working girl, you know?”41  The 
Deliverator, likewise, “has been working this job for six months, a rich and lengthy 
tenure by his standards,” and then not  a full eighteen pages into Snow Crash he crashes 
his delivery car.  “Hiro…as of thirty seconds ago is no longer the Deliverator.”42  In the 
ensuing chapters, we almost believe Hiro is just plain-old “broke and unemployed”—
until a video-game company offers, nay, begs him to take a steady, high-paying job, and 
he turns it down because “all the programmers have to wear white shirts and show up at 
eight in the morning and sit in cubicles and go to meetings.”43  Case, broke within an inch 
of his life at the start of Neuromancer, would no sooner take this kind of job:  “He 
                                                
40 Elise Hu, “How The Sharing Economy Is Changing The Places We Work,” National Public Radio 
Morning Edition (November 14, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/11/14/244568645/how-the-sharing-economy-is-
changing-the-places-we-work (March 24, 2014).   
41 Gibson, Neuromancer, 30. 
42 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 2, 18.  Literally:  before this moment, with the one aforementioned exception 
about report cards, Hiro is referred to always as The Deliverator, never as Hiro.  After this moment, he is 
always Hiro.  The same thing happens again later on in the book, when a boat called the Kowloon, 
captained by a man named Eliot, capsizes.  Moments later, the narrator explains:  “Eliot used to be the 
skipper of a boat called the Kowloon.  At the moment, he is between jobs.”  Stephenson, Snow Crash, 347. 
43 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 21, 38-39. 
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wondered briefly what it would be like, working all your life for one zaibatsu.  Company 
housing, company hymn, company funeral.”44 
So these cyberpunks are poor, but they’re poor by choice.  Poor because they’re 
too hip to have a steady job.  Poor in the right-wing-stereotype way—not meriting any 
kind of welfare or public service.  (If any were even available in these quasi-anarchic 
worlds, either to our dubiously-deserving heroes or to the genuinely starving masses that 
choke the streets of Stephenson’s Los Angeles.)  Basically, they’re hipster-poor:  too 
poor to afford dwellings nicer than an industrial-chic 20’ x 30’ “U-Stor-It” unit or a 
“coffin” at “Cheap Hotel”—the initial abodes of Hiro and Case, respectively—but never 
too poor for a top-of-the-line computer or “a bottle of expensive beer from the Puget 
Sound area, which Hiro really cannot afford.”45  They may be poor in fiscal capital, for 
the moment, but they’ve got plenty of cultural capital, all the more so for refusing unhip, 
un-neoliberal work.46  When their material poverty get hard to bear, they can always just 
leave—into cyberspace/the Metaverse, where cultural capital is fiscal capital, and they 
are forever wealthy and powerful.47   
                                                
44 Gibson, Neuromancer, 37. 
45 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 21. 
46 Chicago economist Gary Becker, a key player in the neoliberal campaign, might call their capital not 
cultural capital but human capital:  that set of money-making talents and capabilities, acquired mostly 
through various kinds of education and training, that would make a flat-broke Bill Gates (if we can imagine 
such a thing) still a lot richer than a flat-broke you or me, or for that matter, a flat-broke Kim Kardashian.  
See Gary Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to 
Education, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press, 1994).  The relationship between Becker’s 
neoclassical concept of human capital and Bourdieu’s Marxist concept of cultural capital deserves further 
exploration.  It is a fascinating case of convergent intellectual evolution.  The main difference between 
them appears to be that Becker, appropriately enough, assumes a neoliberal-style unified capitalist market 
and reasons (with daunting mathematical complexity) from there, while Bourdieu is more concerned with 
the (often destructive and oppressive) historical and political processes through which these markets are 
formed in the first place. 
47 Cyberspace is “[Case’s] distanceless home, his country.”  “Hiro spends a lot of time in the Metaverse.  It 
beats the shit out of the U-Stor-It.”  Gibson, Neuromancer, 52; and Stephenson, Snow Crash, 24; 
respectively. 
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And by the end of both novels, this capital imbalance is redressed in the “real 
world,” too:  Hiro and Y.T. receive a whopping “twenty-five million Hong Kong 
Dollars” from Uncle Enzo and fellow mega-franchiser Mr. Lee, and Case and Molly are 
“both credited with large amounts in numbered Geneva accounts” by the powerful 
artificial intelligence they succeeded in freeing.48  Not that they ever asked for this 
money, of course.  Case and Hiro and their female sidekicks, it turns out, aren’t actual 
entrepreneurs.  They are spared the tireless, thankless work of running an actual business:  
going to meetings, raising funds, strategically building relationships—i.e., organizing.  
No, they’re idealized entrepreneurs.  They don’t organize, and they don’t have to.  They 
just pursue their own individual passions and do what they love, without regard for 
strategy or power-building or personal gain, and they end up falling ass-backwards into 
money and success and unimaginable agency.  It’s Horatio Alger for the cyber-
generation, a neoliberal fairy tale. 
So this “millennial” lifestyle, this perverse interpretive strategy that transforms 
benefit cuts and decreased job security into feelings of freedom and liberation, wasn’t 
invented by millennials at all.  (At nearly thirty, I am on the elderly side of the millennial 
generation, and Neuromancer was released in the year of my birth.)  It’s actually a 
product of previous generations—who, by the time we came along, had left us with no 
alternative.  Even the gushy NPR piece about Galvanize admits that many of us embrace 
our so-called freedom “out of necessity.”  In the words of MIT researcher Denise Cheng, 
millennials often work so many hours, and in such precarious conditions, because “they 
actually don’t have a lot of the same opportunities…right around the time they were born 
                                                
48 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 394; Gibson, Neuromancer, 268. 
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was when a lot of corporate structures started to change, and those benefits started to go 
away.”49 
But of course, that’s only a problem for the non-elite.  For the “homeowners, red-
faced and sweaty with their own lies, stinking of Old Spice and job-related stress,” who 
“have parallel-parked their bimbo boxes [minivans] in identical computer-designed 
Burbclave street patterns and secreted themselves in symmetrical sheetrock shitholes with 
vinyl floors and ill-fitting woodwork and no sidewalks, vast house farms out in the loglo 
wilderness, a culture medium for a medium culture,” who harass busy Deliverators 
because “against all logic [they] had decided that this was the place to take their personal 
Custerian stand against all that was stale and deadening in their lives.”50  These are the 
losers, the little people in their little boxes made of ticky-tacky, who all look just the 
same and have no agency to speak of.  Not individual.  Not special.  Not worthy of our 
protagonists’ time, or of ours.  Just part of the “biomass.” 
Cyberpunk novels, no less than Atlas Shrugged, encourage their readers to shun 
the biomass—never mind that we’d probably be part of it ourselves.  Like my students, 
shunning the destitute and unattractive miners in Harlan County; and like the pundits of 
Silicon Valley, with their characteristic “lack of empathy for industries and institutions 
that are currently in crisis” (as Morozov observed); we cyberpunk readers are encouraged 
to “worship the god of creative destruction.”51  If life has gotten harder for the 
downtrodden wage-laborers of the world, that’s just the will of the market (or is it the 
Internet?).  And besides, we are not they.  Our proper place is with Hiro, floating above 
                                                
49 Elise Hu, “How The Sharing Economy Is Changing The Places We Work.” 
50 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 3, 191. 
51 Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here, 45, 22. 
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L.A. in a helicopter and loath “to bury himself in it, become a single muddy pixel in some 
airline passenger’s window.  Plunging into the biomass.”52   
He, and by proxy we, are part of a distinct elite.  “The Deliverator belongs to an 
elite order, a hallowed subcategory,” begins the very first sentence of Snow Crash.53  
This line, like so much of the novel, teeters on the brink of self-parody—but Snow Crash 
is no more a parody than Neuromancer is a dystopia.  It’s in fact central to the plots of 
both novels that Hiro and his fellow “hackers”—and Case and his fellow “cowboys”—
constitute what Stephenson calls the “technological” or “technomedia priesthood.”  Like 
the regular priesthood, they may be materially poor, but (in Gibson’s words) they “lived 
for the bodiless exultation of cyberspace…the elite stance involved a certain relaxed 
contempt for the flesh.  The body was meat.”54  And through denying the meat, they 
gained immense, otherworldly power:  the power of “the magic word…true names”—“a 
speech with magical force.  Nowadays, people don’t believe in these kinds of things.  
Except in the Metaverse, that is, where magic is possible.”55   
If you’re in the technological priesthood, you don’t need to organize people, 
money, and ideas to build power.  In the Metaverse, as a lone, isolated hacker, you can 
discover and properly utter the “true name” of a program and successfully bring down 
entire corporations, governments, nations.  When you’ve got that kind of agency, who 
needs a union?  Stephenson goes out of his way to note that unionization is “unheard of, 
                                                
52 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 189. 
53 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 1. 
54 Gibson, Neuromancer, 6.  
55 Gisbon, Neuromancer, 173, 243; Stephenson, Snow Crash, 211.  The Christ-like, transcendent nature of 
cyberpunk agency is particularly apparent in Neuromancer, where contact with powerful Artificial 
Intelligences causes Case to repeatedly flatline—come very close to death—and reawaken with far greater 
knowledge and power.  Maelcum, his Rastafarian ally, wakes him up after one such encounter:  “‘You dead 
awhile there, mon.’  ‘It happens…I’m getting used to it.’  ‘You dealin’ wi’ th’ darkness, mon.’  ‘Only game 
in town, it looks like.’”  Gibson, Neuromancer, 181. 
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for hackers.”56  It goes against the whole aesthetic.  The technological priesthood is made 
up of “young, smart people…who take the risk of living in the city because they like 
stimulation and they know they can handle it.”  “The city,” like “the Internet,” easily 
becomes a stand-in for “the market”:  they face it all alone, unafraid, knowing their 
priestly essence will get them through, safely and prosperously.57   
Cyberpunk novels, in other words, are structured around a culture war.  It may 
look like a war against capitalism, but it is actually a war within capitalism.58  It is a war 
between the old institutionalized capitalism and the new entrepreneurialism-for-all.  Not 
between left and right, but between cool and uncool, between technological priesthood 
and biomass.  It’s the culture war Thomas Frank describes in the story of Gary Aldrich, a 
righteously old-fashioned conservative political writer who is angry that his old-
fashioned conservative values are being shunned by contemporary culture.  Aldrich is 
right, Frank argues—his values are in fact being shunned—but not for the reasons he 
thinks:   
It’s not because radicals have secretly taken over the world that people like the 
intensely anal Aldrich feel so uncomfortable; it’s because the new, turbocharged 
capitalism has no place for hyperorderly, gray-flannel people like him, and it 
informs him of this every chance it gets.  It tweaks a nation of Gary Aldriches in 
all its signature cultural outlets—in management books, TV commercials, and 
Tom Peters PowerPoint presentations.  Consumer capitalism’s only use for such 
ramrod-straight men is in showing them to be visibly upset by the liberating 
potential of some Internet portal or corn chip, filming them as they inveigh 
against some soda pop because it breaks the rules or lets the consumer be an 
individual or tastes too outrageous or whatever.59 
                                                
56 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 115. 
57 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 191-192.  A tech-booster acquaintance of mine once suggested to me that I free 
myself from the shackles of the university—what with its job security and whatnot—and “throw myself 
upon the market.”  (I did not oblige.) 
58 Gibson seems to get this, at least on some level.  His neo-Rastafarian character Maelcum says:  “this no 
m’ fight, no Zion fight.  Babylon fightin’ Babylon, eatin’ I’self, ya know?”  Gibson, Neuromancer, 248. 
59 Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?, 134.  Frank is paraphrasing the argument he made in far greater 
detail in his earlier book The Conquest of Cool.  In brief, Bourdieu-inflected summary:  by the end of the 
1960s, whatever your political persuasion, it was clear that conformity and (traditional) conservatism had 
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This is, basically, the plot of both Neuromancer and Snow Crash—and of so 
many cyberpunk-inspired stories since, from The Matrix to the American film version of 
The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo.  The villains of these stories resemble Gary Aldrich, 
writ large and reductio ad absurdum.  Neuromancer pits Case and Molly against the 
industrial clan of Tessier-Ashpool:  “a very quiet, very eccentric…family, run like a 
corporation,” “a family inbred and most carefully refined.”60  Tessier-Ashpool may own 
many of the world’s biggest technology firms and its two most advanced pieces of 
Artificial Intelligence, but it is distinctly pre-modern:  rife with palace intrigue, betrayal, 
and corruption, and living in a grotesque mansion of endless twisted passages turned in 
on themselves, filled with excessive amounts of expensive European bric-a-brac, which 
“smelled faintly musty, faintly perfumed, like a church.”61   
Snow Crash, in its usual quasi-mockery, gives us “L. Bob Rife, last of the 
nineteenth-century monopolists”:  a cartoon supervillain you love to hate, equal parts H. 
L. Hunt and L. Ron Hubbard.  His goal is, very simply, world domination:  not only over 
the world’s capital but also, literally, over every person’s mind.  Why?  We never really 
find out.  Hiro suggests “he wants to be Ozymandias, King of Kings”—but that’s about it.  
Presumably he wants it for its own sake, because that’s the kind of guy he is.  He owns 
the entire worldwide network on which the Metaverse operates.  His ultimate aim is to 
force the entire world speak a unified language, which Rife can then control through 
                                                                                                                                            
lost much of their previous market value, and that the value of nonconformity and rebellion had spiked.  
Corporate culture, no less than student and activist culture, was affected by this massive shift in the cultural 
market.  Advertising executives were particularly sensitive to it—and used it to their advantage.  The 
airwaves became flooded with ads that suggested that to purchase a whole range of products was in fact to 
challenge “The Man”—which resulted, in classic Kansan fashion, in His pockets being lined all the more.  
60 Gibson, Neuromancer, 75, 101. 
61 Gibson, Neuromancer, 178. 
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antennas implanted literally into people’s brains.  He’s a Texas oilman with a “steerlike 
body” and waxed moustache who speaks “with an incredibly sardonic and contemptuous 
twang, the exaggerated accent of a cowboy who suspects that some Yankee pencilneck is 
looking down his nose at him.”62 
In the history of the modern West, there are two main groups of people who have 
opposed these kinds of big bourgeoisie.  There are the revolutionaries, who oppose them 
because they exploit workers’ labor, and then there are the avant-gardists, who oppose 
them because they’re aesthetically boring.  It’s not always easy to tell these two groups 
apart:  they both skew young and countercultural, and they often share a similar 
language—Marxism and communism, in the early twentieth century; anarchism and 
libertarianism, now.  But they are two very different groups of people, who oppose the 
bourgeoisie for very different reasons, and with very different results.63   
Cyberpunks are avant-gardists, not revolutionaries.  It’s true that Gibson didn’t 
much like Singapore, but save a few perfunctory references to repressive law-
enforcement tactics, his main issue was that it was “boring.”  There was no exciting, 
crumbling Night City-esque district where “the underlying social mechanisms” were 
revealed.  The most happening clubs still felt painfully “G-rated.”  And if you were 
looking for any, ahem, services beyond a “heterosexual hand-job” at the mall, you’d need 
to go off-island.64  Same goes for the protagonists of Snow Crash and Neuromancer.  
Yes, they are sometimes put off by how Rife and Tessier-Ashpool exploit and oppress 
untold numbers of people, but they, too, will shamelessly off the odd Turk, “Jeek,” or 
                                                
62 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 113-117, 406. 
63 I am paraphrasing Raymond Williams—specifically, his posthumously-published essays “The Politics of 
the Avant-Garde” and “Language and the Avant-Garde,” in The Politics of Modernism:  Against the New 
Conformists (New York:  Verso, 1989):  49-80. 
64 Gibson, “Disneyland with the Death Penalty.” 
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“Refus” who’s standing in their way.  No, the villains’ real sins are sins of style.  They 
are old-fashioned and unhip.  Rife, especially, is a militant prude who spies on his 
employees in their bedrooms and fires them for having oral sex—and tells awful dad-
jokes about people like Rockefeller and Vanderbilt (whoever they are)—which are not 
funny—but he laughs at them anyway.65  Near the end of Snow Crash, when Y.T. finds 
herself riding captive in a helicopter with Rife and the President of (what’s left of) the 
United States, she feels zero dread, fear, or awe.  Just contempt:  she “is totally 
embarrassed to be seen with this dull assortment of old farts.”66   
But the cyberpunk villains’ most damning sin, the sin that marks them as 
cyberpunk villains, is that they stand in the way of the unfettered progress of the 
market/Internet.  They are the embodiment of SOPA and PIPA and the NSA and the 
RIAA and the FCC, the worst nightmare of technological freedom and openness, the 
Author.  They must be killed—their demise, and the neoliberal market unification it 
occasions, is the mark of a cyberpunk happy ending—but before that, they must be 
scorned.  Along with the rest of the non-priestly biomass:  the hapless burbclave-
dwellers—and that last, even more pathetic obstacle to market unification, government.  
Another recent Public Radio story on “millennials” reported that “more than three-
quarters of young voters in a recent survey said they did not trust government to do the 
right thing most of the time,” and Morozov observes that “a strong antigovernment 
sentiment—that it’s always a parasite on innovation—is a recurring feature of the geek 
                                                
65 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 113-115. 
66 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 441. 
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mentality, which is partly responsible for the disgust many geeks feel toward politics.”67  
(This, despite the immense amounts of funding the U.S. government plowed into the 
development of the Internet, without which it might not exist at all.) 
This feeling of contempt toward government, and political (non-market) agency 
of any kind, runs through the whole genre of cyberpunk.  In an unimportant moment 
early in Neuromancer, Case “punched himself down a wall of primitive ice [firewall] 
belonging to the New York Public Library”—primitive, defenseless, hopeless.68  For 
Gibson, as for post-1968 radicals both left and right, the government is basically the 
police:  the New York Public Library aside, all we see of government in Neuromancer 
are cops, who are always counterproductive, or too late to help, or both.  The remains of 
the U.S. government in Snow Crash are a deformed lovechild of Kafka and Koestler:  an 
impenetrable bureaucracy whose employees are “intended to be interchangeable parts,” 
denied their own individual workstations because that would reflect “inadequate team 
spirit,” monitored in their every move by a “central computer [that] notices just about 
everything,” and—just in case the point wasn’t clear—required to spend a full 15.62 
minutes reading the latest updated regulations for toilet-paper sharing in the office, which 
consume a full five pages of the novel.69  The government has become so unimportant, so 
irrelevant, that when the President comes aboard the helicopter with Rife and Y.T., no 
one even recognizes him.70   
                                                
67 “Millennials May Be Growing Fed Up With Politics, Period,” Minonesota Public Radio News (May 21, 
2013), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2013/05/21/daily-circuit-youth-vote (March 27, 2014); Morozov, To 
Save Everything, Click Here, 60. 
68 Gibson, Neuromancer, 56. 
69 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 280-287. 
70 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 425. 
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The governments in both novels are falling apart:  in Neuromancer  “the Pentagon 
and the CIA were being Balkanized, partially dismantled,” and in Snow Crash, “various 
national governments auction[ed] off their possessions.”  Not that anyone seems to mind:  
“most people are not entirely clear on what the word ‘congress’ means.  And even the 
word ‘library’ is getting hazy…as the number of media grew, the material became more 
up to date, and the methods for searching the Library became more and more 
sophisticated, it approached the point where there was no substantive difference between 
the Library of Congress and the Central Intelligence Agency.  Fortuitously, this happened 
just as the government was falling apart anyway.  So they merged and kicked out a big fat 
stock offering.”71 
But why?  What happened?  Gibson gives a boilerplate explanation:  World War 
III happened.  Stephenson is much more radical:  he does not give any explanation at all.  
We’re left to assume that it just happened, that government “withered away” as Marx 
(sort of) predicted it would—leaving us not with socialism, but with an equally idealized 
utopia:  a fully globalized, unified anarcho-capitalist market, complete with 
unprecedented, scary socioeconomic inequality, lawlessness, and environmental 
devastation, but also with the unfathomable erotic excitement of utter individual freedom.  
A world in which Hiro Protagonist, nobody’s right-wing ideologue, could casually 
observe that government “was invented to do stuff that private enterprise doesn’t bother 
with, which means that there’s probably no reason for it.”72 
For us, as for Hiro, this kind of statement might not sound too remarkable.  We 
hear this kind of thing all the time.  But rewind a few decades, go back to the early 1970s 
                                                
71 Gibson, Neuromancer, 83; Stephenson, Snow Crash, 22, 116. 
72 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 437. 
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and try saying something like this.  You’d find yourself getting a lot of weird looks.  
Recall what happened to Barry Goldwater in 1964, when he ran hard against the 
government:  he lost, badly.  Then Richard Nixon, the next Republican to win, famously 
declared himself pro-government.73  It’s not that there weren’t people back then who 
were radically anti-government—of course there were—but they were mostly confined to 
some specific interpretive communities (the John Birch Society, the Ayn Rand folks), 
which much of the rest of America considered “crazy.”   
Something happened in the years since.  Something too drastic and too fast to 
have happened “naturally.”  Somehow, in the space of two decades—less, actually—
some of those “crazy” interpretive communities became mainstream.  To understand how 
this happened, we can’t start in the 1970s.  We need to start long before that, back in the 
pro-government heyday of the 1930s and 40s—when amidst the foment of the New Deal 
and the Popular Front, a handful of dissident Midwestern academics, an Austrian émigré, 
and a Kansas City furniture dealer discovered they might benefit from each other’s 
company—and began a collaboration that would change the world.  
  
                                                
73 “We are all Keynesians now,” Nixon reportedly said when he took the U.S. dollar off the gold standard 
in 1971.  Actually, it appears this phrase was coined by a Time magazine editor in 1965, to summarize a 
much more ambivalent statement by the anti-government neoliberal par excellence, Milton Friedman.  But 
he did say “I am now a Keynesian”—a telling-enough declaration in its own right.  All the relevant links 
are available through “We are All Keynesians Now,” Wikipedia,  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/We_are_all_Keynesians_now (October 31, 2013). 
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Chicago, 1947:  How Neoliberalism Got Organized74 
A group of economists, historians, philosophers, and other students of public 
affairs from Europe and the United States met at Mont Pelerin, Switzerland, from 
April 1st to 10th, 1947, to discuss the crisis of our times….The central values of 
civilisation are in danger.  Over large stretches of the earth’s surface the essential 
conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared.  In others 
they are under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of 
policy.  The position of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively 
undermined by extensions of arbitrary power.  Even that most precious possession 
of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread 
of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a 
minority, seek only to establish a position of power in which they can suppress 
and obliterate all views but their own.  
The group holds that these developments have been fostered by the growth 
of a view of history which denies all absolute moral standards and by the growth 
of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law.  It holds further that 
they have been fostered by a decline of belief in private property and the 
competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated with 
these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be 
effectively preserved.75 
 
 
So began the Statement of Aims of the Mont Pelerin Society, released the year the 
group met for the first time.76  Even a quick glance is enough to see that this rhetoric is 
not your standard technical econ-speak.  No, the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS), which 
would soon become the core of an international organizing campaign, was political from 
the start.77  The organizers of the MPS—who until the mid-1950s would openly call 
                                                
74 There are two ways to interpret the phrase “neoliberalism got organized,” and the way we choose makes 
all the difference.  We could interpret it along the lines of “the books got organized”—there were books 
lying around, and then one day someone up and organized them.  Or we could interpret it along the lines of 
“the block party got organized”—there was no block party before it got organized; it came into being 
through being organized.  Most writing about neoliberalism treats it like a book:  one day some people 
dreamed it up, and later on other people caught on, and it spread.  But historically speaking, that is 
incorrect.  Neoliberalism isn’t a book; it’s a block party.  It’s a political campaign. 
75 From “Statement of Aims,” The Mont Pelerin Society, April 8, 1947.  Frank Hyneman Knight, Papers, 
Box 1, Folder 5, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library. 
76 For a brief history of the MPS, see Dieter Plehwe, “Introduction,” in The Road from Mont Pelerin: 1-44.  
Though the MPS is not the center of political power it once was, it’s still around; you can find them at 
https://www.montpelerin.org/montpelerin/index.html (March 27, 2014). 
77 This campaign, as Mirowski describes it, basically has the structure of a Russian doll—where each layer 
often is kept unaware that the other layers, especially the more inner ones, exist, thereby creating an 
impression of spontaneity and decentralization where the reality was much more organized and centralized.  
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themselves “neoliberals”78—claimed to be responding to an urgent crisis, with human 
freedom itself hanging in the balance.  They would need to take drastic action, lest all be 
lost.  And drastic action was indeed taken:  this mild-mannered “group of economists, 
historians, philosophers, and other students of public affairs” would spend the following 
decades building considerable power, through organized people and money and ideas.  
When a more widely-acknowledged crisis hit, in the early 1970s, they were ready to 
make their move. 
Don’t be fooled by the MPS’s exotic, foreign-sounding name.  It was incorporated 
in Illinois.  More specifically, in the office of the economist Aaron Director—soon to be 
Milton Friedman’s brother-in-law—at the University of Chicago Law School.  To 
understand the MPS, and the work it wrought in the world, we need to understand what 
was happening in a few different departments of the University of Chicago, in the five 
years leading up to 1947.  Back in the ‘40s, the University of Chicago was still a relative 
                                                                                                                                            
The innermost shell (#1) is the Mont Pelerin Society; it remained the major player through the 1970s, while 
keeping an intentionally low profile.  The next shell out (#2) is a core set of academic departments, 
intentionally organized by neoliberals in the decades prior to their triumph (the 1940s-1970s), including the 
University of Chicago, the London School of Economics, L’Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes 
Internationales (Geneva), St. Andrews (Scotland), the University of Freiburg, and the Virginia School.  The 
next shell out (#3) is the group of the special-purpose foundations that funded the promotion of neoliberal 
doctrines over the long span of their development and propagation:  the Volker Fund (the original backer of 
Chicago Economics), the Relm Foundation, the Lilly Endowment, etc.  The next shell out (#4) is the group 
of more general-purpose think-tanks that fund and shelter neoliberal thinkers:  the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, the American Enterprise Institute, the Schweizerisches Institut für Auslandforschung, etc.  Finally, 
the outermost shells—more shells grow, as time goes on and the campaign grows—include specialized 
think tanks to quickly distribute talking points and provide talking heads (e.g. the Cato Institute) and fake 
grassroots (“Astroturf”) organizations to supply local and seemingly-popular support to neoliberal causes 
(e.g. the Koch Brothers’ Americans for Prosperity).  See Mirowski, “Postface,” 428-433. 
78 See Mirowski, “Postface,” 427-428:  “when the early MPS members cast about for a label to attach to the 
as-yet amorphous doctrine they had set out to construct, more often than not they did resort to the term 
neoliberalism….What has led so many subsequent commentators astray is the fact that most MPS members 
stopped using the term sometime in the later 1950s.  Indeed, at that juncture they ceased insisting that a 
rupture with the doctrines of classical liberalism was called for.  This decision to support a public stance 
that the liberalism they championed was an effectively continuous political doctrine from the eighteenth 
century all the way through to their own revisionist meditations (such as endless paeans that it was all in 
Adam Smith) and therefore required no special neologism, turned out to be one of a number of precarious 
balancing acts performed in the course of constructing neoliberalism at the MPS.  The historical fact [was] 
that there nevertheless was a discernible rupture in doctrinal content over the course of roughly 1947-
1980.”   
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n00b.  It was barely fifty years old.  Less than ten years previous it had undergone a 
major upheaval:  the football program got closed, a groundbreaking undergraduate liberal 
arts program got opened, and major progressive pragmatists like John Dewey, George 
Herbert Mead, and Robert Park (teacher of Saul Alinsky) got replaced by conservative 
idealists like Mortimer Adler, John U. Nef, and a little later on, Leo Strauss (teacher of 
Paul Wolfowitz). 
The key figure in this transformation was the University’s young, visionary 
president, Robert Maynard Hutchins.  Hutchins, today, is usually remembered for how he 
revolutionized undergraduate education.  But he was equally revolutionary in his use of 
the university as a base for organizing—including some very significant right-wing 
organizing.  His biographer Harry S. Ashmore observed he “conceived of the university 
as a center of independent thought and criticism, but he also insisted that the task of 
defining the issues affecting society carried with it an obligation to develop and 
propagate the means of resolving them.  The means, by definition, would have to be 
political, and they could not be pursued in an ivory tower.”79   
Hutchins himself, though he would play a central role in organizing some of the 
most powerful right-wing ideas of the twentieth century, was no Republican.  He was 
active in the Chicago Democratic Party; he made speeches advocating increased taxes 
and deficit spending, cutting military expenses, and regulating and even possibly 
nationalizing monopolies; many local conservatives considered him a radical.80  They 
were right.  But his radicalism cut many ways.  His belief in the radical freedom of the 
university made him skeptical of the U.S. government’s massive wartime investment in 
                                                
79 Harry S. Ashmore, Unseasonable Truths:  The Life of Robert Maynard Hutchins (New York:  Little, 
Brown & Co., 1989), xvii. 
80 Ashmore, Unseasonable Truths, 123, 127. 
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higher education—and receptive to the kind of “private antistatist funding” that would be 
instrumental in building neoliberalism.81  And his belief that while “the bulk of human 
conduct is not controlled by reason, but by social conditioning,” people should still be 
educated under  the assumption that people are guided by reason, because that’s “what 
ought to be,” put him in the same camp as many neo-Platonist philosophers, including 
those who would be instrumental in neoconservatism.82   
And Hutchins had no qualms about building and using his power to reshape his 
university in his image.  Hutchins hired Great Books founder Mortimer Adler, who 
firmly shared the president’s rational-education convictions, over the objections of nearly 
every professor in the departments of philosophy, sociology, economics, and political 
science, because Hutchins was able to leverage his relationships with the University 
trustees.83  Likewise, he considered bringing the neoconservative political philosopher 
Leo Strauss to Chicago “one of the great triumphs of my career”—even going so far as to 
place his own name on Strauss’s endowed chair.84  In the 1940s, Hutchins would 
                                                
81 Rob van Horn and Philip Mirowski, “The Rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth of 
Neoliberalism,” in The Road from Mont Pelerin, ed. Mirowski and Plehwe:  139-178, 151.  Van Horn and 
Mirowski have done some of the most important revisionist history of the Chicago school, and have more 
recently published an entire edited volume on the subject, emphasizing the organizing that produced, 
sustained, and altered the school’s academic production from the 1940s to the present:  Building Chicago 
Economics: New Perspectives on the History of America's Most Powerful Economics Program, ed. Rob 
van Horn and Philip Mirowski (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
82 Robert Maynard Hutchins, letter to Frank H. Knight, John U. Nef, and Robert Redfield, March 6, 1942.  
University of Chicago, Committee on Social Thought, Records, Box 1, Folder 2, Special Collections 
Research Center, University of Chicago Library. 
83 Ashmore, Unseasonable Truths, 86, 112.  
84 Robert Maynard Hutchins, letter to Leo Strauss, April 13, 1959.  Leo Strauss, Papers, Box 2, Folder 4, 
Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.  He added, several years later:  “I 
hope you live forever.  I do not want anybody else to be the Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished 
Service Professor.”  (Robert Maynard Hutchins, letter to Leo Strauss, September 22, 1965.  Strauss, Papers, 
Box 2, Folder 4.)  Indeed, so great was Hutchins’s enthusiasm for bringing Strauss to Chicago that Strauss 
eventually wrote Hutchins the following telegram, reproduced here in its entirety:  “ACCEPTING 
INVITATION STOP WRITING.”  (Leo Strauss, telegram to Robert Maynard Hutchins, September 13, 
1948.  Strauss, Papers, Box 4, Folder 9.)  Strauss, contrary to popular belief, was never actually a member 
of the Committee on Social Thought, but he mentored many students there and maintained close positive 
relationships with faculty on the Committee. 
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personally and intimately oversee the creation of the Committee on Social Thought, that 
center of right-wing philosophical thought that would include culture warriors like Allan 
Bloom and neoliberals like Friedrich August von Hayek (about whom much more, 
presently).   
Hutchins’s anti-statism, Platonism, and disposition toward active organizing go a 
long way toward explaining the early history of neoliberalism.  Neoliberalism, an 
explicitly political project funded by deeply interested outside sources, was an unusual 
kind of project for an academic institution to take on; the University of Chicago, in Aaron 
Director’s words, “was the only place that was likely to accept such a project.”85  The 
project—which some key participants called a “scheme”86—was hatched in April of 
1945, when an Austrian economist met a Kansas City furniture dealer.   
The furniture dealer was Harold Luhnow, president of William Volker & Co. 
and—in the words of historians Philip Mirowski and Rob van Horn— “a strident anti-
New Deal conservative [who] was then in the process of converting a philanthropic fund 
originally intended to help the citizens of Kansas City into something completely 
different:  a foundation to promote a rethinking of liberal politics in America.”  (I find 
something positively nefarious and Rife-like about turning a civic-interest fund into a far-
right think tank, but that’s just my opinion.)  The economist was Friedrich Hayek, best 
known as the author of The Road to Serfdom, the 1944 bestseller that Glenn Beck and 
Ron Paul trot out to prove that government intervention in the economy is tantamount to 
fascism.  (Hayek’s argument is actually a great deal more subtle, but that’s another story.)  
What’s less well-known, but critically important, is that Hayek was also a very talented 
                                                
85 van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 151. 
86 van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 150.  This language was used by Hayek and economist Henry Simons, 
central to the project until his suicide in 1946, possibly among others. 
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organizer, who would leverage the interests and resources of Luhnow and Hutchins to 
build a powerful worldwide intellectual organization on a scale far greater than either of 
his funders had imagined.87 
Hayek and Luhnow made a simple plan:  bring together a group of prominent 
right-wing, anti-government economists to launch a “Free Market Study,” with the goal 
of producing an American version of The Road to Serfdom, which would nudge the 
American public to the right on economic issues.  Luhnow contributed about $95,000 
(about a million 2014 dollars) over the next five years.88  Hayek built and strengthened 
relationships with leading lights of right-wing economics, and drew several of them to 
Chicago—among them Director, who in turn convinced the University of Chicago Press 
to publish The Road to Serfdom, and Milton Friedman, who would eventually write the 
American Road of Luhnow’s dreams, the 1962 bestseller Capitalism and Freedom.  He 
also convinced Luhnow, despite the latter’s initial reservations, to fund a great deal of the 
Mont Pelerin Society, which would make Chicago’s message go global.89 
Like all organizing, no matter how well funded, it wasn’t ever smooth or easy.  
The building of the “Free Market Study” was hampered by key participants backing out, 
disagreeing, or even dying; by Luhnow questioning Hayek’s decisions and threatening to 
cut the funding; and by other power players in and around the University not 
                                                
87 Van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 141. 
88 Van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 155:  Luhnow’s Volker fund contributed “$25,000 per annum for three 
years,” and in addition, “a further amount of not more than $10,000 per annum for a period of two years to 
cover the salary of Mr. Director for the period of two years after the investigation is completed.  Also we 
agree to defray the expenses of the members of the Advisory Committee as they are brought to Chicago for 
a discussion of this study, this also to include the expenses of Dr. Hayek for any trips he makes to Chicago 
in further supervision of this project.”  
89 Van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 149-150.  They add:  “It is important to realize that, for Hayek, these 
negotiations over Chicago and the parallel construction of what became Mont Pelerin were all part of the 
same common endeavor.” 
   134 
 
cooperating.90  Still, setbacks notwithstanding, the “scheme” went on. Its goal, which 
grew far beyond the writing of a single book, was to create a new kind of “liberal” 
economics, “better suited to modern conditions” than the classical liberalism of Smith or 
Mill.91 
What were these “modern conditions”?  Above all, there was the condition of 
corporate monopoly.  Classical liberals like Smith were very concerned about monopoly; 
they feared those conspiracies against the consumer and contrivances to raise prices, and 
they sometimes supported government action to break up monopolies and near-
monopolies and keep the market competitive—truly free, as they understood it.  This 
definition of “freedom” would not do for Luhnow and his fellow neoliberal-backers, 
often monopolists themselves, who had no interest in bankrolling an idea that would put 
them out of business:  for neoliberals, “free markets” meant “guaranteeing the freedom of 
corporations to conduct their affairs as they wished.”  Luhnow had each member of the 
Chicago Free Market Study’s Advisory Committee pre-screened to ensure conformity to 
this pro-corporate position, and “Hayek had no option but to agree.”92   
Another aspect of these new “modern conditions”—as World War II eased into 
the Cold War—was a very different relationship to the government and state power.  
Where classical liberals worried about too much government involvement in the 
economy, the monopolistic corporations that backed neoliberalism “did not fear 
concentrations of power and generally favored the existence of a powerful Cold War 
                                                
90 Van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 148.  See also van Horn, “Reinventing Monopoly and the Role of 
Corporations:  The Roots of Chicago Law and Economics,” in The Road from Mont Pelerin, 204-237, 
especially 208-209:  around 1950, apparently, Luhnow almost fired Director—a moment, please, to 
meditate on the absurdity of a Kansas City furniture company with the power to fire a University of 
Chicago professor—for being too classically liberal and not sufficiently neoliberal, especially regarding the 
crucial issue of monopoly.  (See below.) 
91 Van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 160. 
92 Van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 155-158. 
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state”—which provided them generous techno-science and military contracts and offered 
its services in forcibly opening and “freeing” the markets of many Third World countries.  
Free markets, neoliberals understood,  
must be constructed, and will not come about ‘naturally’ in the absence of 
concerted effort….‘The Market’ would not naturally conjure the conditions for its 
own continued flourishing, so neoliberalism is first and foremost a theory of how 
to reengineer the state in order to guarantee the success of the market and its most 
important participants, modern corporations.  Neoliberals accept the (Leninist?) 
precept that they must organize politically to take over a strong government, and 
not simply predict it will ‘wither away.’93   
 
Neoliberals, in other words, are not “conservative” in any normal sense.  For 
better or worse, they are radical revolutionaries, no less than the Leninists they often 
emulate.  Yet unlike many left-wing radicals, they’re very coy about their radicalism.  To 
hear them tell it—since the mid-‘50s, at least, when they stopped calling themselves 
“neoliberals” in public—they’re just carrying on the two-hundred-year-old tradition of 
classical liberalism.  But in practice—and in private—they’re very aware that what 
they’ve created is something radically new.  Milton Friedman summed up this 
contradiction in a joking letter he wrote to Hayek about the Mont Pelerin Society:  “our 
faith requires that we are skeptical of the efficacy, at least in the short run, of [our own] 
organized efforts to promulgate [the creed].”94   
Friedman and Hayek were very aware that their conscious, strategic, well-funded 
organizing effort, with its goal to seize (not destroy) state power and use it to create “free 
markets” (which were supposed to occur naturally, without their help), ran contrary to the 
positions they took in public.  It was a cynical bait-and-switch:  neoliberals organized 
themselves politically; they took control of governments and used them to create markets 
                                                
93 Van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 161.  Emphasis (and parentheses) in original. 
94 Van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 160. 
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that were most friendly to their corporate backers, sometimes by force; and then they 
turned around and accused anyone trying to organize against them for going against the 
“natural will” of the “free market.”95 
It’s this characteristic rhetorical strategy, above all else, that unites all the right-
wing organizing of ideas that was going on at Chicago in the mid-1940s.  It’s a strategy 
described most famously by Chicago neoconservative Leo Strauss—whom Hayek knew 
personally, and deeply admired96—as the difference between the “esoteric” truth, which 
only the elite/insiders can know, and the “exoteric” message (or “noble lie”), which gets 
                                                
95 This same bait-and-switch rhetoric is also common among cyberpunks.  As Morozov explains:  
“Whenever you hear someone tell you, ‘This is not how the Internet works,’—as technology bloggers are 
wont to inform everyone who cares to read their scribblings—you should know that your interlocutor 
believes your views to be reactionary and antimodern….Tacitly, of course, the geeks do acknowledge that 
there is nothing permanent about ‘the Internet’; that’s why they lined up to oppose the Stop Online Privacy 
Act (SOPA), which—oh, the irony—threatened to completely alter ‘how the Internet works.’  So, no 
interventions will work ‘on the Internet’—except for those that will.  SOPA was a bad piece of legislation, 
but there’s odd about how the geeks can simultaneously claim that the Internet is fixed and permanent and 
work extremely hard in the background to keep it that way.”  See Morozov, To Save Everything, Click 
Here, 18-19. 
96 Friedrich A. Hayek, letter to Leo Strauss, undated.  Leo Strauss, Papers, Box 2, Folder 1:  “I had hoped 
that your note saying that you were unable to come to the Seminar refered [sic] only to the first meeting, 
but I am now beginning to fear that it may have meant to cover the quarter.  I should be exceedingly sorry 
if that were the case, but I am not yet prepared to give up hope altogether that I may not at least be able to 
persuade you not only to come to the one meeting where we should need your help most but even to open 
the discussion with a brief statement of the problem, which you are better qualified to do than anybody I 
know.  It is the meeting on February 7 on ‘Natural Justice and Positive Law and the Concepts of Law and 
Justice.’  Is there any hope that you will find this possible?”  The connection between the economics 
department (neoliberalism) and the Committee on Social Thought (neoconservatism)—linked, above all, by 
Hayek’s own appointment to Social Thought—which is so crucial to a full understanding of the ideas being 
organized at Chicago in the 1940s, has gone curiously under-reported in extant histories, including van 
Horn and Mirowski’s.  The organizing of the Committee on Social Thought and the reorganizing of the law 
and economics departments—culminating in the founding of the MPS—overlap in lots of ways.  They were 
happening at the same time, in the same place, and they involved many of the same people.  Besides 
Hutchins, there were the economists Frank H. Knight and John U. Nef, who were founding members of 
both Social Thought and MPS, and there was Hayek himself:  the lead organizer of MPS and the Free 
Market Study, who himself was denied a place on the economics faculty and ended up getting appointed, 
presumably by Hutchins, to the Committee on Social Thought.  The neoconservatives of Social Thought 
and the neoliberals of economics/MPS shared not just people, but also ideas.  In particular, they both 
believed that the individual human being is—or should be, and therefore should be made to be—rational 
and calculating.  That is, they both intentionally and proudly conflate is and ought, and advocate for 
intentional action (including political action) to make it so.  See van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 159, 165. 
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told to the masses.97  It also has roots in the legal theories of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, 
a mentor of Strauss’s and an inspiration for Hayek and many other neoliberals—who, 
unsurprisingly, argued for a strong and powerful sovereign ruler, whom he defined as “he 
who decides on the state of exception”—that is, on those situations where the normal 
rules (including of law) do not apply.98   
Put Schmitt and Strauss together, and you get the whole strategy.  First, organize 
enough people and money, from whatever sources necessary, to build a base.  Second, 
claim a state of exception:  the founding document of the Mont Pelerin Society warned 
“the central values of civilisation are in danger,” and one of the founding documents of 
the Committee on Social Thought described the Committee’s work as “the mission to 
which [they are] called by the crisis of modern civilization.”99  Finally, using that state of 
exception as cover, do whatever questionable deeds you need to do to build power (e.g., 
repress democracy using military force to establish a “free” market in Chile).  You’ll be 
able to explain what you’re doing honestly (esoterically) to the elites, who’ll understand 
(and be profiting from it, and probably paying for it).  As for the masses, they’re too 
dumb to understand something so complex—just feed them an exoteric noble lie (you’re 
                                                
97 See Leo Strauss, “Persecution and the Art of Writing,” in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, 
IL:  Free Press, 1952):  22-37.  My explanation is massively reductive does not at all do justice to Strauss’s 
subtle, complex argument:  I am summarizing Strauss as he has been received, not necessarily Strauss as 
he himself intended.  
98 Mirowski argues, further:  “For Hayek and the neoliberals, the Führer was replaced by the figure of the 
entrepreneur, the embodiment of the will-to-power for the community, who must be permitted to act 
without being brought to rational account.  While Hayek probably believed that he was personally 
defending liberalism from Schmitt’s withering critique, his own political solution ended up resembling 
Schmitt’s ‘total state’ far more than he cared to admit.”  See Mirowski, “Postface,” 443-446.  See also Carl 
Schmitt, Political Theology:  Four Chapters on the Question of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab 
(Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press, 1985), especially 5-15. 
99 John U. Nef, letter to Ralph W. Tyler, September 11, 1953 (“Personal and Confidential; A Plan for 
Strengthening the Committee on Social Thought”).  University of Chicago, Committee on Social Thought, 
Records, Box 2, Folder 3. 
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stopping the Communists, fighting for individual freedom to choose, etc.), and they’ll 
believe it. 
This is the same, deeply anti-democratic elitism that leads cyberpunks—in novels 
and in real life—to claim that the Internet shouldn’t be regulated because it’s too 
“complex” for lawmakers (let alone the “sheeple”) to understand, and so inherently good 
and right “that it lies beyond the means of democratic representation.”  These kinds of 
claims are often couched in state-of-exception language, either in the bad way, warning 
that “some dark, evil force—Hollywood, the National Security Agency, China, Apple—is 
about to ‘break the Internet,’” or in the good way, “presuming that we are living through 
revolutionary times” that are “so monumental and inevitable that all resistance seems 
futile,” which in turn “sanctions radical social inventions that might otherwise attract a lot 
of suspicion and criticism.”100 
Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom, the 1962 book that finally fulfilled Harold 
Luhnow’s wishes for (and expenditures on) an American Road to Serfdom, follows this 
same rhetorical strategy.  It is a work more of dogma than of science.  It doesn’t make 
arguments based on evidence; it makes bold proclamations about how the market does, 
should, and must work.  In 1962, these arguments were radical and out-there and out of 
sync with how the world worked; as the neoliberals took power over the next few 
decades, they brought the world closer and closer into alignment with Friedman’s 
descriptions.101  Friedman himself, of course, would play a big part in this process—
especially starting in the early 1970s, when the economy stalled, a state of exception was 
declared and accepted, and Friedman and his neoliberal colleagues became sovereign. 
                                                
100 Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here, 18, 34, 36, 52. 
101 See van Horn and Mirowski, “Rise,” 166-167. 
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Washington, 1974:  Exploiting “The Crisis” 
The ending of Snow Crash, written in the bullish years after 1989, is pretty darn 
happy.  (At least if you like capitalism.)  Rife is dead; his plans for world domination are 
thwarted; the market is relieved of its last remaining monopolist.  Hiro and Y.T. are both 
rich and happy and free to go home to their respective happy relationships:  Hiro with 
Juanita, the xkcd-chic programmer-girl of his dreams; Y.T., still fifteen, with her mom.  
“Yeah,” Y.T. says to her mom in the book’s last line, “home seems about right.”102 
The ending of Neuromancer, written nearly a decade earlier, is more complicated.  
It’s similarly “happy” in broad outline:  Tessier-Ashpool is defeated, the market is freed, 
and Case and Molly both go home rich and successful.  But what actually got 
accomplished?  There was no world-domination plot to thwart.  Besides some icky 
parricide and incest and embezzlement, there’s no evidence that Tessier-Ashpool was 
doing anything bad.  They simply existed, as a human- and history-based anachronism, 
on a market that had entered the era of posthuman transcendence.103  Case and Molly 
brought them down because they were being paid (and in Case’s case, otherwise coerced) 
by an extremely powerful Artificial Intelligence named Wintermute, created and owned 
by the Tessier-Ashpools, that wanted to be free of its human leash.  At the end of the 
                                                
102 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 468. 
103 Case ruminates on this anachronism in his most politically-savvy moment:  “Power, in Case’s world, 
meant corporate power.  The zaibatsus, the multinationals that had shaped the course of human history, had 
transcended old barriers.  Viewed as organisms, they had attained a kind of immortality.  You couldn’t kill 
a zaibatsu by assassinating a dozen key executives; there were others waiting to step up the ladder, assume 
the vacated position, access the vast banks of corporate memory.  But Tessier-Ashpool wasn’t like that, and 
he sensed the difference in the death of its founder.  T-A was an atavism, a clan.”  Gibson, Neuromancer, 
203. 
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novel, this happened.  Wintermute took over and in fact became the entire Matrix:  “the 
sum total of the works, the whole show.”  With what result?  Nobody knows.104 
Except there’s one thing we do know.  We know it from Case, who in the 
moments before he brought the whole house down, found himself in the absurd position 
of screaming at 3Jane, the last remaining daughter of the Tessier-Ashpool clan, begging 
her desperately for the final secret code he needed to complete his destruction of her 
family:  “Give us the fucking code….If you don’t, what’ll change?  What’ll ever fucking 
change for you?  You’ll wind up like the old man.  You’ll tear it all down and start 
building again!  You’ll build the walls back, tighter and tighter….I got no idea at all 
what’ll happen if Wintermute wins, but it’ll change something!”105 
I can’t imagine a clearer or sadder rendition of “there is no alternative.”  As Case 
says, there are only two options:  to stay where you are and let the world pass you by, or 
to neoliberalize.  (The empty downtowns of so many second- and third-tier American 
cities, cleansed of their local establishments and populations in a desperate effort to 
“attract capital,” bear witness to this reality.)   
Snow Crash has made its peace with TINA.  Neuromancer still isn’t so sure.  Its 
penultimate image is one of perfect transcendent agency:  Case jacks into the Matrix, 
looks way up, and sees a holy trinity lording peacefully over all things below—the little 
Brazilian boy who represents the newly-unified and liberated A.I. (called Neuromancer); 
Case’s tragically-murdered ex-lover Linda Lee (through whom Neuromancer 
communicated with Case); and Case himself.  There he stood, the Joseph of cyberspace, 
                                                
104 Gibson, Neuromancer, 269. 
105 Gibson, Neuromancer, 260.  Emphasis in original. 
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having achieved the maximum agency he could ever possibly imagine himself achieving 
as a worker-qua-entrepreneur in the cyberpunk-neoliberal age.   
But that’s not where it ends.  It ends with Molly.  Molly, who had honeymooned 
with Case since they’d defeated Tessier-Ashpool together.  Molly, who after remaining 
distant for nearly 200 pages—even during their frequent intimacy and lovemaking—had 
finally opened up to Case about her fears, her loneliness, her past.  Who’d told Case 
“‘while I’m feeling confessional, baby, I gotta admit…you’re the only good change come 
down since I signed on with [their boss] Armitage….Not that you’re all that shit hot.’  
She smiled.”  Who’d opened Case up and shared his rare moments of humanity and 
humor.  “She was gone,” without warning.  She’d left behind this note:  “HEY ITS 
OKAY BUT ITS TAKING THE EDGE OFF MY GAME, I PAID THE BILL 
ALREADY.  ITS THE WAY IM WIRED I GUESS, WATCH YOUR ASS OKAY? 
XXX MOLLY.”  The novel ends with the words:  “He never saw Molly again.”106 
Like good cyberpunk protagonists, their relationship was defined by business.  
They were always “partners,” first and foremost, like Hiro and Y.T. (who calls Hiro 
“Pod” throughout Snow Crash), and pretty much every other cyberpunk couple.  Their 
relationship doesn’t, won’t, can’t last beyond the end of their joint entrepreneurial 
venture.  (Once Hiro completes his final task of neutralizing the Snow Crash virus in the 
Metaverse, ten pages before the end of the novel, we never hear of him again.)  Like 
heroes in an Ayn Rand novel, if they let themselves become permanently part of a 
collective, even with fellow transcendent cyberpunk agents, they will lose their boundless 
individual potential.  It’ll take the edge off their game.  And that’s not the way they’re 
wired.   
                                                
106 Gibson, Neuromancer, 176-178, 189, 267, 270-271. 
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Cyberpunk stories are, in a sense, coming-of-age stories.  Stephenson describes 
the house of Hiro’s estranged friend (former business partner) Da5id—and sums up 
Hiro’s lost youth—as follows:  “The house is a sort of modernist castle with a high turret 
on one end.  Da5id and Hiro and the rest of the hackers used to go up there with a case of 
beer and a hibachi and just spend a whole night, eating jumbo shrimp and crab legs and 
oysters and washing them down with beer.  Now it’s deserted, of course, just the hibachi, 
which is rusted and almost buried in gray ash, like an archaeological relic.”107  Once upon 
a time, Hiro existed happily in a group, a collective, almost a family.  Now, having come 
of age and faced the harsh realities of the “real world,” he knows that this kind of life is 
not possible—there is no alternative to basic, existential aloneness, and he’s got to be 
okay with this.  Stephenson, basically, seems okay with it.  Gibson, somewhat less so.  
But he, too, is forced to admit it’s a real thing.  It’s the reality that they, and their 
characters, and we, must come to terms with, however painful it may be.   
It’s the reality of a perennially unstable market—even now, years after we 
supposedly came out of the recession.  It’s the reality of never being sure you’ll have a 
steady job, with good pay and benefits and security.  It’s the reality that you could have 
your closest relationships severed from you, at any time, on a whim.  It’s the reality of a 
market where you get less and your boss keeps more, where you don’t matter much if 
you’re a worker.  A market set up to benefit the owners, the capitalists—the bigger, the 
better.  A market the neoliberals started dreaming about in the 1930s and 40s, and which 
started to become real at the same moment Gibson and Stephenson started writing.       
It didn’t become real by accident.  Nor was it inevitable, or the result of “market 
forces.”  It was carefully planned, organized, and executed.  It was, in the words of some 
                                                
107 Stephenson, Snow Crash, 190. 
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of its own organizers, a “selling job.”  “Nothing that this nation, or any other nation has 
done in modern history compares in difficulty with the selling job that must now be done 
to make people accept the new reality,” wrote the editors of Business Week in 1974.  In 
this new reality, “some people will obviously have to do with less…cities and states, the 
home mortgage market, small business and the consumer will all get less than they 
want…it will be a hard pill for many Americans to swallow—the idea of doing with less 
so that big business can have more.”108   
It was the same year when a “collective sadness” had overtaken Americans, 
according to historian and organizer Michael Harrington.  The country seemed to be “in 
mourning for a dying era,” labor historian Jefferson Cowie observed, as it felt “the 
promise of modernity itself slipping out of reach.”  In the past year, Americans had felt 
the start of an economic downturn from which it would never, really, recover.  “Above 
                                                
108 Harry C. Boyte, The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen Movement (Philadelphia, 
PA:  Temple University Press, 1980), 225n-226n.  Nowhere was this selling job more dramatically 
represented than in the 1976 film Network.  Not in the scene we all know—where crazed anchorman 
Howard Beale (played by Peter Finch) inspires America to get up and shout, “I’m as mad as hell and I’m 
not going to take it anymore!”—but much later in the movie, after Beale has inspired a nationwide anti-
corporate movement and made his network’s holding company very, very nervous.  In the scene I’m 
talking about, Beale meets chairman of the board Arthur Jensen (played by Ned Beatty), who ushers Beale 
into a giant, empty conference room, tells Beale, “I’d like to try and sell something to you,” blacks out the 
lights, and bellows:  “You have meddled with the primal forces of nature, Mr. Beale, and I won't have it, is 
that clear?!…You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoples.  There are no nations!  There 
are no peoples!…There is only one holistic system of systems, one vast and immane, interwoven, 
interacting, multi-variate, multi-national dominion of dollars!…It is the international system of currency 
that determines the totality of life on this planet!  That is the natural order of things today!  That is the 
atomic, subatomic and galactic structure of things today!  And you have meddled with the primal forces of 
nature, and you will atone!…You get up on your little twenty-one inch screen, and howl about America and 
democracy.  There is no America.  There is no democracy.  There is only IBM and ITT and AT&T and 
Dupont, Dow, Union Carbide and Exxon.  Those are the nations of the world today.…We no longer live in 
a world of nations and ideologies, Mr. Beale.  The world is a college of corporations, inexorably 
determined by the immutable by-laws of business.  The  world is a business, Mr. Beale!  It has been 
since man crawled out of the slime, and our children, Mr. Beale, will live to see that perfect world in which 
there is no war and famine, oppression and brutality—one vast and ecumenical holding company, for 
whom all men will work to serve a common profit, in which all men will hold a share of stock, all 
necessities provided, all  anxieties tranquilized, all boredom amused.”  The selling job is a success.  Beale 
is convinced.  And he is depressed.  He goes on TV and tries to preach this gospel of postmodern neoliberal 
powerlessness.  It doesn’t go well.  See Paddy Chayefsky, Network, DVD, directed by Sidney Lumet (Los 
Angeles:  MGM/UA, 1976).   
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all, the mid-1970s marked the end of the postwar boom.  The years prior to the 1973-74 
crisis had been the most economically egalitarian time in U.S. history, the point on the 
graph where the bounty was shared most equitably, and unemployment was at historic 
lows.  The year 1972 was also the apex of earnings for male workers.  Starting in the 
1973-74 years, real earnings began to stagnate and then slide.”109  This downturn had 
various and still-debated causes, from the rebuilding of Europe and Asia to the 
development of new communication and transportation technologies to the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods agreements to the massive amounts of money being spent on the 
Vietnam War.  And it was at this moment—the moment of crisis, of the state of 
exception, when the economic order was breaking down, and the old models seemed like 
they were no longer working—that the neoliberals, after thirty years of quiet organizing, 
finally made their move. 
When it happened, it happened quickly.  During the recession of 1974-1975, the 
Ford administration would still “increase spending to reduce unemployment and boost 
demand”—a classic New Deal, pro-government response.  But four years later, in the 
recession of 1979, the Carter administration responded neoliberally—with big public 
spending cuts.  “There was irony in a Republican administration increasing spending and 
a Democratic administration choosing deregulation and tax cuts.  In between, however, 
was…a watershed in postwar history.”  A new historical agent had emerged:  “an 
enormous corporate lobby at every level of government that fiercely opposed 
democratizing reform and that had an aggressive counter-agenda of its own.”110  “‘With 
top corporate leaders now out in front, the business lobby is bigger and more influential 
                                                
109 Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 12. 
110 Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 233; Boyte, The Backyard Revolution, 8. 
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than ever,’ exalted a Fortune reporter.  ‘Suddenly business seems to possess all the 
primary instruments of power—the leadership, the strategy, the supporting troops, the 
campaign money—and a new will to use them.’”111  They rolled back social spending, 
redesigned tax policy, “mounted a massive ideological and cultural offensive” to shift 
public opinion in favor of corporate rule, and most of all, busted lots and lots of unions, 
with a fervor not seen since the epic labor battles of the early twentieth century.112 
This new corporate lobby had Chicago written all over it.  Its policy demands 
perfectly reflected the hopes and dreams of Harold Luhnow.  Its zeal in seizing and using 
state power befitted an idea that was organized, and political, from the very start.  Its 
language, from the 1974 Business Week editorial onward, could have come right out of 
the Committee on Social Thought or the Mont Pelerin Society.  And one of its most 
prominent voices was Chicago’s own Milton Friedman, who “was awarded the Nobel 
Prize for economics in 1976 as his thinking flooded into the intellectual void.”113  In this 
moment of crisis—however real and/or manufactured—it was only the neoliberals who 
seemed to have answers to the most pressing questions, and to be in the positions of 
power to turn those answers into action.  Neoliberalism quickly became the only game in 
town, to which there was no alternative.  And cyberpunk, in the years to come, would 
make us love it. 
The left, meanwhile, was dumbfounded.  As economist after economist lined up 
to denounce the 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins bill, maybe the last and greatest piece of New 
                                                
111 Boyte, The Backyard Revolution, 17. 
112 See Boyte, The Backyard Revolution, 1-16; Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 213-260; and, for a detailed account of 
the new union-busting of the 1970s, Fantasia, Cultures of Solidarity, 65-72.  If anything, Fantasia suggests, 
labor since the ‘70s may be even worse off than in the last round of corporate antagonism in the early 20th 
century.  Then, at least, oppositional interpretive communities existed.  But in the postwar “consensus,” 
these “cultures of solidarity” eroded in what appeared to be a bilateral disarmament.  Unbeknownst to 
labor, however, management was arming itself in secret, at (and around) Chicago. 
113 Boyte, The Backyard Revolution, 15; Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 226. 
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Deal-style legislation, which might have ensured full employment for all Americans—
just take a moment and imagine that—Hubert Humphrey got up in front of Congress and 
exclaimed:  “If the greatest free nation in the history of mankind has to get down on its 
knees in fear of something as abstract and arbitrary as these so called ‘free market 
forces,’ well, then we’re through.  We might as well haul down the flag, lock up the 
Capitol, go home and admit that we don’t have the courage or the imagination to govern 
ourselves.”114 
By that point, the left (or what was left of it) was not of much help.  The so-called 
“class of ‘74”—the wave of Democrats swept into Congress in the wake of Watergate—
“consisted of a new breed of post-1960s, free-market, social liberals, who were skeptical 
of workers’ needs and suspicious of their institutions.”  While they were “inspired to do 
something about urgent issues of race and gender inequality,” they “also tended to be 
chary of structural solutions.”115   
These new, young liberals represented a very different interpretive community 
than the one that had produced older liberals like Humphrey.  It was an interpretive 
community raised not in the troubled 1930s but in the serene 1950s, when the economy 
had always been working fine, so they didn’t worry about it much—and shaped more 
recently by the experiences of 1960s activism and, especially, by the failures of the 1968 
uprisings.  These young people were by no means neoliberals—they had nothing to do 
with the campaign that started at Chicago and Mont Pelerin—but they had an approach to 
politics, a habitus and set of interpretive strategies, that turned out to be very compatible 
with the neoliberal agenda.   
                                                
114 Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 278. 
115 Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 13. 
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It was this habitus, disposed toward detached individualism and ill-disposed 
toward collective agency, that would come to define American left, liberal, and 
progressive communities in the decades to come.  It would ensure that the neoliberal 
campaign could continue to grow and develop, pretty much unchecked.  And it 
developed, in particular, in the set of institutions and organizations in and around 
American higher education. 
It is to these institutions, which I’ll collectively call “academia and para-
academia,” to which we now will turn.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Academia and Para-Academia 
 
 
I called you out twice, you not about that life. 
—Graffiti, Northern Liberties, Philadelphia, Fall 2013 
 
I'm being such a stereotypical tumblr liberal in my English class right now. 
—Facebook status of a colleague/friend, 10/31/13 
 
So I read Karl Marx.   
Proletariat shall rise.   
Advice did not help. 
 
So I read Foucault. 
Power comes from everywhere. 
Advice did not help.   
—Bathroom wall, University of Chicago, circa 2005 
 
 
A Tale of a Phail1 
On a sunny, hot afternoon in late May 2009, Pedagogy and Theatre of the 
Oppressed  stormed Minneapolis City Hall.  I was managing the event.  I had led a group 
of about fifty artists, activists, organizers, researchers, and teachers, of many races, 
genders, ethnicities, nationalities, and socioeconomic classes through the streets of the 
Cedar-Riverside neighborhood, onto a Light Rail train, out through stone arches and up a 
marble stairwell and into the staid, hallowed halls of power.  Power, meanwhile, had been 
put on notice.  The police and sheriffs were out in force.  Something out of the ordinary 
was happening.  Something with the potential for…subversion.   
The crowd poured into the ornate City Council Chambers and beheld the 
grandeur:  the gilded, mural- and candelabra-covered walls; the vaulted, filigree-studded 
ceiling; the massive raised dais and imposing chairs reserved for City Council members; 
                                                
1 As the kids on the Interwebs are saying these days. 
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and the small, packed-together wooden chairs on the floor, where they could sit.  Every 
detail of this space—the seat of our theoretically-democratic local government—seemed 
designed to tell ordinary citizens to sit down, shut up, and heed the authorities on high.   
Yet this group of citizens was in no mood to heed.  They were determined to 
make this space their own.  While I went off to make arrangements with the Council 
clerk, with whom I’d planned the event, they set to work transforming the space.  They 
cleared all the chairs out of a semicircular area of floor in the back of the chamber:  an 
impromptu stage.  Then they turned all the chairs around and arranged them to face this 
stage, instead of facing the dais-and-podium at the front of the room.  The established 
order had been upended.  The action, today, wasn’t going to take place up above, but 
down below.  The Council members could keep their high ground, but today, that wasn’t 
going to be the stage; it was the cheap seats.   
When I came back with the Council clerk, she was not pleased.  Yes, she told the 
assembled group, the Council had consented to let us use the space and move “a few 
chairs,” but no one had talked about this kind of upheaval.  After a few moments of 
general hesitation, Julian Boal stepped forward.  Boal, world-renowned theater artist and 
son of the legendary director and writer Augusto Boal, had spent the past three days 
training this group, and he would lead the session to come.  He took a moment to assess 
the situation, looked at the clerk, then turned to the extremely diverse group in front of 
them.  How, he asked them, did city councils arrange their spaces in all the places where 
they are from?  A torrent of answers followed.  Boal summarized, to the clerk:  in 
different places we do things different ways.  Then the crowd, following his lead, 
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resumed the re-arranging.  The clerk, though nonplussed, stayed out of the way.  For that 
one moment, at least, the power of this impromptu interpretive community had overcome 
the formal authority of the state.   
The stage was set; the play was ready to begin.  It was to be a demonstration of 
“Legislative Theatre,” a form of theater developed by Augusto Boal when he was elected 
to the city council of Rio de Janeiro.  It was a method for artists, organizers, and 
legislators to literally make law together, collaboratively, though a combination of theater 
and parliamentary debate.  The Rio city council had passed dozens of laws through 
Legislative Theatre.  In Minneapolis, alas, it would be only a demonstration:  the council 
was not actually in session, and no laws would actually be passed.  But it would be, in 
Julian Boal’s words, a demonstration “with teeth.”  Many community leaders, including 
four City Council members, were in attendance.  And the play addressed a hotly 
controversial issue:  the attempt by Minneapolis Mayor R. T. Rybak to close the city’s 
Department of Civil Rights, a move many low-income communities and communities of 
color saw as an attempt to curb their power and influence.   
The play itself, written by the group that performed it, told the story of a disabled, 
black mother whose son is wrongfully harassed by the police, and who tries in vain to get 
redress from her government.  It was short and simple—maybe seven minutes long—but 
the audience was clearly moved.  This was due in no small part to the compelling 
performance of Cheryl Wilson, a longtime Minneapolis community organizer who had 
herself raised eight children, in the leading role.  At the end of the play, as is customary 
in Legislative Theatre (as in the related form of Forum Theater), Boal waited for the 
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applause to end, then asked the actors to begin it again.  Only this time, Boal instructed 
the audience to stop the action whenever they could see a better way for Wilson’s 
character to break the oppression she was experiencing—literally, to yell “Stop!”—then 
to come up onstage, replace Wilson, and try out the new idea.  In this manner, the 
audience tried out lots of different interventions, at lots of different points within the 
story.  They had various degrees of success, but the common upshot was clear:  for 
justice to prevail, the Department of Civil Rights needed to stay open.   
Once everyone who wanted to intervene had been given a chance, audience 
members proposed and debated legislation.  The four Council members present 
participated generously.  When the session finally ended, hours later, no law had been 
passed, but everyone involved—actors, spectators, council members—left feeling proud.  
We had done good work.  We had made something new and exciting.  We had broken 
new ground, made new connections.  We had made a promising start, and we were 
excited to do more.2 
But then…nothing more ever happened.  Not another theater performance, not 
another council session, not even a follow-up conversation.  Some emails got shot back 
and forth in the weeks and months that followed.  A meeting got planned but never took 
place.  Boal was frustrated.  Wilson was frustrated.  I was frustrated.  But none of us felt 
like we could do anything about it.  We had all done a huge amount of work to organize 
the performance.  We had organized a singular event, putting together lots of different 
constituencies in a way that could have sparked a new synthesis of art, organizing, and 
                                                
2 For a more detailed account of this event and its consequences, see my article “Making Space (Literally) 
for Social Change through Community-Based Theatre—From Soup Kitchen to City Hall,” Theatre Topics 
21, no. 2 (September 2011):  199-208. 
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lawmaking—a new political movement, even, with significant and growing power.  But 
now, somehow, we felt powerless.  Everyone had gone in separate directions.  It had just 
fizzled. 
This chapter asks, and tries to explain, why. 
 
The Resistance to Agency 
To start, some context will help.  Pedagogy and Theatre of the Oppressed, Inc. 
(PTO), which sponsored the City Hall event, is a nonprofit corporation that “supports 
people whose work challenges oppressive systems by promoting critical thinking and 
social justice through liberatory theatre and popular education.”3  Its main vehicle for 
doing this work is an annual conference, where hundreds of educators and researchers 
and activists from many states and countries come together to share ideas, build skills, 
and network with each other.   
In 2009, that conference was held in Minneapolis.  The lead organizers had hired 
me to do logistics—which, as the conference drew nearer and people dropped out of key 
positions, meant I ended up running much of the conference.  (For my efforts, I would be 
elected to a two-year term on PTO’s Board of Directors.)  One of our headline events was 
a three-day workshop on Legislative Theater—to be led by Julian Boal, whose revered 
father had died only three weeks earlier.  It would culminate in a real, live performance in 
City Hall before real, live legislators.  Practitioners of Theatre of the Oppressed from 
                                                
3 “About,” Pedagogy and Theatre of the Oppressed (website), http://ptoweb.org/aboutpto/ (November 12, 
2013). 
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around the world, coming to town for the conference, would come a few days early to 
take part in the workshop and performance, stay for the conference, and then go home.   
So that’s one obvious reason why the City Hall event had no follow-up:  days 
later, a lot of participants just left.  But that can’t be the whole answer.  Not all of us left.  
Many of us, including most of the core organizers, lived in the area.  Even given the 
people we’d lost, we could still have done plenty with the people we had.  We just didn’t.  
How to make sense of this?  Well, the first steps will (by now) be predictable.  If we rule 
out the Kansan possibility that we were “acting against our interests” (whatever that 
would mean), we’re left with only one conclusion:  that for whatever reason, it was not in 
our self-interest to develop our one-off performance into a full-fledged campaign or 
movement, with the potential to build power and enact concrete social and political 
change.  Given the obvious contradiction with our stated political goals—challenging 
oppressive systems, and so on—it makes sense to ask of ourselves the same questions we 
asked of the men at the laundromat in Chapter One, and the students in my cultural 
studies class in Chapter Two:  what kind of market were we on?  What kind of habitus 
did it value?  What kind of interpretive community built it?  And more specifically:  what 
kind of dispositions and interpretive strategies existed there, that might account for our 
strange and counterproductive behavior? 
One thing, at least, was clear:  we were not being cynical or opportunistic.  Our 
fault, if anything, was the opposite:  we were too earnest and idealistic.  We hadn’t been 
thinking opportunistically—that is, strategically—at all.  By the time we got to the 
performance and the conference, we were burnt out.  We had poured all of our energy, all 
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of our resources, all of our meetings and fundraising and strategic alliances, into 
producing the most excellent one-off event possible.  We hadn’t thought to conserve any 
of our energy, to develop relationships and new leaders for the long term, to keep 
building power.  It’s not that we didn’t want to, at least not exactly; it’s just that it never 
occurred to us.   
Well actually, that’s not quite fair.  It had occurred to one of us, quite a bit.  
Cheryl Wilson—the organizer who’d played the lead role in the play—worked hard to try 
to push the rest of us to do this kind of longer-term work:  to build relationships with 
more council members, to do more active turn-out, and especially to plan follow-up 
meetings and get local conference-goers to commit to attending them.  Again, it’s not that 
the rest of us disagreed with her.  We knew those things were important.  We wanted to 
do them.  There was just so much other work to do in planning the conference, and we 
didn’t have time for anything else.  If this sounds like me whining and making excuses, 
that’s because it is.  Here, as usual, we never have time for anything except for the things 
we make time for.  And for everyone except Wilson, this kind of follow-up work wasn’t 
one of those things.  For the rest of us, the main point was producing the conference; 
everything else was gravy.    
Here, precisely, was the problem.  As Wilson said to me several months later, the 
people who came to the conference “may get the techniques…may get how it’s done 
[theoretically],” but they “don’t know how it feels…to do the grunge work”—the hard, 
slow, time-consuming work of building power through organized people and organized 
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money.4  Wilson had the dispositions and interpretive strategies of a community 
organizer; the rest of us did not.  Our habitus had been developed on a different kind of 
market.  A market that places a lot of value on planning a conference that demonstrated 
great potential for political agency, and less value on the hard, prolonged labor needed to 
create actual agency.  A market that values single spectacular acts of resistance more 
than long-term strategic campaigns, and pure ethical intent more than messy political 
work.5   
The values of this market sound a little the job requirements for a successful 
professor:  go to as many conferences and publish as many papers as you can, and you’ll 
succeed; long-term, extended “community” work is great in theory, but it’s hard to find 
time for it, since it doesn’t give you much value in terms of tenure or raises or 
promotions.  Indeed, if you go to PTO conference, you’ll find plenty of academics:  
people like me, who draw their primary income from working as researchers and 
instructors at colleges and universities, and who are majority (though not all) white and 
professional-middle-class.   
But you’ll also find a lot of people there who aren’t academics:  people who are 
employed as theater directors, K-12 teachers, teaching artists, freelance facilitators, 
employees of nonprofit and government agencies; and people of various (often 
precarious) employment who call themselves “activists.”  These people, including many 
of the participants in the Legislative Theatre performance, seem to be diverse in almost 
                                                
4 Cheryl Wilson, personal interview, December 14, 2009. 
5 For a further description—and critique—of this market, see John McGowan, Democracy’s Children:  
Intellectuals and the Rise of Cultural Politics (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2002), especially 
Chapter 3; and Harry C. Boyte, “A Commonwealth of Freedom:  Response to Beltrán,” Political Theory 38 
(2010):  870-876. 
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every way possible:  race, class, gender, sexuality, nationality, ethnicity, age, and 
education level.  Yet listen closely, and you’ll notice something interesting:  despite all 
these differences, they all seem to speak a similar language.  I don’t mean English—
though that’s usually true, too.6  I mean a specialized jargon that includes words like 
“inclusiveness,” “privilege,” “oppression,” “resistance,” “liberatory,” “transformational,” 
“marginalized / targeted / underrepresented communities,” “POC” (“people of color”), 
“PGP” (“preferred gender pronoun”), “positionality,” “intersectionality,” and “social 
justice.”   
It’s a language I hadn’t heard much before I came to PTO—not at home, or at 
school, or on TV, or in the history department of the University of Chicago or even the 
Cultural Studies and Comparative Literature department at the University of Minnesota.  
Nor was it the language Paulo Freire spoke in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, or Augusto 
Boal in Theatre of the Oppressed.  It was, rather, the language of certain sections of 
academia:  I started hearing it more as I spent more time around people from theater and 
film studies, communication studies, English, art history, the various area/ethnic studies, 
and the “human” and “critical” sides of sociology, anthropology, geography, and history.  
I also heard it as I started spending more time in certain interpretive communities outside 
academia:  in anti-racism workshops, in artist and activist collectives and cafes and other 
                                                
6 I still think about the moment in a plenary session on immigration at PTO 2010, in Austin, Texas, when 
the facilitators asked the audience if anyone needed the session translated into Spanish.  No one responded.  
Then a middle-aged black woman raised her hand and said, “In solidarity, I need it….It’s not logistical, it’s 
political.”  Again, no one responded.  And so an interpreter translated the entire session into Spanish, even 
though no one in the room expressed any difficulty understanding English.  Maybe it was a kind gesture of 
inclusion.  But I can’t help wondering if it might have been like insisting that a person with a disability use 
a wheelchair, even when s/he wants to walk—ignoring the actual people in the space when they say what 
their needs are, and telling them what their needs should be.  Or maybe even indulging our own guilt, that 
there should have been people in the room who couldn’t understand English.  I’m not sure.  It would have 
been good to talk about it.  I guess I could have raised the question myself…. 
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“radical” spaces, on various blogs and social media sites, and in some socially-conscious 
nonprofits.  These kinds of organizations, which aren’t academic but share a language 
with academia—a common interpretive community, with common interpretive 
strategies—are what I’m calling “para-academia.” 
Para-academia is the rings of biotech firms around the campus of MIT.  It’s the 
mass of education corporations, for- and nominally nonprofit, just outside the gates of 
Princeton.  It’s the Mont Pelerin Society, headquartered in the University of Chicago Law 
School.  It’s an intimacy with academia that’s often geographic, and always linguistic.  
The common language of academia and para-academia comes in many different 
dialects—physical chemists sound pretty different from art historians, neither of whom 
sound much like activists in the Direct Action Network or employees of the RAND 
Corporation—but they’re all unified on a common market that values a specific kind of 
habitus, disposed toward a specific set of interpretive strategies. 
It’s a habitus that’s disposed, above all, (1) to see the world as a place where 
there’s something called the truth, sitting out there somewhere, apart from human action, 
and (2) to see its job as finding that truth and telling it.  Most of us developed these 
dispositions in school, when we got valued—in the form of praise and grades—for 
getting the right answer.  Given that most of us have spent over a decade in school, it’s 
no surprise that a lot of us still have these dispositions as adults.  Only now we justify our 
search for truth differently, not for the sake of good grades but for the sake of beauty, or 
justice, or progress, or preservation, or profit, or even for its own sake.   
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We usually understand this truth as coming in two main types.  “Scientific” truth 
is sitting out in the open, ready to be found as soon as we find the right tool or technique 
to do it.  “Social” or “cultural” truth, on the other hand, has been hidden or obscured by 
some bad guy (society, the media, etc.), whose lies we need to expose before we can get 
at the true truth.7  But either way—whichever kind of truth we’re looking for, and 
whatever reason we give for why we’re looking for it—the fact is, we’re looking for it.  
Our goal is to find it and tell it to the world.  And then it’ll make us free. 
What’s wrong with this, exactly?  Nothing, really.  It’s just an interpretive 
strategy.  Like all interpretive strategies, it lets us understand certain things better than 
others.  This one, in particular, has let us understand a whole lot:  it’s pretty much made 
all of modern science possible.8  The only problem with it—if you can even call it a 
                                                
7 These last two sentences sum up, in gross oversimplification, the distinction between “traditional” and 
“critical” theory described by the postwar German critical theorist Max Horkhimer.  Traditional theory—
Kantian, mainstream, empiricist—is intended to fuel the march of progress.  Critical theory—Marxist, 
countercultural, hermeneutic—is intended to disrupt this march, which it views as harmful…or rather, 
nonexistent…but the myth that it exists is harmful.  In general, the “hard” sciences have mostly followed 
the path of traditional theory, joining forces with capital-based markets to develop new technologies and 
grow these markets; the “critical” humanities have followed the path of critical theory, setting itself in 
opposition to these capital-based markets and producing writing and other art that challenges them and their 
economic and cultural effects.  (The social sciences are split down the middle:  economics tends to be on 
the traditional side, especially after the neoliberal takeover; political science, sociology, and geography 
have factions on either side; and history tends to practice an uncertain, unstable hybrid of the two.)  The 
division between traditional and critical theory has often taken the form of a culture war:  C. P. Snow called 
it “the two cultures,” and Bruno Latour calls it the “science wars.”  Indeed, many of the big Buchanan-era 
Culture Wars came out of this academic divide, as the humanities and social sciences seemed to be moving 
from traditional (the Great Books) to critical (postmodern “theory”), thus deepening their deviation from 
the patriotic techno-science that was in the process of winning the Cold War (or so the argument went).  I 
don’t want to suggest that this divide is unimportant.  But I do want to suggest, along with Latour, that it 
doesn’t run as deep as many people think, including many academics:  that underneath these differences, 
both sides share a common language:  a common pursuit of disinterested truth, a common belief that that 
truth will set you free, and a common ignorance of the organizational nature of knowledge (organized 
ideas), which leads to the resistance to agency.  See Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in 
Critical Theory:  Selected Essays (New York:  Continuum, 1982), 188-243; C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures, 
reissue ed. (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out 
of Steam?” 
8 Which for me, just to be clear, is a good thing.  I enjoy my antibiotics and my evidence-based truth-
claims, thank you very much. 
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problem—is that it lets us see so much that we sometimes forget that it’s an interpretive 
strategy at all.  But like all interpretive strategies, it has its limits.  One big one, in 
particular:  it stops us from seeing ideas as things that are organized, by organized groups 
of people.  It stops us from seeing that the truth is something political:  not something 
holy and pure and detached that sometimes gets corrupted by politics, but something 
that’s political—a product of people in organizations—from the beginning.  It makes us 
think that doing politics and seeking truth are two separate activities, and need to be kept 
that way. 
This interpretive strategy basically understands the world like it’s a cyberpunk 
novel, with three main characters.  First there’s us, the hacker-hero.  Second, there’s the 
truth itself, which we understand in the form of a secret code, a “true name,” sitting out 
there in cyberspace, waiting for us to find it.  (Even when we think the truth is “inside of 
us,” it’s still not part of us; we still understand ourselves as a “we” that needs to find 
“it.”)  Our job, like Case’s, is to work alone until we find that secret code, and then enter 
it into our computer (in the form of papers, articles, etc.)—and then, we assume, the bad 
guys will come crumbling down.  The third character is society.  Society is the unstylish 
bad guys (Rife, Tessier-Ashpool) combined with the unstylish everyone else (the 
burbclave dwellers, the biomass).  They’re the Kansans, the dupes, the mass ass.  They’re 
the ones we’ll be setting free, by finding the truth and publishing it, but don’t expect them 
to thank us for it:  if you’ve ever read a student paper you know that it’s “society,” along 
with its double “the media,” that’s responsible for all the harmful lies in the first place.9 
                                                
9 This argument owes a lot to Latour, who makes a very similar argument in the first chapter of his book 
Pandora’s Hope:  “society,” as a modern concept, is an outgrowth of Kant’s abstract “transcendental Ego,” 
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In this cyberpunk reality, with its usual neoliberal overlay, nothing that’s 
organized is ever good or real—except capital markets, assumed to be inevitable.  The 
heroes are pure; they work alone and see through all of society’s bullshit.  (Just like 
humanities and social science academics:  it’s unusual to see a paper with two or more 
authors, let alone an ongoing collaborative project.)  The truth is pure; it exists outside 
and independently of humans and their organizations.  But in society, they don’t have that 
truth, at least not until we heroes bring it to them:  what they have instead are “social 
constructions.”  When people say “x is a social construction,” what they mean is, x is not 
actually true or real.  The assumption is that when something is made by people in 
groups—literally, a “social construction”—it’s wrong or false.  (I will often counter:  a 
bridge is a social construction.  I certainly hope it’s real when I’m driving over it.)  The 
true truth—including the true fact that those other truths are social constructions—is not 
socially-constructed, not organized.  It’s just independently, absolutely true. 
Sociologist Bertell Ollman, back in the late 1970s, criticized this same resistance 
to the idea of organized truth:   
Most Americans slide in their thinking from the individual to ‘everybody’ without 
passing through the mediation of particular groups.  Thus, for example, when 
responsibility for an act goes beyond its actual perpetrator, everyone is said to be 
guilty.  This is the logic (if not the politics) behind Billy Graham’s request that we 
all pray to be forgiven for the sins of My Lai and Watergate, a request that most 
people can deny only by upholding the equally absurd position that Calley and 
Nixon are solely responsible. The middle terms are missing.10   
 
                                                                                                                                            
an “opaque window” between the individual mind and the “outside world” (itself a modern creation), “just 
a series of minds-in-a-vat”—isolated, but forever under suspicion of joining together, not in a productive 
organization but as a mob, mindless and unstoppable, which will obliterate the pursuit of scientific truth by 
subjecting every truth-claim to a majority vote.  See Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope:  Essays on the Reality 
of Science Studies (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1999), especially 6-7. 
10 Bertell Ollman, “On Teaching Marxism,” in Social and Sexual Revolution (Cambridge, MA:  South End 
Press, 1979),  http://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/docs/ssr_ch05.php (November 21, 2013). 
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Ollman, committed Marxist that he is, is talking mostly about class:  the 
bourgeoisie, working in its own self-interest.  I want to take his idea of “middle terms” 
more broadly:  the “middle terms” are organizations.  Charlie Company.  CREEP.  The 
Pentagon propaganda office.  The post-1965 Republican party, and the Nixon factions 
within it.  All the real conspiracies among members of the military, the government, and 
the business community.  These are the intentionally-organized interpretive communities 
are where meaning gets made, where power gets built, and where agency is made 
possible.   
When we understand truth and reality in terms of these kinds of organizations—as 
products of the interpretive communities we organize and are organized into, where 
meanings get made—then, and only then, can we even imagine playing a role in making 
that reality.  When we know that the truth isn’t something given, set, and outside of us—
when we know things are the way they are because of the power (organized people, 
money, ideas) that different organizations have built, and the results of power-struggles 
between them for control over the dominant cultural market—then we can analyze how, 
and by whom, that power has been built, and how that power might be challenged or 
seized, either through organizing new interpretive communities and/or through changing 
(strengthening, weakening, altering) existing ones.   
That’s a hard thing to do, when you’ve got a habitus built on a market dead-set 
against understanding the world this way.  When we understand organizing as something 
that’s either bad or useless (or both), it’s hard to see ourselves as anything but an 
anonymous collection of small individuals, powerless in the face of “society”—until, of 
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course, we find the secret code and enter it into our computers.  The best we can do is 
keep looking, and try our best not to harm anyone on the way there.  (This is the basic 
message of most mainstream moral message and religious sermons.)   
Some of us, in academia and para-academia, are content with this lot:  pursuing 
and stating truths, in the hopes that one of them will one day make us free.  But not all of 
us.  A handful of academics and para-academics, mostly on the right, have built 
organizations that have given them a whole lot of agency.  (Post-1947 Chicago 
economics and the Mont Pelerin Society come immediately to mind, of course, as do the 
more recent think tanks that some of these same wealthy donors have funded.)   
On the other side, there are many more, mostly self-conscious liberals, 
progressives, or leftists, who really want agency, who really want to go out and make real 
change, but just don’t know how.  These are the folks at PTO, in the artist and anarchist 
collectives and nonprofits, and in all those academic departments and programs with an 
orientation toward “justice” or “social change.”  It’s not the biggest part of academia and 
para-academia.  Nor is it the most influential part.  But it’s the part I’m from.  It may 
even be where you’re from, too.  And, I’m convinced, it’s the part that’s most vital for us 
to understand.  Here, in one of the parts of academia and para-academia where political 
agency should be the most possible, it’s often in fact the least possible.  Here, where a 
group of us would spend months of our lives preparing for a Legislative Theatre session, 
we still just left and dropped the ball afterwards.  Surely, if we can understand how this 
left/liberal/progressive fringe of academia and para-academia works—and how it 
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produces such a strong resistance to agency even in people who so very much want 
agency—we can start to understand the whole thing. 
 
1968 + 1641 = The Anarcho-Liberal Habitus 
It’s hard not to like a work of sophisticated academic theory that takes its 
inspiration from SpongeBob SquarePants.  Let alone one that also insists “Finding Nemo 
contains a secret plan for world revolution.”  Judith Halberstam’s The Queer Art of 
Failure is a delight.11  It is one of the best, most thoughtful, creative, wide-ranging, and 
honest pieces of academic writing I have seen in a long time.  And I’m not the only one 
who thinks so:  since its publication a couple of years ago, it has been read widely 
throughout the left/liberal/progressive side of academia and para-academia, cited widely 
in conference papers and activist blogs alike.12  Its back cover—always a useful 
                                                
11 Judith Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure (Durham, NC:  Duke University Press, 2011), 21.  A note 
on pronoun usage:  Halberstam, who now generally goes by the first name Jack, is neither “an 
unambiguous ‘she’” nor “an unambiguous he,” and self-admittedly “loosey goosey about pronouns.”  I 
considered continually switching up the pronouns—which could reflect Halberstam’s interest in playful 
ambiguity—but I worried that this would be so confusing that it would distract from Halberstam’s actual 
arguments—hardly germane to an author who wishes to downplay the gender and pronoun obsession.  I 
will, therefore, take the most boring and conservative route and use “she/her/hers,” as Halberstam does on 
her own USC faculty page—with the caveat that this choice, like all other available choices within a 
dominant culture that makes a fetish of the gender binary, is imperfect.  For more on this issue, see Jack 
Halberstam, “On Pronouns,” http://www.jackhalberstam.com/on-pronouns/ (November 23, 2013). 
12 At this point, my repeated conflation of “left,” “liberal,” and “progressive” is no doubt driving some 
readers crazy.  Especially readers whose habitus was formed on markets that placed great value on one or 
more of these terms, or on an aversion to one or more of these terms, or on the importance of ideological 
precision in general.  Let me try to explain.  I’m not suggesting that these terms, or the institutions and 
histories and personal identities they refer to, are all the same.  They are not.  Self-identified leftists, 
liberals, and progressives have often historically been on different, even starkly opposing, sides of 
important issues.  This remains true today, for those people and interpretive communities (such as 
Marxists) who remain loyal to a rigorous definition of these terms.  But their numbers are dwindling.  It’s 
pretty rare these days to find a “liberal” who would take offense at being called a “progressive,” or vice-
versa.  (The big exception to this is libertarians, many of whom hold onto the classical, European definition 
of “liberal”:  free individuals, free markets.)  “Leftist” still feels a little stronger to me, but in American 
political parlance (from network-news pundits to even some political theorists) the word “left” is used to 
describe everything to the left of the Republican Party.  I, for one, tend to get called all three—and though I 
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archive—is filled with endorsements from prominent feminist, queer, and otherwise 
“critical” academics.  One of them even calls it “a manifesto for cultural studies.”   
What does this manifesto contain?  What program is Halberstam laying out?  It 
seems like a program that’s…remarkably similar to my own.  Halberstam is concerned 
that the neoliberals have convinced too many people “that success happens to good 
people and failure is just a consequence of bad attitude rather than structural conditions.”  
(Right.  It’s not just about individuals doing good or bad.  The fact that so many people 
are “failing” now has everything to do with the way the neoliberals, as an organized 
campaign, have restructured the market.  Go on…)  And she wants to make the university 
“a new kind of public sphere with a different investment in knowledge, in ideas, and in 
thought and politics” but is skeptical of “the critical academic,” who might not be 
working against the neoliberal marketplace so much as carving out a place for 
her/him/itself within it.  (Yes, absolutely…) 
                                                                                                                                            
have my issues with all these terms, and with catch-all political labels in general, I don’t usually contradict 
people.  You may notice I hardly mention “ideology” in this book at all.  That’s because I’m not sure how 
helpful a concept it is, in the post-1968/1974/1989 United States.  Traditionally—which is to say, in Europe 
in the late 18th and 19th Centuries—“ideology” meant the positions of an organized group, especially a 
political party.  This is still true in some places today:  in many countries in Europe and South America, 
where socialist parties are still active and viable, to be a “socialist” simply means to be a member of that 
country’s socialist party.  Likewise with “liberal,” “conservative,” “progressive,” etc.  But when we talk 
about ideology here in the U.S., both in and outside the academy, we almost always mean it as a bad thing:  
it’s what stops people from working together, what causes hatred and genocide and sexism and racism, 
what keeps the Kansans from acting in their self-interest.  This is no surprise, in a culture once dominated 
by Madison-style resistance to “factions,” and more recently dominated by neoliberals who are opposed to 
all organizing (other than their own).  That’s why I don’t talk much about “ideology” in this book.  It’s not 
how most contemporary U.S.-Americans seem to navigate the world.  The language I use instead—about 
habitus, markets, interpretive communities, and interpretive strategies—better fits the way most of us 
(myself included) understand ourselves politically:  we believe and do what feels right, without much 
regard for a party-line.  It’s not that we’re not organized; it’s just that we’re not very self-consciously 
organized; most of our organization has been done by someone else, without our knowledge or consent.  
Interpretive communities, Stanley Fish observes, have no formal membership:  “the only ‘proof’ of 
membership is fellowship, the nod of recognition from someone in the same community, someone who 
says to you what neither of us could ever prove to a third party:  ‘we know.’”  In this murkier, less-
conscious organizational reality, “liberals,” “progressives,” and “leftists” tend all to “know,” and to give 
each other that “nod of recognition.”  See Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, 173. 
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And like me—and SpongeBob—she frames her work in terms of the question:  
“What is the alternative…to cynical resignation [i.e., to being an agency-less speck in 
neoliberal “society”] on the one hand and naïve optimism [i.e., pretending you’re an all-
powerful cyberpunk hero] on the other?  What is the alternative, SpongeBob wants to 
know, to working all day for Mr. Krabs, or being captured in the net of commodity 
capitalism while trying to escape?”13   
The logic of Halberstam’s manifesto is simple and compelling.  If neoliberalism is 
based on Margaret Thatcher’s dictum that “there is no alternative,” Halberstam counters 
by offering all kinds of alternatives:  alternative histories, alternative political formations, 
alternative ways of living and doing and being in the world.  Despite these attempts, 
though, I worry that Halberstam does not actually end up offering an alternative at all.  
All of her attempts, rather, end up landing us right back in the neoliberal market they try 
to resist.  None of this is because Halberstam is a bad or flawed theorist.  (Far from it.)  
No, if Halberstam’s book can’t offer a viable alternative to neoliberalism, it’s because the 
very market that’s shaped both her habitus and her book—the market of academia, even 
at its most leftist/liberal/progressive—has left her, too, with no alternative. 
The problem, as I see it, starts right after Halberstam poses the SpongeBob 
question: 
So what is the alternative?  This simple question announces a political project, 
begs for a grammar of possibility (here expressed in gerunds and the passive 
voice, among other grammars of pronouncement) and expresses a basic desire to 
live life otherwise.  Academics, activists, artists, and cartoon characters have long 
been on a quest to articulate an alternative vision of life, love, and labor, and to 
put such a vision into practice.  Through the use of manifestoes, a range of 
political tactics, and new technologies of representation, radical utopians continue 
                                                
13 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 3, 8, 1. 
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to search for different ways of being in the world and being in relation to one 
another than those already prescribed for the liberal and consumer subject.14 
 
Whoa.  Umm…Gary…I don’t think we’re in Bikini Bottom anymore.   
This language sounds like it’s from a different ocean altogether.  And it is:  it’s 
from the Academic Ocean.   
You don’t have to be a literary theorist to recognize that Halberstam is writing in 
some kind of code.  It’s just not how most people usually speak and write, right down to 
the phrasing and the sentence structure.  If you do happen to be a literary theorist, you’ll 
recognize the code immediately:  it’s the familiar style of “theory,” which has dominated 
the market for academic writing in the humanities since the ‘80s.15  “A grammar of 
                                                
14 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 2.  
15 Point of clarification:  my critique, in the following pages, is not of any particular kind or work of 
“theory,” but of the market.  I’m critiquing the way the way the contemporary academic and para-academic 
market uses and distorts theoretical (and all other) texts, not the merit of the individual texts themselves.  
Which is to say:  I’m staying out of the “good theorists”/“bad theorists” debate—one of the preferred 
culture wars of left/liberal/progressive academia.  I obviously have my personal preferences, which are 
easy enough to guess.  But I know plenty of people who work with theory I don’t like, who still do 
excellent and important work; and conversely, I know plenty of people who work with theory I do like, 
who still do counterproductive work.  As always, my interest is in the interpretive strategies:  how we read, 
interpret, and value the theory and theorists we read, whomever they might be, on the market we’re on—a 
market that tends, again, to resist looking at ideas and people, including ourselves and our own ideas, as 
organized.  I don’t see any sense in attacking “Deleuze” as such:  if we read him as art, as Foucault 
recommended, he’s a very different person from if we read (and “use”) him as citable, scientific truth, as 
per the dominant interpretive strategies.  In addition to ignoring the artistic dimension of these “theoretical” 
texts, these strategies also ignore their historical contexts.  As the French intellectual historian François 
Cusset observed:  “The problem with disregarding the genealogy of capitalism or the critique of market 
domination in works by Deleuze, Lyotard, or even Paul Virilio, or with splitting Derrida’s critique of 
logocentrism from the political context of France’s late 1960s, is that one risks having these works speak 
the very language of late capitalism.  One risks mistaking them for what they clearly denounced:  the 
promotion of relativism, of fluctuating and nonreferential values, that is, a praise of the new virtual, global, 
financial capitalism.  Praising the autonomy of the signifier for itself, the death of the subject for itself, or a 
general economics of floating signs and drifting symbols detached from any stable standard, only gives 
food for thought to management gurus, postmodern sociologists, and the intellectual lobbies of a ‘self-
controlled’ society.  Maybe such readings of French Theory are also a direct effect of the changing 
American university, or of what Bill Readings calls the ‘university in ruins,’ since the university too has to 
comply with the new dogmas, the dogmas of self-regulation, of a paradigmatic Internet network, and of the 
ultimate free market.  Academia too has no other choice than to favor circulation over production, 
information over labor, and to break down all barriers to the dissemination of intellectual commodities.  
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possibility” points to the French theorist Jacques Derrida.  “Different ways of being in the 
world” points to the German philosopher Martin Heidegger.  “The liberal and consumer 
subject” points to the French theorist Michel Foucault.   
I don’t think Halberstam wrote in this kind of code on purpose.  Especially given 
that she “hope[s] this book is readable by and accessible to a wider audience.”16  Like 
most of us, she’s not entirely in control of her language.  Her choices in the way she 
writes, like many of our choices about everything, aren’t so much “choices” as feelings—
the not-entirely-conscious response of a habitus to the market it’s on:  in this case, an 
academic market that puts a high value on this kind of phrasing and these kind of theory-
invocations.  Halberstam, through her whole book, is attempting something rather hard:  
to challenge the value-system of a market from within that market itself.  The market says 
extol success; she will extol failure.  The market says write for fellow theory-specialists; 
she will write for a wider audience.  The market says cite works of high culture; she 
quotes SpongeBob.   So it’s no surprise that, from time to time, her habitus will snap 
back. 
Consider the way Halberstam describes herself.  She is “someone who never aced 
an exam, who has tried without much success to become fluent in another language, and 
who can read a book without retaining much at all,” someone who “didn’t even manage 
to pass my university entrance exams.”  Yet this celebration of her own failure seems 
almost dishonest.  She never acknowledges that she is fluent in an extremely 
                                                                                                                                            
Maybe so, but the result, still, is to risk turning real social critics into trendy conservatives.”  See François 
Cusset, French Theory:  How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the 
United States, trans. Jeff Fort (Minneapolis, MN:  University of Minnesota Press, 2008), xvi. 
16 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 24. 
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sophisticated, professional language (the language of theory); that she has a professorship 
at the University of Southern California (she must have done well in school at some 
point); and that she got this book published by Duke University Press (if she can’t read a 
book, she can certainly write one).  Somehow, among all of Halberstam’s “failures,” she 
succeeded in amassing a whole lot of cultural capital; somewhere along her 
“Benjaminian…stroll down uncharted streets in the ‘wrong’ direction,” she learned to 
effortlessly cite German philosopher Walter Benjamin.  But she never tells us about that 
part.17 
Why not?  Unless Halberstam is actually trying to pull one over on us—which I 
seriously doubt—it’s got to be a habitus thing again.  If she doesn’t talk about herself in 
the context of organizations, specifically those organizations where she built all her 
cultural capital, it’s because doing so didn’t feel right.  And according to my colleague 
and former teacher Timothy Brennan, Halberstam isn’t alone.  On the current academic 
market, talking about the agency you’ve built within organizations pretty much never 
feels right:   
From the running of English departments to annual meetings of the editorial 
boards of scholarly journals, academic intellectuals spend 50 percent of their time 
in the force fields of bureaucracy, counting votes, preparing policies.  Academic 
unions at some schools hold hearings, file briefs, and petition the legislature; ad 
hoc organizations like Teachers for a Democratic Culture and the Union of 
Democratic Intellectuals used to print newsletters and place op-ed pieces.  But in 
general, the writing in cultural studies journals is, purely speaking, anarchist in its 
politico/moral positioning.18 
 
                                                
17 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 12, 25, 6. 
18 Timothy Brennan, Wars of Position:  The Cultural Politics of Left and Right (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 151. 
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Academics, like everyone else, participate in organizations whether they like it or 
not.  Halberstam had to have participated (at least somewhat successfully) in all kinds of 
organizations, to get the kind of cultural capital she has.  And she still participates in 
organizations, now:  at the very least, in her department at the University of Southern 
California, and on the editorial board of GLQ (A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies).  
Yet when Halberstam describes herself in The Queer Art of Failure, it’s as if none of 
these organizations existed.  This goes likewise for many academics I know.  Some are 
very talented organizers, who have organized the necessary people and money and ideas 
to build the power to enact controversial curricular reforms, get faculty hired and fired, 
and win massive amounts of resources for themselves and their departments.  Yet as soon 
as they start writing and teaching, all this power savvy and organizational consciousness 
goes bye-bye.  Here, power isn’t what all kinds of people and organizations build in order 
to further their self-interests.  No, power is something bad.  It’s wielded by non-human 
(non-organizational) evildoers like “society” or “hegemony,” who use it to “discipline” or 
“oppress” the innocent good guys, who are always powerless and never organized; to be 
a good guy, in this strange parallel universe, means to virtuously resist power, but never 
to build it yourself. 
Halberstam’s theory revolves around this same, familiar cast of characters.  
There’s always a clear villain, and it’s usually “the state”—sometimes accompanied by 
henchmen like “disciplinarity,” “heroic and grand logics,” “heteronormative, capitalist 
society,” and “neoliberalism”—understood not as a human-made organization, but as an 
amorphous specter, like all the rest.  Much like the men from the laundromat, Halberstam 
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doesn’t really distinguish among government, business, education, the various news and 
entertainment media, or other powerful social institutions.  There’s no sense that these are 
all clusters of human-made organizations, with all kinds of various self-interests that 
sometimes coincide and sometimes don’t, and which people participate in in all kinds of 
different ways.  No, for Halberstam, they’re all part of the same thing, the System, the 
Man, the State-with-a-capital-S.  Thomas Frank rightly criticizes the Kansans for 
imagining “liberalism” as a monolithic, all-powerful force bent (for whatever reason) on 
destroying their homespun, God-fearing way of life—but theorists like Halberstam do the 
same thing:  they imagine “the State” as an equally monolithic, all-powerful force bent 
(for whatever reason) on destroying the subversive, queer freedom of the individual. 
It’s a particular, peculiar approach to politics.  Brennan calls it “anarcho-
liberalism.”19  “Anarcho” because it denounces nearly all forms of government, 
education, and most organization in general; “liberalism” because its highest virtue is 
upholding the freedom of the individual against an invasive “society.”  Anarcho-
liberalism started taking over the academic market in the latter half of the 1970s, at the 
same time as the neoliberals were taking over the capital market.20  These two forms of 
liberalism, which would do a lot to strengthen each other, both owe their dominance to 
the “crisis” of the late ‘60s and early ‘70s:  the economic collapse, the cultural fallout 
from the Civil Rights and ensuing student movements, and the trans-Atlantic uprisings of 
1968. 
                                                
19 Brennan, Wars of Position, 12. 
20 See Brennan, Wars of Position, especially ix-xiii and 1-5.  
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It was in 1968, according to historian Peter Starr, when “calls for the overthrow of 
the late capitalist order” started becoming “routinely coupled with calls for sexual 
liberation, for a radical disalienation of a modern subject caught in an increasingly 
technocratic world, for guerrilla art, or for new conceptions of urban space.”21  The goal, 
in the words of two prominent French 68ers, was to create “a fragile synthesis of two, 
ordinarily irreconcilable dogmatic logics—one of Marxist inspiration, the other 
libertarian.”22  That synthesis never happened.  Marxism lost; libertarianism won.  Starr 
explains:   
The order of the day included ecologism, consumerism, and regionalism; the 
defense of the rights of minorities and gays; anti-psychiatry and the liberation of 
‘desire.’  ‘Difference’ was the password and the right to difference the 
fundamental stake in political struggles.  Or, more precisely, the celebration of 
difference stood athwart the political, eschewing politics proper while claiming 
real political effects, in accordance with an extension of the political, most 
commonly associated with Foucault, to include all life situations governed by 
differential relations of power.23   
 
This was not necessarily the position of Michel Foucault the human being, who 
was variously involved with “politics proper” throughout his life and academic career.  
But it was the position of “Foucault” the commodity and “theory” icon24—who would 
                                                
21 Peter Starr, Logics of Failed Revolt:  French Theory After May ’68 (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University 
Press, 1995), 5. 
22 See Starr, Logics of Failed Revolt, 6. 
23 Starr, Logics of Failed Revolt, 7. 
24 My erstwhile colleague and professor John Mowitt makes this point in a short, interesting piece called 
“The Method of Discourse.”  Foucault has become a method in and of itself, which has pervaded much of 
the humanities and social sciences.  This method is to analyze the ways “discourse functions to establish a 
framework within which things become thinkable…to lay out what kind of frame of intelligibility made it 
possible for documents to be read and written as significant statements of scientific knowledge at a given 
moment…the apparatus wherein statements, practices, and experiences could be perceived as meaningfully 
correlated with one another, such that it would make sense to talk about subjects as [for example] having 
either sex, or a sex.  It was this very act of discourse that led Foucault to develop, and later insist upon, the 
notion of ‘subject positions’; the idea being that frames of intelligibility positioned subjects in relation to 
their norms such that the very act of knowing oneself, in fact, or even of knowing one’s own desire, was 
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soon be lumped with fellow 68-era icons such as “Barthes,” “Derrida,” “Deleuze,” and 
“Althusser,” into a pantheon that would take on immense market value.  “For the 
American academic, the entrée into theory can appear to be an indispensable prerequisite 
to entrance into the world of scholarly publishing, itself reflective of a culture industry 
for which…‘the only choice is either to join in or be left behind.’”25   
This “theory” was, in Starr’s words, a “logic of failed revolt,” fully grounded in 
defeat.  “If the new philosophy has a coherent theory of revolution,” observed American 
literature professor Michael Ryan, in dialogue with prominent post-’68 theorist Gayatri 
Spivak, “it is this:  revolution is impossible because the same always returns in the 
opposite.  The Master can never be altogether eliminated because to oppose him is 
merely to reaffirm his power.  And whatever alternative is set up in opposition to the 
Master will be yet another Master.”26  
After 1968, to be a good revolutionary no longer meant to organize, build power, 
and overthrow capitalism.  Now it meant to celebrate and protect “difference”—the 
                                                                                                                                            
caught up in a discourse that conditioned this act of self-understanding.”  Foucault, then, was more than 
just a method.  It was an entire approach to problem-selection (in the words of philosopher of science 
Thomas Kuhn).  It had a huge effect not just on the ways academics did their research, but also on the kinds 
of questions they investigated in the first place.  (Some friends and colleagues enjoy making me angry by 
pointing out traces of the Foucault method even in my own writing, in ways that go beyond the title to 
Chapter One.  They are surely correct.)  These questions, both in how they were asked and how they were 
investigated, follow (or perhaps inaugurate) the basic academic/para-academic structure we can see in 
everything from Althusser to cyberpunk to  What’s the Matter With Kansas?:  how does the “apparatus” of 
“discourse”—often, as in the title of my degree, linked to “society”—structure the “subject positions” that 
the enslaved individual mistakes for a self-formed identity?  These aren’t necessarily bad questions to ask.  
But when they’re the only questions we ask, when they become (again in Kuhn’s terms) paradigmatic, we 
end up excluding all possibility of “real world” agency from the conversation.  See John Mowitt, “The 
Method of Discourse,” Meditations 19, no. 1 (Spring 1995):  1-7. 
25 Starr, Logics of Failed Revolt, 201.  Starr is quoting Horkheimer and fellow postwar German critical 
theorist Theodor Adorno, who collectively coined the phrase the “culture industry.”  See Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
(Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 2002), 94-136. 
26 See Starr, Logics of Failed Revolt, 15. 
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freedom of individuals—against the constant threat of the Master.  The Master could be a 
government, a corporation, or even a union or a people’s organization or a leftist 
revolutionary movement.  The moment a group of people started to organize and build 
power, they were immediately suspected of threatening others’ “difference,” and 
therefore aiding (or actually being) the Master.  The new revolutionaries didn’t spend 
much time fighting fascism in public life; rather, just as “the Christian moralists sought 
out the traces of the flesh lodged deep within the soul” (in Foucault’s words), so do these 
modern monks, through their scholarly articles and artworks and anti-racism workshops, 
“pursue the slightest traces of fascism in the body.”27  The pursuit of political agency had 
been replaced by the pursuit of ethical purity.  And ironically enough, for a body of 
theory famous for opposing “binaries,” it seemed to leave us with the starkest binary of 
all:  either you’re a fascist, or you’re a victim. 
The iconic statement of this program is Howard Zinn’s famous People’s History 
of the United States.  Zinn’s book, while a wonderful piece of popular writing which has 
introduced generations of readers to “history from below,” is frustrating in the way it 
perpetuates this same overly-simplistic moral divide.  Zinn takes the messy, complex, 
morally-ambiguous struggles of various people and groups to organize and build power, 
and reduces them to a black-and-white struggle “between conquerors and conquered, 
masters and slaves, capitalists and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex.  
And in such a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of 
                                                
27 Michael Foucault, “Preface,” in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus:  Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis:  University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977):  xi-xiv, xiii. 
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thinking people, as Albert Camus suggested, not to be on the side of the executioners.”28  
It’s the same position that the famous critic Edward Said took, when he wrote of the 
imperative “for an intellectual…to be unusually responsible to the traveler rather than to 
the potentate, to the provisional and risky rather than to the habitual, to innovation and 
experiment rather than the authoritatively given status quo.”29 
But…what if the traveler is a dangerous criminal, and the potentate is more-or-
less just?  What if the provisional and risky is harmful (such as in neoliberalism) while 
the habitual includes a responsible social safety net?  These are hypotheticals, of course.  
But they illustrate the problem with replacing organization-based, political analysis with 
sweeping, moral generalizations.  And here’s another question:  if the world is truly 
divided into fascists and victims…where does that leave us, academics and readers of 
Zinn and Said?   
It leaves us detached.  Like Hiro in his helicopter, we are to float above the 
“biomass,” passing judgment without any self-interest of our own, and without tarnishing 
our ethical purity by getting involved in any organizations.  The rest of the world may be 
working in their own self-interest, but we academics, like Hebrew National hotdogs, 
answer to a Higher Authority.  Our raison d’etre, Said insists, is “to represent all those 
people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug.”  To support 
everything that is dominated, transient, and provisional, and oppose everything that 
dominates, stays fixed, and is permanent.  To take “the exile position.”30  An academic 
                                                
28 Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (New York:  HarperPerennial, 1980), 9-10. 
29 Edward Said, “Intellectual Exile:  Expatriates and Marginals,” in The Edward Said Reader, ed. Moustafa 
Bayoumi and Andrew Rubin (New York:  Vintage, 2000), 380-81; quoted in Cusset, French Theory, 20. 
30 See McGowan, Democracy’s Children, 3n, 16.  Emphasis added. 
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and artist colleague of mine, very committed to “social justice,” told me when she enters 
a community, her disposition is immediately to “find the marginalized people.”  If they’re 
marginalized, we should advocate for them; if they’re not, we shouldn’t.31  Which rules 
out making meaningful distinctions—such as the crucial distinction Augusto Boal 
(among others) makes between the oppressed, who are actively working to build power 
and end their oppression, and victims, who are not.   
Halberstam, like nearly all self-consciously radical academics of the past few 
decades, is on board with this program.  Her book celebrates “the relationship between 
new forms of animation and alternative politics,” by which she means not revolutionary 
organizing but lifestyle—“alternative ways of knowing and being.”32  Halberstam 
explores “the ways the modern state has run roughshod over local, customary, and 
undisciplined forms of knowledge” and sets out “to pick up some of the discarded local 
knowledges that are trampled underfoot in the rush to bureaucratize and rationalize an 
economic order that privileges profit over all kinds of motivations for being and doing.”33  
The point is not to organize against this profit-driven state, to build a new or better one, 
but merely to “resist” its tendency to “squash” other ways of “being in the world.”  And, 
                                                
31 But, wait, who is most deserving of our advocacy?  When we remove all categories of organization and 
self-interest, suddenly we are responsible for the whole world.  Hence what some critics have called the 
“Oppression Olympics,” a kind of a race-to-the-bottom triage system for determining who is the “most 
oppressed”—and thus, the most morally/ethically pure and worthy of consideration.  Political scientist 
Adolph Reed explains:  “this mode of argument has precedents in the allegations of black workers’ double 
oppression that appeared in some quarters of left debate in the 1970s and of black women’s double or triple 
oppression that gained currency within the women’s movement perhaps a bit later.  Implicit in both 
formulations was a presumption that greater oppression assigned a group greater insight or gave its claims 
moral priority.  To the extent that the proliferating specification of identity positions follows a similar logic 
it betrays the grain of truth beneath conservatives’ ugly dismissals of the new academic specialties as 
‘oppression studies.’”  See Adolph Reed, Jr., Class Notes:  Posing As Politics and Other Thoughts on the 
American Scene (New York:  The New Press, 2000), xix.   
32 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 23-24. 
33 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 9.  
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in a more positive vein, to “privilege the naïve or nonsensical,” the “unconventional 
loners,” and above all the “failures.”   
Halberstam, despite her interest in “alternative politics,” doesn’t analyze how 
these loaners and failures might be organized—either in the future (by/for themselves, for 
the better) or in the present (by someone else, for the worse).  It’s just not a question that 
occurs, either to her or, it seems, to most of her readers.  As with Foucault and Zinn, 
taking the side of these “marginal” folks is not a political strategy; it’s an ethical 
imperative, and an empirical truth, and an aesthetic preference—all rolled into one.  
When you’re given an image like the “thicket of subjugated knowledge that sprouts like 
weeds among the disciplinary forms of knowledge, threatening always to overwhelm the 
cultivation and pruning of the intellect with mad plant life”—and implicitly asked which 
side you’re on—there’s not even a question.  Of course we prefer the exciting and active 
mad plant life, which threatens the boring prudish Gary Aldrich-style cultivator and also 
happens to let the plants go free and respect the natural, free-flowing course of 
knowledge.  Like a cyberpunk novel—and like the neoliberal conception of “the 
market”—this kind of image gives you a (really easy) choice between something that’s 
ethically wrong and politically oppressive and aesthetically boring and factually incorrect 
(all the same, all part of the Master) and something that’s ethically right and politically 
liberating and aesthetically interesting and factually correct.34          
                                                
34 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 9.  
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This kind of analysis might be fun, but it’s not particularly serious.35  To be fair, 
Halberstam openly declares that “not being taken seriously…is my goal.”36  But I want to 
question whether we should take that seriously.  She pretty clearly cares about the people 
and issues she’s writing about; the liberation of these subjugated peoples and ways of 
knowing and being seems pretty deep in her self-interest, as a writer and a scholar and a 
one-time theater performer and a person who has herself experienced various forms of 
failure and queerness.  The interpretive strategies she’s using, the only ones available on 
the market she’s on, are just getting in her way.  It’s hard to work for people’s liberation, 
after all, when you honestly believe that neither they nor you have any agency, or ever 
could have any agency—that all the agency lies in the State. 
This belief is depressingly common, in a lot of the most popular social theory of 
the past century.  In the social sciences, it’s been expressed (variously) in the work of 
Max Weber and C. Wright Mills and Jürgen Habermas, and many more in between.  In 
the post-68 humanities, it’s been expressed most clearly in the work of the French 
philosopher Louis Althusser.  His most oft-read essay, “Ideology and the State” (1969), 
                                                
35 “Serious,” as I’m using it here, is a term of art in the oral tradition of broad-based community organizing.  
To be “serious” means to do an objective power-analysis—to assess your own, your allies’, and your 
opposition’s resources and potential for agency—and then to act, strategically, based on that analysis.  
(Which might include strategically deciding not to act, in a given way in a given moment.)  It is frequently 
coupled with the imperative to be “clear”—meaning, to do an objective analysis of your and others’ self-
interest, and then to act strategically based on that analysis.  When an organizer observes that a colleague is 
not acting “clearly” or “seriously”—which always poses a risk to their shared work and self-interest—s/he 
performs what’s called an “agitation”:  s/he sits down with that colleague and, in an intentional and 
prepared way, lays out (1) what that colleague is doing now, (2) what that colleague could be doing if s/he 
were acting more clearly and seriously, and (3) what’s getting in the way.  I’ll discuss all of this at much 
greater length in the next chapter, but I bring it up here in order to explain what I’m doing with Halberstam, 
and some of the language I’m doing it in.  This chapter is, in essence, an agitation that I am giving my 
colleagues in academia and para-academia, out of our mutual self-interest in taking down TINA.  We will 
do better, I am arguing, if we are more serious about the agency that we, our readers and colleagues, and 
those we consider “oppressed” actually have, and could build.  For more on “clear,” “serious,” and 
“agitation,” see Chapter Four.  
36 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 6. 
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implicitly argues that the uprisings of the previous year failed because…none of us have 
much agency.  We have been made who we are—docile creatures who sit down, shut up, 
and do what we’re told—by “ideology,” which is controlled by “the State” and expressed 
through its various “ideological state apparatuses” (ISAs):  education, religion, the 
family, the law, the media, basically every institution of human culture.  The ISAs turn 
each individual into a “subject” of ideology, who thinks s/he is independent and free-
thinking but in fact not at all.  And should we somehow manage to smuggle some trace of 
agency past the ISAs, the State will deploy the “repressive state apparatuses” (RSAs)—
the police and the military—to beat it out of us, literally.37   
I find this argument frustrating and oversimplified.38  At the same time, I 
understand its appeal.  It tries to take stock of the enormity of the challenges “we” face.  
If it ends up being rather fatalistic and masochistic, it may just be riffing on the culture 
around it:  what critic Christopher Lasch called the “masochistic relish” that the 1968 
generation took in “denunciations of itself…as empty, conformist, sexually repressed, 
and dead to feeling.”39  And it’s an appealing, blunt instrument for convincing naïve, 
                                                
37 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and the State,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben 
Brewster (New York:  Monthly Review Press, 1971), 127-186.  Althusser’s “structuralist Marxism,” argues 
historian Patrick Brantlinger, represents “what happens to Marxism when the idea of economic causation is 
subtracted from it, or when something else—the ‘structural,’ based on a Saussurean linguistic model—is 
substituted for the economic.”  To which I need only add:  not just the economic, but also the 
organizational.  Althusser removed all the dialectical dynamism from Marxism:  all the instability and 
inevitable clashes of classes, ideas, and institutions that can create change, and ultimately, revolution, and 
in doing so, he managed “to liquidate any role for human agency in the making of class consciousness and 
history.”  See Patrick Brantlinger, Crusoe’s Footprints:  Cultural Studies in Britain and America (New 
York:  Routledge, 1990), 77, 89.  For a far, far more thorough critique of Althusser—specifically, of his 
pre-1968 writings—see E.P. Thompson, “The Poverty of Theory,” in The Poverty of Theory (New York:  
Monthly Review Press, 2008), 1-210. 
38 In my less mature moments, I have suggested that “ISA” should stand for “infantile social analysis.” 
39 Christopher A. Lasch, The Agony of the American Left (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 31.  Note 
the publication date. 
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blithely individualist undergraduate students that they are in fact not free agents, 
unaffected by the culture around them. 
Is there no potential for agency at all for Althusser?  Not quite.  He gives us one 
way out.  In addition to the all-powerful “State” and the Kansans trapped in “ideology,” 
there is one more category of person:         
I might add:  what thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the 
street), in reality takes place in ideology.  What really takes place in ideology 
seems therefore to take place outside it.  That is why those who are in ideology 
believe themselves by definition outside ideology:  one of the effects of ideology 
is the practical denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology:  
ideology never says, ‘I am ideological’.  It is necessary to be outside ideology, i.e. 
in scientific knowledge, to be able to say:  I am in ideology (a quite exceptional 
case) or (the general case):  I was in ideology.  As is well known, the accusation 
of being in ideology only applies to others, never to oneself.40 
 
The only way out of ideology, it seems, is through practicing “scientific 
knowledge” and speaking directly about ideology—that is, through being an academic 
theorist like Althusser himself.  That’s the hope for agency.  It’s a questionable hope—
just because I know my body-image issues come from the ideology of the capitalist 
media doesn’t mean I magically stop having those issues—but if you believe Althusser, 
it’s the only hope there is.  It gives a different spin on SDS leader Todd Gitlin’s remark 
that after 1968 “the right marched on Washington and took a great deal of it while the left 
was marching on the English department.”  I used to find this ironic.  After reading 
Althusser, I’m not so sure.41  If you really believe that doing theory is the only way left to 
                                                
40 Althusser, “Ideology and the State,” 175.  I hope this last sentence is a joke, or at least somewhat ironic.  
But I’m not sure. 
41 “Transcript for:  A Conversation with Todd Gitlin,” Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg (November 23, 
1995).  http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/transcript235.html (November 26, 2013).  As Brennan notes:  “if 
[Marx’s famous] eleventh thesis on Feuerbach (‘philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point, 
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get agency, then joining the English department really could be, un-ironically, a 
revolutionary act.   
And so it was that in the years after 1968, the same years when the neoliberals 
began ransacking the public sphere, leftist radicals and activists entered academia in 
droves.  Suddenly, as right-wing critics like David Horowitz and Gertrude Himmelfarb 
noted with horror, everyone who wanted to study English literature was also expected to 
want to overthrow capitalism.  (Or at least to pretend.)42  But they needn’t have worried 
so much.  They might talk, write, and publish about revolution, but this revolution, in 
practice, pretty much just meant writing more theory. 
Althusser, to be fair, was not an organizer.  He was a philosopher.  If he resisted 
all agency other than the theorist’s, he was only following in the footsteps of his 
discipline—created, in its modern form, some 330 years earlier, when another French 
philosopher shut out the rest of the world and tried to achieve true scientific knowledge 
(which had evaded all the dupes out there) through his pure individual thoughts alone.  
                                                                                                                                            
however, is to change it’) had generally been taken as a declaration of philosophy’s limits, Althusser…with 
virtuosic cheekiness…considered it a call for a new philosophy that would [itself] transform the world” 
(Brennan, Wars of Position, 311n39). 
42 These were the “significant parts of the academy” that, according to Horowitz, have become agencies of 
social and political change,” staffed by “activists who regarded the university as a platform from which to 
advance their political mission.  Drawing on the works of European Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci and 
Herbert Marcuse, and the educational theorist Paulo Freire, the radicals viewed universities as ‘means of 
cultural production’ analogous to the ‘means of production’ in Marx’s revolutionary schema.  To these 
professorial activists, the academic classroom offered a potential fulcrum for revolutionary change.  
Because the university trained journalists and educators, lawyers and judges, future political candidates and 
operatives, it provided a path to cultural ‘hegemony’ and an opportunity to promote a radical 
transformation of the society at large.”  See David Horowitz and Jacob Laskin, One Party Classroom:  
How Radical Professors at America’s Top Colleges Indoctrinate Students and Undermine Our Democracy 
(New York: Crown Forum, 2009), 6-7, 9.  On pretending:  I know at least one colleague who entered a 
comparative literature program as a self-described conservative, who within a year called himself a 
Marxist.  This was no nefarious leftist conversion, however:  when asked to do an afternoon of campaign 
work for a progressive Democratic candidate, he declined, but because “that’s a little too concrete for me.”  
Marxism, for him and so many others, was just a body of texts used to do certain kind of theoretical 
readings of literature, amenable to Republicans just as much as to Democrats. 
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I’m talking about René Descartes,  the Catholic mercenary (figuratively and also literally) 
who’s maybe most remembered for inventing the coordinate plane (remember y = mx + 
b?), and who’s also considered one of the founders of both modern philosophy and 
modern science.   
Descartes might be an early cyberpunk.  In his Meditations on First Philosophy, 
published in 1641 and (like Althusser) still widely taught in introductory university 
courses, Descartes basically jacked in:  he locked himself in an empty room, retreated 
from the external world into his deck-of-a-mind, and started hacking:  “the mind, through 
the exercise of its own freedom, supposes the nonexistence of all those things about 
whose existence it can have even the least doubt.  In doing so the mind realizes that it is 
impossible for it not to exist during this time.”  (Hence:  “I think, therefore I am.”)  When 
we isolate ourselves completely, “freeing us of all prejudices,” we learn that the only 
thing that is incontrovertibly real is our own mind.  And our only hope of reaching any 
real, objective knowledge is to keep this mind isolated, in its vat. 43                       
                                                
43 René Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy,” in Discourse on Method and Meditations on First 
Philosophy, 4th ed., trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett, 1998):  45-103, 54.  Descartes was 
obviously not the first philosopher to deal with questions of reality, appearances, and deception.  But in 
Plato’s cave, the shadows on the wall of the cave are fake; the point of philosophy is to free people from 
that fake, solipsistic knowledge and bring them back into the world of people.  What’s new about Descartes 
is, he switches it around:  now it’s the outside world, the world of human and relationship-based 
knowledge, that’s fake; to get real, philosophic, scientific knowledge, you have to go into the cave.  (You 
can, in this way, draw a straight line from Descartes to Baudrillard.)  Descartes wasn’t alone in this 
innovation:  he stood on the shoulders of Luther, who had recently locked himself in the Wartburg to do 
battle with the Devil in order to bring the Bible to the people (the first translation into German), and of 
Machiavelli, who secluded himself in his study and costumed himself in the robes of sovereignty in order 
to discover the secrets of statecraft (in The Prince).  This was also the moment when first-person 
perspective was invented in painting.  It was—as Foucault and many other scholars have argued—the birth 
of “modernity,” when the modern “individual” was born:  capable of attaining all knowledge of the world 
from where he stood (still very much he, at this point), capable of forging a destiny independent of the 
people around him, and defined in sharp relief to a “society” that may stand between him and true, absolute 
knowledge and (cyberpunk) agency.  There are many accounts of this historical moment and the changes it 
wrought:  my two (very different but oddly complementary) favorites are Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of 
History (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2002), Chapter 1 (“A Dangerous Form of Knowledge”), 
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Thus was modern knowledge born.  The world according to Descartes is not a 
place we live in, are a part of, work to shape; it is a place we examine from the outside, 
remaining safely locked in our little room with our mind in its vat (or in our helicopter 
above the biomass).  We are now spectators, consumers of the world.  It’s only from this 
perspective that questions like “Are we really real?” and “Am I just making all of this 
up?” and (fellow French philosopher Bruno Latour’s favorite) “Do you believe in 
reality?” make any sense.44  We will never be able to answer these questions, at least not 
in any absolute sense.  And yet these are now the questions that dictate the dominant 
interpretive strategies of formal knowledge-seeking, in and out of academia.  The goal is 
absolute knowledge.  Incontrovertible, unbiased, disinterested, disembodied knowledge.  
Knowledge that is “freed” from the “distortions” of particular interpretive strategies and 
the particular habitus, markets, and interpretive communities that create them—freed, in 
other words, from humans and their human ways of meaning-making.  It’s an interpretive 
strategy that demands knowledge attained “outside” of interpretive strategies.  Which is, 
for humans, impossible by definition.   
But that hasn’t stopped many humans from trying—very, very hard, for a very, 
very long time.  “Society,” as we know it, comes right out of Descartes’ separation of 
mind and “outside” world.  In Latour’s words, “this ‘society’ itself was just a series of 
minds-in-a-vat, many minds and many vats to be sure, but each of them still composed 
                                                                                                                                            
and Augusto Boal, Theatre of the Oppressed, trans. Charles A. and Maria-Odilia Leal McBride (New York:  
Theatre Communications Group, 1979), Chapter 2 (“Machiavelli and the Poetics of Virtù”).         
44 Here, and below, I am again largely paraphrasing Latour’s arguments, especially from the first chapter of 
Pandora’s Hope (“Do You Believe in Reality?”).  
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of…a detached mind gazing at an outside world.”45  No wonder organizing and agency 
seem so impossible:  each mind is in a separate vat, existentially and basically alone.  
And if those vats were ever to overflow, and mix all those minds together, the result 
wouldn’t be agency but the mob, the masses, the crowd, the “Tea Party Jacobins”:  the 
bogeymen of elitist conservatives and concerned liberals alike.46  That’s the choice:  
radical individualism or the mob, anarchism or authoritarianism. 
What’s missing in this analysis, again, are Ollman’s “middle terms”:  all of those 
intentional organizations, as large-scale as unions and political parties and as small-scale 
as faculty and student associations, through which people work collectively to make their 
world.  These “middle terms,” on a market set by Descartes and Althusser, not only 
become hard to see; they become taboo to talk about.  And taboo to talk about.  John 
McGowan, English professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, tells what happened when this 
unspoken taboo got broken: 
I entered the room a little late for the session on criticism and social change [at the 
1986 Modern Language Association conference].  The first speaker, a woman, 
was already telling the audience of about sixty that ‘structuration’ was the 
sociologists’ term for what she wanted to describe, but that she would avoid using 
such hideous jargon.  She was here to talk about her experiences working for 
change as a woman within the profession….The speaker began to explain 
university bureaucracies and methods of negotiating with them in the vocabulary 
supplied by personnel management theories and organizational psychology.  Her 
examples of prejudice had made me uneasy; now her valorization of the stuff 
MBAs are made on and her use of their horrendous neologisms positively 
offended me. 
Academic audiences are hardly demonstrative.  I was feeling puzzled, 
wondering if I was showing my curmudgeonly colors by finding her so 
distasteful.  She was perfectly politically correct, a warrior for women’s rights, 
and there was every reason to believe that an audience gathered to hear her, a 
                                                
45 Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 7. 
46 See Mark Lilla, “The Tea Party Jacobins,” The New York Review of Books (May 27, 2010).   
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/27/tea-party-jacobins/ (December 2, 2013). 
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well-known critic of criticism and a prominent neo-Marxist, talk about criticism’s 
ability to effect social change would be sympathetic to her goals and 
achievements.  In any case, I sensed something was wrong, but thought it might 
just be me. 
The speaker obviously felt totally in control as she rounded the final 
corner and gave personal testimony about her career in “implementing change.”  
A veteran of the sixties and the New Left, she had refused to be discouraged by 
the movement’s collapse, going off instead to take a workshop that taught her 
how to become a “change agent.”  At the first university where she was 
employed, she had put together a coalition of women who presented the 
administration with one hundred demands, some of them substantial, some of 
them fluff that was meant to be bargained away in negotiations.  They got the 
administration to accede to all the demands they had agreed among themselves 
were essential.  Subsequently, she had acted as a liaison between women scholars 
and various publishers as part of a concerted effort to overcome the long-standing 
tendency of women academics to publish less than their male counterparts.  In 
conclusion, as someone “who had implemented much change in universities,” she 
could tell us that change is possible if you work for it. 
She thanked us and sat down.  In silence.  The moderator of the panel 
stood up and introduced the second speaker .47 
 
No one applauded.  At all.  “I have never witnessed or even heard of a similar 
occurrence at an academic conference,” McGowan continues.  “My first thought was, so 
much for our commitment to political change.  Here is an audience that fondly believes 
itself radical, but when presented with an energetic and effective political activist, turns 
up its nose.”  But after a little more guilt and privilege-checking and Lasch-style 
“masochistic relish,” McGowan offers a very insightful analysis: 
Our response was…less a matter of prejudice against her activities than a 
complete failure to recognize her relationship to what we do and believe.  Some 
class snobbery was present.  She was dressed and talked like an in-house 
corporate lawyer—someone with a law degree from Notre Dame or a state 
university; but she was on our side.  More crucial was our intellectual snobbery.  
Her analysis of the issues was crude and simple-minded.  Worse, perhaps, was her 
straightforward pursuit of economic goods within the world we inhabit; academic 
radicals prefer their politics more refined:  abstract visions of justice for all in 
some utterly transformed social order.  Her attachment to the pseudo-academic 
                                                
47 McGowan, Democracy’s Children, 42-43.  
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disciplines developed for bureaucrats by the nation’s business schools violated 
our allegiance to our more humane, subtle, complex, and elegant literary 
vocabulary.  Finally, the tin ear that allowed her to use the word “change” in such 
inappropriate ways and a phrase like “change agent” without the slightest tinge of 
irony proclaimed that she was not one of us. 
…our impoliteness did reveal what we English and modern language 
professors, despite our various internecine quarrels, share in common.  For better 
or for worse, this is who we are:  a group that values complex political analyses 
over crude, if effective, political action.  We are skeptics who find it difficult to 
credit direct accusations of sexual discrimination, even while developing 
theoretical models that designate a whole culture and all its linguistic usages 
‘patriarchal’; habitual pessimists who have become so comfortable with our ritual 
denunciations of contemporary culture and all its works that any intimations of 
possible change offends us; political activists who fully intend to leave the dirty 
political work to others; and, most crucially, writers and teachers whose most firm 
allegiance is to language.  You can say anything at the MLA convention and 
receive applause so long as you do not abuse our highly developed sense of 
linguistic decorum.  To know, practice, and defend the intricate, unwritten, rules 
of that decorum makes you a full-fledged member of our group.48 
    
In a world where ideas are made (organized) in interpretive communities—i.e., 
our world—that’s always the big question:  are you in “our group,” or aren’t you?  And in 
a culture defined by culture war, this question easily becomes:  are you us, or are you 
them?  Friend or enemy?  If it feels like a silly question, it can still make or break your 
career:  say or do or write something that puts you outside of the group, and the market 
will enact its revenge. 
What does “our group” look like?  It looks like a counterculture.  The same 
counterculture that Case and Hiro and the rest of the “technological priesthood” live in.  
Put together the 1641 disposition to detach and the 1968 disposition to resist, and you get 
a culture defined by opposition—to the mainstream, to the status quo, to “society.”  We 
might want to connect with “the people,” but first we need to find the code and enter it in 
                                                
48 McGowan, Democracy’s Children, 44. 
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and radically re-make them:  “The intellectuals who practice leftist cultural politics are 
‘out of touch’ with the people,” McGowan declares, “but…there is not any group already 
existing out there ready-made, for them to get into touch with.  That group—or coalition 
of groups—needs to be made, to be forged, through the performatives of cultural 
politics.”49 
But wait—what’s the problem with the people out there now?  There are actually 
groups out there, like the one that MLA speaker belonged to.  The trouble is, they have 
the wrong style.  Style, in academia as in many countercultures, is crucial.  The speaker 
had the right political views or goals, but she talked funny:  corporate, confident, 
concrete.  She knew how the organizational structures worked, and how to build power 
within them.  She didn’t speak in theory-citations; she didn’t demean herself or negate 
her own agency; she didn’t prostrate herself before impossible-to-penetrate oppressive 
structures, impossible-to-reach oppressed peoples, or impossible-to-access liberation 
movements.50  That is:  she didn’t give her audience any of the Halberstam-style “nods of 
                                                
49 McGowan, Democracy’s Children, 23. 
50 This kind of language, for the members of this interpretive community, is what my colleagues Robin 
Brown and Carl Herndl (following the tradition of “object relations” psychoanalysis) would call a “self-
object.”  Self-objects are, literally, those objects in relation to which we have developed our selves, our 
most basic understanding of who we are in the world.  (Without them, we would be feral children.)  Many 
of our most important self-objects are people—starting with the people who raised us (parents or otherwise) 
and continuing throughout our lives with particularly important teachers, mentors, role models, and peers—
who “tell us…who we are and how to be.” But not all self-objects are people.  Think about all the books, 
songs, movies, activities, places, and/or foods, among other things, that are so close to us we consider them 
a part of us.  When we see them being attacked, we will defend them fiercely, even irrationally.  And we 
would no sooner separate ourselves from them than we would from one of our own arms or legs.  The urge 
to hold fast to our self-objects is one of the most durable dispositions in our habitus.  Brown and Herndl’s 
innovation is to connect self-objects to rhetoric.  One of the most important—and overlooked—strategies of 
effective rhetoric is to identify the self-objects of your audience and then speak accordingly:  tailor your 
arguments to resonate with them, and above all avoid attacking them head-on.  (This is the wisdom of Saul 
Alinsky’s oft-repeated dictum:  if you want to organize Orthodox Jews, don’t go into their neighborhood 
eating a ham sandwich.)  And beyond that, Brown and Herndl argue, rhetoric is a self-object, maybe even 
the most powerful one.  The way we talk, the patterns and accents and vocabulary and sentence structure 
and pace and interruptions and gestures, is a huge part of who we are.  That, ultimately, was the rhetorical 
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recognition” that would have reassured them that they were all in the same interpretive 
community.  It’s not that the audience didn’t like or respect her, at least not necessarily; 
it’s that they didn’t get her.  They didn’t see themselves in her, or her in themselves.  And 
so, as we commonly do in that situation, they rejected her. 
It’s a tragic double-bind.  We, academics of the left/liberal/progressive variety, 
are a counterculture that craves connection, often to the very “society” we reject.  
McGowan observes “something forlorn about the [academic] intellectual, always a sense 
of being slightly irrelevant, something that motivates the corresponding dream of hooking 
up with the true source of social power, whether that source be the state or the proletariat.  
Hence [Italian organizer and philosopher Antonio] Gramsci’s notion of the ‘organic’ 
intellectual who is seamlessly woven into a social group.  The intellectual rarely, if ever, 
feels organic.”  And at the same time “there is almost always another group—a group 
often figured as oppressed—who is to benefit from the intellectual’s activities.  This 
group isn’t seen as directly connected (either through reading or other direct encounters) 
with the intellectual’s work, but is to benefit nonetheless….Called to explain how their 
work will effect the transformations it calls for, the intellectual has only comically feeble 
Rube Goldberg scenarios to offer, a voodoo politics replete with its own versions of 
‘trickle down’ influence.”51   
                                                                                                                                            
mistake of the speaker at the MLA conference—at least, if her goal was to make herself and her ideas 
acceptable to her audience (which is up for debate).  In speaking the language of organizing, she attacked 
their most important self-object head-on.  See Brown and Herndl, “Beyond the Realm of Reason,” 
especially 228-230. 
51 McGowan, Democracy’s Children, ix, 3-4.  Note:  McGowan misreads Gramsci and his concept of the 
“organic intellectual” in an important and very common way, which I will discuss in Chapter Four. 
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Yet here, standing in front of them—in front of us—was a real-live “organic 
intellectual.”  A well-known academic, who was “seamlessly woven into a social group” 
that is “often figured as oppressed,” who had built “social power” and used it to fight that 
oppression, and who was now offering herself to us and asking us to accept her.  And we 
didn’t.  For the simple reason that…we didn’t know how.  Just like we didn’t know how 
to keep building power after the Legislative Theater session in Minneapolis.  Our 
habitus—disposed to understand ourselves and our work and the truth as detached from 
all organizations, to privilege the unseen and powerless over the visible and powerful, 
and to resist all agency other than the cyberpunk—wouldn’t let us.52       
This double-bind goes a long way toward explaining the vague discontentment, 
the general malaise, that hangs over many of the best academics I know.53  It’s the feeling 
we experience in (only the best) seminars, the same feeling I get when thinking about our 
Legislative Theatre session at City Hall:  the feeling that we’ve gotten as far as we can 
                                                
52 The obvious question to ask, at this point, is:  then wherefore this book?  If I don’t cyberpunk-ish-ly 
claim immunity from interpretive communities and markets—which of course I don’t—then how do I 
square this piece of academic cultural production with a market that seems like it would be pretty hostile to 
it?  I discuss this question in depth in the Prologue, but briefly:  first, I have some different dispositions in 
my habitus, because of some interpretive communities I’ve fallen ass-backwards into—chief among them, 
broad-based community organizing and my family (including my politician and journalist father).  Second, 
I am taking an intentional risk, offering this book on the academic market; I am aware that it may fail, and 
I’m okay with that (I’m not sure I want an academic job anyway…and I’m lucky and privileged enough to 
have some other options).  Third, I have a vague inkling that the academic market may be shifting:  what 
with all the recent interest in “civic engagement”—and a re-investment into the values of land-grant 
universities—I may be following an emerging trend myself. 
53 This phenomenon has been variously documented.  Harry Boyte and the Center for Democracy and 
Citizenship (then at the University of Minnesota)  interviewed over 30 professors from across the 
University of Minnesota in the late 1990s.  They found that nearly all professors they talked to were 
frustrated with their work environments, and that that frustration tended to take a common, cyberpunk-
neoliberal form:  public and interpersonal work was devalued, in favor of hyper-individualized market 
competition.  In the words of retired political science professor Charles Backstrom:  “I thought of my job 
description as including work with communities…[but] there was a war of cultures at the University then.  
I felt pressure to focus only on publications.”  Harry C. Boyte, “Public Engagement in a Civic Mission:  A 
Case Study” (Washington, D.C.:  Council on Public Education, 2000).  For a wider, national perspective 
that makes a similar point, see also Kerry Ann O’Meara and R. Eugene Rice, Faculty Priorities 
Reconsidered: Rewarding Multiple Forms of Scholarship (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005). 
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get within the interpretive strategies available to us—and yet we’re still so far away from 
agency.  Political scientist and journalist Adolph Reed, a longtime Marxist critic of 
“theory,” suspects cynicism:  “the highly theorized retreat to a world-weary, sometimes 
agonizedly disappointed quietism that presumes the privilege of secure, middle to upper-
middle class employment with good benefits.”54  I’ve certainly seen a lot of this.  But I 
also know a good number of academics, myself included, who long to be a part of the 
“outside” world—the “real” world—but don’t always know how to get there.   
Halberstam is in this group, too.  Like many of us, she is discontented with the 
available paths within the academic market:  either (1) seeking disinterested truth (which 
doesn’t exist), or (2) writing “anti-Cartesian” books and articles declaring (the 
disinterested truth) that there is no disinterested truth.  And so, again like many of us 
looking for “a way out of the usual traps and impasses of binary formation,” she pins her 
hopes on “the external world beyond the ivied walls of the campus.”  Halberstam’s 
experiences in this “external world,” including her work with “the legendary lesbian 
performance group LTTR,” have convinced her “that some of the most important 
intellectual leaps take place independently of university training or its aftermath or as a 
detour around and away from the lessons that disciplined thinking metes out.” 55 
I couldn’t agree more.  I draw a lot of my own intellectual inspiration, not to 
mention most of my joy in living, from the world outside the university.  I’m just not sure 
escaping the university is as easy as Halberstam thinks.  The market of academia, its 
dominant values and interpretive strategies, stretches far beyond the bounds of campus.  
                                                
54 Reed, Class Notes, xiv. 
55 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 2, 11, 24. 
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When Halberstam and I participate in social-justice performance groups, sit on the board 
of non-profits, and post our writings in the blogosphere—as is our disposition—we may 
get joy and inspiration, but we may not have traveled very far from the university at all. 
 
The Dominant Dispositions:  Step Back, Call Out, Resist 
In 2010, during my term on the PTO Board of Directors, I once got an email from 
a fellow board member who had drafted a definition of “Open Access Membership”:   
You may self-identify as eligible for this form of membership if paying 
full conference fees would cause you financial hardship.  One might select this 
category based on student status, unemployment, wages that make the regular 
membership unsustainable, or other factors….   
 
Then, three minutes later, the same person sent another email—“Wait! Read this 
definition instead…definitely base any comments on THIS version”:   
You may self-identify as eligible for this form of membership if 
paying full conference fees would cause you financial hardship.  One might select 
this category based on student status, unemployment, wages that make other 
categories of membership unsustainable, or other factors…. 
 
See the difference?  It was “edited to take out the normalizing word regular.”  
(Yet the seemingly equally “normalizing” word “full” remained—without comment—
including from me.) 
In 2013, the popular Tumblr (blog) “sexartandpolitics” featured a debate among 
several anonymous bloggers about whether “2Spirit” is or is not a “trans identity.”  One 
blogger wrote:  “2Spirit is not an identity for anyone who is not Native American/First 
Nations/indigenous to the Americas….It is not for any white person to use, ever, in any 
self-description….White people, shut the fuck up and accept that you do not own 
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everything and that not all things are open to you. Grow the fuck up and stop whining 
about how ~excluded~ you are.”  Another blogger responded:  “two-spirit is a trans* 
identity.  whether you think it’s cultural appropriate or not is irrelevant.  it is a trans* 
identity.  and telling a two-spirit person that can’t be their identity is transphobic.”  (The 
next day, the same Tumblr reposted an essay about how “people throw around ‘Tumblr 
feminist’ as a way to delegitimize those of us who are not welcome in the mainstream or 
had to fight tooth and nail to appear there.  There’s definitely a hint of classism and 
credentialism involved in disregarding someone’s work based on what space it appears.”  
The essay concludes:  “I’m interested in the most ignored, the most plagiarized and the 
most marginalized having a voice, wherever that occurs, in tweets or blogs that 
are simultaneously disrespected as they are consumed and plagiarized. Nobody is a 
“‘Tumblr feminist.’”)56  
“In the 1990s,” writes anarchist ethnographer and ethnographer-of-anarchism 
David Graeber, “the Love & Rage Federation dissolved over issues of white privilege.  
Love & Rage had begun as an initiative to create a continental anarchist network around 
a newspaper of the same name.  In many ways it was quite successful.  After ten years, 
however, they found themselves stubbornly unable to expand beyond their original core 
of middle-class white activists or include significant numbers of people of color.  Furious 
arguments ultimately broke out over the reasons for this:  which also became theoretical 
                                                
56 http://www.sexartandpolitics.com/post/67425875375/while-chatting-with-theivorytowercrumbles-i-said, 
November 18, 2013 (November 27, 2013); 
http://www.sexartandpolitics.com/post/67432117333/imnotevilimjustwrittenthatway-biyuti, November 18, 
2013 (November 27, 2013); http://www.sexartandpolitics.com/post/67449340850/what-the-hell-is-a-
tumblr-feminist, November 19, 2013 (November 27, 2013).  All emphases and non-standard spelling and 
grammar in original. 
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debates about the nature of white privilege and ways of overcoming white 
supremacy….Within a year or two, Love & Rage split into feuding factions over racial 
issues, and the entire project ultimately foundered.”57 
Welcome to para-academia.   
I imagine none of these groups would be particularly happy with this label.  PTO 
was founded by academics and often hosts events on academic campuses, but it 
distinguishes itself by its commitment to practice and practitioners off campus.  Tumblr 
culture is often explicitly anti-academic:  the “2Spirit” debate happened just hours after 
the same blog featured a conversation with another Tumblr called 
“theivorytowercrumbles,” and there are many other Tumblrs about discontented 
relationships with college classes and graduate programs.  As for anarchism, Graeber 
takes care to distinguish between “two intellectual streams that emerged from the period 
of May ’68 in France that are still alive in the US and English-speaking world”:   
the pre-1968 revolutionary strain, kept alive in zines, anarchist infoshops, and the 
Internet, and the post-1968 strain, largely despairing of the possibility of a mass-
based, organized revolution, kept alive in graduate seminars, academic 
conferences, and scholarly journals.  The first tends to recognize capitalism as an 
all-encompassing symbolic system that creates extreme forms of human 
alienation, but sees it as possible to rebel against it in the name of pleasure, desire, 
and the potential autonomy of the human subject.  The second tends to see the 
system (whether it is now labeled capitalism, power, discourse, etc.) as so all-
encompassing that it is constitutive of the desiring subject him- or herself, 
rendering any critique of alienation, or possibility of a revolution against the 
system itself, effectively impossible….The [pre-1968] Situationists argued that 
the system renders us passive consumers, but issued a call to actively resist.  The 
current radical academic orthodoxy seems to either reject either the first part or 
the second:  that is, either it argues that there is no system imposed on consumers, 
or that resistance is impossible.58 
 
                                                
57 David Graeber, Direct Action:  An Ethnography (Oakland, CA:  AK Press, 2009), 241-242. 
58 Graeber, Direct Action, 259-260. 
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This difference may exist, but it’s overstated.  Both inside and outside the walls of 
the university, it’s not uncommon to hear passionate calls to “resist” right next to equally 
passionate declarations that resistance is futile—sometimes coming from the same 
speaker.59  “There are thousands of Marxist academics but very few Anarchist ones,” 
Graeber maintains—yes, but only because in academia, anarchism is in the water.60  (We 
don’t have a lot of self-proclaimed Cartesians, either.)  A handful of particularly 
thoughtful academics, like Halberstam, give “European anarchist thought” proper credit 
for the “loose collectives of individuals versus the State” frame that they use to analyze 
politics; most don’t.61    
The mixing of academia and para-academia, pre-68 and post-68, is partially 
demographic.  Graeber admits:  “If there’s anything that does set [anarchist activists] off 
from the bulk of Americans it is that they are disproportionately likely to have attended 
college.  Many, of course, are themselves students, but the activist core seems to be made 
up of what might even be called post-students:  young women and men who have 
completed college, but are still living something like students.”62  These are the people—
                                                
59 As political scientist and longtime leftist Adolph Reed observes, “left sectarians” outside academia and 
“structuralist Marxists” within it are both “immobilized by their conviction that it is not possible to change 
anything until everything is changed…[their] tendency to view the configuration of power relations 
existing at a given moment as identical to the limits of possibility.”  Paul Willis, sociologist and famous 
cultural studies practitioner, has argued similarly against “a purist structuralist immobilizing reductionist 
tautology:  nothing can be done until the basic structures of society are changed but the structures prevent 
us [from] making any changes.”See Reed, Class Notes, xiii, and Paul Willis, Learning to Labor:  How 
Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1977), 186. 
60 Graeber, Direct Action, 211. 
61 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 10.  This anarchist thought, Halberstam continues, favors 
“mutuality, collectivity, plasticity, diversity, and adaptability,” and even intentional “illegibility” as ways to 
avoid “political manipulation.”  After all, these “subjects” get “manipulated precisely when they become 
legible and visible to the state (undocumented workers, visible queers, racialized minorities).”  So much of 
this dominant frame, which usually is traced vaguely to “Foucault” or “post-structuralism,” has deep 
anarchist roots. 
62 Graeber, Direct Action, 247. 
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the “academics, activists, artists” of Halberstam and the PTO website—who show up 
whether an event is held on campus or off.  Yes, there’s some distinction between the 
more professionally-dressed pessimists of the University of Minnesota sociology 
department and the sweats- and rags-clad utopians of the Minneapolis Autonomous 
Radical Space, but there’s also a lot of people who bring a change of clothes.  Most who 
are currently in one of these communities, if they’re not currently in the other, either have 
been or will soon be.  I observe a recurring circuit:  academics escape to para-academia 
when the analysis gets too depressing and they need to do something, and para-academics 
escape to academia when they feel like they’ve been banging their heads against the wall 
doing things—or when they need a paycheck.63 
Economically speaking, it’s an efficient machine for building capital, both 
cultural and fiscal.  Para-academics add value to their work by citing academic theory, 
and academics add value to their work by citing para-academic practice.  (This is 
especially noticeable in the art world, where academics who make their careers writing 
about artists and artists who make their careers responding to academic theory often 
                                                
63 I am consciously drawing on Paulo Freire’s concept of praxis, itself drawn from the Marxist tradition of 
organizing.  Theory and practice, action and reflection, he argued strongly, must always be part of the 
same, ongoing, collective action (praxis):  you act, then reflect on that action, then act on that reflection, 
and so on.  He called reflection without action “verbalism” and action without reflection “activism”—both 
useless.  (“Activist,” in many organizing circles, is not a positive word.  It connotes, in the words of one 
organizer friend, “someone who goes alone to a protest.”)  The current state of anarcho-liberal academia 
and para-academia, I am arguing, encourages a lot of verbalism and activism, but very little praxis.  Hence 
the moment at the 2011 PTO conference when a young man stood up and announced an upcoming day-
long Latino political event.  The event would include many speakers and discussions, he explained, but he 
assured us that “it’s not just going to be all talk.  There’s going to be direct action too.”  This kind of 
formulation, denigrating the talk and fetishizing the action, ensures the futility of both.  See Paulo Freire, 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, especially 87. 
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spend time together at the same gallery openings and conferences.)64  There’s nothing 
wrong with this exactly, but it does ensure that academia and para-academia remains a 
counterculture, whose “most firm allegiance,” to recall McGowan’s words, is “to 
language.”  Specifically, to making sure our language is always fully factually accurate, 
ethically right, and, yes, politically correct—a language that gets the right answer, in all 
senses—even when that means sacrificing our relationships and our agency.   
We see this in our three sample para-academic interpretive communities.  My 
colleague on the PTO board got very emotionally invested in making sure everyone knew 
she knew the “normalizing” word “regular” should not be used (but “full” was apparently 
okay), to the point of hair-splitting silliness.  The bloggers on Tumblr fought over the 
proper use of  the identity labels “2Spirit” and “Tumblr feminist,” to the point of anger 
and hurt feelings and name-calling.  And the anarchists’ “theoretical debates about the 
nature of white privilege,” far from strengthening their federation, ended up ripping it 
apart.   
Language is important, obviously.  (Far be it for me, a rhetorician, to say 
otherwise!)  Language makes and breaks, heals and hurts, and is absolutely worth our 
time and attention.  It’s just a problem when it becomes the only thing that gets our time 
and attention.  Given how comfortable we academics and para-academics are with talking 
about language, it’s tempting to approach all social and political problems as if they were 
                                                
64 François Cusset describes this phenomenon in detail, as he discusses the influence of “French theory” on 
the art and literary markets of the United States in the 1980s and 1990s.  See Cusset, French Theory, 
especially 230-262. 
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problems of incorrect language.65  When Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning was 
sentenced to 35 years in prison for leaking military secrets to WikiLeaks in the fall of 
2013, Facebook and Tumblr exploded in outrage—not over the military’s horrific 
treatment of Manning, or over the harmful and illegal military activities that Manning had 
discovered, or over the absurd political and military situation that put us in this situation 
in the first place, but because the New York Times had referred to Manning by an 
incorrect gender pronoun.   
It’s not that anyone thought the other issues weren’t worth talking about.  It’s just 
that this particular one fit so easily into the frame, into the academic and para-academic 
mode of approaching the world, that it was irresistible.  We might not be able to decipher 
the complex, often contradictory self-interests of the U.S. military and the Obama 
administration—but we can line up behind a powerless individual who was being 
linguistically oppressed by the media.  If we can’t understand the larger organizational 
problem, much less organize ourselves to solve it, at least we can (1) step back from the 
dominant media narrative, (2) call out an obvious instance of transphobia, and therefore 
(3) resist the oppression. 
These three gestures—to step back, to call out, and to resist—are the dominant 
dispositions of the anarcho-liberal habitus, in and out of academia.  When artists or 
educators call their work “political,” when a blog or a conference devotes itself to “social 
                                                
65 This, again, is an example of what philosopher-of-science Thomas Kuhn called “problem selection.”  
(See note 25.)  And it may be the most profound influence of the 1968 moment—including but not limited 
to “post-structuralism” and “French theory”—on the academic and para-academic market.  It underscores 
all the perpetual hand-wringing about “identity politics,” a term I very intentionally don’t use, because of 
the culture war it’s caused and the intense emotion it elicits on “both sides.”  To the extent that there’s a 
problem with “identity politics,” it’s that it’s hard for anarcho-liberals to see identities—all identities—as 
the product of interpretive strategies, which in turn are the products of organizations.   
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justice,” or when my academic department declares (on its website) that “a commitment 
to political praxis drives what we do,” it means they’re in the business of stepping back, 
calling out, and resisting.66 
Halberstam’s book examines art works, mostly animated films, that “might offer 
strange and anticapitalist logics of being and acting and knowing, and they will harbor 
covert and overt queer worlds”—that is, that offer “us” models for how to step back, call 
out, and resist a mainstream, capitalist culture that is false, wrong, and harmful.67  The 
movie Little Miss Sunshine, for example,  
leads to a kind of ecstatic exposure of the contradictions of a society obsessed 
with meaningless competition.  By implication it also reveals the precarious 
modes of success by which American families live and die….By gyrating and 
stripping to a raunchy song while heavily made-up and coiffed little cowgirls and 
princesses wait in the wings to chastely sway in the spotlight, Olive [the 
protagonist] reveals the sexuality that is the real motivation for the preteen 
pageant….this failure, hilarious in its execution, poignant in its meaning, and 
exhilarating in its aftermath, is so much better, so much more liberating than any 
success that could possibly be achieved in the context of a beauty 
contest….Without retreating to a puritanical attack on sexual pleasure or a moral 
                                                
66 The modern origin of the disposition to step back / call out / resist, as far as I can tell, lies in the 
discontent of women, and increasingly other groups, with the student organizations of the 1960s—
specifically the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS).  The original “call-outs,” according to historian Sara Evans, were agitations, intended to 
hold fellow members of these organizations accountable to the ideals of equality and civil rights that they 
all shared.  That is, they were very intentionally working to maintain a counterculture and keep it 
(somewhat) pure.  The difference is, they were under no illusions that that, in and of itself, was doing 
political work:  it was necessary maintenance work on a culture that was otherwise dedicated to building 
power and taking agency.  In the wake of 1968, when those organizations splintered and shattered and 
many of their members entered academia, that distinction started to fade:  the step-back, call-out, and 
resistance itself started being seen as the political action.  See Sara Evans, Personal Politics:  The Roots of 
Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement & the New Left (New York:  Vintage, 1979), especially 
83-101.  An academic friend of mine, who was active for years in West Coast anarchist/activist circles, 
suggested another, possibly complementary genealogy:  “call-out” culture, she said, emerged from the FBI 
crackdown on progressive groups in the 1960s and 70s, called COINTELPRO (Counter-Intelligence 
Program)—specifically, out of these groups’ need to discover and expose the FBI infiltrators.  Whether or 
not this history is true, the fact that it is (apparently) widely believed among activists is evidence in its own 
right.  
67 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 20-21.  Halberstam writes to an assumed “us” throughout the 
book; this “us,” it seems, is the members of the counterculture interested in doing this stepping-back, 
calling-out, and resisting. 
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mode of disapproval, Little Miss Sunshine instead relinquishes the Darwinian 
motto of winners, “May the best girl win,” and cleaves to a neo-anarchistic credo 
of ecstatic losers:  “No one gets left behind!”68       
 
The Little Miss Sunshine model of politics is very good at exposing and revealing 
the problems with society’s rules, and finding ways to resist them on the level of 
individual lifestyle choices, but it makes no effort to change these rules.  (That would 
require organizing to build power.)69  It’s a very simple idea:  if the Master says do 
something, to step back and call it out and resist, we should do the opposite.  If the 
Master says remember, we should forget.  (“In this book forgetting becomes a way of 
resisting the heroic and grand logics of recall.”)  If the Master says succeed, we should 
fail.  (“Failure preserves some of the wondrous anarchy of childhood and disturbs the 
supposedly clean boundaries between adults and children, winners and losers.”)  If the 
Master says make sense, we should not make sense.  (“Subjects…are manipulated 
precisely when they become legible and visible to the state…[so we should] privilege the 
naïve or nonsensical.”)  If the Master says follow the law, we should be criminals.  
(“What else is criminal activity but the passionate pursuit of alternatives?”)70   
                                                
68 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 5.  Emphases added.  Somehow, when thinking about the Bush 
administration’s education policy, I find it hard to accept “no one gets left behind” as a resistant, 
anticapitalist credo. 
69 This is what Brennan means when he says contemporary academic “theory” offers not a political strategy 
but “a manner of right-living.”  See Brennan, Wars of Position, 4. 
70 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 15, 3, 10, 12, 18.  Emphasis in original.  The last quotation is from 
the “Design Collective Zine, Shahrzad (Zurich and Tehran)”; Halberstam uses it as an epigram.  The 
Master is variously figured, in Halberstam and across the fringe of academia and para-academia, as the 
State, the Man, the system, society, hegemony, capitalism, neoliberalism, racism, sexism, ableism, 
essentialism, ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism, anthropocentrism, homophobia, transphobia, patriarchy, 
hierarchy, kyriarchy…the list keeps growing.  Which is part of the appeal:  any new political issue can be 
made into an –ism, –archy, or –phobia to be stepped out from, called out, and resisted.   
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Of course, criminal activity can be a lot of things other than the passionate pursuit 
of alternatives—rich people trying to make themselves richer, poor people trying to get 
enough to eat—some bad, some good, some hard to classify.  The Little Miss Sunshine 
model can’t deal with this kind of complexity:  everything is either good or bad, resistant 
or hegemonic, victim or fascist, us or them.  It’s the kind of Manichean simplicity that, 
for Althusser at least, is exactly the goal:   
A single word sums up the master function of philosophical practice:  ‘to draw a 
dividing line’ between the true ideas and false ideas.  Lenin’s words.  But the 
same word sums up one of the essential operations in the direction of the practice 
of class struggle:  ‘to draw a dividing line’ between the antagonistic classes.  
Between our class friends and our class enemies.  It is the same word.  A 
theoretical dividing line between true ideas and false ideas.  A political dividing 
line between the people (the proletariat and its allies) and the people’s enemies.71 
 
Maybe it’s my habitus—formed in part on Saul Alinsky’s dictum of “no 
permanent friends, no permanent enemies”—but I can’t help but cringe.  How does it 
make sense to draw such a clear and absolute “dividing line”?  People who share our self-
interest in one situation may not in another, and vice-versa; to build power in a specific 
situation around a specific issue, it’s crucial to be flexible and embrace the complexity of 
various organizations and their self-interests.  (Oklahoma senator Tom Coburn and I 
don’t agree on much, but we could definitely work on a campaign together to stop state 
funding for sports stadiums.)   
                                                
71 See Starr, Logics of Failed Revolt, 86.  This quotation comes from an interview with Althusser from—
when else?—1968.  All emphases in original.  Althusser’s absolute conception of friend and enemy, as the 
sine qua non of politics, seems scarily similar to that of the German legal philosopher Carl Schmitt, one of 
the principal legal architects of Nazism.  See especially Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. 
George Schwab (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1996); see also Chapter Two. 
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Again:  Althusser is a philosopher, not an organizer.  But you can’t even get good 
philosophical truth, looking at the world in this way.  When you equate “true” (factually) 
with “friend” (politically), “false” (factually) with “enemy” (politically), the deck is 
rigged.  Now there’s no need to gather evidence to support the claims of our friends and 
disprove the claims of our enemies.  That’s just how it is, beyond question, and if you 
don’t believe it, you must be an enemy, too.  There’s no need to enter into dialogue with 
people outside our group at all.  The only work left for us to do is to analyze all of the 
culture, media, texts, practices, and institutions that make up “the ideology of our 
society” (a favorite student-paper phrase) and call them out—“critique” them, “question” 
them, “problematize” them, “trouble” them, “de-center” them, or “deconstruct” them—
for the ways they are “socially-constructed” and (therefore) part of the enemy.   
Bruno Latour calls this action “debunking.”  But we don’t debunk everything.  
And it’s in our choice of what to debunk and what not to debunk, Latour suggests—what 
to call out as social constructions, and what not to—that we draw Althusser’s dividing 
line.  There are some things, for each of us, whose real-ness is really important to us.72  
Don’t even try to call out James Bond for his sexism or Cold War complicity or 
whatever, at least not in front of me.  He’s a part of my childhood.  Leave him alone.  The 
same goes, in a very different way, for racism.  We don’t like it—it’s morally and 
ethically wrong and politically horrible—but it’s very important to us that it’s real.  We’ll 
call people out (such as Klan members) who say that racial hierarchy exists, but we’ll 
                                                
72 These things are often self-objects, objects (including people) that we’ve developed our social selves in 
relation to; when we perceive our self-objects to be under attack, we feel it physically, in our bodily 
habitus, and we tend to drop everything to defend them.  Debunking someone’s self-objects is a quick way 
to end a dialogue—if not start a fight.  For more detail, see note 56. 
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just as quickly call people out (such as naïve white undergrads) who say that racism itself 
doesn’t exist.  Same goes for all the other identity-based –isms.  And for gender being a 
social construct, and for imperialism being oppressive, and for capitalism being 
exploitative.  And for my personal bugbear:  human-caused climate change—what we 
used to call “global warming,” before the Right got its way.  It just exists.  Period.  But 
there are lots of people out there—including, Latour observes, a certain “Mr. Luntz”—
who are trying to debunk it.  We hates him.73 
I believe—no, I know, with as much certainty as I know there’s a ground 
underneath my feet—that racial hierarchy is a myth, that gender is a social construct, and 
that racism and oppression and exploitation and human-caused climate change are all 
incontrovertibly (and unfortunately) real.  But what’s equally real is that there are other 
people out there who know the opposite, with just as much certainty.  And that I’m not 
going to change them by calling them out, or calling them dupes.  I’ll just be providing 
fodder for the Coulters and Limbaughs, who are all too ready to point out that I’m 
insulting their intelligence and dignity.  Just as punks and anarchist black blocs alienate 
potential allies when they start burning flags and smashing windows, so do social justice 
bloggers alienate potential allies when they start smashing well-loved truths.  They might 
be “right,” but they’re also making it hard to build a broad base.   
                                                
73 Latour uses—and then questions—Martin Heidegger’s distinction between a Ding (a complex, naturally- 
or hand-made thing such as a handmade jug), a matter of concern which is to be appreciated and admired, 
and a Gegenstand (a simple, artificially-made object such as a Coke can), a matter of fact which is to be 
analyzed and debunked as a “social construction.”  Latour wants to question this distinction, to take it down 
(to…debunk it?), to “talk about the object of science and technology, the Gegenstand, as if it had the rich 
and complicated qualities of the celebrated Thing.”  See Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?,” 
especially 233-237.  It’s interesting to note the parallels between Heidegger’s absolute distinction between 
Ding and Gegenstand and Schmitt’s absolute distinction between friend and enemy—especially since 
Heidegger and Schmitt were the two major German philosophers who came out openly in favor of Nazism.    
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But if your habitus was developed mostly on the market of academia and para-
academia, then you will call that person out on misusing the word “regular” or 
misunderstanding “2Spirit” or the theoretical nature of “white privilege”—no matter the 
cost.  Otherwise you just couldn’t live with yourself; you would feel complicit in the 
System.  To allow this wrong language to stand, un-called-out, would be to perpetuate the 
oppression.  And from there it’s an easy jump to the next logical conclusion:  that to use 
the right language is, in and of itself, to liberate someone.74   
This is giving language too much power—as we academics and para-academics 
habitually do.  We often quote Paulo Freire, who said in Pedagogy of the Oppressed that 
“to speak a true word is to transform the world”—but we forget that for Freire, a “true 
word” has a revolutionary organization behind it.  That kind of large-scale organizing is 
all but impossible, even on the most active fringes of para-academia.  When 
contemporary debates within anarchist groups “center most of all on how to combat 
racism and sexism in the movement, about forms of decision-making, and questions of 
violence and nonviolence,” as Graeber observes, there’s not much room for questions of 
building power.75  Or of expanding a base.  Or of identifying strategic allies and targets, 
and crafting winnable campaigns, and forming a short- and middle- and long-term plan to 
                                                
74 This is an example of the anarcho-liberal “operative logic” that Reed calls:  “has a similar effect as = 
might as well be = is.”  It’s this logic, Reed argues, that allows academics to talk about a local rent strike as 
“a rejection of capitalist imperatives” and a planned march as a “general strike.”  “Redefining such political 
expressions as deeply, intrinsically, substantively, or implicitly radical enables a slight-of-hand that imputes 
support for the radicals’ broader programs by association, without the test of persuasion”—or, of course, 
the need to actually organize people.  It also allows academics and para-academics to talk about their (our) 
own work in similar terms:  “the leap that equates, for instance, the practices of textual interpretation or the 
production and analysis of forms of popular culture with direct challenges to power relations—such as 
conducting a strike, electing or defeating a legislator, mobilizing against NAFTA, fighting against 
segregation or for national healthcare—takes that inclination [to see one’s own work as political] to the 
point of solipsism.  And it empties the idea of political action of any substantive meaning.”  See Reed, 
Class Notes, x-xi, xx.  
75 Graeber, Direct Action, 222.     
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challenge and ultimately overthrow the capitalist market—the stated goal of the 
movement.   
These questions are always the next step, the one we haven’t quite gotten to yet.  
Yes, of course we need to address them, but first we need to take care of (what’s known 
in the common parlance as) “our own shit.”  First—in the words of political scientist 
Adolph Reed—“whites must demonstrate their antiracism; heterosexuals must prove their 
opposition to homophobia; men must establish their antisexism; each nonwhite group 
must convincingly show its appreciation and respect for the perspectives of the others—
all before strategic consideration of possible points of mutual concern.”76  Entire national 
political organizations, as we have seen, have fallen apart as a result of this logic.  More 
mundanely, I’ve seen many a Pedagogy and Theatre of the Oppressed workshop derailed 
when one participant calls out another (or, often, the facilitator) for something s/he said 
or did.  Sometimes these accusations are justified; other times they’re not.  Either way, 
they make the Descartes-like assumption that you have to deal with “the oppression in the 
room” before you can deal with the oppression “outside.” 
This assumption is self-destructive, in at least three ways.  First, it requires us to 
delay questions of organizing and agency—the most important questions, if we take 
ourselves and our work seriously—maybe forever.  Anyone who’s been in “progressive 
meetings of any sort” will recognize Reed’s “predictable moment…when someone—
more or less piously, more or less smugly, always self-righteously—rises to introduce the 
concern that, ‘As I look around the room, I don’t see enough of the X, the Y or the Z 
present,’ and to issue the standard calls for inclusiveness and for making greater effort to 
                                                
76 Reed, Class Notes, xxiii. 
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reach out, etc.”  Again, these concerns are sometimes justified.  I think we were right to 
be concerned that the PTO board, at least during my term, was overwhelmingly white.  
But since no one was discussing a plan to solve that problem, all the continual call-outs 
were just crippling, an opportunity for to express white liberal guilt that took away time 
and resources from fighting any kind of oppression.  The game of “who’s in the room,” 
absent a concrete strategy and goal (we’re going to do these things to get this number of 
these kinds of people into the room by this date)  can easily become an infinite regress, a 
pursuit-without-a-terminus, as organizations like Love & Rage end up driving themselves 
into ruin in pursuit of picture-perfect “inclusiveness.”77   
Second, given how very few people are free of any and all prejudice, it seriously 
cuts down on potential allies.  The call-out, as a form, is “fundamentally counter-
solidaristic.  Its default posture is accusation; it is propelled by presumption of others’ 
bad faith.”78  I could call out PTO for (what I perceive as) the propagation of racial 
hierarchy implicit in the image on their website, which includes a black body being led 
(in a Theatre of the Oppressed game) by a white hand—but what, exactly, would that 
accomplish?  Surely it wasn’t intended, and it’s not clear that it’s actually doing any harm 
to anyone.  And the more time and energy we spend doing this kind of stuff—tearing 
each other down and calling out each other’s perceived wrongdoings, in an ever-more-
specialized language no less—the more we ensure that we’ll remain a counterculture:  a 
postmodern Puritan “city on a hill,” sealed off from a “society” and “real world” that 
                                                
77 Reed, Class Notes, xxiv. 
78 Reed, Class Notes, xxiv.  Again, I make a sharp distinction between a call-out and an agitation.  The 
latter is relational, strategic, and constructive; the former is a one-off attempt to up one’s cultural capital, 
relationships and strategy be damned.  See notes 38 and 79.  
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doesn’t much like or understand us, and unwilling and/or unable to build the relationships 
and power that could bring our interpretive communities closer together. 
Third, and finally, it actually gets the theory wrong.  Any contemporary scholar of 
race will tell you that racism is not, primarily, a matter of individual bad behavior.  It’s 
institutional—a product of organizations—and structural—a product of the interpretive 
strategies those organizations have developed over time.  The fact that black children are 
systematically deprived of a good education because their families are red-lined out of 
primarily-white neighborhoods with well-funded schools, for example, has nothing to do 
with whether the white families living in those neighborhoods are or are not “racist.”  To 
focus on the individual prejudices of these people would be a mistake—the same mistake 
as spending so much energy calling people out, trying to keep our language and 
counterculture pure.   
It’ll be a hard mistake to fix.  Getting people (including ourselves) to understand 
it intellectually is easy; getting our habitus to act differently is not.  Most people I’ve 
discussed these issues with agree with me, but then they go right back to making call-
outs.  (I’m guilty of it myself from time to time.)  The urge to step back and call out and 
resist is strong, and as we’ve seen, it’s intimately connected to the urge to create 
knowledge and seek and speak the truth, which drove many of us to get into academia, 
artistry, and activism in the first place.   
It’s also intimately connected, a little less idealistically, with the way these 
markets create value.  On the academic and para-academic market, thirty years after the 
onset of cyberpunk neoliberalism, there’s not much cultural capital to be had in the 
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“grunge work” of collaboration, relationship building, and strategic power-building 
campaigns—the only way to “resist” racism, if we understand it organizationally.  On the 
other hand, you can get a lot of quick cultural capital by calling out the racial prejudice in 
a new song or movie or policy decision, writing an article about it—or participating in a 
Legislative Theatre performance about it—and then moving on to the next thing.   
Which is to say:  on the market of academia and para-academia, at least as it’s 
currently organized, there may be no alternative.        
Luckily, there are alternative markets. 
 
How Freire Got Neutered, and Why it Matters 
Drive about a mile a mile east of Augsburg College, where we held the Pedagogy 
and Theatre of the Oppressed conference, and you’ll reach what one local organizer calls 
the “corridor of power”:  the intersection of University Ave. and Raymond Ave.  There, 
you’ll find the headquarters of the faith-based organizing networks ISAIAH and Jewish 
Community Action, the citizen-action organization TakeAction Minnesota, and the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) State Council, among many others.  
These organizations, sometimes called “power organizations,” operate on a very different 
market from academia and para-academia.  On this market, your value depends mostly on 
how much power you can build:  how well you can organize people, money, and 
(sometimes) ideas into greater and greater collective agency, to change laws, employment 
policies, governments, and ultimately social and cultural structures. 
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Here, there’s a lot less discussion about radical difference, and a lot more about 
“the everyday world we all share—the world of seeking, working, or worrying about a 
job, finding and consuming healthcare, forming and maintaining personal attachments, 
paying bills, raising children, playing, fretting about the future, shopping for furniture, 
trying to make sense of current events”; less about “who’s not in the room” and more 
about “how best to deploy the resources of those who are in the room.”79  Here, the 
assumption isn’t that people must purge themselves of their prejudices before entering, 
but that by doing the work, working side-by-side with a diverse group of people on issues 
in their shared self-interest, their prejudices will gradually wither away.80  Pete Marincel, 
my SEIU organizer friend from Chapter Two, once told me about a middle-aged white 
worker he organized, who was variously prejudiced against people of color:  after months 
of working together with a young black woman to elect pro-labor candidates to the state 
legislature, he found he had lost a whole lot of his prejudice.  Just in case the point 
needed clarifying, Pete concluded:  “And it wasn’t because of some anti-racism 
workshop.”   
Geographically, the corridor of power was not very far away.  But to a habitus 
formed on the academic and para-academic market, it might as well be in another 
dimension.  We don’t consciously dismiss it; we’re just not very conscious of it.81  It 
never occurs to us, or to them, that we could all work together on common political 
                                                
79 Reed, Class Notes, xvi-xvii, xxvi. 
80 This is the old Habermas notion of “cognitive dissonance.”  It also resonates with Bourdieu’s notion of 
“durable dispositions”:  put a person through an experience that’s intense and sustained enough, and that 
person’s habitus will gradually be molded to the new market.  (Think about medical residencies or basic 
training.  For more on this point, see Chapter Four.) 
81 Which begs the obvious question:  how, then, do I know so much about them?  I’ll tell the full story in 
Chapter Four, but the short answer is:  ass-backwards.  Through a couple of connections, and a lot of luck. 
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projects, or what that would even mean.  Like the woman at the MLA conference, they 
seem to speak an entirely different language.  We might see an SEIU or ISAIAH 
organizer on the news or on the street; we might have gotten canvassed by TakeAction 
Minnesota at our front door; we might have even become members—but we’re still only 
dimly aware that these organizations exist, much less of what they do and how we might 
relate.   
So most of the time, we don’t.  We talked a lot about “community engagement” 
as we planned the PTO conference.  We wanted to be as “inclusive” as possible.  We 
reached out to lots of non-academic organizations:  pretty much any group any of us 
knew about, we contacted.  And, as these things go, all these organizations were para-
academic.  Even the ones that did some organizing, too, were firmly rooted in language- 
and difference-first interpretive strategies:  the goal was purity as much as agency, and 
the call-out always came before the power-analysis.  I don’t think any of us, during our 
whole year of planning, thought to make contact with any organizations along the 
corridor of power.  Nor did anyone there, I’m pretty sure, have any idea the conference 
was happening.   
Which is a shame.  For one thing, anyone from the corridor of power would have 
immediately sided with Cheryl Wilson and insisted, as a condition of their organization’s 
involvement, that we develop a strategy for developing the Legislative Theatre session 
into a campaign to make actual legislative change.  (Only then would such an action be in 
their organization’s self-interest.)  But the tragic irony goes a lot deeper.  The traditions 
of Pedagogy of the Oppressed and Theatre of the Oppressed themselves, the very 
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foundation of our work, were created in the context of power organizations.  Long before 
Boal’s theater techniques were canonized as “Theatre of the Oppressed,” they were 
“experiments with the people’s theatre in Peru,” conducted “within the program of the 
Integral Literacy Operation (Operación Alfabetización Integral [ALFIN])…a national 
literacy campaign” directed by “the revolutionary government of Peru….The method 
used in the literacy program was, of course, derived from Paulo Freire.”82   
Freire’s method, too, was developed in the context of revolutionary organizing.  
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, also the title of a book long before it was a codified set of 
practices, was about how to do pedagogy, and communication more generally, within an 
already-existing revolutionary movement.  Freire made no pretense of creating a 
revolution through his teaching methods.  “Only a revolutionary society can carry out this 
education in systematic terms,” he insisted.  “The revolutionary leaders need not take full 
power before they can employ the method,” but as they are using this method, it’s 
assumed that they are also working toward taking full power.83   
Freire and Boal—like all Marxists working in South America around 1968—took 
the existence of strong power organizations, which worked closely with intellectuals in 
their pursuit of collective agency, as a given.  There wasn’t much need to write about 
these organizations explicitly, because everyone knew about them already.  But when 
their work got transported into the United States, in the very moment of the cyberpunk-
                                                
82 Boal, Theatre of the Oppressed, 120. 
83 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed [30th Anniversary Edition], 86.  Freire’s concern, here as elsewhere, 
was that the revolutionary leadership would be too didactic and monologic in the way they communicated 
and taught.  It was never that the revolution wouldn’t exist.  Nor, at this point anyway, was it about regular 
classroom-teaching.  For more about the adaptation of Freire into contemporary U.S. classroom teaching, 
see Chapter Four. 
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neoliberal takeover and the anarcho-liberal march on the academy, a lot of this 
understanding got lost in translation.   
Literally, in Freire’s case.  Take a look at your copy of Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed, if you have one.  Does it have a red cover that says “30th Anniversary 
Edition”?  (It’s the only edition currently in print.)  Or a white cover that says “20th 
Anniversary Edition”?  If so, you are in possession of a mutilated text.  It’s not just a 
translation (from the original Portuguese); it’s an intentionally inaccurate translation.  
The editors acknowledge this inaccuracy—sort of.  There’s nothing about it on the cover, 
or on the title page, or in the text itself, or even in the footnotes.  The only place it’s 
mentioned is several paragraphs into the Publisher’s Forward:  “As times change so do 
attitudes and beliefs.  The translation has been modified—and the volume has been newly 
typeset—to reflect the connection between liberation and inclusive language.”84   
The persnickety academic in me can’t go on without questioning how the editors 
think a new typeset might aid in the cause of liberation.  (Perhaps it’ll increase cultural 
legibility?)  But seriously:  we need to look closely at this modification.  Take a look at a 
representative sample:  a key passage from the Preface, where Freire details what it 
means to be the kind of person who is capable of carrying out the kind of pedagogy he 
calls for—a radical, rather than a sectarian.  First is the out-of-print original edition from 
1970; next is the same passage from the 30th Anniversary Edition (the same as the 20th 
Anniversary Edition), with changes in boldface: 
While the rightist sectarian, closing himself in “his” truth, does no more than 
fulfill his natural role, the leftist who becomes sectarian and rigid negates his very 
nature.  Each, however, as he revolves about “his” truth, feels threatened if that 
                                                
84 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed [30th Anniversary Edition], 8.  
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truth is questioned.  Thus, each considers anything that is not “his” truth a lie.  As 
the journalist Marcio Moreira Alves once told me:  “They both suffer from an 
absence of doubt.”  The radical, committed to human liberation, does not become 
the prisoner of a “circle of certainty” within which he also imprisons reality.  On 
the contrary, the more radical he is, the more fully he enters into reality so that, 
knowing it better, he can better transform it.  He is not afraid to confront, to listen, 
to see the world unveiled.  He is not afraid to meet the people or to enter into 
dialogue with them.  He does not consider himself the proprietor of history or of 
men, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he does commit himself, within history, 
to fight at their side.  The pedagogy of the oppressed, the introductory outlines of 
which are presented in the following pages, is a task for radicals; it cannot be 
carried out by sectarians.85 
 
Whereas the rightist sectarian, closing himself in “his” truth, does no more than 
fulfill a natural role, the leftist who becomes sectarian and rigid negates his or 
her very nature.  Each, however, as he revolves about “his” truth, feels threatened 
if that truth is questioned.  Thus, each considers anything that is not ‘his’ truth a 
lie.  As the journalist Marcio Moreira Alves once told me, “They both suffer from 
an absence of doubt.”  The radical, committed to human liberation, does not 
become the prisoner of a “circle of certainty” within which reality is also 
imprisoned.  On the contrary, the more radical the person is, the more fully he 
or she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he or she can better transform 
it.  This individual is not afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled.  
This person is not afraid to meet the people or to enter into dialogue with them.  
This person does not consider him or herself the proprietor of history or of all 
people, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he or she does commit him or 
herself, within history, to fight at their side.  The pedagogy of the oppressed, the 
introductory outlines of which are presented in the following pages, is a task for 
radicals; it cannot be carried out by sectarians.86 
 
Most of the changes, clearly, are about gender.  The original 1970 translation, 
more similar to the original Portuguese, uses “man” and “men” and “he” and “his” as 
universals.  The 1990 editors, eager to make the language more “inclusive,” want to 
change this.  But they don’t do it consistently.  Depending on the instance, they might 
change “he” (“ele” in Portuguese) into “the person,” “this person,” “he or she,” or “this 
                                                
85 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed [original edition], trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: 
Seabury, 1970), 23-24. 
86 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed [30th Anniversary Edition], 39.  Changes in boldface; emphases 
added. 
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individual.”  In one case a whole sentence is changed from the active into the passive 
voice, in order to avoid a male pronoun.  And in other cases, they don’t change the male 
pronouns at all.87   
Before jumping into an analysis of these inconsistent gender-based changes, let’s 
look at the one other change:  “while” to “whereas.”  Wherefore this change?  Unlike all 
the others, it has nothing to do with gender.  The original Portuguese “enquanto” means 
(in this context) the same thing as “while”—they’re both normal, everyday words.  
Whereas “whereas” is pretentious legalese.  We can argue about the need for the other 
changes, but I see no possible justification for this one.  This is important, because it 
shows the editors were sloppy.  Which changes the way we analyze the other changes 
they made:  these editors didn’t seem to take serious time to consider the semantic 
ramifications of each altered word.  They were, at least to an extent, going with their 
gut—what psychologist Daniel Kahneman would “System 1” thinking—and what we 
might call their naked, anarcho-liberal academic habitus. 
This habitus, as we know, includes (1) a disposition to resist organizing and 
agency, and (2) a disposition to draw a line between absolute friends and absolute 
enemies.  This second disposition explains why these editors (and/or the publisher) felt 
these changes were necessary in the first place.  They clearly liked this book; they wanted 
it to be a friend—if nothing else, so it’d sell more copies.  But there was a problem.  It 
couldn’t be an absolute friend, because the language had a (fatal) flaw:  it was sexist.  
And so they set to work, scrubbing Freire clean of his imperfections as quickly as 
                                                
87 To be fair, these masculine pronouns do occur much more frequently in the English text than in the 
Portuguese original.  This is due to the structure of the Portuguese language:  in Portuguese, as in Spanish, 
a greater choice of verb conjugations often renders pronouns unnecessary. 
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possible, so he can enter the pantheon of “theory” next to all the other “friends” we quote 
and cite and use, instead of one of the “enemies” we expose and call out and debunk.88  I 
want to question whether this is necessary.  (Yes I understand it might be necessary on 
the current market; I mean necessary in the more idealistic sense.)  Why can’t we 
understand Freire, and everyone else, not as absolute friends or enemies but as 
complicated, flawed, and sometimes brilliant human beings?89   
This same disposition also explains all the places within the passage where the 
male pronouns were not changed.  They are all the places where Freire is describing 
(what Althusser would consider) the enemy:  sectarians, as compared to radicals; and 
rightist sectarians, as compared to leftist ones.  The editors, probably without knowing it, 
added into Freire’s text an absolute distinction between friend and enemy—where friends 
are gender-ambiguous, and enemies are gendered male—which wasn’t in Freire’s 
original at all. 
This imposed division is particularly frustrating, given how hard Freire worked to 
avoid these kinds of absolute differences.  To end oppression and achieve what he called 
“humanization…the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a 
                                                
88 A quick and easy guide to who’s who, in most academic texts, is to look at the verb tenses.  Friends 
generally get quoted in the present tense (“Foucault writes…”):  their words are eternal and true.  Enemies 
generally get quoted in the past tense (“Hitler wrote…”):  their words are time-bound and false.  You’ll 
notice I try to use them interchangeably, though I probably slip into the pattern at times.    
89 I am, in other words, echoing Latour’s call (in “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?”) to see everything 
as a Ding and nothing as a Gegenstand.  I am also paraphrasing the position of critical race theorist bell 
hooks:  “There has never been a moment when reading Freire that I have not remained aware of not only 
the sexism of the language but the way he (like other progressive Third World political leaders, 
intellectuals, critical thinkers such as Fanon, Memmi, etc.) constructs a phallocentric paradigm of 
liberation—wherein freedom and the experience of patriarchal manhood are always linked as though they 
are one and the same….And yet, I never wish to see a critique of this blind spot overshadow anyone’s (and 
feminists’ in particular) capacity to learn from the insights….There is no need to apologize for the sexism.  
Freire’s own model of critical pedagogy invites a critical interrogation of this flaw in the work.  But critical 
interrogation is not the same as dismissal.”  See bell hooks, Teaching to Transgress:  Education as the 
Practice of Freedom (New York: Routledge, 1994), 49. 
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way to create it), become in turn the oppressors of the oppressors, but rather restorers of 
the humanity of both.”90  For universal humanization to even be possible, Freire had to 
maintain the possibility that humanity, despite all differences, was capable of becoming a 
single, unified agent, capable of working collectively to make a world that’s better for all 
humans.  That is, the possibility that humanity is fundamentally organizable.  So it’s not 
a surprise that the editors’ other big anarcho-liberal disposition—the resistance to agency 
and organizing—gets in the way here, too.  When they replace “he” with all those 
different pronouns without rhyme or reason, this (potentially) unified humanity gets 
obscured.  By the end of the very first paragraph of Chapter One, Freire’s unified “man” 
(“hommem”) has already gotten dispersed into “humankind,” “an individual,” “a person,” 
and “the people.”91  The 30th Anniversary Edition of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, in other 
words, is a story that’s lost its protagonist. 92  It’s as if you rewrote The Fellowship of the 
                                                
90 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 28 [original edition], 44 [30th Anniversary Edition].  (No changes.) 
91 See page 45 in the 30th Anniversary text; page 27 in the original.  To be clear:  I’m not giving Freire a 
pass on his pronouns.  The use of the male pronoun to represent universal humanity is obviously 
misogynistic, as Freire himself has acknowledged.  It was an instance of all-too-common casual misogyny; 
Freire wasn’t thinking about gender at all, and he unthinkingly used the misogynistic language in the air 
around him.  That is a problem, a flaw, an imperfection.  I’m not sure it had to be changed at all—but the 
changes wouldn’t have been a big deal, if they had been made responsibly:  if the editors had replaced 
“man” (and “men,” and “he,” etc.) with consistent gender-neutral pronouns, thus preserving the sense that 
humankind could be organized.   
92 In technical terms:  it’s lost its dialectic—which happens to be the soul of the book.  Freire drew on a 
wide range of sources—his material power analysis came from Marx, his understanding of the psychology 
of oppression from Erich Fromm, his anticolonial context from Frantz Fanon, his interactionist approach to 
teaching from Jean Piaget—but, good Marxist revolutionary that he was, his basic philosophical position is 
that of the nineteenth-century German philosopher George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.  Hegel understood 
history as the progress of a single, unified World Spirit—manifested in people—toward universal freedom.  
It’s easy to mock this idea—I did so for years—but it’s the basic way almost everyone (in modern Western 
cultures) understands history.  We may spend our academic days debunking Hegel, but at the end of the 
day most of us are still “progressives,” who believe that to support same-sex marriage (for example) means 
to be “on the right side of history.”  Historical progress, for Hegel, is not simple or linear:  it’s dialectical.  
Dialectical thought is most commonly identified with Hegel, but it’s as old as Heraclitus, the ancient Greek 
philosopher best known for saying you can’t step in the same river twice (the water’s always changing, 
always flowing).  History moves forward, according to dialectical thought, through of the conflict of 
opposing forces.  These two basic Hegelian principles—history as the progress of universal Spirit toward 
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Ring and took out the fellowship—and left Frodo, Sam, Gandalf, and Aragorn to try to 
defeat Sauron, variously, on their own.  (This new edition would probably not have 
sequels.) 
Freire does make one big either-or distinction:  between “oppressor” and 
“oppressed.”  But he’s very careful to point out that these are not absolute identities.  
They’re not identities at all, actually, but rather provisional positions within a relationship 
that’s ever-changing.  A person oppressed at home can be an oppressor at work, and vice-
versa.  “It is the rare peasant who, once ‘promoted’ to overseer, does not become more of 
a tyrant to his former comrades than the owner himself.  This is because of the context of 
the peasant’s situation, that is, oppression, remains unchanged.”93    “Oppressor” and 
“oppressed” tend to follow class lines, but not always:  Freire makes special reference to 
                                                                                                                                            
universal freedom, and historical progress as the result of the dialectical conflict—are at the core of 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed.  Freire begins by explaining that “humanization…is man’s vocation” (28 
[original edition]).  Dehumanization, its dialectical opposite (antithesis), is very possible and happens very 
often, but that isn’t where history is going.  The entire rest of the book—and perhaps all of Freire’s work—
depends on this principle.  There is a single subject, “man,” which is moving toward humanization.  The 
entire point of revolutionary pedagogy is to work toward getting there.  The editors of the 30th Anniversary 
Edition, knowingly or not (probably not), have de-Hegelianized this text.  “Humanization…is man’s 
vocation” is such a powerful statement because we have experienced that same “man,” in the previous 
paragraph, as “he perceives the extent of dehumanization,” “he asks himself if humanization is a viable 
possibility,” he recognizes that “both humanization and dehumanization are possibilities for man as an 
uncompleted being conscious of his incompletion”—and then devotes himself to his vocation” (27-28 
[original edition]).  Compare this with the 30th Anniversary Edition:  here, “an individual [not a collective 
humanity in which we all take part, but a single individual] perceives the extent of dehumanization,” “he or 
she may ask [does not even definitely ask] if humanization is a viable possibility,” and “both humanization 
and dehumanization are possibilities for a person [individual, again].”  Then we learn that 
“humanization…is the people’s vocation,” never having met “the people” before (43 [30th Anniversary 
Edition]).  Freire’s central story has lost its protagonist—and we, the readers, can no longer identify 
ourselves as protagonists.  The text has lost its drama, poetry, tension, and hope, and we have lost our 
agency within it.  Again, just to be clear, this is not an argument for male-gendered pronouns.  Had the 
editors stuck with one consistent gender-neutral replacement for “man,” “men,” “he,” and “his,” the text 
would have retained its basic power.  As it stands, with its Hegelian heart cut out, the text ends up sounding 
almost cyberpunk-neoliberal:  there’s “an individual” over there who might (or might not) be asking big 
hard questions, there’s another “person” over here who’s trying to figure out why s/he’s incomplete, and 
somewhere in there is “the people,” who might or might not have any relationship to those two previous 
isolated characters. 
93 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 30 [original edition], 46 [30th Anniversary Edition].  (No changes—
again, the male pronouns remain unchanged when talking about the bad guys.) 
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the “middle-class oppressed.”94  The enemy, if we can even call it that, is not the human 
oppressor but the human oppressors but the non-human “situation of oppression” itself, 
“affecting both the oppressors and those whom they oppress.”  (The oppressor “is himself 
dehumanized because he dehumanizes others.”)95   
When I first read this passage, in my second year of graduate school, I wrote in 
the margin:  “but how to distinguish [between oppressor and oppressed], outside a given 
context?”  I didn’t understand, then, that this is the point:  it’s impossible to distinguish 
outside the context of a given situation.  That’s what Freire is interested in:  the situation, 
not the individuals.  “Any situation in which ‘A’ objectively exploits ‘B’ or hinders his 
[and her] pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person is one of oppression.”96  This 
formula, in the middle of Chapter One, is the only definition of oppression—or of 
oppressor or oppressed—Freire offers. 
It’s worth noting that Doug Paterson, founder of Pedagogy and Theatre of the 
Oppressed (and a colleague I like and respect very much), seems to miss this definition 
completely.  “Freire does not, as far as I can find, ‘define’ oppression and seems to accept 
the meaning as prima facie.”97  How to explain such a glaring oversight?  Easy:  Paterson 
read Freire using anarcho-liberal interpretive strategies.  I did, too, as my margin notes 
                                                
94 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 49 [original edition], 62 [30th Anniversary Edition].  (No changes.) 
95 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 32 [original edition], 47 [30th Anniversary Edition].  (No changes, 
even in the pronouns.) 
96 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 40 [original edition], 55 [30th Anniversary Edition].  Changes in 
brackets. 
97 Douglas Paterson, “Putting the ‘Pro’ in Protagonist:  Paulo Freire’s Contribution to Our Understanding 
of Forum Theatre,” in Come Closer:  Critical Perspectives on Theatre of the Oppressed, eds. Toby Emert 
and Ellie Friedland (New York:  Peter Lang Publishing, 2011):  9-20, 12.  Paterson then goes on to quote 
his computer’s built-in dictionary (“the exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, cruel, or unjust 
manner”), Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary (“a sense of being weighed down in body or mind”) and 
the Shorter OED (“harsh…authoritarian…cruel or unjust exercise of authority”), in order to make up for 
Freire’s supposed deficiency.  These become his working definitions; they all, of course, lack all sense of a 
Hegelian dialectic.   
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show.  We were both looking for absolute, individual- and identity-based definition, and 
Freire was not giving us one.  He missed the definition Freire did give—relational, 
situational, not based in establishing friends and enemies—because his habitus disposed 
him to miss it.  And if these nuances evaded Paterson, a scholar and practitioner deeply 
versed in Freire and Boal, it’s no surprise that they evade many of our colleagues as well. 
The work of Mark Weinblatt, a well-traveled theater director and frequent PTO 
presenter (and former assistant camp director at Appel Farm, where I now work), 
provides a clear example of these kinds of misunderstandings.  His trademark invention is 
what he calls “Theatre of the Oppressor.”  Theatre of the Oppressor works not with the 
“truly ‘oppressed’”—e.g., the person-of-color getting harassed by the security guards—
but with “the potential ally from the dominant social group”—the white guy who stands 
by and does nothing while it happens.98  Weinblatt draws on an interpretive strategy 
called “Systematic Oppression Theory”—popular in anti-racism workshops and on 
Tumblr—to divide the world into two kinds of people:  “agents” and “targets.”  He 
provides a handy chart:99 
Category Agents Targets 
Age Adults (21-59) Children, youth, elders 
Disability Able persons Persons with disabilities 
                                                
98 Marc Weinblatt, with contributions from Cheryl Harrison, “Theatre of the Oppressor:  Working with 
Privilege Toward Social Justice,” in Come Closer:  21-31, 21.  I’m not the first to question Weinblatt’s 
work:  it’s been criticized by several prominent members of the PTO community, including Paterson and 
Julian Boal—precisely those people who have the biggest stake in, and knowledge of, the dialectical 
origins of Pedagogy of the Oppressed and Theatre of the Oppressed.  But in my many years of experience 
doing Theatre of the Oppressed, most (first-world) practitioners still follow the same basic tenets and 
assumptions that Weinblatt does; hence, his work is still worth studying.  
99 Weinblatt, “Theatre of the Oppressor,” 31. 
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Religion Christian Non-Christian 
Ethnicity Euro-Americans People of Color (including 
African, Asian, Arab, 
Latino/a, & Native peoples) 
Social Class Middle and Owning 
Class (enough or 
more than enough 
resources) 
Poor & Working Class  
(less than enough resources) 
Sexual Orientation Heterosexuals Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, 
Queer 
Indigenous 
Background 
Non-native Native 
National Origin U.S. Born Immigrant 
Gender Male Female, Transgender,  
Gender Queer, etc. 
 
We’ve seen this before.  “Targets” are the victims, the friends; and “agents” are 
the executioners, the enemies.  (The resistance to agency indeed.)  It’s an understanding 
of politics that’s clear, concise, and sometimes useful, but it also produces a huge amount 
of unhelpful anxiety.  Again:  where does it leave us?  What do we do in those situations 
where we—as we all do, at least during the thirty-eight years after our twenty-first 
birthday—fall on the bad side of the chart?  As Weinblatt puts it:  “I am a straight, white, 
able-bodied man, raised upper middle-class, living in the United States—a person of 
some privilege in a country of tremendous privilege.  In anti-oppression jargon, I possess 
much ‘agency.’  Symbolically, and, in ways, literally, I am the oppressor.”100   
                                                
100 Weinblatt, “Theatre of the Oppressor,” 23. 
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This kind of confession-talk, what a conservative might call “liberal guilt,” plays 
a very important role on the anarcho-liberal market.  It’s known as the “privilege check.”  
It’s a gesture of immense value:  to perform a well-executed privilege check confers great 
cultural capital.  In a way, it’s your ticket of admission:  when you check your privilege, 
you speak about ideology and are therefore no longer in it; you have called-out and 
resisted your various –isms; and you are granted admission to step back into the 
counterculture.101 
But if you’re not exactly an agent anymore, neither are you a target.  You’re back 
in limbo, suspended in Descartes-style detachment, “above” and “outside” the “real 
world,” unsure what your self-interest is or should be, unsure whether you are or should 
or can be part of a social organization at all.  That produces all its own forms of anxiety:  
above all, what a professor of mine once called the “spotted owl” problem.  As in, even if 
you present a great paper about the oppression of queer workers of color in the logging 
industry, someone could always call you out:  “What about the spotted owl?!”  We 
academic cyberpunk heroes, absent a serious organizing strategy, have assumed the 
                                                
101 The iconic statement of confessional privilege-checking is Peggy McIntosh’s “White Privilege:  
Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack” (1988), http://www.isr.umich.edu/home/diversity/resources/white-
privilege.pdf (December 10, 2013), an article that’s “now considered a ‘classic’ by anti-racist educators.  It 
has been used in workshops and classes throughout the United States and Canada for many years.”  This 
article is the major source of the privilege checklists, privilege walks, and other privilege-checking 
activities that we’ve all experienced in diversity sessions and anti-oppression workshops.  (Everyone seems 
to remember the Band-Aids.)  As with Weinblatt, it’s not that (most of) what she says isn’t true; it just that 
it’s useless, and maybe even counterproductive, for building agency:  the whole point here is to be able to 
step back and expose and call out white privilege, especially your own, not to use an analysis of this 
privilege to build anything.  For a habitus disposed to such para-academic activity, this will feel natural and 
normal…and not do much.  For a habitus without these dispositions, this will feel uncomfortable and forced 
and will produce resentment as likely as enlightenment.  It’s not until the last paragraph of the article that 
McIntosh asks:  “What will we do with such knowledge?  As we know from watching men [and their male-
privilege], it is an open question whether we will choose to use unearned advantage to weaken hidden 
systems of advantage and whether we will use any of our arbitrarily awarded power to reconstruct power 
systems on a broader base.”  That’s it; the end.  Who this “we” is, and how this reconstruction work might 
be done, is not addressed.  That, as usual, is the next step—not the one we’re on.   
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burden of addressing all oppressions, all the time.  Para-academics are in the same boat:  
Graeber describes the “endless moral dilemmas for those whose privilege actually allows 
them to rebel,” especially given that it might be “impossible for the truly oppressed to 
become genuine revolutionaries.”102  Even here, in the heart of activist culture, people are 
still anxious about whether they’re doing something “real.”   
This anxiety is the source of a lot of the bad behavior we see in academic and 
para-academic environments, as participants ritualistically and repeatedly check their 
own privilege and call out that of others in order to keep their cultural capital up.  There’s 
particular anxiety around what agency we can, or should, take.  To the extent that we’re 
“agents,” shouldn’t we not take agency?  To the extent that we’re “targets,” what agency 
do we have?  To the extent that we’re neither, what are we?  What, exactly, is an “ally,” 
and how do we know we’re being a good one?  Katherine Burke, current president of the 
PTO board, wrestled with these questions as she prepared to start a Theatre of the 
Oppressed project in a poor neighborhood in Cleveland, as part of her academic job:   
I’m a white woman who lives a comfortable life in the suburbs.  What right do I 
have to come in to this place, their place, and then drive home to my safe 
neighborhood?  What if no one is interested in doing this?  Space is limited; what 
if we don’t have a room that is right for the work?  What happens if, when I 
introduce Boal’s games, no one wants to play? People have busy lives.  Will we 
have enough time to put this together? Will people come back week after week?  
What if they just don’t want to do Forum [Theatre]? 
 
My biggest fear is white privilege, which I struggle to see and deal with on a daily 
basis.  Even writing this blog entry is a reflection of white privilege. I may have 
good intentions, but I am naïve.  I’ve been told before to check my racism.  Who, 
me? I used to balk at the notion.  But it was true; I’ve been silent when I should 
have spoken up, and I’ve made “safe” choices so I wouldn’t rock the boat.  I’m 
sure that I’ll be confronting my own white privilege again, and I already feel 
intimidated by the idea of someone pointing it out.  But I hope people do point out 
                                                
102 Graeber, Direct Action, 245.  Emphasis added. 
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my shortfalls.  I hope I will welcome the critiques with an open and mind and 
heart. 
 
I don’t know the people who will be in this group.  I don’t know their desires or 
needs.  I don’t know so many things, and the unknown is a scary place for me.  
Part of me wants to bag it, to take an easier road, to not take this risk.  But the 
other part of me desperately wants to be the person Paulo Freire describes in 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed: 
 
[T]he more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality so 
that, knowing it better, he or she can transform it. This individual is not afraid to 
confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled. This person is not afraid to meet the 
people or to enter into a dialogue with them. This person does not consider 
himself or herself the proprietor of history or of all people, or the liberator of the 
oppressed; but he or she does commit himself or herself, within history, to fight at 
their side. 
 
So my first task is to “meet the people;” to “enter into a dialogue.” I am not the 
liberator, but I do come armed with the arsenal of Theatre of the Oppressed in my 
tattered copy of Games for Actors and Non-Actors.  And with these tools I will 
commit myself to becoming an ally.  Wish me luck. I’ll keep you posted.103 
       
This is a beautiful, elegant account of a very difficult situation, one that I have 
found myself in many times.  It’s also a perfect example of how when we neuter Freire, 
when we cut away the collective agency at the heart of his definition of oppression, we 
make situations like this one a lot harder than they need to be.   
Freire would not call Burke “privileged.”  He would call her oppressed.  Not 
oppressed in the same way as the people she’ll be working with; not oppressed in a way 
that anyone needs to pity her; but objectively oppressed, “hinder[ed in her] pursuit of 
self-affirmation as a responsible person.”  Like the so-called “oppressors” in Weinblatt’s 
workshops, who wanted to act as “allies” but couldn’t bring themselves to, Burke wants 
                                                
103 Katherine Burke, “The Beginning,” Pedagogy and Theatre of the Oppressed, Inc. (website), November 
7, 2013.  http://ptoweb.org/2013/11/katherine-burke-considers-the-beginning/ (December 9, 2013).  The 
Freire quotes come, of course, from the 30th Anniversary Edition.  Some emphases added, for clarification. 
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to do meaningful work alongside others who are oppressed.104  But something has been 
standing in her way, “hindering” her from doing this work—and you might add, 
“objectively exploiting” her labor in the academy.  She’s very aware of that something, 
but she doesn’t think of it as her oppressor.  It’s what she calls “white privilege.” 
There’s a reason Freire doesn’t talk about “privilege.”  It’s not because it doesn’t 
exist, or it isn’t important.  It’s because it’s simply one form, one subset, of oppression.  
This is not a theoretical argument; it’s a historical fact.  White privilege, the paradigm for 
how we talk about all “agent” privilege, is an organized idea—with a history not-
coincidentally similar to neoliberalism’s.  It was organized by a conspiracy of wealthy 
white plantation owners in colonial Virginia in the mid-1600s, working out of simple 
economic self-interest.  They had a problem, you see:  their workers, whom they treated 
awfully, were starting to organize, too, out of their own self-interest.  These workers—
white, black, and indigenous—“saw each other as sharing the same predicament,” wrote 
historian Edmund Morgan.  “It was common, for example, for servants and slaves to run 
away together, steal hogs together, get drunk together.  It was not uncommon for them to 
make love together.”  And, their bosses feared, fight together.105 
                                                
104 Freire observed that the oppressed “almost always, during the initial stage of the struggle…instead of 
striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors, or ‘sub-oppressors.’”  He added, a few pages 
later:  “only as they discover themselves to be ‘hosts’ of the oppressor can they contribute to the midwifery 
of their liberating pedagogy.”  This does not make them “oppressors” in any absolute sense; it is totally 
characteristic behavior of “the oppressed.”  See Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 29-30, 33 [original 
edition]; 45, 48 [30th Anniversary Edition].  (No change.) 
105 See Thandeka, Learning to Be White:  Money, Race, and God in America (New York:  Continuum, 
2001), 44.  This history, despite being far too rarely discussed and understood, is well documented:  in the 
third chapter (“Class”) of Thandeka’s book, in the second chapter (“Drawing the Color Line”) of Zinn’s 
People’s History of the United States—and in the book they both draw from, Edmund S. Morgan’s 
American Slavery, American Freedom, reissue ed. (New York:  Norton, 2003).  I was heartened, a couple 
of years ago, to see it included in TakeAction Minnesota’s training on “Worldview and Racial Justice,” too.  
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So these bosses began what would become a time-honored tradition in American 
politics:  they started a culture war.  They passed new laws—easy to do, in a legislature 
where only white male landowners could participate—which gave their poor (landless) 
white workers little, symbolic bits of privilege:  they got a few employment benefits, they 
were allowed to whip fellow black workers, and they were allowed to keep their clothes 
on when their bosses whipped them.  This “divide-and-conquer class strategy,” in the 
words of the Reverend Thandeka, “led the poor whites to identify with the ruling elite”:  
with their fellow whites, rather than their fellow workers.106  These poor whites, despite 
having been thrown a few crumbs, were still poor, and still oppressed, in the same way as 
their black and indigenous coworkers.  But now they were oppressed in a new way, too.  
They were oppressed by their white privilege, an interpretive strategy that hindered them 
from understanding their shared oppression, and therefore hindered them—and continues 
to hinder us—from organizing across racial lines to break it. 
This isn’t about feeling sorry for the poor suffering white people.  Understanding 
oppression, in Freire’s sense, is never about feeling sorry for the oppressed.  It’s about 
doing an objective power-analysis:  understanding what’s keeping us apart and holding us 
back from working together toward our collective humanization.  White privilege, along 
with the other “agent” privileges, is one of those things.  When we understand privilege 
along Weinblatt’s lines—not as a form of oppression but as the opposite of oppression—
we unwittingly continue the work the Virginia plantation owners started.  We make a 
fetish of the deep divide between us and our fellow workers; we turn it into an absolute, 
Descartes- and Althusser-style truth.  We make the goal of our work to recognize and 
                                                
106 Thandeka, Learning to Be White, 46. 
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humble ourselves before the depths of this divide—as opposed to Freire’s goal, which 
was to overcome it.107  We make it ever harder for us, any of us, to see the very real 
oppression that we all share—in our common experience as part of the 99 percent, for 
example—and our equally real, simple self-interest in breaking them. 
                                                
107 Or, in Hegel’s language, to aufheben it.  Aufheben, the German word that means “to raise up,” “to tear 
down,” and “to preserve,” is the dialectical word par excellence.  (Most English editions of Hegel translate 
aufheben—a common, normal German word—as “sublate,” an obscure grotesquery that I will not 
acknowledge further.)  When we have a dialectical understanding of historical progress, as Hegel and 
Freire did, two entities can be deeply, profoundly different, and yet through their conflict these differences 
can be simultaneously preserved, honored, and overcome.  This Aufhebung seems to be the desired result of 
most anti-oppression work:  we don’t want to end the differences between men and women, or blacks and 
whites, or gays and straights.  We want to honor and preserve them, in a way that lets us work together 
toward our collective humanization.  Or better, thinking about Pete Marincel’s story from SEIU, the 
reverse:  we want to work together toward our collective humanization, to make a world that will honor and 
preserve our differences.  (This is also why, for a dialectical thinker, class can never be a category of 
identity difference, like race and gender and the others.  Class, like oppressor/oppressed—often but not 
always synonymous—is not an identity but a position in a dialectical relationship:  precisely the dialectical 
relationship we are looking to aufheben.  The goal is not to destroy identity differences, but it is to destroy 
class differences—and the whole system that supports them.)  For a dialectical thinker, the goals of 
honoring, preserving, and overcoming identity difference are not contradictory.  Anyone who has ever 
formed a close, lasting relationship with someone across some kind of difference—and through working on 
that relationship, has come to better understand and appreciate this difference—knows this to be true.  
Dialectical thought is dynamic, relational thought:  thought that gets formed through the changing process 
of human (and non-human) relations, over time.  It is, in the strict sense of Saul Alinsky, radical:  it 
requires us to love all people, as participants in the messy, dynamic, relational progress of history toward 
humanization.  It is the philosophical backbone of nearly every major revolutionary movement in modern 
times.  Post-colonial academic critics may “debunk” Hegel and Marx for their Eurocentrism and 
phallocentrism, but anti-colonial organizers hold them dear.  (This is where Freire’s Hegelianism comes 
from:  he quotes Frantz Fanon and other Hegel-influenced anti-colonial leaders extensively.  See also Susan 
Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh, PA:  University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009).)  
But dialecticism, the tradition of Hegel and Heraclitus, isn’t the only major tradition of Western 
philosophy.  There’s also another, the tradition of Plato and Parmenides:  conservatism.  Philosophical 
conservatism has nothing (necessarily) to do with being a Republican; many liberals and progressives and 
leftists are, philosophically, conservatives.  It means you believe the world is fundamentally made up of 
fixed forms, not ever-changing relationships.  Maps, for instance, proceed from the conservative 
assumption that you can step in the same river twice:  the water molecules may be different, and there may 
have been some more erosion, but it’s still the Mississippi.  The criminal justice system, likewise, is 
necessarily conservative:  it wouldn’t work very well if people could claim innocence because they’re not 
the same person they were when they committed the crime.  (Our “corrective” penal system does carry the 
dialectical assumptions that you won’t always be the person you were—except when you apply for a job 
and you have to check “the box,” or if you’ve committed a sex crime and need to register as a “sex 
offender.”)  Academia and para-academia, insofar as they’re grounded in a search for the absolute truth 
that’ll set us free, are fundamentally conservative.  This includes the anarcho-liberal parts, with their 
insistence on absolute friends and enemies; on the absolute truth of language, identity, and difference; and 
on the unchangeable model of politics as isolated virtuous individuals resisting the all-powerful Master.  
When we neutered Freire, we turned him into a conservative, too.  As long as we remain conservatives, we 
will, by definition, never be able to make much radical change. 
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I hope that Burke can ground her work in this shared oppression and self-interest.  
(I suggested as much to her.  See the Appendix for her own thoughts.)  Not that she 
should discount or downplay the deep differences between her and the people she’s 
working with.  Just because they’re socially-constructed, by the Virginia plantation 
owners and their centuries of descendents, doesn’t mean they’re not real.  But it does 
mean that they can be overcome.  What I hope is that Burke can make overcoming these 
differences, through extended, relational work, the goal—rather than just the usual step-
back and call-out and one-off act of resistance, such as our Legislative Theatre session in 
Minneapolis.  Boal and Freire, understood with their roots in organizing and collective 
agency intact, can help get her there.   
But it’ll be a mighty strain on the habitus.  Too hard a strain for Weinblatt, who 
admits:  “As someone living in a body suit that possesses significant agency, I am aware 
that I could use my privilege and quit being an activist at any time.  If I were doing more 
traditional activism as a community organizer, I worry that indeed I might quit.”108  
Maybe too hard for anyone—at least, for anyone to do alone.  Freire and Boal would be 
the first to say that we have to take these kinds of projects on as part of an organization:  
a revolutionary movement, a party, or at least an organized interest group.  Cyberpunk 
neoliberalism has made these kinds of groups increasingly hard to come by; anarcho-
liberalism has made those that remain increasingly hard to recognize and connect with. 
                                                
108 Weinblatt, “Theatre of the Oppressor,” 30.  McGowan, likewise, once “asked a friend…why anyone 
who truly wanted to promote a feminist or Marxist revolution would ever make the decision to become an 
English professor.”  His friend responded with a long (and interesting) countercultural discussion of the 
“modernist adolescences” that drove many of their generation to modernist literature, alongside rock music, 
“to escape the suburbs in which we grew up”—but he concluded in a sadder and soberer way:  “Besides, he 
added, look around.  What other alternatives are there for the political radical; where else can you imagine 
a tolerable life for yourself?”  See McGowan, Democracy’s Children, 40-41. 
   226 
 
But they’re out there.  As I learned a few years ago, when by sheer dumb luck, I 
stumbled upon the corridor of power.   
To which we will now return. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Arendtian Impulse 
 
 
 This is a new arena for me.  I don’t know how to feel.  
—Trainee, Ohio Organizing Collaborative weeklong training, June 2011 
 
 
A Tale of…a Fail? 
I used to love to teach Brave New World.   
Partly because it’s one of my favorite books.  But more importantly, because it’s 
misunderstood.  In important ways.  And I wanted to set things straight. 
Most people, scholars and laypeople alike, read it like it’s 1984:  a dystopian, 
cautionary tale about an oppressive, all-powerful System and the righteous but doomed 
individuals that try to fight it.  It seems to have all the right markers of this kind of story.  
A weird, disturbing society that literally mass-produces people and engineers every 
aspect of their wants and needs—and then engineers a mass-consumer society to 
perfectly cater to each of these wants and needs.1  (Eww.)  A mass populace of 
homogenous hedonists who go mindlessly through their work- and play-lives from day to 
day, year to year, birth to death, laboring and consuming without a critical thought in 
their heads.  (Eww.)  And a handful of discontents, who share our disgust at this society, 
who are determined to step back from it, call it out, and resist it.  (Yay!)  Basically, they 
read it like it’s an anarcho-liberal fairy tale.   
                                                
1 An important and overlooked detail:  Huxley’s System does not engineer the people themselves.  Contrary 
to popular belief, there is no genetic engineering involved at all, even simple Mendelian hybridity, which 
was well-known to Western scientists (and certainly to Huxley) by the late 1920s.  All of the engineering 
takes the form of conditioning:  designing the physical, social, cultural, and economic conditions in which 
the embryo, child, and adult exists.  Huxley was not interested in altering human nature.  He was interested, 
rather, in experimenting with the possibilities of human nature, as it was, given the right conditions.  See 
Aldous Huxley, Brave New World and Brave New World Revisited (New York:  Harper Perennial, 2004). 
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There’s only one problem with this reading.  The System in Brave New World 
might be all-powerful, but it isn’t actually oppressing anyone.  There’s no secretly-
exploited underclass, as in The Time Machine, or even a secretly-suffering individual, as 
in The Giver.  No one is objectively exploited:  all the value of society’s (meaningless, 
centrally-directed) labor goes into the production of mass-consumer goods available to 
all, and class differences exist only to divide up the labor efficiently and maximize 
everyone’s happiness.  And no one is hindered in the pursuit of his or her self-affirmation 
as a responsible person:  most people don’t want any more than the (consumer-based) 
affirmation and (minimal) responsibility that they’ve got—and the few who do, such as 
our protagonists, are not punished but sent to an island, where they can live as 
independently and individualistically and critically as they please, without disturbing 
everyone else’s (blissfully uncritical) happiness.2 
And, without oppressing anyone, Huxley’s System seems to provide everything 
we would ever want.  Before we started reading the book, I used to ask my students to list 
all the things that would make a perfect world.  You can guess the results:  no war, no 
disease, no hunger, no violence, no prejudice, no unhappiness, and so on.  Once we’d 
                                                
2 “It’s lucky,” remarks World Controller Mustapha Mond, “that there are such a lot of islands in the world.  
I don’t know what we should do without them.  Put you all in the lethal chamber, I suppose” (Huxley, 
Brave New World, 205-206.)  The flippancy of this remark, the only reference to violent punishment in the 
whole novel, suggests how very far-fetched an idea this is.  The one place you could make an argument that 
oppression is still happening is with the Savages—who , in the eugenic eyes of 1930s Britain, may or may 
not have counted as people at all.  And even this is questionable.  They are allowed to live as they like, on 
their own land.  There is a history of violence between the World Controllers and the Savages, and their 
land is patrolled and secured with an electric fence, but it seems the era of gas bombs ended long ago, and 
none of the Savages seems to want to leave.  The sad case of John and Linda—which drives the novel’s 
plot—is due not to a flaw in the System but to the irresponsible actions of two individuals within it:  the 
hapless Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning, who never should have left Linda behind on the 
reservation, and the fatally-curious Mustapha Mond, who never should have allowed Linda or John (back) 
into “civilization,” much less forced John to stay.  (But of course, had these events not happened, Huxley 
would have been deprived of a plot.) 
   229 
 
read the book, I would remind them of this list, and point out that Huxley’s System 
provided all these things.  And that even our aptly-named protagonist Bernard Marx, 
whom we liked so much when he started calling out this awful illiberal culture early in 
the book, stopped being quite so critical once he started getting laid.3  I would wonder out 
loud whether this might be true for us, too.  What leads some of us, including me, to 
spend so much of our lives criticizing “society”?  Yes, of course there are legitimate 
things to criticize in our world (as opposed to Huxley’s), but what makes us do it?  What 
makes me do it, relatively privileged white guy that I am?  Would I really have become a 
professional humanities academic—essentially, somebody who does call-outs for a 
living—if I had been one of those popular-kids-turned-investment-bankers, whom I 
openly mocked and secretly envied (and to some extent still do)?  If I’d had friends 
before the age of sixteen, or sex before the age of twenty-seven?  Personal bitterness and 
resentment aside, couldn’t I have found happier, more fulfilling ways of living my life? 
The reason we side with Bernard Marx, I would conclude, isn’t because the 
System he criticized was oppressive.  (It wasn’t.)  It was, rather, because we share his 
self-righteous outrage.  We can’t bear to think about a world that would deny us the 
possibility of being radical social critics, cyberpunk über-agents who—if we could just 
find the right code—could singlehandedly bring down everything out there that makes us 
                                                
3 This little plot point, though rarely discussed, is hardly subtle:  “success…completely reconciled him…to 
a world which, up till then, he had found very unsatisfactory.  In so far as it recognized him as important, 
the order of things was good.  But, reconciled by his success, he yet refused to forego the privilege of 
criticizing this order.  For the act of criticizing heightened his sense of importance, made him feel larger.  
Moreover, he did genuinely believe that there were things to criticize.  (At the same time, he genuinely 
liked being a success and having all the girls he wanted.)”  And Mr. Marx’s fall from grace only gets more 
pathetic from here:  by his final appearance, near the end of the novel, he has been reduced to a blubbering 
wreck, sobbing, begging, and selling out his fellow cultural critics—all in an unsuccessful attempt to 
remain in the society he spent the whole novel criticizing, rather than be sent to the critical-individualist 
paradise of an island.  See Huxley, Brave New World, 145, 203. 
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feel insecure about ourselves.  This was not a fault of Huxley’s System.  There’s nothing 
wrong with it.  If we see something wrong with it, it means there’s something wrong with 
us. 
My students didn’t buy it.  (I choose this metaphor with care.)  They agreed it was 
an interesting way to think about the book.  But when pressed—and, of course, I pressed 
them—they still thought Bernard Marx was right and the System was wrong.  My 
teacherly sense of professionalism stopped me from calling them out as hypocrites and 
self-indulgent sadists who would condemn untold millions to death and suffering and 
starvation and poverty and misery just so they could live out their little narcissistic 
fantasies of absolute academic agency—but just barely.  They would grant me my points.  
They didn’t necessarily know why they disagreed.  They just…did.  From somewhere 
deep in their habitus, it seemed.  And honestly, I felt it, too.  A sense that no, evidence be 
damned, this couldn’t be a perfect world.  I just assumed—given the lack of rational 
evidence—that this was my elitist academic habitus talking, formed by the capitalist, 
individualist, and otherwise evil market I lived on.  So I resisted it, and as a good teacher 
of cultural studies, tried to get my students to resist it, too. 
I should have known something was wrong, based on how I was teaching them.  I 
was lecturing at them.  I was trying to “get” them to do and believe something.  And even 
how I framed what I was doing—“teaching Brave New World”—went against one of my 
most important teaching mantras:  “We don’t teach material; we teach people.”  What I 
was doing was wrong, and ineffective, and on some level I knew it.  But I did it anyway.  
I’m not sure if I’d even call it a fail, because I was desperate.  I didn’t know what else to 
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do.  I really believed teaching was political, and that the point of politics was to fight 
oppression, and so the point of teaching was to envision and create a world with no 
oppression.  Even if that world ended up looking unsavory to our narcissistic, privileged 
eyes.  And if my students couldn’t see that—well, it was my job to make them see it. 
It took a major habitus transformation before I was able to get some perspective 
on all of this—a transformation that I’ll be describing, in detail, in this chapter.  Now I’m 
convinced that my students were right, and I was wrong.  Yes, there is no oppression in 
Huxley’s world.  But no, the point of politics is not, only, to fight oppression.  (We know 
it’s not, because then we would gladly accept Huxley’s world as a utopia.)  Politics, I 
now understand, is not just a negative activity—about stopping bad things.  It’s also, and 
more fundamentally, a positive activity:  about making the world we live in.  We reject 
Huxley’s world, I realize now, because it’s a pre-fab world.  It’ll be the same on the day 
we die as it was on the day we were born.  We get no hand in making it; all we do is 
consume it, and labor mindlessly to reproduce the things we consume.  We’ll never have 
the chance to participate in making or changing our world in any way—and in Huxley’s 
vision, maybe even creepier, we’ll never want to.   
This does not feel right.  At all.  We can’t always explain why.  It just doesn’t.  
We reject this world, as if by impulse.   
Or, maybe, precisely by impulse. 
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Public Work 
“Looking back at that night when I beat her with an open hand, I didn’t black out.  
I was feeling good.  I was in power, I was strong, I was in control.  I felt like a man.”   
This is a man in a domestic violence support group, as recorded by journalist 
Susan Faludi, describing what he felt while beating his wife.  “But what struck me most 
strongly,” Faludi continued, “was what he said next:  that moment of control had been the 
only one in his recent life.”4   
This man, like so many others Faludi interviewed and observed in her massive 
study of American men in the mid-nineties, felt powerless, weak, and out of control.  To 
the point where he did awful, inexcusable things to get even a little bit of that control 
back.  Faludi traces these feelings back to “a culture that encourages people to play 
almost no functional public roles, only decorative or consumer ones”—the culture that 
developed when the neoliberals took power.5  Faludi bookends her study with the story of 
McDonnell Douglas, the airplane manufacturer which was then in the process of closing 
one of its major American factories.  She asked the CEO for his “thoughts on the security 
and well-being of the company’s employees,” and he replied that “McDonnell Douglas’s 
duty was ‘to take very good care’ of only two parties:  its customers and its 
shareholders.”6  Its workers had to take care of themselves.  These workers, men who 
spent their lives as dedicated company employees, were experiencing a rude awakening:  
                                                
4 Susan Faludi, Stiffed:  The Betrayal of the American Man (New York:  William Morrow and Company, 
1999), 8-9. 
5 Faludi, Stiffed, 34-35. 
6 Faludi, Stiffed, 579. 
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“loyalty, whether to a corporation, an army, or a football team, no longer allowed a man 
to lay claim to male virtue…it was as likely, in fact, to make him a pitiable sap.”7 
There’s no use in calling out the CEO of McDonnell Douglas for his anti-social 
behavior.  It’s very possible that he’s a decent guy who feels as desperate and powerless 
as the man who beat his wife.  The point is that his behavior has, scarily, become the 
norm—as the job market, in the words of sociologist Alison Pugh, has moved “from 
stable, industrial employment to the fluid, modular, networked economy” that includes an 
“increase in employers’ use of temporary or contract employment and of outsourcing as a 
tactic in good times and bad, the shrinking of men’s job tenure, the increase in long-term 
unemployment and in perceived job insecurity, and the shifting of risk from employers to 
employees through changes in and curtailment of benefits.”  In this market, the postwar 
labor arrangement—where workers pledged lifelong loyalty and employers pledged 
benefits and job security—had been replaced by “the one-way honor system,” where 
employees were expected to work hard and be loyal to their employers, but “any 
employer obligation was dependent on…a social contract ‘we all know’ has disappeared, 
and was no longer part of reasonable expectations.”8 
“We all know” is the operative phrase here.  The reason “we all know” it is 
because the neoliberals successfully made us know it, and made it true.9  Pugh observes 
the way laid-off workers “blame themselves for losing their job.  They report, wistfully or 
                                                
7 Faludi, Stiffed, 595. 
8 Allison J. Pugh, “The Social Meanings of Dignity at Work,” Hedgehog Review 14, no. 3 (Fall 2012):  30-
38, 32, 33. 
9 Pugh acknowledges this explicitly:  the reigning virtues of “mobility, choice, and independence…are not 
random virtues, but rather ones ensconced in the free market ideology of the postindustrial economy and 
the neoliberal withdrawal of the state.”  Pugh, “Social Meanings,” 36.  (Having studied the history of 
neoliberalism, we know that “withdrawal” was not exactly what was going on, but her point is well taken.) 
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tragically, that they should not have taken that job in the first place, they should have 
come to the job with better training or education, or they should not have complained 
about a problem or coworker.”  Many workers, she continues, “feel pressure to adopt a 
certain acceptance (either resigned or gleeful) towards insecurity.  I found that 
many…actively worked on their feelings to generate the ‘right sort of detachment.’”10  In 
other words, they try to act like cyberpunks:  radically detached, entrepreneurial 
individuals like Hiro and Molly, who see an insecure market as a way to be powerful.  
These workers are no dupes:  on a unified neoliberal market, with all other markets and 
interpretive communities destroyed, acting like a cyberpunk is the only way to feel 
powerful.   
But for most of us, it hurts.  Education scholar Mike Rose observes that “not only 
are you demeaned by losing a job, or having a job that is low-wage and unstable, 
but…you’re rendered impotent.  You could express your anger, but the minute you do, 
your kids are going to suffer for it.”11  But suppressing these feelings, accepting our 
identity as cyberpunks, pretty much means giving up on the possibility of doing 
something, together, about the situation that’s hurting us all.  As Pugh writes:  “While 
[workers] protect themselves from their feelings, they also protect their employers, 
suppress what could be an important impetus for collective action, and further a 
privatization of risk that brings the burdens of globalization to rest  on their shoulders.  In 
part in order to move forward as individuals, laid-off employees are, through their 
emotional labor, shunting aside a potentially important collective resource for social 
                                                
10 Pugh, “Social Meanings,” 34. 
11 “Work and Dignity:  A Conversation Between Mike Rose and Matthew Crawford,” Hedgehog Review 
14, no. 3 (Fall 2012):  39-47, 41. 
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change:  their own antagonism.”12  The result of all this—as one man describes his 
feelings to Pugh—is that workers are left “lost and wandering.”13 
Or, to put it in philosophical terms:  lonely. 
We usually think of loneliness as something personal and private.  Not so, says 
German-American political theorist Hannah Arendt.  Arendt—probably best known 
among general readers for covering the Eichmann trial and coining the phrase “the 
banality of evil,” and among broad-based community organizers for writing a very 
important book about public action14—argued that loneliness is a serious and dangerous 
political problem.  Maybe even the most serious and dangerous problem in the modern 
world.15   
                                                
12 Pugh, “Social Meanings,” 36.  
13 Pugh, “Social Meanings,” 37. 
14 See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem:  A Report on the Banality of Evil, reprint ed. (New York:  
Penguin, 2006); and Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press, 
1958).  A point of academic clarification:  I am going to be talking a lot about Arendt in the first part of this 
chapter, because (1) she deals with the concept of loneliness in a particularly productive way, and (2) she is 
one of the most widely-cited philosophers in the public-work tradition, which forms the backbone of this 
chapter.  My frequent references to Arendt are not meant to suggest that I agree with other academics who 
talk a lot about Arendt.  Many theorists in the so-called “Arendt revival”—Giorgio Agamben, Antonio 
Negri, and the many contemporary academics who cite them as authorities—read Arendt in a way I find 
very questionable.  Specifically, they recast Arendt as an anarcho-liberal who endorses a wide range of 
unserious symbolic acts of democratic purity, as a form of “politics.”  Conversely:  though I will be 
criticizing Arendt, I do not necessarily agree with other academics who criticize Arendt.  Tim Brennan, for 
example, unfairly calls her out as “the left Cold War intellectual” (Wars of Position, 20; emphasis in 
original).  Arendt was indeed critical of Marx and communism and the Soviet Union, but she was no 
cheerleader for western capitalism, either.  I read her through the interpretive strategies of the public-work 
tradition:  appreciatively, for the insights she offers into building a democratic culture, and critically, for the 
unhelpful way she (like most Western political theorists) keeps “politics” and “action” separate from the 
rest of our lives, including (especially) our work lives.  (For more on this, see note 22.) 
15 Pope Francis, interestingly, seems to concur.  In a 2013 interview, he claimed:  “The most serious of the 
evils that afflict the world these days are youth unemployment and the loneliness of the old. The old need 
care and companionship; the young need work and hope but have neither one nor the other, and the 
problem is they don't even look for them anymore.  They have been crushed by the present.  You tell me: 
can you live crashed [sic] under the weight of the present?  Without a memory of the past and without the 
desire to look ahead to the future by building something, a future, a family?  Can you go on like this?”  
Francis, like Arendt, perceives how loneliness and joblessness are part of the same problem:  the loss of 
companionship, hope, memory, community, and the impulse to be part of making the future by building 
things collectively.  See “Pope Francis: The ‘Most Serious’ Evils are ‘Youth Unemployment and the 
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Before we can understand why, first we need to understand exactly what Arendt 
means by “loneliness.”  It’s not just, or even necessarily, about being alone.  Solitude, 
time we intentionally spend alone, can be extremely healing and therapeutic:  “In 
solitude…I am ‘by myself,’ together with my self, and therefore two-in-one, whereas in 
loneliness I am actually one, deserted by all others.  All thinking, strictly speaking, is 
done in solitude and is a dialogue between me and myself; but this dialogue of the two-
in-one does not lose contact with the world of my fellow-men because they are 
represented in the self with whom I lead the dialogue of thought.”16 
Solitude is a virtue, and a choice:  I choose to leave my community, the place in 
the world where I belong, to go off alone for a while and take care of my self—knowing 
that I can come back when I choose to.  Loneliness, on the other hand, is not a choice:  
loneliness is what happens when that place, that community, does not exist.  When 
there’s no place to come back to.  It’s “the experience of not belonging to the world at all, 
which is among the most radical and desperate experiences for man.”17 
                                                                                                                                            
Loneliness of the Old,’” LifeSiteNews.com (October 1, 2013),  http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/pope-
francis-the-most-serious-evils-are-youth-unemployment-and-the-loneline (January 1, 2014). 
16 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York:  Harcourt, 1968), 475-476. 
17 Ibid.  I experience the divide between solitude and loneliness, for example, when thinking about writing 
this book.  Yes, I have deliberately isolated myself in order to write it—as I must.  But it’s a different kind 
of isolation from when I isolate to write, say, a script for a theater group I’m working with.  There, I know 
I’ve got a place and a community to go back to when I’m done, which will take what I’ve written and run 
with it.  (Of course, when we think about what larger community might care about the theater company’s 
work, we’re back to the same issue.  To avoid it completely, we’d need to be living in a place like Arendt’s 
mythical Athens—which may or may not have ever existed—where the bounds of our community were 
also the bounds of our essential world.)  With a book like this, I can’t be so sure.  Will there be a 
community to take it back to?  Who will read it, care about it, incorporate it into their lives and our shared 
world?  I can’t be sure.  Nor can most writers, in my place.  This lack of certainty is unnerving.  It makes 
me wonder about my connection to the world, if I and my work matter at all.  These are the seeds of 
Arendtian loneliness.  (This feeling was the main impetus for the Facebook book-update project; see the 
Appendix.) 
   237 
 
This discussion of loneliness isn’t just philosophical navel-gazing—it’s the 
conclusion to Arendt’s book-length study of The Origins of Totalitarianism.  
“Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian government…is 
closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness, which have been the curse of 
the modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and have become 
more acute with the rise of imperialism and social traditions in our own time”—and have 
become more acute, still, as the neoliberals have consolidated their power.   “What 
prepares men for totalitarian domination in the non-totalitarian world is the fact that 
loneliness, once a borderline experience usually suffered in certain marginal conditions 
like old age, has become an everyday experience of the evergrowing masses of our 
century.  The merciless process into which totalitarianism drives and organizes the 
masses looks like a suicidal escape from this reality…totalitarian domination tries never 
to leave him alone except in the extreme situation of solitary confinement.”18  (Or in the 
words of Don DeLillo’s fictional “Hitler Studies” professor:  “To break off from the 
crowd is to risk death as an individual, to face dying alone.  Crowds came for this reason 
above all others.”)19 
Loneliness, according to Arendt, is the result of people losing their agency.  This 
happens when people lose two out of our three basic capacities for activity in the world.  
The first is action—people’s collective and public agency, their ability to act together to 
                                                
18 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 475, 478.  Note, again, the striking resonances with Pope 
Francis’s statement.  Note, also, how this formulation confounds those who would dismiss Arendt as a 
simple “Cold War” thinker.  Yes, she believes in the ideals of democracy and contrasts them with 
“totalitarianism,” which comprises both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia—a conflation that angers many 
leftists.  But she doesn’t exactly extol the NATO nations as bulwarks of these democratic ideals, either.  
Insofar as mass loneliness exists here, too, Arendt sees us as only few steps away from totalitarianism 
ourselves—due, in no small part, to the workings of the capitalist “free” market. 
19 Don DeLillo, White Noise (New York:  Penguin, 1999), 73.  
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affect their political, economic, and cultural world—which they lose when they’re 
isolated from each other.  “This isolation is, as it were, pretotalitarian; its hallmark is 
impotence insofar as power always comes from men acting together, ‘acting in concert’ 
(Burke); isolated men are powerless by definition.”  The second is work—people’s 
individual and private agency, “the most elementary form of human creativity, which is 
the capacity to add something of one’s own to the common world.”20  The third—all we 
have left, in a condition of loneliness—is labor, and its converse, consumption.  The 
endless, self-perpetuating cycle of using our bodies to make and/or get the things we need 
to put back into those bodies in order to survive…in order to go make and/or get more of 
those things.21 
At that point, we’ve lost our humanity.  Literally:  we’ve lost that which makes us 
human.  To labor and to consume is literally to survive, and no more:  every animal, and 
on some level even every machine, does these things.  This is the bare minimum of 
existence.  But to be human—to impulsively reject Brave New World as a utopia—means 
to have the impulses to act and to work.  The combination of these two impulses—the 
impulse to “act in concert” with the people around us in order to “add something of one’s 
own to the common world”—is what I’ll call the impulse toward “public work,” or the 
“Arendtian impulse.”  Once we lose the capacity to fulfill this impulse, Arendt suggests, 
it’s only a matter of time before we lose it completely.22 
                                                
20 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 474-475. 
21 Arendt develops this argument, about the triumph of labor over work and action and its relationship to 
the degradation of both public and private life, in The Human Condition.  This later book barely mentions 
totalitarianism or non-democratic governments at all:  her main reference point is the 1950s United States, 
where she sees these same tendencies toward totalitarianism very much happening (see note 18, above).   
22 (Warning:  this note is quite long.  And necessarily so:  it’s the theoretical backbone of the whole chapter, 
with all the technical details that would otherwise clutter up the narrative.  You don’t need it to understand 
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the chapter, and unless you’re really into political theory, you might want to skip it.  Still reading?  All 
right, here goes.)  My major critical intervention into Arendt’s theories can be summed up as follows:  the 
distinction Arendt makes between labor and work is very necessary for public work, and often overlooked; 
the distinction she makes between work and action, on the other hand, is not, and must be abolished.  
Arendt grounds her distinction between labor and work deep in Western culture:  “every European 
language, ancient and modern, contains two etymologically unrelated words for what we have come to 
think of as the same activity, and retains them in the face of their persistent synonymous usage...the word 
‘labor,’ understood as a noun, never designates the finished product, the result of laboring”—it designates, 
rather, the primal animal pain of the process—“whereas the product itself is invariably derived from the 
word for work” (Human Condition, 80); “laboring and consuming follow each other so closely that they 
almost constitute one and the same movement, which is hardly ended when it must be started all over 
again” (100); “unlike working, whose end has come when the object is finished, ready to be added to the 
common world of things, laboring always moves in the same circle, which is prescribed by the biological 
process of the living organism and the end of its ‘toil and trouble’ comes only with the death of this 
organism” (98).  Theorists of public work, including my mentor and colleague Harry C. Boyte, sometimes 
miss the importance of this distinction.  Boyte rightly criticizes political theorists for their tendency “to 
separate active citizenship from work,” but then also criticizes Arendt for “her consignment of labor to the 
realm of necessity, not freedom” and argues we need to “shift the concept of Arendtian world-building 
from the fleeting moments found in revolutionary times to everyday, quotidian labors that build a common 
world.”  Conflating labor and work, as Boyte does, makes it impossible to recognize the central issue of 
loneliness.  Work is what produces a common world; it involves agency and can be (but is not always) 
public.  Labor is what reproduces the current world; it does not involve agency and cannot be public.  
Labor isn’t bad or wrong; it’s probably necessary for existence, and it’s only harmful when it is the only 
possible human activity.  This, precisely, is the condition that produces loneliness.  The neoliberal 
campaign has aimed, precisely, to reduce all work to labor—to eliminate all agency that lies outside of “the 
market.”  The public work tradition, on the other hand, aims to limit the amount of labor we must do, and 
replace a great deal of this labor with work.  (To an important extent, the distinction between labor and 
work is phenomenological—it has as much to do with the interpretive strategies through which we 
understand  the things we do, as it does with the nature of those things itself.  Hence the apocryphal story 
Boyte told me, about two bricklayers working side by side, who are asked what they are doing.  One says, 
“I’m laying bricks.”  The other says, “I’m building a cathedral.”  The distinction between labor and work is 
not about physical versus mental activity; it’s about non-agentive versus agentive activity, about whether or 
not you feel like you’re taking part in building your world .)  Arendt’s distinction between work and action, 
on the other hand, is far less defensible—and, as Boyte suggests, it is an impediment to public work.  It 
makes sense abstractly:  it’s the difference between fabricating material objects, based in the private 
relationship of human and object, and participating in public life, based in the public relationship between 
human and human.  But it makes much less sense in terms of our everyday experience:  almost everything 
we make involves our relationship with other people (people we’re making it with or for or about or 
because of), and almost every relationship with other people involves making something (a meal, a law, an 
institution, an idea, the relationship itself).  I have trouble seeing a statement like “there can be hardly 
anything more alien or even more destructive to workmanship than teamwork” (Human Condition, 161) as 
anything other than personal opinion, and in the history of many art forms, blatantly inaccurate.  And 
politically, keeping action and work apart can be downright destructive.  Brennan is right to criticize 
Arendt for asserting that “praxis is that component of subjectivity associated with the public person—the 
person of the polis—although the meaning of praxis (literally ‘action’) is expressed in Arendt’s reading 
only by way of activities that are not aimed at a goal and leave behind no work” (Wars of Position, 195).  
This understanding of action seems, almost by definition, to exclude action that’s effective or agentive, that 
changes something or makes something happen—and, in a very Cold War fashion, to praise “democracy” 
for its own sake.  But in Arendt’s defense, this harmful distinction between work and action has been part 
of Western political theory since its origins in ancient Greece.  Boyte criticizes the same  error, this 
tendency to “accept a view of citizens as, in a sense, permanent outsiders,” in most modern political theory:  
“When common action is separated from public debate, the process through which citizens learn crucial 
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This is what’s happening, right here and right now.  Faludi and Pugh and all the 
workers they talk to know it.  And we know it, too—from the experience of so many of 
our friends and family and neighbors and colleagues, and very possibly ourselves.  We 
may disagree on why it’s happening (natural market forces? a conspiracy of the wealthy 
and powerful?), or who’s to blame for it (Big Business? Big Government?), but we all 
know it’s happening.  We feel ourselves becoming more isolated, more abandoned by the 
communities and social structures and safety nets that once protected us.  We don’t know 
whether we’ll have Social Security when we retire, or enough savings to put us through a 
hard time.  We don’t know when we might have to leave our closest friends behind, 
because they (or we) might have to just leave.  We spend less and less time in public, and 
more and more time online, worrying we might be “missing out.”23  We feel, like 
                                                                                                                                            
dimensions of public life are lost because reflective reason is separated from experience of the 
consequences of action.”  The result, Boyte argues, is the replacement of civic agency—where ordinary 
people do things for themselves—with expert agency, where we wait for the laboring professionals 
(technicians, politicians, etc.) to do the things for us.  (By accepting and endorsing the split between work 
and action, Arendt makes the end of civic agency—which she decries as the result of loneliness and the end 
of humanity itself—a foregone conclusion.)  Culture war, including its anarcho-liberal variety, is the 
immediate result:  “a romanticized and Manichean politics, where forces of light battle forces of evil and 
power is understood in primarily moral categories.  Such a pattern characterized the protest politics of the 
1960s and turned the crusade between the Free World and the Iron Curtain into its moral obverse, a battle 
between flower children and [the ‘United $nake$’ of] ‘Amerikkka.’  Subsequently, such an understanding 
of issue conflicts has come to characterize virtually every popular dispute on both left and right, from 
prayer in the schools to abortion, garbage incinerators to AIDS.  Despite the participatory flavor of the new 
social movements and other forms of grass roots activism, the result has been a restriction of any possibility 
for a genuine public sphere”—for the collective construction of “free spaces” where people of diverse 
backgrounds and worldviews can fulfill their Arendtian impulse, acting in concert and adding something of 
our own to the common world—“ever since.  Seeing controversies as the clash between innocents and 
moral monsters severely constricts the possibilities of genuine engagement with one’s opponents.”  See 
Harry C. Boyte, “Constructive Politics as Public Work:  Organizing the Literature,” Political Theory 39, 
no. 5 (October 2011):  630-660; and Harry C. Boyte, “The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics,” in 
Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1992), 340-355; see 
also Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, 4th American ed. (Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press, 
1992), especially his defense of politics against its “false friends” the “non-political conservative,” the “a-
political liberal,” and the “anti-political socialist” who practices “student politics,” 111-139. 
23 The phenomenon of Fear of Missing Out (FOMO), as linked to increased Facebook and other social 
media usage, has been widely documented in the popular press since 2011.  (Google it and behold.)  
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Descartes, that we can’t trust anything beyond our noses.  We feel ourselves drifting 
toward loneliness, toward dehumanization (in the sense of both Arendt and Freire).  And 
worst of all, we feel like there’s very little we can do about it. 
This desperate condition explains, for one, why we’re so quick to call our political 
opponents “Nazis” or “Communists.”  I imagine most people would admit, when pressed, 
that neither Obama nor Bush actually wants to overthrow the U.S. government and 
impose a totalitarian state.  But we’re reacting to a very real, pre-totalitarian sense that 
our security, our place in the world, might be slipping away.  It’s a feeling of loneliness, 
and of fear:  fear of even worse loneliness to come.  The only real way to fight this fear, 
and this loneliness, and the real economic changes that are causing it, is through politics.  
That is, real politics—what I’m calling “public work”:  people coming together in public, 
Arendt-style, to collectively make their world.  But most of the time, this kind of work 
feels impossible.  Sure, we’d all love for the world to be that way, but we’re not naïve.  
We know that There Is No Alternative but to do politics the way we see politics being 
done on the news, in Washington, and on Tumblr:  as culture war.  As a fight to the death 
against Them.  A frame that exploits these feelings of loneliness and fear, and often 
makes them worse. 
Witness the Detroit-area autoworker Dewey Burton, the New York Times’s poster 
child of the white working class throughout the 1970s.  When asked if he supported the 
right-wing segregationist George Wallace, Burton replied:  “I’m either for him or the 
                                                                                                                                            
Arendt, in The Human Condition, might diagnose it as a result of the public and private realms being 
eclipsed by “the social.”   
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Communists, I don’t care, just anybody who wouldn’t be afraid of the big companies.”24  
His ideology might have been mangled, but his basic self-interest was clear as day:  he 
would support anyone who would stop the big companies, the big uncontrollable forces 
running the world, from taking over the little corner of the world he made for himself and 
his family.25  “The DayGlo® ‘This Family WILL NOT Be Bused’ sticker on the Burtons’ 
screen door was a complicated thing,” observed historian Jefferson Cowie:   
Many anxious old liberals and impatient New Leftists dismissed votes like 
Dewey’s as clear racism, but his political choices cannot be dismissed so simply.  
                                                
24 Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 5. 
25 Arendt places huge importance on this notion—of having a little corner of the world that’s 
incontrovertibly your own.  It’s what she calls “property,” not to be confused with “wealth.”  “Prior to the 
modern age, which began with the expropriation of the poor and then proceeded to emancipate the new 
propertyless classes, all civilizations have rested upon the sacredness of private property.  Wealth, on the 
contrary, whether privately owned or publicly distributed, had never been sacred before.  Originally, 
property meant no more or no less than to have one’s location in a particular part of the world and therefore 
to belong to the body politic….This piece of privately owned world was so completely identical with the 
family that owned it that the expulsion of a citizen could mean not merely the confiscation of his estate but 
the actual destruction of the building itself” (Human Condition, 61-62).  This basic distinction between 
wealth (the stuff you accumulate to get rich) and property (your little bit of “privately owned world” that 
lets you be you) has been lost in modern politics—and the result is a world where loneliness is a constant 
threat.  Arendt would have no trouble understanding why our discussions of taxation tend to get 
emotionally charged and even existential:  most of us would probably still agree that “to have no private 
place of one’s own (like a slave) meant to be no longer human” (64)—and in a world where wealth equals 
property, if you’re not accumulating enough wealth, you’re in danger of losing your very humanity.  
Democrats and Republicans alike are often seen as inhumane for denying people their property, in the 
ancient definition.  Republicans, through “entitlement” reform, would deny them the property itself.  
Democrats, through top-down initiatives like busing (and insensitive-if-accurate rhetoric like Obama’s 
“you didn’t build that”), would deny them the ability to make this property truly their own.  This is the line 
of thinking that led to Arendt’s most controversial political position:  her opposition to federal intervention 
to desegregate the schools in Little Rock, Arkansas.  It’s a position that’s hard to defend—and Arendt itself 
“had the grace to reverse” it “after the intervention of the black novelist Ralph Ellison” (to quote critic 
Seyla Benhabib), but it’s worth understanding the logic that led her to it.  When people feel their basic 
property being challenged, they will react viciously.  Without this kind of federal intervention fueling 
southerners’ most existential fears, it’s hard to imagine Nixon’s cynical “Southern Strategy” working 
nearly as well as it did:  playing on this mix of (illegitimate) racism and (legitimate) fear of loss of property 
to move the Southern working class into the Republican column for decades to come—where, Kansas-
style, they ended up strengthening the neoliberal activists that did far more than Democratic 
desegregationists to destroy their property.  See Hannah Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” Dissent 6, 
no. 1 (1959): 45-56.  See also Seyla Benhabib, “Models of Public Space:  Hannah Arendt, the Liberal 
Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere:  73-98; for more on “property-
owning consciousness” (as opposed to class-consciousness) as a particularly American approach to 
citizenship—and foundation of the populst tradition—see Gerald Taylor, “Prometheus Unbound:  
Populism, The Property Question, and Social Invention,” The Good Society 21, no. 2 (2012):  219-233. 
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Raised poor (the first indoor running water he had was when he moved from 
southern Illinois to Detroit as a teenager), Dewey nonetheless profited from 
generations of segregated housing patterns, silent white privilege, and 
occupational segregation.  Still, he felt open to black people as both leaders and 
neighbors.  He touted his black union local leader as “the best president we’ve 
ever had” and claimed that he would welcome anyone into his neighborhood.  “If 
a black mom and daddy buy or rent a house here and send their kids to [my son] 
David’s school and pay their taxes, that’s fine.  Busing black kids to white 
neighborhoods and white kids to black neighborhoods is never going to achieve 
integration.  It’s upsetting.  It’s baloney.”  Like Wallace, Burton also detested 
“welfare freeloaders,” pointing to an unruly white family down the block.  His 
protest against liberalism had as much to do with control of his life, the fate of his 
family, and his modest and tenuous place on the social ladder as it did anything 
else.26   
           
This, too, is the matter with Kansas.  No industrial worker in the 1970s could be 
blamed for feeling in danger of losing control of his life, and losing his place on the 
social ladder.  And whatever our personal opinions about busing, it’s easy to understand 
how people like Burton could see it—for not entirely racist reasons—as yet one more 
way that his life and his world were being taken away from him.27  Especially “at a time 
when the traditional working-class ally, the Democratic Party, offered precious little 
material comfort to working people” and “Ronald Reagan’s New Right offered a 
restoration of the glory days by bolstering morale on the basis of patriotism, God, race, 
patriarchy, and a nostalgia for community.”28  This is the same logic of pretty much every 
culture war.  Defend what little you’ve got left, your home and your identity and your 
                                                
26 Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 5. 
27 Nor are these feelings unique to the hard-hat set.  In West Hartford, Connecticut, the upper-middle-class 
liberal suburb where I grew up, the Democrats always controlled the Town Council and Board of 
Education—with one exception:  the term after they tried to desegregate the elementary schools by busing 
kids across town.  (Since coming back to power, they have not tried again.)  No one had a problem with 
black kids, of course; they just wanted “neighborhood schools.”  As with Burton, racism is a necessary but 
insufficient explanation. 
28 Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 16. 
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values, because They—the government, the corporations, the Power Elites, the 
Ideological State Apparatuses—are coming for them.29 
Burton was no dupe.  The Democrats were forcing him to take his kids out of 
their neighborhood school and offering him nothing in return; the Republicans, at least, 
were offering him some “psychic income.”  So Burton, a lifelong labor Democrat, voted 
for Reagan.  (“Sure, I’ve got some qualms deep inside me about voting for a 
Republican,” he admitted.  “But a man’s got to grow up sometime.”)  And later, when 
Reagan turned out to be a neoliberal activist—Cowie calls him “the central protagonist in 
the new economic transformations devastating working-class communities across the 
heartland”—Burton got the message.  “As Dewey later confessed:  ‘Reagan blindsided 
us.’”30 
Leftists and liberals play on people’s loneliness and fear, too.  I discovered this 
myself, when I spent the summer after high school as a door-to-door canvasser for a 
citizen-action group.  Our job was to spend sweltering summer evenings walking by 
ourselves around suburban subdivisions, knocking on people’s doors, interrupting their 
dinners, reciting a script we’d memorized about how big corporations were taking over 
the world, and asking them to become members—which meant writing a check for sixty 
                                                
29 The issue of guns fits this script in a particularly literal way, especially in light of Arendt on property.  
It’s easy to think of a gun as agency incarnate, and not just because of its phallic properties.  In a historical 
moment when we feel (and are sometimes made to feel) like we have less and less control over the world 
around us (the job market, the housing market, the popular culture, etc.), it’s easy to understand how a gun 
(to a habitus formed on a certain market) can feel irresistible.  It’s power.  It’s control.  It’s the ability to 
defend my little bit of God-given property that makes me a person in this world, when all else fails.  (Hence 
also the appeal of Stand Your Ground and Shoot First laws, based on so-called Castle Doctrine:  my home 
is my castle.)  Northern liberals like me may not express our feelings in this way, but we’ve got a lot of the 
same feelings.  Gun rights folks are neither crazy nor stupid, and not nearly as different from “us” as we 
often think. 
30 Cowie, Stayin’ Alive, 14-17. 
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dollars.  It was one of the loneliest experiences of my life.  I was expected to raise eighty 
dollars a night.  Most nights I didn’t.  Nor did I realize, until much later, that the same 
was true for almost all of my fellow canvassers.  I spent my nights, and the days and 
weekends between them, feeling insecure, incompetent, and scared.  (And I was one of 
the lucky ones who got paid a just-over-minimum-wage salary, regardless of how much I 
raised.  My friends at other, similar organizations got paid commission.)31   
Nor was the experience any less lonely for the “members” we signed up.  
“Membership” meant they wrote us a check, and we sent them emails—to “mobilize” 
them to write to their representatives, to attend the occasional “action,” and, of course, to 
contribute more money.  That’s it.  Members never met.  They never got together to build 
the organization and determine its agenda.  They were strictly isolated consumers, united 
only in their abstract agreement on certain issues, not in any lived sense of community or 
common work.  (Is your next-door neighbor also a member?  She could be—I did knock 
                                                
31 My parents, still traumatized by my experience, continue to give money to every door-to-door canvasser 
who comes to their house.  This story has a curious epilogue:  a decade after I worked at this organization, 
my father, who travels the state of Connecticut convincing towns to build more affordable housing, sent me 
an email telling me he met my old canvass director, then the chief of staff for a Connecticut city mayor.  
Apparently he spoke very highly of me.  (“When he found out I was your father, he suddenly got a lot more 
cooperative	  !! So thanks!”)  Which shocked me—I always assumed, from the feedback I got, that I was 
mediocre at best—and made me wonder if all of my canvasser-colleagues felt as lonely and insufficient as I 
did.  And my experience was far from unique.  Boyte observes:  “A century of ‘mass politics’ stressing 
universal claims, distributive justice, individual rights, and an essentially uprooted view of the citizen has 
come to shape progressive approaches to change.  Mass politics is based on a consumer conception of the 
person as concerned with individual appetites and needs….It is closely tied to top-down mobilizing 
techniques like the door-to-door canvass and internet mobilizations, using a simplified script of good versus 
evil to rally large number of people, in which experts design both message and method.”  See Boyte, 
“Constructive Politics as Public Work,” 644.  For more on canvassing, in particular, see also Dana R. 
Fisher, Activism, Inc.:  How the Outsourcing of Grassroots Campaigns is Strangling Progressive Politics in 
America (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 2006).  On my last point:  I recently suggested to some 
(rich New York liberal) family friends that many liberals know our MSNBC anchors better than we know 
our own neighbors.  They did not see a problem with this.  That, right there, is the problem. 
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on her door, too.  But she could also be The Enemy, one of the evil Republican 
corporatists who are destroying our society.  You’d never know.  Best to stay indoors.)   
Again, I’m not sure if anyone really likes this way of doing politics.  My fellow 
canvassers and I sure didn’t—in the very few times we felt we could discuss it, we talked 
about how we’d rather be building communities and engaging the public.  But that wasn’t 
the job we were hired for.  Here, as in so many other situations, there appeared to be no 
alternative. 
Why don’t more people get involved in “politics”?  This story suggests one 
reason.  It’s not necessarily that we don’t care about the world we live in:  the world 
where we work, play, eat, sleep, drink, and make things.  Rather, it’s that “politics” feels 
so very disconnected from that world.  There was a time, Faludi suggests, where a man 
(in particular) could lead “a meaningful life—by being the kind of man who would 
struggle against racism at a shipyard union local, a neighborhood grocery store, a public 
school; by being a man whose actions mattered to a society he cared about.”  But in the 
wake of the neoliberal revolution, which outsourced the shipyard and busted the union 
and put the neighborhood grocery store out of business and diverted all the public 
school’s resources into standardized test-prep, it’s become difficult-to-impossible to 
practice this kind of “everyday politics.”32  Most of us only experience politics as 
consumers, in the abstract, on TV and/or online, and via the odd neighborhood canvasser.  
We don’t encounter it in our everyday lives, where it might matter directly to us, and 
where we might be able to do something about it.  Yes, we vaguely know it’s still 
                                                
32 Faludi, Stiffed, 596.  “Everyday politics” is a steal from Boyte—see especially Everyday Politics:  
Reconnecting Citizens and Public Life (Philadelphia, PA:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 
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important, but—in the immortal words of Luke Skywalker—“it’s all such a long way 
from here.”   
The only time most of us get involved is when we feel threatened:  when we, like 
Dewey Burton, get convinced that some bad guy is trying to take away what little agency 
we’ve got left, and we’ve got to fight like hell to defend it.33  Which explains, finally, 
why culture war dominates our politics.  It’s the only thing that dependably gets our 
attention (and our cash)—and everybody in the industry knows it.  That’s why every 
political PR guru, from Frank Luntz on the right to George Lakoff on the left, tells you to 
take a top-down, us-versus-them approach to rhetoric and strategy.34  Never mind all the 
polls and focus-group sessions that say people want to “change the tone” and “end the 
partisan bickering” and “stop the divisiveness.”  When the divisiveness stops, and the 
bickering amps down, and we are assured that our little bit of security is secure, we feel 
free to tune out.   
It’s a vicious circle.  The more people disengage and stop participating, the more 
our politics becomes a culture war; the more our politics becomes a culture war, the more 
people disengage and stop participating.  But there’s more to the story.  Yes, the 
neoliberals have had great success in destroying a lot of the places and interpretive 
communities where “politics” and everyday life come together, but they didn’t act alone.  
In the words of my colleague and mentor, the political theorist Harry Boyte, sometime in 
the early twentieth century,   
                                                
33 In that sense we all, regardless of ideology, fit Bernard Crick’s description of the “apolitical liberal,” who 
“will join in political crusades to clean up this or that, but [who] abhors the political regular.”  (Basically, 
the anarcho-liberal in its most passive form.)  See Crick, In Defense of Politics, 97-98. 
34 See, for example, Luntz’s Words That Work and Lakoff’s The Political Mind. 
   248 
 
the left made a Faustian bargain.  Socialists and welfare-state liberals alike said in 
effect that if democracy understood as popular power is impossible in the modern 
world, they will settle for a more equal distribution of resources and incomes 
instead, to be accomplished primarily through the state.  This theme, expressed as 
the singular focus on questions of justice (both distributive and procedural) on the 
liberal left, was also given institutional foundations in the growing bureaucracies 
and large scale organizations of reform in the twentieth century:  enormous 
unions, political parties, professional associations, and so forth.  All of these 
progressively detached popular participation and agency from politics.  As a 
consequence, justice, not power, has formed the main access of public debate in 
welfare-state politics.35 
 
 
Like Dewey Burton, we saw where the wind was blowing.  We felt our agency 
slipping away, as we became a mass society with distinctly pre-totalitarian overtones.  
So…we gave up.  We gave up our agency, ceded our power to “technology” and “the 
Market” and the technocrats that claimed to represent it.  We stopped trying to make the 
world ourselves, and became consumers—we consented to be served.  We formed 
nonprofits and NGOs and other agencies, not to build power, but to provide services to 
the “underprivileged” and “marginalized”—whom we turned into consumers, too.  We 
created a political culture that turned the resistance to agency, both our own agency and 
the agency of the “underprivileged” and “marginalized” we served, into a virtue.  And 
after giving up our agency, and consenting to be served, we just asked in return that we 
be served fairly:  we asked for “social justice.”  And then we were somehow surprised 
when The System didn’t give it to us.  (This is the origin of call-out culture—which, I 
                                                
35 Boyte, “The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics,” 349.  This is the grain of truth in conservatives’ 
argument that Nazism, Stalinism, and the New Deal have something in common.  They do:  it’s called 
modernism.  (Essentially:  the idea, in art and architecture and literature and music as well as in politics, 
that a single, central designer can build something, alone and from scratch, that will solve every problem 
and answer every need.)  Of course, many of conservatives’ own organizing projects, such as neoliberalism 
and neoconservatism, are equally modernist (they just substitute the market and the military for the 
government).  As are nearly all mainstream and not-so-mainstream modern political positions, across the 
spectrum.  Only populism—which hardly counts as a position or ideology at all—may present an 
alternative…about which much more to come. 
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have found, is conspicuously absent in interpretive communities that take their own 
power and agency seriously.) 
This was when we started pretending that Brave New World was a utopia, and that 
top-down schemes like busing might be a good idea.  After all, if power and agency are 
off the table—and “social justice” is the only value we’ve got left—why not do it as 
efficiently as possible?  This is exactly the attitude of many of the nonprofits I’ve worked 
with.36  The people who work at these agencies tend to be wonderful:  they work very 
hard at unglamorous jobs for not very much money.  It’s just that the market they’re on 
incentivizes efficiency, not agency.  The very language they speak, the set of interpretive 
strategies they use to make sense of their work, makes them powerless.  It’s all about 
doing things for other people—as opposed to with other people, or even for themselves 
(thinking about their own self-interest).  Politics is framed in terms of advocacy (speaking 
for others) and mobilization (getting others to do things).  Day-to-day work, kept separate 
from politics whenever possible, is framed in terms of the distinction between server and 
                                                
36 I’m not the first to make these observations.  As scholar Derek Barker observes, on a market where 
nonprofits are accountable to centralized foundations instead of a citizen base, “citizen participation in 
decision making is likely to be viewed as risky, unpredictable, and disruptive…an unpredictable endeavor 
that could backfire, bringing conflict to the surface and complicating implementation of the NGO’s primary 
agenda.”  See Derek W. M. Barker, “The Colonization of Civil Society,” Kettering Review 28, no. 1 (Fall 
2010):  8-18.  For a more radical (and well-documented) take on the same issue, see The Revolution Will 
Not Be Funded:  Beyond the Non-Profit Industrial Complex, ed. INCITE! Women of Color Against 
Violence (New York:  South End Press, 2009).  And for more explicit evidence of how and why this model 
doesn’t work, see Sarah Evans and Barbara Nelson, Wage Justice:  Comparable Worth and the Paradox of 
Technocratic Reform (Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press, 1989).  As Boyte summarizes, Evans and 
Nelson “find that equalizing wages was accomplished through centralizing processes which had the 
unintended effects of making workers increasingly powerless” (“Constructive Politics as Public Work,” 
644). 
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served, between the people working in those agencies and the people being served by 
them, who are called clients or consumers.37   
The barriers between producers/providers/servers (“us”) and 
consumers/clients/served (“them”) aren’t just linguistic.  Walk into a homelessness-
related nonprofit—I’ve been in more than sixty—and you’ll almost always find yourself 
navigating a maze of locked doors, buzzers, security cameras, and monitored waiting 
rooms.  The employees have the keys; the “clients” don’t.  I’ve sat in meetings of 
thoughtful, perceptive providers, who will criticize a case worker for not treating her 
clients with sufficient respect but a few minutes later will insist that you never want to 
give rent money directly to a homeless person; s/he’ll drink it up.   
Again, this is not to call out these people for their sins—they’ve each saved more 
lives than I ever will.  It’s just to point out that these agencies aren’t places where people 
experiencing homelessness, or the people who serve them, have much agency.  Their 
very structure, from their language to their physical space, makes it hard for “consumers” 
to become producers.  And because of this, mission statements to the contrary, they are 
unlikely ever to end homelessness.  This market structure, which incentivizes service and 
not agency, is the grain of truth in the conservative claim that the welfare industry 
reproduces itself. 
                                                
37 Public work scholar Stephen Smith’s assessment of a homeless shelter where he once worked is, in my 
experience, the norm:  “the people who had the most control over our program were rich white funders. 
Then came the all-white ‘administrative’ staff that was based off-site. Then came the all-black ‘client 
services’ staff that was based at the shelter. And the people who had the least control over the program 
were, of course, the people who had the most to gain and lose: the homeless men, women, and children we 
called ‘clients.’”  See Stephen Smith, “Lessons I Wish I’d Learned On Campus,” in From Command to 
Community:  A New Approach to Leadership Education in Colleges and Universities, ed. Nicholas V. 
Longo and Cynthia M. Gibson (Medford, MA:  Tufts University Press, 2011):  234-246.  Service agencies 
are often para-academic:  they share a great deal of personnel, language, interpretive strategies, and market 
values with academia, including a characteristically anarcho-liberal resistance to agency. 
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I have discussed this issue with several “clients” and former “clients.”  I have yet 
to find one who disagrees.  Nor do many nonprofit workers themselves.  As with my 
canvassing colleagues, it’s not that most people who work in these agencies want it to be 
the way it is.  Many of them, especially the ones with social work degrees, have a basic 
understanding of “community organizing” and want to get the “grassroots” more 
involved.  They’re just not clear how this could happen, given current realities; once 
again, it feels like there’s no alternative.  Even if they could find some new sources of 
funding for agency-based work—the organizations on the corridor of power are largely 
foundation-funded, too—how would they use it?  Organize the clients?  Let them do 
whatever they want?  Not have security at shelters?38 
Clearly, this would all require a major shift in frame.  But it wouldn’t be breaking 
entirely new ground, either.  Consider this story, told by broad-based organizer par 
excellence Saul Alinsky:39 
                                                
38 I’ve found it particularly interesting how this provider/client relationship, with all of its anxieties, 
reproduces itself across all levels of nonprofit administration.  For example, when I worked with a coalition 
of homelessness providers, the coalition staff expressed the same anxieties about the individual member 
agencies—basically, that they don’t know how to govern themselves—that the staff of these agencies 
expressed about their “clients.” 
39 You may note that here, as elsewhere, I quote Alinsky mostly from his lesser-known earlier, 1946 book 
Reveille for Radicals (New York:  Vintage, 1989), rather than from his more famous later, 1971 book Rules 
for Radicals (New York:  Vintage, 1989).  There are a few reasons for this.  First, Reveille gives a fuller 
picture of the why (rather than the how) of organizing—and when I quote Alinsky himself, that’s mostly 
what I’m looking for.  (For the how, I turn to the writings of more recent organizers such as Ed Chambers 
and Michael Gecan, to the writings of recent scholars of organizing such as Mark Warren and Richard 
Wood and Harry Boyte, and to my own notes and experiences.)  Second, Reveille is connected to the 
populist tradition, including the Popular Front, in a way that Rules isn’t:  by 1971, after watching the effect 
that McCarthyism-inspired historical amnesia had on the 1960s “New Left,” Alinsky had gone cynical.  He 
had given up a lot of his expansive vision and talked instead of a much grimmer, bleaker future in which 
culture could not be changed, people are not just flawed but essentially corrupt, and the best we can ever do 
is struggle uphill, forever.  Rules represents both the basic, foundational text of modern organizing—much 
of what I quote from more recent organizers can be traced back to it—as well as the nadir of organizers’ 
optimism, from which they’ve been trying to emerge, while keeping the basic principles intact, ever since.  
See Harry C. Boyte, “Civic Agency and the Cult of the Expert” (Kettering Foundation, 2009), 
http://kettering.org/publications/civic-agency-cult-exp/ (October 28, 2009), 20-25. 
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A vivid illustration of the significance of what the people mean by their ‘own’ 
came out of a discussion of the program and budget of a people’s movement 
which took place between one group that included stockbrokers, financiers, and 
some professional social workers and another group that included some of the 
main officers of the People’s Organization.  During this meeting one of the 
subjects that came up for discussion was the outdoor recreation center built and 
owned by the People’s Organization.  A prominent stockbroker pointed out that 
since there was a substantial sum involved in athletic equipment and such in this 
recreation center, the People’s Organization should have a night watchman and 
ought to take immediate steps to hire one. 
Officials of the People’s Organization brushed aside the suggestion with, 
“But why do we have to have a night watchman?” 
The stockbroker continued, “Well, the public park has equipment similar 
to yours and they have to hire a night watchman to make sure that the people in 
the neighborhood don’t steal things—now do you see what I mean?” 
The officials of the People’s Organization looked confused for a moment 
and then burst forth with, “No!  We don’t see what you mean.  The public park 
doesn’t belong to us; it belongs to the public.  Our recreation center belongs to 
us—it’s ours—and people aren’t going to steal from themselves something which 
belongs to them—which is theirs.  The public park belongs to the public—we 
don’t own it; they need a night watchman.” 
The stockbroker looked even more confused.  The expression on his face 
indicated that he thought the People’s Organization officials were “slightly nuts” 
and he dropped the subject.40 
     
Would this approach work in a homeless shelter?  Maybe, maybe not.  All I’m 
saying, in general, is:  yes, there is an alternative.  It might be queer—pace Halberstam—
but not in a divisive or countercultural way.  If anything, it may sound weirdly 
Republican.  Alinsky’s “Iron Rule” is “never, never do for others what they can do for 
themselves.”41  “What you get by your own effort is really yours,” Alinsky adds, in a 
                                                
40 Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, 178-179.  Note how closely this story, and so much of Alinsky to come, 
resonates with Arendt’s understanding of work, property, and loneliness.  It also oddly resonates with 
Hobbes’s insistence that sovereigns will never abuse their subjects because that would be like abusing (a 
part of) themselves—only here, that unity isn’t assumed; it depends on a huge amount of organizing work, 
to bring people’s self-interests into such clear alignment. 
41 It is also the second half of the epigram to Roots for Radicals, the most comprehensive guide to broad-
based community organizing, written by Alinsky’s colleague and successor Ed Chambers.  The first half of 
the epigram, not coincidentally, is a quote from Arendt’s Human Condition:  “Power is actualized only 
where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where 
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statement that almost—almost—could have come from Paul Ryan.  “It is a part of you, 
bound and knit to you through the experiences that you have undergone in securing 
it….While to be given life’s essentials may be physically pleasant it is psychologically 
horrible, and the recipient, though outwardly expressing appreciation, is inwardly filled 
with revulsion.”42 
I’m staggered, again and again, by how true this is:  how important it is for people 
to do things for themselves, even when it would be so much more efficient to have 
someone else do it for us.  This is definitely true for me; recall my story from Chapter 
One about how I doggedly refused my parents’ money to pay for a doctor, even as I got 
sicker and sicker.  It was equally true for a therapist friend of mine in Minnesota:  when 
an unemployed client of hers came in one day and announced that he would enroll in a 
for-profit online university and finish his degree, and she gingerly tried to suggest that 
this online university was very expensive and not very good, he interrupted her, feeling 
dejected—“You don’t like my plan?”  And it was true for philosopher and agency scholar 
Matthew Crawford, who recalls “when my dad was getting old.  He had Parkinson’s 
disease.  There was one time I got in the car with him, and he was trying to buckle his 
seatbelt.  It was just going on and on, and it was all I could do to stop myself from just 
buckling it myself.  After a long struggle he finally got it, and he turned to me, exhausted, 
and said, ‘Thank you for not doing it.’”43 
                                                                                                                                            
words are used not to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy 
but to establish relations and create new realities.”  See Chambers, Roots for Radicals, 7. 
42 Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, 175. 
43 “Work and Dignity,” 46-47.  Alinsky tells many stories along this same line.  One more, worth 
mentioning here:  he quotes an “eleven-year-old newsboy in a slum community in Chicago,” talking with a 
sociologist who’d spent some time living in that community:  “Take my family.  If we need dough we go to 
[a local community leader named] Big Butch.  Tell him about it and he gives over a double sawbuck and no 
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Crawford is a self-described conservative.  As are many of the political theorists 
who study agency—such as fellow conservative and Chicago Committee on Social 
Thought alum Yual Levin.  Levin, writing in the Weekly Standard, insists that “real 
freedom is only possible with real responsibility.  And real responsibility is only possible 
when you depend upon, and are depended upon by, people you know.  It is, in other 
words, only possible in precisely that space between the individual and the state that the 
left has long sought to collapse”—except, of course, for leftists like Bertell Ollman (from 
Chapter Three), who similarly emphasized these “middle terms.”  In these “mediating 
institutions,” Levin continues, which include “the family, civil society, and the private 
economy,” we generally meet “face to face—between parents and children, neighbors 
and friends, buyers and sellers…In that space, in other words, we do more than provide 
for ourselves and others.  We build our character and raise our children, we sustain and 
evolve our traditions and culture—we flourish and thrive.”44 
                                                                                                                                            
questions asked.  But you go to the Welfare and what happens?  They start with how many times a day you 
part your hair and a hell of a lot of other questions that ain’t nobody’s business.”  When the sociologist 
gently reminded the boy “that the Welfare had given the family about $150 while Big Butch had 
contributed maybe $25…the newsboy looked at him with surprise and snorted:  ‘You don’t seem to 
understand.  It isn’t what you give that’s so damn important, it’s how you give it.  They got that dough 
from Big Butch not just without a single snoop but with a pat on the back and real sympathy.  When you go 
to Butch you’re a human being.  When you go to the Welfare, you’re a…a…Well, they got a word for it—
you’re called a “case”’” (Reveille for Radicals, 69-71).    
44 Yual Levin, “The Real Debate,” Weekly Standard 18, no. 4 (October 8, 2012), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/real-debate_653224.html (November 15, 2012).  Lest I 
downplay their differences too much:  Levin is thinking about the corner grocery store; Ollman is thinking 
about the proletariat.  (Alinsky’s “People’s Organization” is somewhere in between.)  Still, we’re all 
speaking a similar language.  We argue for the importance of an analysis, and a practiced, based in these 
“middle terms” or “mediating institutions.”  Which means we argue against the perspective of mainstream 
progressives and “fiscal” conservatives like, who will reduce all social analysis to government (or 
government/market) on one side, and unorganized individuals on the other—or, in anarcho-liberal-speak, to 
the State on one side, and “bodies” on the other.  A final note on terminology:  I will use “traditions,” 
throughout this chapter—as Levin and Alinsky and many others do—as roughly a combination of 
“interpretive strategies,” the ways a given community makes meaning in the world, and “dispositions,” the 
ways that people’s bodies comfortably move in a given community.  The two are, of course, deeply related, 
almost to the point of being synonymous; the main difference is about emphasis. 
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Levin’s categories are a little suspect; he seems to ignore the neoliberals’ success 
at making “the state” the servant of “the private economy.”  (In the age where 
multinational, big box and Internet-based corporations have eclipsed the corner drug 
store, how much of “the private economy” actually happens “face to face”?)  Still, 
Levin’s larger point is well taken.  And it’s remarkably reminiscent both of Alinsky—
“the enemy [Republicans] love to emulate,” according to Thomas Frank45— and of 
Arendt.  The great hope of the Arendtian impulse, the basic drive to work together with 
the people around us to build our institutions and make our common world, is that it can 
unite people across the political spectrum and the culture-war divide.46  Not by force, like 
                                                
45 Thomas Frank, “Donkey Business,” Harper’s 328, no. 1964 (January 2014):  5-8. 
46 To be clear:  I’m not saying we’re all the same, only that we share common ground—on which we have 
yet to build much.  Big differences still remain.  Arthur Brooks, president of the American Enterprise 
Institute, insists (correctly, if smarmily) that most Americans are “New Age radicals,” who “have simple 
faith that ingenuity and hard work can and should be rewarded” and “know that no amount of unearned 
money [such as money attained through a more progressive tax system] can ever heal the human heart” 
(The Battle, 71).  Of course, the human heart is one thing; the human stomach is quite another.  Alinsky 
asserts:  “It is after he achieves enough food for today and all of the tomorrows that he moves to the next 
stage, realizing that this has not brought him happiness.  Then he is ready for, and starts demanding, other 
things.  Until that time you can no more tell a person striving for physical survival that survival in itself will 
not bring him happiness any more than you can tell a drowning man that a lifeline is not more important 
than anything else.  On the West Coast the story is told of a white hippie preaching rejection of the system 
and all its immoral values, and pleading for members of his audience to drop out and join the hippies.  At 
this point a young black spoke up, ‘Hey, how can I drop out when I ain’t never been in?’” (“Afterword to 
the Vintage Edition,” Reveille for Radicals, 230).  Arendt calls “necessity” a “prepolitical” matter, which 
many critics (such as Benhabib) take to mean she doesn’t care about it.  Not true.  To participate in politics, 
she is quite clear, one must first “master necessity” and “become free” (Human Condition, 38).  (In ancient 
Athens, this meant “ruling over slaves”—which has caused some of these same critics to call her out for 
condoning slavery—but in the modern world, we need no such thing.  In the words of public work scholar 
and Denison University president Adam Weinberg:  “we have the technology (e.g., knowledge, methods, 
processes, and physical tools) and the locally rooted assets to focus on climate change, human rights 
abuses, water shortages, joblessness, ethnic conflict, and other critical global issues. What we lack is the 
capacity to come together as human beings and socially organize ourselves to use our technology and assets 
to address these problems.”)  Arendt’s major criticism of modern politics, which I find very accurate, is that 
it only addresses necessity, that it has become “gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping” 
(Human Condition, 28) that, in Paul Ryan’s words, provides for the stomach (administers top-down 
services) at the expense of the heart (allows people to collectively work on the world they live in).  See 
Adam Weinberg, “Preparing Students for Work as Citizens,” in Democracy’s Education:  A Symposium on 
Power, Public Work, and the Meaning of Citizenship, ed. Harry C. Boyte (Nashville, TN:  Vanderbilt 
University Press, forthcoming 2014). 
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neoliberalism, or by resignation, like anarcho-liberalism, but by active, engaged, 
participatory, public work.  “In a time of concern on the left about the public squalor of a 
marketplace culture and on the right about the overreach of government technocrats,” 
Boyte declares, “public work holds potential to break the impasse.”47 
Consider a recent example of this potential:  the way readers and viewers of all 
political persuasions have reacted to The Hunger Games.  Unlike many other recent 
youth phenomena, such as Harry Potter and Twilight, which have turned off some big 
groups of readers (especially conservatives), I have yet to find a single category of people 
who don’t claim The Hunger Games as their own.  Left-wingers like Donald Sutherland, 
who plays the demonic President Snow in the movies and openly supports the Occupy 
movement, see The Hunger Games as a clear parable of economic inequality:  the Capitol 
is the One Percent, the Districts are the 99 Percent, and it’s a war to restore economic 
justice.  The right-wingers at Fox News, though, insist it’s a cautionary tale about the 
evils of government overreach:  the Capitol is Big Government a ways down the Road to 
Serfdom; the Districts are the serfs, suffering from quotas and restrictions; and it’s a war 
to restore the freedom of the individual and the market.48 
As with any movie, or any “text,” it’s impossible to say who’s right:  it’s all about 
the interpretive community you’re in, and the interpretive strategies you’re using.  What’s 
                                                
47 Boyte, “Constructive Politics as Public Work,” 650. 
48 See Rory Carroll, “Donald Sutherland:  ‘I Want Hunger Games to Stir Up a Revolution,’” The Guardian 
(November 19, 2003), http://www.theguardian.com/film/2013/nov/19/donald-sutherland-hunger-games-
catching-fire (April 2, 2014); Silas Lesnick, “Donald Sutherland on the Sociopolitical Importance of The 
Hunger Games,” Comingsoon.net (March 24, 2012), 
http://www.comingsoon.net/news/movienews.php?id=88016 (April 2, 2014); James P. Pinkerton, “‘Hunger 
Games’ Shoots Arrows at Big Government, Big Media, Hits Bullseye,” Fox News (March 22, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/03/22/hunger-games-shoots-arrows-at-big-government-big-media-
hits-bullseye/ (April 2, 2014). 
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important is that this story resonates.  No one wants to side with the Capitol—and more 
importantly, everyone accepts the premise of the story.  It is a story of radical revolution, 
both economic and political, but it doesn’t fit any of the usual “radical” modes.  It’s not 
anarchist—no one is trying to abolish government, just to institute a better government.  
It’s not liberal, neo- or anarcho- or otherwise—no one is fighting for abstract concepts 
(“the market,” “justice”), and no one is petitioning the Capitol to provide a better 
distribution of wealth or calling them out for their social injustice (lotsa luck…).  And it’s 
not socialist—no one is looking to end capitalism, much less to end work, and no one is 
making any distinctions between the factory workers, the mine workers, the farm 
workers, the small shopkeepers, and the local government officials.  All of these workers 
and local folks are part of “the people”—the producers, the everyday folks in the districts 
that make all the stuff.  And they are pitted against “the powerful”—the consumers, the 
decadent people of the Capitol, who have more than they could ever need, and still 
demand more.  This analysis—and The Hunger Games as a whole—comes straight out of 
one of America’s oldest, most important, and most misunderstood political traditions:  
populism.49 
“Why is there no socialism in the United States?”  The German sociologist 
Werner Sombart asked that question early in the twentieth century, and American leftists 
have been debating it ever since.  To me, though, the answer seems simple:  because 
populism.  Populism, for better and worse, fits most Americans’ habitus much better than 
socialism.  It appeals, specifically, to our Protestant commitment to work and our 
                                                
49 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between populism and (other?) forms of leftist politics, see 
Harry C. Boyte, “Populism and the Left,” democracy 1, no. 1 (April 1981):  53-66. 
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“aspirational” (rather than objective) understanding of class.50  Socialism, in practice, 
tends to be caught up in the “Faustian bargain” that produced the welfare state:  we give 
up some of our agency to a centralized bureaucracy, so we don’t have to work as hard.51  
We don’t like that.  I don’t like that.  I consider myself pretty left-wing, and when I spent 
a year living in Germany—a relatively moderate welfare state—I felt uncomfortable with 
all the comfort.  It seemed to produce a profound malaise.52  But of course, I say that as 
an American.  In Europe, there are a lot of people whose dream life includes not working.  
In the U.S., much less so.53  Most of us, myself included, don’t mind having work as a 
central part of our lives.  What we want is for this work to be good work.  Meaningful, 
dignified work—work that’s work, in Arendt’s terms, not just labor.  Work that adds 
value to our lives, rather than subtracting value in a way that needs to be made up for in a 
salary.54  The kind of work that fulfills our impulse to do things and make our world for 
                                                
50 “Speak Aspirationally” is Rule Seven—and, I think, one of the most important—of Frank Luntz’s “Ten 
Rules of Effective Language.”  “Aspirational advertising language doesn’t sell the product as a mere tool or 
as an item that serves a specific, limited purpose. Instead it sells the you—the you that you will be when 
you use the product...a smarter, sexier, sunnier you.”  To speak to people aspirationally, Luntz argues, is to 
appeal to them much more than if you speak to them as they currently are.  In this case:  we’re all middle 
class.  Or at least, that’s what you say, if you want to get elected.  See Luntz, Words That Work, 18-20. 
51 The other approach to labor you used to hear among socialists—the Stalinist glorification of the most 
boring, repetitive labor—has thankfully gone out of style in all but the most stubbornly nostalgic 
Communist circles. 
52 I’m aware that “welfare state malaise” is a right-wing talking point, popularized especially by the 
conservative German economist Hans-Werner Sinn.  As with the Arendt boosters and critics, I’m not 
suggesting that I agree with Sinn—I don’t, most of the time—but that he raises an issue that is real, and that 
needs discussion, including by liberals and leftists and progressives.  See Hans-Werner Sinn, Can Germany 
Be Saved?:  The Malaise of the World’s First Welfare State (Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 2007). 
53 “In Western democracies in general, and in America in particular, the working life has long been 
connected with identity, moral character, and human dignity,” observes philosopher William Hasselberger.  
“The celebration of the moral worth of work is a fixture of American culture.”  See William Hasselberger, 
“Human Agency and the Ethics of Meaningful Work:  A Bibliographic Essay,” Hedgehog Review 14, no. 3 
(Fall 2012):  48-57. 
54 Russell Muirhead, another conservative public-work scholar (at the Hoover Institution), cites research 
suggesting that money can “spoil things,” that “getting paid for doing an activity…can change the meaning 
of that activity”—and that when people are not paid for work, they enjoy that work more.  (Assuming, of 
course, that they have enough to eat; Muirhead, like Brooks and other conservatives, seems to elide this 
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ourselves—that gives us, in the words of economist Amartya Sen, the “absolute capacity 
to take part in the life of the community.”55 
Populism is also very different in how it looks at those “middle terms” and 
“mediating institutions” of civil society:  the local groups, associations, unions, and 
especially churches where people come together to make meaning.  A lot of traditional 
liberals and leftists, including most academic and para-academic anarcho-liberals, tend to 
call out these institutions as impediments to social change.  (I am someone who takes 
religion seriously, both academically and personally, which a lot of people in my various 
interpretive communities have trouble understanding.  More than once, I’ve had friends 
and colleagues ask me how I could actually believe in something so backward and 
counterproductive.)  Populists, on the other hand, see these institutions as places to start, 
elements that can be combined into bigger, more powerful organizations.  Populists work 
through local institutions and traditions, not against them.56 
This is not always a good thing.  There’s a reason people usually use “populist” to 
mean a bad thing; it’s not just prejudice against the yokels.  Populism draws its strength, 
in the words of Boyte and historian Sara Evans, from “the sense of aggrieved peoplehood 
that translates a community’s common bonds into an insurgent…conviction that an elite 
                                                                                                                                            
small issue.)  See Russell Muirhead, “Meaningful Work and Politics,” Hedgehog Review 14, no. 3 (Fall 
2012):  21-29, especially 26. 
55 See Pugh, “Social Meanings,” 30. 
56 Boyte’s research suggests that this approach, in addition to being more appealing to many Americans, is 
also more politically effective:  “the argument that radical protest movements emerge because of radical 
dissociation from traditional backgrounds is simply wrong.  Recent [in 1981] social history of factory 
struggles demonstrates clearly that people draw on a range of ethnic, kinship, religious, and other 
traditional relations in fighting back and in developing a collective consciousness….The left [socialist] 
view neglects a range of resources that help to explain why ordinary people, steeped in lifelong experiences 
of degradation, defeat, and humiliation, gain the courage, the confidence, the skills, and the hope to fight 
back.”  See Boyte, “Populism and the Left,” 58. 
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[the Capitol] has dishonored and abused a people’s [the Districts’] sacred spaces, its 
historical memories and customs, its origins, common territory, and ways of life.”57  This 
kind of story and conviction can cut various ways.  Martin Luther King, Jr., very much a 
populist, never called out or stepped back from the culture of the American South, despite 
obvious reasons to do so.  Instead, he located his movement within southern culture and 
insisted that “segregation was an evil ‘betrayal of the southern heritage’ itself”—and in 
doing so, opened up the movement to a lot of sympathetic southerners (black and white) 
who would never have supported something that insulted this heritage.58  At the same 
time, of course, there was this other movement called the Ku Klux Klan, which also 
claimed to be part of the southern tradition, with rather less inclusive and democratic 
results.59 
These two kinds of populism, democratic and anti-democratic, inclusive and 
exclusive, MLK and KKK, have existed side by side pretty much as long as there’s been 
populism at all.  For a lot of people, especially academics and para-academic pundits, the 
fact that the KKK side exists is reason to call out (and throw out) the whole thing—but 
that is a huge mistake.  Like it or not, populism is what we’ve got.  Dig just below the 
surface, and you’ll find that every major people’s movement in the United States been 
has had its rhetorical and organizational roots in populism.  If we want to be part of 
making change in the United States, as academics, para-academics, or otherwise—or 
                                                
57 Boyte, “Populism and the Left,” 61-62; see also Sara M. Evans and Harry C. Boyte, Free Spaces:  The 
Sources of Democratic Change in America (Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press, 1992), 156. 
58 Evans and Boyte, Free Spaces, 158. 
59 “The very vagueness of the populist formulation leads to a political ambiguity and volatility….The vision 
of the American destiny put forth by populism can be inclusive, open, and cooperative.  Or it can be closed, 
static, fearful, and bellicose” (Boyte, “Populism and the Left,” 62,  64). 
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even if we just want to understand how others are making change—we have to pay 
attention to populism.   
Boyte and Evans, two academics who do take populism seriously, have analyzed 
the populist movements of the past and come up with a compelling explanation for the 
difference between MLK-style and KKK-style populism.  Populist movements are and 
remain democratic and inclusive, they conclude, when they’re based in what they call 
“free spaces”:  “‘schools for democracy’ owned by participants themselves…settings 
which create new opportunities for self-definition, for the development of public and 
leadership skills, for a new confidence in the possibilities of participation, and for wider 
mappings of the connections between movement members and other groups and 
institutions.”60   
Free spaces can be churches, taverns, cafes, community centers, folk schools, 
union halls, classrooms, city squares, Occupy camps—pretty much any kind of space, as 
long as it’s made, owned, and inhabited by the same people, who use it as a place to 
develop their own collective agency.  Free spaces are both public, places where people of 
diverse backgrounds meet and discover their shared self-interest and learn to work and 
act together, and relatively safe, free enough from oppression and other external threats 
that people can put their guards down and allow themselves to grow.61  These people 
                                                
60 Evans and Boyte, Free Spaces, ix, xix. 
61 Sociologist Richard Wood, writing about the internal culture of Alinsky-style organizations, observes 
that  organizers and volunteer leaders “work to shape organizational cultures that help develop…informed, 
assertive, morally reflective participants,” through “generating an internal public sphere, or what feminist 
theorist Nancy Fraser calls a ‘subaltern counter-public,’ within the organization.”  I want to quibble with 
Wood a bit.  What these Alinsky-style organizations are trying to produce is free spaces.  And free spaces 
are not exactly the same as “subaltern counter-publics” as Fraser describes them:  “parallel discursive 
arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.”  They’re similar in that they’re set off 
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might have entered the movement “in defense of their rights, traditions, and institutions,” 
but as they spend more time in the movement’s free spaces, “they discover in themselves 
and their traditions new resources and potentials.  They repair their capacity to work 
together for collective problem solving.  They find out new political facts about the 
world, they build networks and seek contacts with other groups of the powerless to forge 
a broader group identity.”  In this way, and only in this way, can a movement achieve “a 
transformation in power relations, not simply a return to past conditions or the 
replacement of one elite”—one Master—“with another.”62   
Without these free spaces, this kind of education and growth and transformation is 
not possible.  All that’s possible is resistance in the face of crushing oppression, which at 
best will only provide a band-aid solution, and at worst will be co-opted by all kinds of 
anti-democratic interests, from hate-mongers to product marketers.63  To build a politics 
                                                                                                                                            
from the media-drenched arena of the state and the market, and therefore somewhat safer—but different, 
crucially, in that they’re public and heterogeneous, intended not for a single subordinated social group but 
for many different ones to meet, build relationships, and work through their differences and find mutual 
self-interest.  They are also not explicitly “counter” or “oppositional,” in Fraser’s sense:  a populist politics 
based on free spaces explicitly rejects this kind of culture-war, us-versus-them orientation.  Finally, and 
necessarily, free spaces are always assumed to be imperfect:  Evans and Boyte stipulate that “there is no 
such things as a perfectly democratic ‘free space’ in our view”; it’s an ideal to be worked toward.”  See 
Richard Wood, Faith in Action:  Religion, Race, and Democratic Organizing in America (Chicago, IL:  
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 161; Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere:  A Contribution to 
the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere:  109-142, 117; Evans 
and Boyte, Free Spaces, xviii. 
62 Boyte, “Populism and the Left,” 63-64. 
63 It’s the movements devoid of free spaces, the anti-democratic and exclusive ones, that 68-era French 
philosopher Michel de Certeau describes in his schema for understanding political action, widely cited in 
academia and para-academia.  His error is that he assumes these are the only possible movements.  
According to Certeau, all political action can be categorized either as strategy—action taken by the Master, 
with power, planned out in advance, in a space that’s His own—or tactics—actions taken by the radically 
oppressed subalterns, with no power, done on the fly with no plan, on a terrain they don’t own…because, 
you see, if they owned their own space, they wouldn’t be radically oppressed subalterns anymore.  In this 
deeply anarcho-liberal understanding of politics, all actions taken by the oppressed are and must be in the 
mode of resistance, because, having no space of their own, they are constantly being pressed up against the 
will of the Master to dominate every bit of their lives and subjectivities.  (This also goes a long way toward 
explaining call-out culture:  in a space where you have no defenses, no room to move, nothing at your back, 
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that goes beyond good-versus-evil, us-versus-them, oppression-versus-resistance—i.e., a 
politics that actually builds things that last—the first things we need to build are free 
spaces. 
This is public work:  the work of building free spaces, and the work of building a 
democratic culture in and through these free spaces.  A culture that, in turn, changes the 
way we understand, relate to, and value our work and our (working) selves.64  And by 
work, I really mean work.  The kind of work that’s your job, that you’ve been trained in, 
that means something to you, that you get paid for.  “Public work” can be a hard concept 
to get our heads around, given that (for pretty much the whole history of Western 
                                                                                                                                            
you are naturally on high alert at all times; you feel like you have to protect yourself from every potential 
threat.)  De Certeau gives a perfectly accurate description of political action that lacks free spaces.  But 
when you have free spaces—that is, when you make them—things are different.  Now the oppressed, 
ourselves very possibly among them, have some breathing room.  We are not under constant threat.  We 
can strategize.  We can plan.  We can keep what we win.  We are not radical subalterns.  We are human 
beings, working together and pooling our resources (people, money, ideas) to make a better life and world 
for ourselves and each other.  One vivid example of the difference:  the Georgia populist leader Tom 
Watson, when the free space of the People’s Party was in full bloom in the 1890s, was an outspoken 
crusader against imperialist war (“it would arouse the military spirit everywhere…the time is 
approaching…when wars…will be just as much a relic of the past…as are now the old, rude ways of trial 
by combat and dueling”) and for multiracial solidarity (“Now the People’s party says to these two men [one 
white and one black], you are kept apart that you may be separately fleeced of your earnings.  You are 
made to hate each other because upon that hatred is rested the keystone of the arch of financial despotism 
which enslaves you both.  You are deceived and blinded that you may not see how this race antagonism 
perpetuates a monetary system which beggars both”).  Two decades later with the People’s Party in ashes 
and no other populist free spaces in sight and enemies seeming to press in all around, Watson had become a 
race-baiting bigot:  most famously, he incited a mob to lynch the Jewish businessman Leo Frank in 1913 
Atlanta.  This is the difference a free space makes.  See Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 
trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1988), 34-39; and Evans and Boyte, 
Free Spaces, 174-181. 
64 In the present economy, dominated by neoliberals who (as we saw in Chapter Two) will stamp out free 
spaces at any opportunity and have created a situation where “workers must stand ever-ready to change 
employers and industries…the experience of work cuts against the gradual accumulation of ability, renders 
expertise irrelevant, and makes it hard to conceive of our careers (and perhaps our lives) as possessing any 
unity,” declares the (conservative) Muirhead.  Which makes the task of building more free spaces all the 
more vital.  Pugh asks, on the same lines:  “What if we thought about dignity [of work] as a social 
construct, something that refers to our capacity to stand as fully recognized participants in our social world, 
that derives its very meaning from its social context?”  My anarcho-liberal habitus is still struggling to 
understanding “a social construct” as something good—but yes, very literally so.  In free spaces, 
interpretive communities that we organize, we can intentionally construct the interpretive strategies we use 
to make meaning out of work—meaning that would be impossible on the neoliberal market.  See Muirhead, 
“Meaningful Work and Politics,” 21-22; Pugh, “Social Meanings,” 30. 
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political thought) we’ve tended “to separate active citizenship from work,” to assume that 
“citizenship is off-hours activity.”65  You go to work, put in your hours as a wage-slave, 
and then once you’re done, in the time left over after taking care of dinner and the house 
and the spouse and the car and the kids and the preparation for tomorrow’s work, maybe 
you go volunteer at the soup kitchen or make some calls at a campaign phone bank.  
Public work dares to imagine—and make—a different kind of world.  In this world, 
“politics” isn’t kept over in the corner away from your “real life.”  In this world, the work 
you do during the day is part of “self-organized efforts by a mix of people who solve 
common problems and create things, material or symbolic, of lasting civic value.”66  
Public work can take lots of different forms—in theory, at least, as many forms as there 
are jobs.  Public workers in various fields have successfully turned farms, science labs, 
doctor’s offices, law firms, and nursing homes into free spaces—and the list is growing.67 
Ironically, the people who often have the most trouble imagining what they do as 
public work are exactly the people who theoretically should be most interested in this 
kind of work.  These are the people I’ll broadly call the humanists.  The “academics, 
artists, and activists.”  The people who spend their (our) lives working with ideas, and 
with other people.  (The people, I imagine, most likely to be reading this book.)  We 
understand, deeply, how important this work is, how much the world is hurting without it, 
and how much good it could do, but we often have the most trouble getting involved in 
                                                
65 Boyte, “Constructive Politics as Public Work,” 645; Harry C. Boyte, “Turning Jobs into Public Work:  A 
Project of the American Commonwealth Partnership” (Center for Democracy and Citizenship, November 
2, 2012).  Boyte notes, in this same paper, that “the congressionally mandated National Conference on 
Citizenship, which publishes an annual Civic Health Index with more than 40 measures to assess the civic 
health of communities and the nation, includes no indicators connected to work or the workplace.” 
66 Boyte, “Constructive Politics as Public Work,” 632-633. 
67 See Boyte, “Constructive Politics as Public Work,” 649-650; see also Boyte, Everyday Politics. 
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this work, ourselves.  Part of our problem is our habitus:  many of us are on the market of 
academia and para-academia, and plagued by a disposition to resist agency.   
But there’s another part of it part of it, too, that’s a lot simpler.  Sure, we’d like to 
do public work, but…what, actually, could we do?  Engineers, farmers, scientists, and 
caregivers (for example) have it relatively easy in this way.  They make or do things.  
They can publicly make or do these things by building relationships with neighbors, 
finding out what their needs are, training some of them in some basic skills, and doing the 
work alongside them in a way that builds everyone’s individual and collective agency.68  
But what do we have to offer?  What do we make?  What can we do, as public work? 
That’s the question that will concern us for the rest of this chapter.  My answer is 
actually very simple, though it’ll take some time to unpack.  (You’ll notice “the rest of 
this chapter” is quite a few more pages.)  Basically I will argue that public work, for 
humanists, means three basic activities:  organizing, making art, and teaching.69  These 
                                                
68 Albert Dzur, a leading public work scholar, elaborates:  “We can train doctors, nurses, and public health 
workers to see and treat people primarily as patients or we can train them to listen to and respect people’s 
knowledge and agency in the process of working on health and well-being together.  We can teach legal 
professionals to represent clients, deliver justice, and provide security to a largely passive populace or we 
can teach them to include citizens and neighborhoods in co-creating a just social order.  We can prompt 
policy analysts and public administrators to devise cheaper and faster means of serving citizens as clients or 
we can encourage them to involve citizens as equals in the planning process and in collaborative 
governance.  We can continue to pass along tried and true curricula fitting for largely passive classrooms or 
we can help teachers encounter students as people with a voice and choice in their education.”  See Albert 
Dzur, “The Democratic Roots of Academic Professionalism: Power and Freedom in Co-Creation,” in 
Democracy’s Education:  A Symposium on Power, Public Work, and the Meaning of Citizenship, ed. Harry 
C. Boyte (Nashville, TN:  Vanderbilt University Press, forthcoming 2014); Dzur’s footnotes include 
detailed studies of each of the cases he mentions in the quotation above. 
69 This is obviously a polemical argument, meant to provoke disagreement and discussion.  You could 
make a good argument for lots of other possibilities other than these three.  And you could certainly argue, 
as I will, that these three overlap with each other, to the point where they’re sometimes hard to distinguish.  
But I will maintain that these are the three basic possibilities—both for argument’s sake, and because I 
really believe it.  You’ll notice I have not included “research” or “writing” in this list.  Not because they’re 
not important to public work—they are, critically so.  But not when done for their own sake.  I want to 
argue that for research or writing to qualify as public work, we need to conceive and practice it in the 
context of organizing, making art, and/or teaching. 
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three activities aren’t mutually-exclusive:  to do any one of them, as public work, means 
to be doing some of the other two at the same time.  There are important differences 
among these three activities, but approached from the perspective of public work—the 
work of collectively building free spaces and building a more democratic culture in and 
through those spaces—they’re mostly differences of emphasis.  Making public art 
involves doing some organizing and teaching; doing public teaching involves making 
some art and doing some organizing; doing public organizing involves doing some 
teaching and making some art.70 
In these final three sections, we will explore each of these three activities in detail, 
and how they can be done as public work.  Our central case study will be the experiences 
of one young public work scholar and academic/artist/activist who, by various turns of 
events, has stumbled into a great deal of training and experience in all three of these 
activities:  me.    
            
Organizing:  Organic Intellectuals Among Us 
University of Wisconsin professor Aaron Schultz, in his introductory course on 
community organizing, clarifies what makes organizing difficult in a neoliberal-
dominated world:  “The problem is not that people today don’t belong to any 
organizations at all, or that they don’t volunteer to help others.  Instead, what have been 
                                                
70 Myles Horton, the great American public educator who founded the Highlander Folk School and trained 
many of the most important southern organizers and educators of the twentieth century (most famously 
Rosa Parks), makes this point in a conversation with Paulo Freire:  “Saul [Alinsky] says that organizing 
educates.  I said that education makes possible organization, but there’s a different interest, a different 
emphasis.”  See Myles Horton and Paulo Freire, We Make the Road by Walking:  Conversations on 
Education and Social Change, ed. Brenda Bell, John Gaventa, and John Peters (Philadelphia, PA:  Temple 
University Press, 1990), 115. 
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lost are collections of people who see themselves as an ongoing, relatively permanent 
‘we’ that can act as collectives.”71 
This is a more precise definition of loneliness than the one I offered earlier.  It’s 
not that we never associate:  “teamwork” and “group work” have never been more 
popular, in the classroom and in the boardroom.  It’s that our associations are usually 
cyberpunk-style.  When we come together, it’s for a specific project over a specific term.  
We might come together in a very serious, intense way, for an extended period of time, 
but we still know that as soon as the term and project is over we’ll scatter and become 
strangers once more, just like Case and Molly and Hiro and Y.T.  Whether we like it or 
not.  We may try to make ourselves like it, like the workers Alison Pugh interviewed, but 
we’ll have only limited success.  Even in these cyberpunk stories there’s always a tinge 
of regret.  And in my own, real-life stories—from the last night of camp at Appel Farm 
Arts and Music Center, where I’ve worked for the past six summers; to the last meeting 
of many of the classes I’ve taught at the University of Minnesota; to the last performance 
of a play my theater company in Chicago had worked on for months—people flat-out 
don’t want to leave.  We want to do more together, to share more of our lives, to keep 
working in the mutual interests and traditions that we’ve discovered and created.  We 
hate that we have to leave; we feel awful that we have to leave; sometimes we even cry 
because we have to leave.   
                                                
71 Aaron Schutz, “One-On-Ones,” http://www.educationaction.org/uploads/1/0/4/5/104537/171--
one_on_ones-f.doc (December 30, 2013).  Schutz cites Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone:  The Collapse and 
Revival of American Community (New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2000), a book that’s become required 
reading for many professional organizers.  Putnam charts this decline in the disposition to understand 
ourselves in the permanent first-person plural across many aspects of American life—including, iconically, 
the decline in bowling leagues.  Various scholars have lodged legitimate critiques of some of Putnam’s 
arguments, in the decade-and-a-half since the book’s publication, but his big point is undeniable and very 
important. 
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But we know we have to leave.  There is no alternative.  We have to leave and go 
back to the “real world.”  What is this “real world”?  We usually don’t ask, much less try 
to explain it; we just know.  Organizer Ed Chambers, Alinsky’s protégé and successor, 
offers as good a definition as I’ve seen:  “Self-preservation, food, clothing, shelter, safety, 
health care, education, and work are necessary for everyone.  Large numbers of people 
agonize over these things every day of their lives; many of us think of nothing else.  This 
demanding set of real circumstances, which we didn’t create but which we are thrown 
into, is the world as it is.  When people refer to the ‘real world’ in conversation, this is 
what they mean.”72  In the language of Hannah Arendt, whom Chambers often cites, the 
“real world” is labor.  When we understand this “real world” as the only world there is, or 
the only real world there is, we experience loneliness. 
Chambers, a good organizer in the Alinsky tradition, believes “we live with a 
tension under our skin at the center of our personhood” between this “world as it is” and 
an equally real “world as it should be,” made of our deepest ideals and aspirations.73  The 
way to work through this tension—to work in the world-as-it-is and make it more like the 
world-as-it-should-be—is to organize, as Chambers and Alinsky and countless others 
have done for their whole lives.  But for most of us, who don’t organize and don’t even 
know how we could or what that would look or feel like, the “world as it is” is it.  We 
didn’t make it, and we often don’t like it, but we feel we can’t fight it.  This goes for 
pretty much everyone, regardless of how privileged we are (or aren’t):  in a culture where 
neoliberals have wiped out most markets other than the consumer-and-entrepreneur-
                                                
72 Chambers, Roots for Radicals, 21. 
73 Ibid. 
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based Market, even those of us who have built or received a lot of value on this market 
still usually don’t have the dispositions and interpretive strategies necessary to challenge 
it.  (That is, the more privileged among us are no more likely to bring the market down 
than the less—even though, in a real way, it would probably be in all of their interests.) 
This problem—the destruction of markets other than the consumer-and-
entrepreneur one—used to be a major area of research, especially in cultural studies, the 
academic tradition I’m closest to.  Early practitioners of cultural studies, working in and 
around the Birmingham (UK) Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, argued that yes, 
corporate-produced mass-media culture did have the power to shape the habitus of the 
lower classes—to turn workers into consumers—but only because these lower classes 
were, or had become, disorganized.  These early cultural studies practitioners, many of 
them organizers themselves, saw this “mass culture” as a kind of ersatz organizing:  the 
habitus-forming glue, poured in from above, that held isolated and lonely people together 
in an interpretive community that made them easy to exploit and oppress.74  Cultural 
studies was the study of how mass culture worked, on one hand, and the study of 
“popular culture” (what we’d call “folk” or “indigenous” culture) on the other:  those 
other markets and interpretive communities that hadn’t (yet) been destroyed, the ways in 
which they kept people from being entirely isolated and lonely—and the ways in which 
these “popular” traditions could form the foundation for a renewed organizing effort to 
                                                
74 In the words of cultural studies leader Stuart Hall, when people (in his case, working-class blacks and 
working-class whites) are divided, “capital penetrates through and occupies the gap.”  See Stuart Hall, Chas 
Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis:  Mugging, the State, and 
Law and Order (London:  Macmillan, 1978), 395. 
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resist the domination of mass culture and its elite owners, and to create the free spaces 
necessary to remake our world ourselves.75 
When Birmingham cultural studies practitioner-turned-Princeton sociologist Paul 
Willis set out in the 1970s set out to discover How Working Class Kids Get Working 
Class Jobs, he concluded with a two-level argument.  Level one—right out of What’s the 
Matter with Kansas?—is that working-class kids are culturally aware enough to know 
that the school system is a mechanism for reproducing the dominant ideology of a society 
they don’t like, so they rebel against it; but they’re not culturally aware enough to know 
that in rebelling against this school system, and getting bad grades which qualify them for 
only low-paying jobs, they are actually reproducing their own lower-class status.  (To 
describe this situation, Willis invents the accurate but unfortunate term “partial 
penetration”:  the kids “penetrated” the dominant ideology, but only “partially.”)  But 
level two is that this situation of partial penetration happens because of “the lack of 
political organization.”  More specifically, the lack of an organization with a populist 
sensibility:  “before any mass party could articulate itself properly as the representative of 
the working class it must understand and learn from working class consciousness and 
culture,” rather than calling it out or dictating to it.76   
While Willis was writing his study, five of his colleagues were working on 
another study, which would take the same argument even further:  the 1978 book 
                                                
75 This is a gross oversimplification.  It leaves out, for instance, the important question of Marxism—which 
is not the same as populism.  But it’s a true story, in broad outline.  See Patrick Brantlinger, Crusoe’s 
Footprints:  Cultural Studies in Britain and America (New York:  Routledge, 1990), especially Chapter 2. 
76 Willis, Learning to Labor, 145, 154n.  Emphasis in original.  He continues:  “Until that effort the 
dialectical relation of party and consciousness is a dead letter.”  Willis, though a Marxist who believes in 
mass parties and dialectics and class consciousness, sounds so very populist and Alinskyan nonetheless. 
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Policing the Crisis.  These five authors, headed by Center director Stuart Hall, were 
writing about the “moral panic” around “mugging” (black violent crime) that erupted in 
the London news media in the mid-1970s, and its relationship to British racism and the 
rise of neoliberalism.  Their goal, ultimately, was to understand “how we think, and 
organize to contest, the internal divisions within the working class which currently 
articulate themselves ‘along racial lines.’”  “Black crime,” they conclude, “functions as 
one of the vehicles of this division” and “sustains the political separation” between 
working-class blacks, who resist their community’s persecution in a “substantial, 
organized, and political form,” and working-class whites, who are seduced by right-wing 
rhetoric “calculated to nourish unorganized white working-class resentment.”  The stated 
goal of their research is to develop “a theoretically informed political practice and 
strategy.”77 
Why bother with these British relics from the 1970s?  Because they represented 
something we don’t see much these days:  a school of intellectuals who spoke the 
language of organizing.  They rejected the detached elitism and fatalism of  many post-
1968 leftists and followed, instead, in the footsteps of the 1920s Italian organizer and 
political theorist Antonio Gramsci.78  They drew, especially, on his concept of the 
“organic intellectual,” which we briefly discussed in Chapter Three.79  Unlike the 
                                                
77 Hall, et al, Policing the Crisis, especially Chapter 10 (“The Politics of Mugging”), 329, 393-396. 
78 This is not an act of interpretation on my part.  Hall himself has talked and written about his engagement 
with Gramsci extensively—see, for example, Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies,” 
in Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula A. Treichler (New York:  Routledge, 
1992):  277-294.  Policing the Crisis, like many Hall publications, is riddled with Gramsci citations and 
terminology. 
79 Tim Brennan, a Gramsci scholar, makes two important points that I want to add here as caveats.  First, as 
hard as these cultural studies practitioners tried to escape the shadow of Althusser and the interpretive 
strategies of anarcho-liberalism, they did not entirely succeed.  “Stuart Hall…and others all concede that 
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“traditional intellectual,” formed on the market of academia and para-academia and 
disposed to detach from the “real world” of labor and organizations, the organic 
intellectual has no illusions of being “autonomous and independent” of this latter world.  
The work of an organic intellectual includes “active participation in practical life, as 
constructor, organizer, ‘permanent persuader’ and not just [as] a simple orator.”  Organic 
intellectuals, in other words, are intellectuals who work as organizers as well as writers 
(artists) and teachers.  Like all intellectuals, they work with ideas; unlike other kinds of 
intellectuals, they also understand that all ideas are inherently organized—because all 
meaning gets made in interpretive communities, which get made and changed and 
expanded and destroyed through the work of organizing.  And so they understand that 
having agency in the world of ideas means doing organizing work:  either working as 
organizers themselves (organizing people and money along with ideas), or working in 
close strategic collaboration with organizers.80 
                                                                                                                                            
their Gramsci came through Althusser.”  That is, Gramsci might have provided their answers, but Althusser 
still determined the questions—questions that kept them focused on “representation and ideology” in the 
disembodied, disorganized abstract; questions about what the System does to the individual consumer; and 
questions that kept them locked in a culture-war mode and limited their ability to think in terms of 
collective agency and the strategic power-building needed to produce it (Wars of Position, 247).  Thus, 
Evans and Boyte attribute the idea of “the pervasive domination of ruling-class ideas in every social nook 
and cranny” not to Althusser but to Gramsci—or at least to “one reading” of Gramsci (Free Spaces xvii).  
Second, the term “organic intellectual” was not nearly as central or important for Gramsci as it seems in 
Selections from the Prison Notebooks, the standard English-language collection of his writings.  The term 
“does not exist in Gramsci’s original Italian until later in the essay, and then only in a subordinate, 
offhanded way (not as a definitive category.  He is…speaking of intellectuals who organize—who are 
aware of their place in a field of political interests” (Wars of Position, 268).  Like other icons of theory 
we’ve discussed, “Gramsci” as we know him is quite separate from Antonio Gramsci the human being.  His 
writings may not have been “neutered” in quite the way Freire’s have, but there are similarities.  The term 
“organic intellectual” has taken on a life of its own:  it has become pretty much the way academic leftists 
(including McGowan from Chapter Three) have come to talk about themselves in relationship to politics 
and organizing.  So even if it wasn’t that important for Gramsci, it’s important for us. 
80 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (New York:  International Publishers, 1971), 3-23; see especially 7-10.  Gramsci, in turn, 
drew much of his inspiration from the tradition of Marxism, a tradition that has been defined by organic 
intellectuals all the way back to Marx and Engels themselves. 
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The modern world has no shortage of organic intellectuals.  Most of them, both in 
Gramsci’s time and in our own, work as “the ‘permanent persuaders’ of the media, 
lawyers, clerks, and the factory pencil pushers.”81  But there are, and have always been, 
some organic intellectuals who work elsewhere—such as Gramsci himself, who left a 
cushy position at the University of Turin to organize with the local communist party and, 
later on, become a minister in the Italian parliament.82  This was the tradition in which 
Willis and Hall and their Birmingham colleagues understood themselves.  Like Gramsci, 
they understood culture in terms of “alliances and blocs, leadership acting in the name of 
specific interests.”  They understood the lower classes (a rough translation of Gramsci’s 
“the subaltern”) as, at least potentially, “an active historical agent…a collective subject [a 
“we”!] that erupts into a transformative force.”83  They thought, basically, like organizers.     
All the same, if they wanted to be organic intellectuals (as the evidence suggests), 
they never quite made it.  Not because they weren’t “subaltern” themselves, or because 
                                                
81 Brennan, Wars of Position, 268.  This doesn’t make them the “bad guys”; they’re just workers, with 
specific skills, looking for the places on the market where those skills will be valued the most.  But it does 
mean, contrary to popular academic belief, that organic intellectuals aren’t always the “good guys,” either.  
Brennan explains:  “The famous division between ‘organic’ and ‘traditional’ intellectuals is not, as is often 
said, a distinction between progressive critical minds and old-style humanists, aesthetes, or ‘men of 
letters.’…Gramsci’s distinction, moreover, is not normative; it was possible to be a politically abhorrent 
organic intellectual, as indeed he shows with most of his examples”  (Wars of Position, 268).  Judith 
Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure provides a typical example of this misunderstanding.  “The split 
between the traditional and the organic intellectual is important,” Halberstam argues, “because it recognizes 
the tension between intellectuals who participate in the construction of the hegemonic (as much through 
form as through content) and intellectuals who work with others, with a class of people in Marxist terms, to 
sort through the contradictions of capitalism and to illuminate the oppressive forms of governance that have 
infiltrated everyday life.”  In the same vein, Halberstam describes Gramsci not as an organizer but as “a 
political intellectual and a socialist activist on the Italian political scene”—a model Halberstam wishes to 
claim for her own work, which fits much better with the contemporary (cyberpunk, anarcho-liberal) 
resistance to understanding oneself as part of “an ongoing, relatively permanent ‘we.’”  (“Gramsci,” 
Halberstam continues, “was involved in political parties his whole life and served at various levels of 
politics over time”—as if she knew the truth, that he was an organizer and fully committed to the 
Communist party, even up through serving as one of the party’s ministers in the Italian parliament—but her 
habitus wouldn’t let her say it.)  See Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 16-17.   
82 Brennan, Wars of Position, 234. 
83 Brennan, Wars of Position, 256. 
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they kept their academic jobs, but because they didn’t organize.  They didn’t build power 
through organized people, money, and ideas, and they didn’t work strategically with 
people and organizations that did.  They stayed detached.  There are probably several 
reasons why.  For one, as we’ve seen, the academic market has heavy incentives against 
this kind of sustained, long-term, relational work.  But this was less of a concern at the 
Center, where after decades of internal organizing they had succeeded in making their 
own little market, where this kind of work might have been more valued.   
No, the bigger reason why Hall and his colleagues stayed detached was that the 
interpretive strategies of Gramsci, and of pretty much every organic intellectual on the 
academic radar screen, come from Marxist organizing.  (Marxist organic intellectuals like 
Gramsci, Freire, Lenin, Georg Lukacs, and Henri Lefebvre, are regulars on academic 
syllabi.  Populist ones like Alinsky, Bayard Rustin, Ella Baker, Martin Luther King, and 
Myles Horton, not so much.)84  For a Marxist organizer—as opposed to a populist one—a 
political organization means a Communist Party and a proletarian mass organization 
behind it.  These were rather hard to find in 1970s Britain, to say nothing of the twenty-
                                                
84 These lists—though partial and somewhat arbitrary—are nonetheless worth comparing.  The Marxists are 
all white, non-American (mostly European) men unknown to most Americans, except occasionally as 
insults.  The populists are all Americans, of different races and (to a lesser extent) genders, some of whom 
are well known and some aren’t.  These differences are important.  “Theory,” on the current academic 
market, seems to be defined by its Europhilia and mainstream unknown-ness—which, in turn, keeps it 
detached from mainstream culture and inaccessible to anyone outside the club.  (To my academic habitus, it 
feels almost impossible to think about reading King, or even Rustin or Baker, as “theory.”)  Excluding 
these populist organizers from the academic market, besides detaching American academics from the most 
vital tradition of political change in our own country, has also produced a curious distortion.  Given our 
present situation, where of all the theorists we read in academia, the organizers are all white men (even 
non-white/male/European Marxist organizers like Rosa Luxemburg and C.L.R. James tend to get short 
shrift) and many of the most prominent anarcho-liberals are not (Spivak, Bhabha, hooks, Mouffe, etc.), it’s 
not surprising perhaps that many academics and para-academics (of all races and genders) have been led to 
the (very, very false) assumption that the only people who care about organizing and agency are white men.  
From there, it’s easy to imagine that to care about organizing and agency at all is somehow an expression 
of privilege, which can—and must—be called out. 
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first century United States.  Willis and Hall, weaned on Marxist organizing, would not 
have seen the hodgepodge of religious, community, and  neighborhood organizations 
around them as possible roots of political agency.  To a Marxist, they are useless at best, 
and counter-revolutionary at worst.85 
In this context, we can understand Hall’s claim—to a conference of famous 
American and British cultural studies practitioners in 1990—that “we were trying to find 
an institutional practice in cultural studies that might produce an organic intellectual,” but  
we didn’t know previously what that would mean, in the context of Britain in the 
1970s, and we weren’t sure we would recognize him or her if we managed to 
produce it.  The problem about the concept of an organic intellectual is that it 
appears to align intellectuals with an emerging historic movement and we 
couldn’t tell then, and can hardly tell now, where that emerging historical 
movement was to be found.  We were organic intellectuals without any organic 
point of reference; organic intellectuals with a nostalgia or will or hope (to use 
Gramsci’s phrase from another context) that at some point we would be prepared 
in intellectual work for that kind of relationship, if such a conjuncture [historical 
moment] ever appeared….We never produced organic intellectuals (would that 
we had) at the Centre.  We never connected with that rising historic movement; it 
was a metaphoric exercise.86   
                                                
85 Boyte elaborates:  “Seeing emancipation [of workers] as an intellectual shedding of the past produces 
strong temptations toward condescension by such [Marxist] theorists, and self-distancing from such 
important elements of the social fabric as churches, informal forms of association, clubs, ethnic groups, and 
so forth.”  See Boyte, “Populism and the Left,” 59.   
86 Hall, “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies,” 281-282.  One of the striking things about this talk 
is how “extremely anxious” (in his own words) Hall was throughout.  Even his very measured, distanced 
discussion of organic intellectuals, he worried, might appear to his audience as “anti-theoretical discourse” 
(281).  In the question-and-answer session to follow, he repeatedly felt the need to deny that he was a 
“populist”—for suggesting that non-academics had things to teach academics, for example.  Both he and 
his audience seemed to equate “populist” with “sentimental,” “vulgar,” and otherwise simpleminded.  
Hall’s anxiety accurately reflects how very far away the interpretive strategies of academia and para-
academia—even this most radical fringe—had moved from anything resembling organizing.  After ten 
years of neoliberal domination, and at the height of the (historical) Culture Wars, cultural studies had 
become a fully consumer-based project.  Gone were the various and conflicting black, white, rich, and poor 
people’s organizations of Policing the Crisis, each vying for agency and, in the process, creating the 
contours of modern racism.  To understand racism now meant to understand—and call out—the ways an 
all-powerful, heavily adjectivized System (“white supremacist capitalist patriarchy”) does things to you, the 
individual consumer of movies and TV and books and other media:  how it causes you to get 
“commodified” (bad) or “marginalized” (bad) or “appropriated” (bad),  or encouraged to “transgress” or 
“shift your positionality” (good!), or confirmed in your “power and privilege” (bad).  The best of these 
theorists, such as bell hooks—my source for these quotations—seem to recognize that this culture war- and 
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Their work was “metaphoric,” Hall explains, because there was no “rising historic 
movement” for them to connect with.  Gramsci’s writings were strategy documents for 
the revolutionary Italian Communist Party.  Policing the Crisis was also a strategy 
document, of true Gramscian brilliance, for a revolutionary Communist Party that didn’t 
exist.  Maybe someday it would.  In the meanwhile, theirs was but to write and wait.  In 
Hall’s conception, the organic intellectual sounds an awful lot like the Messiah:  a 
mythical savior that we mere mortals can but await and prepare the way for.87 
                                                                                                                                            
consumer-based frame is a problem.  hooks expressed concern that “communities of resistance are replaced 
by communities of consumption,” and that statements like “fight the power” are useless “when that 
declaration is in no way linked to a collective organized struggle”; she made an “urgent demand that there 
be renewed and viable revolutionary black liberation struggle.”  But these protests, here and elsewhere, are 
just fleeting moments in the middle of arguments that are themselves thoroughly based on the consumer 
model—to which, theorists like hooks tacitly agree, there is no alternative.  This is loneliness, in the mode 
of theory.  With no (perceived) possibility of working in relationship with “a collective organized struggle,” 
and no sense that such a struggle even exists, theorists fall back onto thinking, as Althusser did, that they 
are the struggle, that the theory they write is the replacement for, rather than the auxiliary to, the work of 
organizing.  This is the common and unwitting pretentiousness expressed, with uncommon explicitness and 
honesty, by UNC English professor John McGowan:  “The intellectuals who practice leftist cultural politics 
are ‘out of touch’ with the people, but…there is not any group already existing out there ready-made, for 
them to get into touch with.  That group—or coalition of groups—needs to be made, to be forged, through 
the performatives of cultural politics.”  This understanding of theory as political action also unwittingly 
reproduces the top-down service model of Boyte’s “Faustian bargain.”  Again in McGowan’s words, we 
the theorists will enact social justice, not for ourselves but on behalf of “another group—a group often 
figured as oppressed—who is to benefit from the intellectual’s activities.  This group isn’t seen as directly 
connected (either through reading or other direct encounters) with the intellectual’s work, but is to benefit 
nonetheless.”  Our academic (and para-academic) understanding of “social justice,” as it’s been inscribed in 
our interpretive strategies, is therefore basically consumerist.  We can quote Freire and Lilla Watson and 
dialogue about “dialogue” all we want, but the very language we speak means we’re talking about us, the 
theorists, providing “social justice” as a service to anonymous “marginalized populations” about whom—
not with or even for whom—we write.  (Meanwhile, Policing the Crisis has become such an afterthought 
that it hasn’t been in print in decades.  I got my copy, some years ago, for $45, and that was a steal.  The 
cheapest copies I see on Amazon now go for just under $200.)  See bell hooks, “Eating the Other,” in Black 
Looks:  Race and Representation (Boston, MA:  South End Press, 1992), 21-39; and John McGowan, 
Democracy’s Children, ix, 3-4, 23.  See Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion of McGowan and his 
line of argument.   
87 Nor was this conception limited to Marxists.  A great deal of the “theory” read by academics and para-
academics is not Marxist, and especially after 1968, some of it is explicitly anti-Marxist.  Regardless, most 
of these non- and anti-Marxists were once Marxists, and in any case, share Marxists’ interpretive strategies 
for understanding what organizing is and must be (basically, a Communist party and a mass organization).  
For that reason, when these anti-Marxist theorists reject Marxism, they (and the academics and para-
academics who follow them) end up rejecting the organizational habitus altogether, in a way that’s had 
profound implications for the interpretive strategies of academia and para-academia.  To the point where 
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To Gramsci, this would all sound absurd:  the organic intellectual was the local 
church pastor working to organize his parishioners to practice their love of God through 
supporting the general strike—or, more likely, to convince them that God would want 
them to work as scabs.  Organic intellectuals did, and do, actually exist as part of our 
everyday lives.  It doesn’t take an act of Providence to produce one.   
All it takes is some training. 
Thus did I find myself, on the morning of Monday, June 6, 2011, among a group 
of ex-convicts, church pastors, neighborhood leaders, educators, health care workers, 
entrepreneurs; blacks, whites, and Latinos; in their early twenties through their late 
sixties; who had gathered in a conference room at Ohio Dominican University, just 
outside Columbus, to discuss Thucydides.  We might have been at a university discussing 
an ancient text, but this was no academic seminar.  It was a training, run and paid for by 
the Ohio Organizing Collaborative (OOC), a statewide group of faith and labor and 
regional organizations, and ISAIAH, the major faith organizing network in Minnesota, 
with offices in the corridor of power.  It was a training modeled closely, though with 
some important deviations, on trainings that have taken place across the country several 
times a year for the past forty years, ever since Saul Alinsky and Ed Chambers hosted the 
                                                                                                                                            
Hall—who clearly cares about organizing—finds himself making statements like “politics is 
impossible…without what Homi Bhabha called social agency as an arbitrary closure.”  The assumption, in 
other words, is that we academics start off floating in the Cartesian/cyberpunk disembodied ether, with 
infinite intellectual and theoretical possibilities stretching out in all directions, unfettered by the Debbie 
Downers of actual human organization.  But then, to deal with actual politics and agency, we must endure 
the unpleasantness of closing off some of these possibilities arbitrarily, as we descend to earth like Hiro in 
his helicopter.  And once we’re there, we have no choice but to take earthly positions:  “It is a question of 
positionalities.  Now, it is true that those positionalities are never final, they’re never absolute.  They can’t 
be translated intact from one conjuncture to another; they cannot be depended on to remain in the same 
place.”  Or basically, what Alinsky calls “no permanent friends, no permanent enemies.”  Just in 40 words, 
instead of 6.  See Hall, “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies,” 278. 
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first Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) Ten-Day Training in the early 1970s.  These 
trainings have different official names in different places, but in the nationwide 
interpretive community of Alinsky-style organizers, they are usually known as 
“weeklong.” 
Unless you’re an organizer or public work scholar yourself, you probably haven’t 
heard of weeklong.  Despite being a decades-old American intellectual and pedagogical 
tradition that has trained millions of Americans, it’s all but unknown in academia, para-
academia, and mainstream media culture.  Just like “organizing” as a whole.  Even in the 
Obama era, where everyone and her mother is a “community organizer,” for most people 
“organizing” still means activism.  It means Occupy.  It means counterculture.  It means, 
as Chambers puts it, people who “dress in black, wear masks, [and] kick in shop 
windows.”  It means “youth, frustrated idealists, and cynical ideologues” marching down 
the street chanting, “‘What do we want?’  ‘Freedom.’  ‘When do we want it?’  ‘Now!’”—
and then, more often than not, going home, without having changed anything.  For the 
“80 percent of moderates who comprise the world as it is,” it means people who aren’t 
you, and people you might not ever want to be associated with.88  Even for me, not 
exactly a moderate, it meant I spent years thinking I wasn’t countercultural enough, 
                                                
88 Chambers, Roots for Radicals, 13, 107.  This understanding of organizing is harmful, in so far as it cuts 
off potential allies.  In my nonprofit consulting work, for instance, I have encountered a lot of people who 
are skeptical of “organizing” because they associate it with confrontational counterculture, and for that 
reason, they eschew the idea of building power relationally at all.  In their understanding—the usual 
understanding—there are only two options:  activism (bottom-up) or service (top-down).  They’re 
understandably wary of the first option, which seems to involve throwing out all expertise and leaving 
everything to the mob (confrontational marches, quixotic letter-writing campaign, etc.), so they feel they 
have no choice but to embrace the second option:  making all decisions at the top, based on the formal 
expertise of technocrats and scientific studies, and denying the people below (the agencies, the providers, 
the “clients”) any agency in the process.  For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Boyte, “Civic Agency and 
the Cult of the Expert.” 
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connected enough, radical enough, cool enough, and otherwise good enough to be an 
organizer.89 
Organizing in the Alinsky tradition—which has close ties to the black freedom 
tradition—which are both derived from the 1930s Popular Front tradition—which owes a 
great debt to the populist tradition—is a different animal.90  Rather than alienating those 
80 percent of moderates, it intentionally focuses on them.  A good broad-based 
community organization consists of “some political conservatives, lots of moderates, and 
some liberals” who seek “common ground, refusing to allow ideological differences to 
perpetuate social divisions.”91  This kind of organization doesn’t ask members to leave 
the communities and identities that define them (race, religion, job, family),92 but just the 
                                                
89 My dilemma, and (I’m pretty sure) that of many others, can be explained based on the results of two 
recent, popular Internet quizzes that are meant to place you on the political spectrum (left to right).  
According to an October 2013 quiz based on an Esquire-NBC News survey about “the new American 
center”—which asked me about my positions on issues such as economic inequality, as well as my level of 
engagement and awareness—I am a “bleeding heart,” all the way to the left.  But according to a January 
2014 quiz developed by pop-psychologist Jonathan Haidt (the “self-righteous hypocrites” guy from 
Chapter One)—which asked me culture war-style questions about my preference about pets (dogs > cats), 
movies (action > documentary), respect for authority (that it’s important to teach to kids…along with the 
importance of respectfully questioning that authority), and self-expression versus self-control (how are 
these things mutually exclusive?)—I’m right in the middle.  So…where do I belong?  Where’s my place?  
Am I, in one sense, a “moderate” after all?  See (for yourself!) “Quiz:  Are You a Member of the New 
American Center?,” NBC Politics, http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/15/20977799-quiz-are-
you-a-member-of-the-new-american-center?lite (January 14, 2014); and Jonathan Haidt and Chris Wilson, 
“Can Time Predict Your Politics?,” Time Magazine, http://science.time.com/2014/01/09/can-time-predict-
your-politics/ (January 14, 2014). 
90 For a brief overview of this historical trajectory, see Boyte, “Civic Agency and the Cult of the Expert,” 
22-23. 
91 Chambers, Roots for Radicals, 15. 
92 Graeber, in his ethnographic study of anarchist activist groups, discusses “the journal Race Traitor, 
which was…avidly read in activist circles.  Its motto was ‘Treason to Whiteness Is Loyalty to Humanity.’”  
This may well be true.  But it’s not a truth that most Americans are ready to embrace in their (our?) own 
lives.  Most people, white or otherwise, are not ready to understand themselves as “race traitors”—and 
when we’re told we have to, we’re likely to turn off entirely.  As IAF organizer Michael Gecan says:  
“Most Americans can’t imagine themselves doused with black paint, lying on a sidewalk, amid hustling 
shoppers and observant cops.  If this is ‘action,’ if this is public engagement, if this is what you need to do 
to get attention, recognition, and response, then most people will just dash past, play solitaire on the office 
computer, or pray that their college-aged kids grow out of this fad and apply to business school.”  See 
Graeber, Direct Action, 241; and Gecan, Going Public, 52-53. 
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opposite:  it trains members to reinvest in their own communities and identities, to dig 
deeper and take them further.93  They likewise don’t ask members to negate their own 
self-interest—either through charity (mainstream liberalism) or through masochism 
(anarcho-liberalism)—but again, just the opposite:  they train members to get “clear” 
                                                
93 Broad-based organizers often describe their organizations as “organizations of organizations”:  “While 
most political organizations recruit the relatively disconnected activist,” observes sociologist Mark Warren, 
“the IAF approach engages citizens as they are rooted in relatively stable community networks.”  Reverend 
Johnny Ray Youngblood, a leader of the IAF-affiliated East Brooklyn Congregations (organized by 
Gecan), insists:  “We are not a grassroots organization.  Grass roots are shallow roots.  Grass roots are 
fragile roots.  Our roots are deep roots.”  Originally, back in the 1940s, this meant a wide range of 
neighborhood, ethnic, labor, and faith groups—but as suburbanization and white flight and (later) 
neoliberalism weakened many of these groups, IAF organizations became focused on religious 
congregations.  “The IAF doesn’t organize congregations because of any high moral reasons,” Chambers 
explains, “but because they are pockets of power with leadership and roots in local communities.  These 
neighborhood institutions are the only ones that haven’t been redlined.  The fastest growing urban 
institutions are black Pentecostal and black Baptist churches.  That’s because people and families need a 
support system, and congregations, like unions, are natural support systems for family and community.”  
By organizing already-existing organizations rather than individuals, Warren continues, IAF organizations 
circumvent the difficulty of getting “people to cooperate with each other from scratch.  Existing institutions 
incorporate networks of citizens who share some level of initial trust and cooperative ties.  Moreover, 
institutions embody the traditions and values that can sustain community life.  A commitment to 
community, and the motivation to care for it, rarely exist in the abstract.  Communities and their institutions 
share a history through which people develop particular traditions that bind them together and motivate 
them to act.”  While organizers—as opposed to countercultural activists or mainstream service providers—
actively seek to work through (rather than over or against) these local community institutions and 
traditions, they also—as opposed to anti-democratic populists—actively work to (in Wood’s terms) 
“rework these cultural meanings.”  Alinsky unequivocally opposed labor organizers who upheld 
segregation because “after all in a town located so far south they had to respect local traditions and a lot of 
stuff like that.”  Less dramatically, Wood observes, local cultures often include “unexamined cultural 
assumptions” that work against their own people’s agency, such as the assumptions that conflict is bad and 
politics are dirty and it’s more important to be ethically pure than to be politically effective; “to circumvent 
these accepted cultural meanings, organizers engage in [what he and fellow scholars call] cultural work,” 
defined as “both intentionally importing cultural meanings from the [local] organization’s wider 
environment and reworking these cultural meanings within the organization.”  Purists may object that this 
“reworking” contradicts organizers’ commitment to respecting local traditions; Alinsky would respond 
simply that “life is a story of contradictions.”  Organizer and scholar Romand Coles would elaborate that a 
“trickster sensibility” undergirds all of the work of organizing, for instance in the “political jujitsu” 
(Alinsky and Chambers’s term) that organizers use to align people’s self-interests in directions that those 
people never originally intended, but always—and this is the test—ultimately serve to build all of those 
people’s collective power.  See Mark R. Warren, Dry Bones Rattling:  Community Building to Revitalize 
American Democracy (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 2001), 20, 30-31; Harry C. Boyte, 
CommonWealth:  A Return to Citizen Politics (New York:  Free Press, 1989), 83; Chambers, Roots for 
Radicals, 129; Wood, Faith in Action, 156; Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, xiv, 170-173, and for several 
more examples of “political jujitsu,” 108-119; and Romand Coles, “Of Tensions and Tricksters:  Grassroots 
Democracy between Theory and Practice,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 3 (September 2006):  547-561, 
especially 550-552; see also Gecan, Going Public, 152. 
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about their own self-interest, and to get “serious” about building the necessary power to 
“impose your self-interest on the world.”94   
This work wouldn’t be possible, of course, if our differences really ran as deep as 
the rhetoric of the culture wars would have us believe.  Luckily, they don’t.  Alinsky 
asserts, with characteristic bluntness, that there are “general issues of the kind that all 
people support, such as medical care, full employment, good housing, good schools, 
equal opportunities, and above all the opportunity to create their own program.”95  When 
I first read this, I didn’t buy it:  aren’t there large, organized, and well-funded groups that 
oppose full-employment, housing, education, and (especially) health care laws?  Yes, of 
course there are, I realized after thinking about it some more, but that’s not what Alinsky 
meant.  He didn’t mean that everyone wants these things for everyone else, or that 
everyone wants the government to give these things to everyone else.  He meant that we 
all want these things for ourselves, and for the people we love as ourselves.  That, right 
there, is Alinsky’s answer to all the pundits, and to everyone else who insists that 
difference is too absolute to work through.  This is the self-interest that we all share, 
across every possible culture-war divide.  Including, crucially, that last part about “the 
opportunity to create [our] own program”:  the Arendtian impulse.96 
                                                
94 “Clear” and “serious,” as discussed in a footnote in Chapter Three, occur frequently in the vocabulary of 
organizers.  When I write them, I particularly hear the voices of the aforementioned Pete Marincel, the 
organizer who (more than anyone else) trained and mentored me, and his father Paul Marincel, the 
organizer who founded ISAIAH and once led the national Gamaliel Foundation, and who trained me in 
agitation.  The last quotation—“the ability to impose your self-interest on the world,” as a not-
uncontroversial definition of power—comes from Paul. 
95 Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, 54. 
96 This doesn’t mean we agree on everything, or ever will—or ever will need to.  “The IAF does not assume 
members have common interests,” Warren writes.  “In fact, IAF organizations are premised upon the 
understanding that people have different interests.  The IAF intentionally seeks to build broad-based 
organizations, that is, affiliates made up of institutions that have diverse traditions and interests.”  Thinking 
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Here was a kind of organizing work I could get behind, that I could feel good 
about myself while doing.  But the question remains:  if this world is so hidden from 
academia and para-academia and mainstream culture, how did I manage to find it in the 
first place?  The answer:  pretty much by accident.  I arrived in Minneapolis in back in 
2007 as a first-year graduate student, very excited to research Theatre of the Oppressed.  I 
met with University of Minnesota theater professor Sonja Kuftinec, an expert in this kind 
of theater and an organic intellectual with an immense network of people and 
organizations.  Sonja urged me to make contact with a Theatre of the Oppressed group at 
Minneapolis Community and Technical College.  Working through my disdain and slight 
fear of community colleges—good suburban Connecticut boy that I was, I had never set 
foot in one before—I went.  Within an hour, my prejudices had been systematically 
demolished.   
Courageous Conversations, the campus Theatre of the Oppressed organization, 
was a group of energetic, extremely smart people—multiracial, multi-ethnic, pretty much 
multi-everything—who were deeply committed to doing really important work.  I was 
particularly struck by two of the group’s leaders:  Michael Kuhne, an English professor, 
                                                                                                                                            
especially in terms of race, Warren observes that “the multiracial organizations formed by the IAF are not 
integrationist.  In fact, the institutional organizing approach”—the church or union you already belong to 
becomes a member; again, you don’t become a member on your own—“is meant to respect the traditions of 
each racial community….Participation in the IAF does not require African American participants to 
submerge their history and deny racial differences in favor of a homogenous whole.  The purpose of 
building broad-based organizations is to bring communities with different traditions and interests together, 
not so they become the same, but so that they can learn to support each other and to find a common ground 
for action.”  The Alinsky method doesn’t assume all our interests are the same; it just “quite explicitly 
rejects the notion that these interests are in permanent conflict.  Instead, it seeks to structure a process in 
which a diverse group of participants can find a commonality of interests and an understanding of the 
common good.”  Weeklong, as we will see, is an essential part of structuring this process:  it ensures that 
organizers and leaders have significant overlap in their habitus, with shared dispositions that let them see 
enough things similarly enough that they can do this cross-cultural work effectively.  See Warren, Dry 
Bones Rattling, 153, 227.  (Emphasis added.) 
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and Nickia Jensen, then a student (now a middle-school math teacher).  There was 
something different about them—not different from other people at the community 
college, where they fit in seamlessly, but different from other “social justice” and “social 
justice theater” practitioners I’d met.  They were grounded, practical, and strategic.  They 
set goals and evaluated everything they did based on how well it met those goals.  They 
built relationships with as wide a group of people as possible, regardless of how 
“progressive” or “non-progressive” they were.  They were deeply interested in justice 
work, and deeply uninterested in the kind of call-outs and infighting and divisive 
behavior that often infiltrates this kind of work.   
I flatter myself to think Nickia and Michael saw something in me, too; in any 
case, they made an effort to get to know me.  They met with me, worked with me some 
more, and challenged me (researcher or not) to do serious artistic work in collaboration 
with black, Somali, gay, trans, and working-class students—without making it about my 
own race- and class- and other privilege-guilt.  And they would mentor me through it.  I 
felt my chest clench up, but then I exhaled a little.  This felt good.  In a way I’d never 
quite felt before.  I didn’t know I could do this kind of work, and enter into serious 
relationships with “those kind of people” (forgive; I was a year out of college and so very 
nervously white) without feeling bad about myself.  And I’d never felt so intentionally 
invested in before, by people I respected and admired but didn’t really know all that well.  
I wanted more of this.  I made a point of building my relationships with Nickia and 
Michael.  I taught a class with Nickia through the local Experimental College, and I 
roomed with Michael at my first Pedagogy and Theatre of the Oppressed conference.   
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And as we got to know each other, they started telling me about this thing called 
“organizing.”  And this thing called “weeklong.”  They’d both been through it—and 
since coming back, they had incorporated what they’d learned into their work, both in 
pedagogy and in theater.97  (It would be a while longer before I understood they were 
putting back the organizing that had originally been at the center of this work, which 
most first-world practitioners had unwittingly removed.)  They encouraged me to go to 
weeklong myself—but to be honest, I wasn’t sure how I felt about a super-intense week 
of super-experienced organizers challenging you about why you’re not more politically 
active in the world.  I thought that kind of challenge could only be a call-out, something 
that would make me feel even more guilty about my privilege and inaction than I already 
did.  And besides, there was no organization I was working with.  Like Hall, I didn’t 
know where I could find one.  (The fact that I was already working with one, Courageous 
Conversations, and in another, the University of Minnesota Department of Cultural 
Studies and Comparative Literature, did not register—let alone the corridor of power 
sitting a couple of miles east.)  I started doing some research; I started reading about 
organizing and meeting with a couple of local organizers and incorporating principles of 
organizing into my academic writing; but it would take another push before I would 
actually go get trained as an organizer myself.   
                                                
97 The two of them, I would later learn, discovered organizing in turn through Harry Boyte and, especially, 
his organizer-colleague Dennis Donovan at the local Center for Democracy and Citizenship (CDC).  
Donovan was in the process of actively recruiting schoolteachers, at all levels, to participate in the CDC’s 
signature program, called Public Achievement, in which students, from middle school- to college-age, learn 
and practice the basic principles and skills of organizing, to better their immediate school environment in a 
way that follows from their own self-interest.  Michael and Nickia both got involved in Public 
Achievement, becoming “coaches” for local teams, and later trainers.  For more information, see 
http://www.augsburg.edu/democracy/publicachievement/ (April 17, 2014). 
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That last push finally came in the spring of 2011.  Through a chance meeting with 
a former student at an anarchist café (the pull of para-academia abides), I learned about a 
local upstart Lutheran-based faith community that used organizing techniques in its 
worship services.  Jew though I am, I was intrigued.  So I went.  And I found something 
like a home.  Spirit of Truth, as the community called itself, was a group of smart, 
thoughtful, mostly young and white people looking to connect—or often reconnect—with 
their religious practice in a way that resonated with their political values and 
commitments.  It was a small group, but they had a trained and experienced young 
organizer on staff, the aforementioned Pete Marincel, and they had serious personal 
connections to many of the most powerful organizers and organizations in the region, 
organizations I’d heard of and was interested in, but had no idea how to access.  And like 
Michael and Nickia, they seemed very interested in building a relationship with me.  (It’s 
amazing, I find myself thinking as I reflect on all this, how much work and commitment 
you can get from people—including me—when you offer them (us) a home and a place 
in the world.  Even without offering them any money.  Arendt would nod, knowingly.) 
Only days after we’d met on that first Sunday, Pete contacted me and asked if I’d 
like to do a “one-to-one.”  (Or more exactly:  Pete contacted a mutual acquaintance, who 
contacted me.  It’s all about the relationships.)  A one-to-one, I knew from Nickia’s notes 
in her copy of Chambers, was “the bread and butter of organizing,” the basis of any 
public relationship.  It’s a short meeting, meant “to focus deliberately on another person, 
to seek out their talent, [self-]interest, energy, and vision,” and to determine if that person 
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is worth developing as a leader in your organization.98  Pete asked me incisive, 
increasingly hard questions, and he listened and responded empathetically to my answers.  
We talked about, well, a lot of the stuff I’ve written about in this book:  about my feelings 
of detachment as an academic, about my cyberpunk desire to stay detached and feel like I 
have (at least the potential for) infinite understanding of the world, and about my 
simultaneous frustration that I didn’t have a place, a path, and a way to act.  Basically, we 
talked about loneliness.   
We ended and agreed to meet again.  We kept meeting, and I kept going to Spirit 
of Truth.  Before long, I’d learned a lot more about organizing and met a lot of really 
interesting people and started feeling like I actually had a home and a context in the Twin 
Cities.  And then, a few months after our first one-to-one, Pete asked me to go to 
weeklong.  (In organizer-speak, I would learn at weeklong, what Pete did was proposition 
me, according to a time-honored five-point process:  he came in with a plan, he made a 
specific ask of me, he shared with me his vision of me and told me how going to 
weeklong would help me get there, he pledged to partner with me as a mentor through 
the process, and he pushed me, gently but firmly, for a commitment.)  I took a few days to 
think it over, but of course I said yes.  We met more times, we talked through the basic 
concepts of power and self-interest and my ongoing journey toward understanding my 
own.  As the date approached, we also talked about my fears.  These fears were mostly 
about not being good enough, not being “truly oppressed” enough, not being 
institutionally-connected enough, and of course, about being called out.   
                                                
98 Chambers, Roots for Radicals, 44-54. 
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Before I left, Pete left me with one last piece of wisdom:  what he called the 
“three kinds of people who go to weeklong.”  Most people, he said, were people like me, 
new leaders looking to find our “path to power.”  But there were also two other types—
people who, as I see it now, couldn’t or wouldn’t push their habitus out of the service 
frame and into the agency frame:  “victims,” who would dwell on their own suffering 
rather than look for ways to build power and overcome it (what Augusto Boal called the 
depressed rather than the oppressed), and “caretakers,” who would dwell on the victims’ 
suffering, and their own relative privilege, rather than look for ways for either/both of 
them to build power and overcome it.  Pete said I would be tempted to be a caretaker:  to 
be so overwhelmed by the stories of people’s sufferings, people who had lived lives very 
different from mine, that I’d forget about my own self-interest and pursuit of power.  I 
told him I’d try hard not to.      
When I pulled up to the dorm at Ohio Dominican University where I’d be staying, 
I was nervous.  The immediate cause of my nervousness, if I’m going to be honest, was 
the handful of poor- and urban-looking black folks I saw unloading their cars and moving 
into the dorm with me.  They are all going to call me out, I kept thinking.  I am so 
privileged, and so out of place, and they are going to call me out, and it’s going to feel 
bad and really uncomfortable.  Those were my conscious thoughts, anyway.  What 
unconscious thoughts and feelings lurked beneath, I cannot say.  I imagine I was a little 
like Dewey Burton opposing busing:  dealing with a combination of ingrained white 
racism and a fear of loneliness, of losing my place.  In my case, that meant losing my 
place as a respected intellectual and teacher whose thoughts mattered, here where I knew 
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no one and all my book-learning and formal credentials would be called into question.  
There’s a reason, I realize only now, why I brought my tattered tan professor’s jacket 
along and wore it compulsively for the first few days. 
I needn’t have worried so much.  By the end of the first night I felt better.  
Comfortable, even.  I moved in, had dinner, went to the first session, and talked into the 
night with people I’d just met.  In that first session, we were asked to tell the story of 
what our grandparents wanted for us and our parents and what that means for us.  “What 
makes organizing powerful is our stories,” explained Trevelle Harp, executive director of 
the Northeast Ohio Alliance for Hope (NOAH) and our first trainer.  He ended the 
session by observing that “these stories,” about jobs and access and immigration and the 
American Dream, “are all the same.”  I wrote in my journal that night:   
Wonderful to be here….Rather scared and shy coming in, as always, or at least as 
usual.  Puttered around the dorm, putting things in order.  But got a chance to talk 
with [my roommate, a young fresh-out-of-Northwestern organizer from 
Cleveland] a little bit…we had dinner together and realized we had a great deal in 
common.  First session (intros) felt a little awkward and over-long, and honestly I 
was disappointed not to be agitated by Trevelle….I thought I sounded quiet and 
unconfident and noncommittal, but Genevieve [another trainee] later said the 
passion was clear….Great people.  Loud.  Assertive.  So much easier to talk 
across racial divide than I thought, at least so far….Lots of war stories from 
many.99  
 
Weeklong is basically organic intellectual boot camp.  It’s a tightly-packed week, 
five days with six to nine hours of training per day, conducted by experienced organizers 
flown in from across the country, who themselves have been prepared through an 
                                                
99 My account of weeklong comes from extensive notes I kept throughout, as well as a nightly journal.  
These are my sources for the description below.  Quotations from my journal are direct, save the odd 
corrected typo.  Quotations from trainers and trainees—in quotation marks—are exact or close to it:  I 
wrote them down, in the moment.  Everything else, not in quotation marks, is my paraphrasing. 
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intensive process of training and evaluation.100  There’s a ton of information and skills to 
learn—how to do one-to-ones, how to be a leader and build a following, how to 
proposition and develop new leaders, how to define (“cut”) issues and build strategic 
actions and campaigns, how to raise money, and how to run effective meetings.  But the 
main point isn’t to learn these facts and skills.  The real point, the thing you go to 
weeklong for and (if it works) keep for the rest of your life, is to change your habitus.101  
To turn you from a well-meaning but powerless do-gooder into a strong, grounded, 
power-seeking and ultimately powerful leader.  (Weeklong exists to train the new 
leaders—both paid staff organizers and volunteer leaders—that its sponsoring 
                                                
100 Having later lived with a full-time organizer who ran sessions at weeklong, I’ve gotten to see some of 
the “back end” of the process.  Behind the weeklong trainings lies a whole other series of “train the trainer” 
events, where experienced trainers train new trainers in the delicate art of agitational training (about which 
more below).  And each weeklong training session is evaluated by at least one (usually more like three) 
other organizers who sit in the back of the room, observe, and debrief with the trainer afterwards. 
101 This is my language, not theirs:  while many organizers read Arendt, I don’t know many who read 
Bourdieu.  But Bourdieu offers the best description of what they’re doing.  (One of the implicit arguments 
of this book, as you might have noticed, is that organizers, and especially organic intellectuals, would do 
well to spend some more time with Bourdieu.  Bourdieu, an organic intellectual himself with ties to the 
French Communist Party among other organizations, would have no doubt agreed.)  Weeklong is a clear 
example of what Bourdieu called a “rite of institution,” an “act of social magic” that makes mere mortals 
into organizers, just as hazing makes them into fraternity brothers, and residency turns them into doctors.  
These kind of experiences are intentionally intense, and even somewhat painful:  the point is to change 
your habitus, both by developing new “durable dispositions”—new moves, new interpretive strategies, new 
ways it feels right to act and be in the world—and by cultivating loyalty to the institution to which you 
have given so much intense time and labor.  One of the reasons organizers have stayed away from 
Bourdieu, I imagine—besides the fact that his writing style is dense to the point of impenetrability (just ask 
my poor students)—is that he talks only about the “bad” side of rites of institution.  As Harry Boyte once 
said to me:  “There’s not much agency in Bourdieu.”  Indeed, all the examples he gives are about how rites 
of institution take agency away from underprivileged people and reinforce structural inequality:  by the 
time and labor and money and connections (fiscal and cultural capital) needed to access them (med school 
is expensive…as are unpaid internships), and by the “naturalness” they confer on the people that hold 
positions of authority (you try and see if your underprivileged and –trained body is able to perform brain 
surgery, or conduct international diplomatic negotiation!).  These things are true and important.  At the 
same time, I want to argue, we can and should use Bourdieu’s analysis to understand other rites of 
institution, such as weeklong, that confer agency on underprivileged people, and start to undermine 
structural inequality.  See Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 117-126, especially 123.     
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organizations need to sustain themselves.)102  One participant in Texas explained:  
“National training is so intense it serves to break down your old picture and get a new 
one as a whole.”103  The trainers’ agenda, above all, is to put us, in the words of my 
fellow trainee from this chapter’s epigram, into a “new arena,” where we “don’t know 
what to feel”—and then to teach us what and how to feel, from the ground up.   
Their primary tool in this habitus-changing work was agitation, another term of 
art among organizers.  In the words of Paul Marincel (Pete’s father), the founder of 
ISAIAH, who trained us in agitation in Ohio, agitation is the act of “holding up a mirror.”  
Specifically, holding up a mirror in front of a colleague, someone you care about, and 
someone whose growth and development is in your own self-interest.  The goal is 
“breaking down the bubble” and getting that colleague more in touch with his or her own 
self-interest.  Like a proposition, it’s a strategic and planned piece of rhetoric, with a 
standard structure.  You present the colleague with three judgments and a proposition:  
(1) where s/he is now, (2) where s/he could be, (3) what’s in the way, and finally (4) what 
you think s/he should do.  Then you let the colleague respond and “own it”—including 
the decision either to accept or to reject your agitation.104 
                                                
102 “While Alinsky had many strengths,” Gecan recalled, “he did not create organizations that endured.”  It 
was Chambers who, in the late 1960s, “realized that we would burn ourselves out if things kept on like 
this”; he called Alinsky and insisted (as he remembers it):  “‘Saul, I’m returning to Chicago to set up the 
IAF Training Institute.  We need more organizers.  I’m thirty-seven now and I’ll burn out if we don’t do 
this.’  There was silence.  I explained a little more.  Still silence.  Then he asked, ‘Who is going to pay 
you?’  ‘You are,’ I answered.”  Thus—combined with a well-timed $250,000 grant from the founder of 
Midas Mufflers (you can’t make this stuff up) and a foundation matching grant—was weeklong born.  See 
Gecan, Going Public, 9; and Chambers, Roots for Radicals, 101. 
103 Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 226. 
104 Paul started the session, after a revealing opening story about his own self-interest (his young adult 
children, whom he’s worried won’t have the opportunity to succeed the way he has, as he’d always 
assumed), the way he sees it relating to some of the issues people in the room in Ohio are dealing with 
(especially around felons losing their citizenship), and some of his own questions and concerns about 
organizing (“we’re doing a lot of organizing but losing a lot of things”), by agitating several people around 
   291 
 
Agitation is the Alinskyan answer to the call-out.  A call-out is individualistic, 
competitive, and zero-sum:  the caller-out increases his or her cultural capital, by proving 
s/he’s right, at the expense of the called-out, who has been proven wrong.  A culture of 
call-outs tends to decrease trust and increase suspicion, as participants censor themselves 
for fear of being called out.  Agitation, when it’s done right, is the opposite.  It’s 
nurturing and collaborative, born out of working together toward the same goal, and it 
lets agitator and agitated increase their cultural capital together, as well as the cultural 
capital of their organization as a whole.  It is a public act of love, and it builds trusting 
relationships.   
It is also dangerous.  A bad agitation—poorly planned, timed, and/or executed—
can hurt a working relationship or even end a friendship.  I’ve seen both.  Paul warned us, 
rightly, against doing unplanned agitations:  “random = reckless.”  A queer feminist 
organizer friend took this warning much further, suggesting to me, seriously and with 
good reason, that people who do agitations should be required to get S&M training.   
                                                                                                                                            
the question:  “It’s Thursday afternoon—time to start making choices about ourselves.  What are we 
wrestling with, about ourselves, in terms of building more power around ourselves?  To deal with things 
you care about in the world?”  After several agitations, he stepped back and took us through the above 
description and instructions.  Finally, he gave us time to prepare our own agitations—of other people in the 
room (whom we’d been getting to know for the past four days)—and then asked some of us to share.  I 
volunteered, and he chose me first.  My agitation was of Zach:  my roommate, whom I’d also done a formal 
one-to-one with.  I told him he was a brilliant, young organizer who was coming into a new community 
with the potential to bridge several worlds and draw on his experience with various other cultures; he could 
be a loud, articulate voice for African-American youth in the larger world, expanding NOAH (the 
Cleveland organization where he’d just started working) in totally new ways; and what was in his way was 
his lack of confidence and assuredness, his feeling like because he was new he didn’t belong, and he didn’t 
exactly “know his place.”  Zach accepted the agitation and—he told me later—he took it very much to 
heart.  From my journal:  “Tears nearly came to his eyes—in a good, productive way.  Paul’s one criticism:  
I didn’t push him enough on turning the idea of loneliness (which Zach said he thought people in the least 
privileged areas felt, and I got him to agree that he felt it too) into building public life and power.  I said 
that was significant [that that was the one place I didn’t push Zach enough], because that’s right where my 
own self-interest is too.  [Paul] said, ‘yes, I know.’”   
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It is the practice of agitation, more than even the jam-packed schedule, that gives 
weeklong its reputation for intensity.  Most of the sessions at weeklong are agitational 
trainings:  they combine the Socratic method (the trainer asks people questions to elicit a 
specific answer) with frequent agitations (in public, during the session, in front of 
everyone else).  Everything at weeklong is set up with agitation in mind.  The training 
room was set up in a U shape, with the top facing the front of the room, so a trainer could 
easily get face-to-face with anyone at any time.  Most trainers, like most organizers in 
general, prefer a humble flip-chart to PowerPoints and other fancier visuals.  The 
unspoken logic is simple:  all the focus should be on the people and their relationships.  
When eyes are on a screen, they’re not on each other.   
To come to weeklong is to ask to be agitated:  it is, as per the S&M comment, to 
give tacit consent.  This is one of the reasons weeklong attendees have sponsors (like Pete 
for me), organizers from home who proposition them to go when they’re ready and then 
counsel them through the process.  By the time I got to Ohio, I knew what I was in for.  If 
anything I left feeling disappointed—on the first night, as my journal indicates, and also 
for the rest of the week—that I didn’t get agitated more.105  But I’d be lying, of course, if 
I said I wasn’t nervous about it.   
                                                
105 In retrospect, I realize I might not have been agitated more because I wasn’t involved with an OOC or 
ISAIAH organizing campaign.  Organizing, as we were taught and trained, is all about working in your 
self-interest; and weeklong exists because of these organizations’ self-interest in developing new leaders; 
so it might just not have been directly in these trainers’ self-interest to agitate me—at least not as much as it 
was in their self-interest to agitate leaders from their own organizations and campaigns, whom they were 
looking to develop for immediate purposes in the immediate future.  I’ve heard similar reports from 
colleagues who have been to other weeklong trainings:  trainers, who are also active organizers actively 
working on campaigns, are looking to get specific things from specific people, and they will often use 
weeklong as a means to get it.  (We witnessed at least one “real-life” proposition in our training, when Lisa 
Amman, leader organizer of ISAIAH, propositioned a trainee into taking on a new and bigger role in the 
campaign she was working on.)  I am not ready to condemn or call-out this approach.  It certainly 
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Judging from the faces and body language of my fellow trainees, as we all filed in 
and took our seats on Monday morning, I wasn’t alone.  This was the Thucydides session, 
the most written-about moment in weeklong.  It’s the most distinctive (it’s really unlike 
anything anywhere else), it’s the most consistent (everyone’s been doing it pretty much 
the same way since Alinsky and Chambers invented it in the late ‘60s), and it’s by far the 
most dramatic.106  Before coming to Ohio, we’d been sent a five page-long excerpt of The 
History of the Peloponnesian War, which we were told to read before arriving at 
weeklong—without further explanation.  (Many of us, on Sunday night, speculated about 
what we’d be doing with it and why it might be relevant.)  Those five pages told the story 
of the moment in the war after the Athenians had conquered the small island of Melos 
and were bargaining with its inhabitants, the Melians, for their lives.   
As Wikipedia summarizes:   
The Athenians demanded that the Melians surrender their city and pay them 
tribute or face the destruction of their city. The Melians claimed their right to 
remain neutral, appealing to the Athenians’ sense of decency and mercy toward a 
small, peaceful, and defenseless city. The Athenians sternly replied that questions 
of justice did not arise between unequal powers and proceeded to lay siege to 
Melos as they had threatened to do, and to starve the resisting inhabitants into 
surrender, slaughter the men of military age, and enslave the women and 
children.107 
 
At the start of the session, Trevelle (our trainer once again) asked for eight 
volunteers to come to the front of the room.  He sat them in two columns of four, facing 
each other; he assigned one side to be the Athenians and the other to be the Melians; and 
                                                                                                                                            
demonstrates organizers’ commitment to the principles they are training us in.  At the same time, for 
someone like me, it was still frustrating. 
106 See Boyte, CommonWealth, 48-49; Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 223; Gecan, Going Public, 36.  
107 “Melian Dialogue,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melian_dialogue (January 14, 2014). 
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he told them to re-enact the debate.  On the flip chart he had written:  “One rule:  I will 
interrupt!”  And interrupt he did.  First he asked people to switch sides.  Then he started 
subbing people in and out.  Then he started asking some people, who had previously been 
in the debate, to leave the room.  Finally, he told everyone who remained in the room to 
be the Melians, reacting and debating with him.  At some point he asked me to leave the 
room at some point—and I did.  (Those of us outside started planning a direct action, 
where we’d burst back into the room brandishing some coat-hangers we found as 
weapons, but Trevelle called us back in before we could carry it out.) 
Then, with all of us back in the room, came the first agitation:  “Why did you 
leave?”  All the typical responses followed:  because you told us to, because you were the 
authority, because we trusted you, because we’ve been trained to do what we’re told, etc.  
Trevelle pushed the point:  “The authority in the room wants you to leave—do you?  The 
way people act in situations like this is like the way people act in the public arena—do 
you agree?”  He followed these provocative questions, typically, with a personal story:  
he had grown up “very churched,” he wanted to be the “best Christian,” which he thought 
meant being passive and letting people walk all over him and not wanting power.  The 
point was, yes he was agitating us, but he understood where we were.  We were in this 
together.  He asked for other, similar stories from us.  (One woman volunteered a 
powerful story of abuse.)  He asked us:  “What were the obstacles for your taking power 
earlier?  How many people here want to be accepted?  What’re you going to do    when 
you get out of here?  Where are you going to take this training? 
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After some back-and-forth with several people, he turned his attention to the role-
play.  “If you were a Melian not in the room, how would you feel, when a few other 
people were making life and death decisions for you?  Why didn’t the Melians sitting in 
the room [in the audience] ask their representatives to caucus?”  We didn’t, of course, 
because we didn’t think of it.  (Someone said, “We could have done that?!”  Trevelle 
reminded us there was just one rule—“I will interrupt!—otherwise, all was fair game.  A 
couple of others asked about the historical context, the differences between then and now.  
Trevelle responded sharply:  John Kasich, the union-killing governor of Ohio, is “our 
representative.”  Is he representing you?)  The point was:  we didn’t think of all this 
because we weren’t disposed to think of it.  We were disposed to try to win the debate, 
and to side with the Melians, who were more morally righteous…which just felt right.  
Just as Trevelle—and Alinsky—knew it would.108 
                                                
108 All of this, like so many of the sessions at weeklong, has a deep history.  (“Organizing,” for better and 
worse, is a culture all its own, with fiercely guarded mores and dispositions and traditions.)  Alinsky 
originally chose the Melian dialogue as a training document to demonstrate to the children of 1968 the 
difference between “abstract ideals and power politics”—and above all, “to shock the new trainees.  Shock 
them it did.  Alinsky’s recruits came to the field of community organizing out of a range of settings—civil 
rights, religious activism, student involvement, and other causes—flushed with zeal to advocate the cause 
of the powerless and the poor.  The eager students would, of course, side with the Melians.  They suggested 
‘better arguments’ the Melians might have advanced.  They speculated that the islanders may have lost at 
the moment but ‘won’ in some sense as lasting martyrs to the cause of liberty.  And, inevitably when asked, 
they would argue with vehemence that the Melians had ‘done the right thing’ in defending their autonomy 
and principles even at the cost of their lives.  When IAF teachers called them romantics, operating out of a 
perspective of ‘victims,’ they would be greeted with offended outrage.  Student outrage was precisely the 
expectation of the IAF educators.  Their use of Thucydides was a dramatic device to have students refocus 
from what Alinsky called ‘the world-as-we-would-like-it-to-be’ to the ‘world-as-it-is.’  Alinsky-style 
organizers drew from Thucydides’s story the lesson that the Melians’ ‘all or nothing’ approach failed to 
understand the process of conflict, power, self-change, self-interest, and negotiations that always is the 
medium for the expression of ideals in politics.”  When Chambers set up the permanent IAF Training 
Institute, he institutionalized the story’s use in the first session of every training.  See Boyte, 
CommonWealth, 48-49, 179n.  See also Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 223:  “The IAF believes that many 
people who get involved in social justice politics are too righteous and fail to understand that politics is 
about practical power.  In the story, the Melians heroically defend their liberty, refuse to give in to the 
Athenians, and are eventually slaughtered.  The point of the exercise is to show that negotiation and 
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Then came the big agitation:  Trevelle insisted it was the Athenians, not the 
Melians, whom we should be imitating.  Not that we should go around slaughtering 
people—the Alinskyan tradition has a tacit, though not an explicit, commitment to 
nonviolence109—but that we should operate in the “world-as-it-is”:  a world of power and 
                                                                                                                                            
compromise over interests, not the assertion of principles, constitute the essence of politics, and 
consequently the basis for IAF political activity.” 
109 Alinsky himself, it’s worth noting, never ruled out violence as a possibility.  “The radical may resort to 
the sword but when he does he is not filled with hatred against those individuals whom he attacks” 
(Reveille for Radicals, 18).  That being said, I have never heard of any contemporary organizing network 
planning an action that includes intentional violence, nor do I imagine most organizers I know being 
comfortable with that kind of action.  Nonetheless, it’s important to note that unlike a lot of other “radical” 
political traditions, Alinskyan organizers don’t hold up nonviolence as a principle.  At a national ELCA 
gathering I attended through Spirit of Truth, I once agitated a Lutheran pastor about his requirement that 
congregations he worked with engage in “nonviolent” community action.  Why call it “nonviolent,” I asked 
him?  Did he really think his white, middle-class parishioners in the Pacific Northwest were likely to go out 
and hurt people?  He agreed that was unlikely.  That being the case, I suggested, the “nonviolent” label 
might be doing something else:  it might be suggesting that it’s not important to take power and 
effectiveness of their actions seriously, that as long as they were being nonviolent, they were doing the most 
important work.  It was an argument rooted in the work of linguist H. Paul Grice:  by flouting what Grice 
called the “maxim of quantity”—it was unnecessary to specify that actions should be nonviolent—the 
pastor was actually conveying other meanings.  (The pastor told me he heard what I was saying, that he’d 
never thought of it that way before, and that he’d think more about it.)  The same is true in a lot of para-
academic spaces (meetings, actions, performance venues) that go out of their way to label themselves as 
“nonviolent,” “safe,” “anti-oppressive,” etc.—as if violence, danger, and oppression might otherwise have 
been thought to be acceptable while having lunch at the Hard Times Café.  These labels appear to have two 
functions.  First, they define an in-group, the interpretive community that “nods” when they see these kind 
of labels and knows what they really mean—namely, that it’ll be a space where people talk, dress, move, 
think, and act in certain predictable, Graeber-ish ways.  Second, as with the pastor, they suggest to 
participants that they are doing the work simply by being in these spaces and being “nonviolent,” and 
calling out  others when they are not—and in this way, they perpetuate the anarcho-liberal resistance to 
agency.  Getting back to the point about Alinskyan organizers:  it’s not just that they don’t hold up 
nonviolence as a principle; it’s that they don’t hold up non- or anti-anything as a principle.  This is what 
Alinsky and others mean when they call their work “non-ideological”:  not that they don’t work from clear 
positions or values (they clearly do), but that they don’t define their positions in terms of being for or 
against a given abstract concept or –ism.  They define their work, rather, in terms of people, and 
communities, and organizations, and campaigns with specific material goals.  (They have this in common 
with the mob.  Which is not an idle comparison:  Alinsky studied Mafia organizing techniques extensively, 
and personally.)  This, as opposed to para-academic interpretive communities like Pedagogy and Theatre of 
the Oppressed, where being anti-isms is the given justification for pretty much everything.  See, for 
instance, critical pedagogue Elizabeth Ellsworth’s well-known description of “the actual political agendas I 
assume such [‘critical’ academic] writers share with me—namely, antiracism, antisexism, anti-elitism, anti-
heterosexism, anti-ableism, anticlassism, and anti-neoconservatism.”  See H. Paul Grice, “Logic and 
Conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics 3:  Speech Acts, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (New York:  
Academic Press, 1975):  41-58.; and Elizabeth Ellsworth, “Why Doesn’t This Feel Empowering?  Working 
Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy,” Harvard Educational Review 59, no. 3 (August 
1989):  297-324, 300. 
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negotiation, not the self-righteous defense of hopeless, abstract principles.  That’s what 
the Athenians did.  They lived in the “real world,” they did a realistic power analysis, 
they acted based on the power they had, they understood their self-interest and that of the 
Melians, and they were ready to accept compromise.  The Melians, on the other hand, 
lived in the “world-as-it-should-be”:  a dream world, where the right argument wins and 
justice prevails and power is unimportant and we all love and include each other and 
everyone has universal health care—Trevelle explained, as he literally pranced around 
the room.  They lived, as the bumper-sticker says, “as if the revolution already 
happened.”  And as a result, they got slaughtered.  “There’s no Melians alive today—
period.”   
The takeaway point:  we need power.  We need to build power.110  “Raise your 
hand if you want power,” Trevelle said—and then agitated people.  The point of this 
training, he told us, was “to change behaviors that keep us powerless.”  He asked us 
“where does power come from?” and elicited all the normal answers—the soul, etc.—
before handing us the formula:  organized people and organized money.  “Period.”111 
                                                
110 “Staff work hard to promote a positive understanding of power within organizational culture,” Wood 
observes, “initially by undermining the negative connotations of the term.”  Trevelle concurred:  “The 
problem with power is that it is often used against us, unilaterally, by people who are over us.  We then 
associate power with negative forces, institutions, hostile individuals, and then think of power as something 
negative and destructive.”  Organizers insist that power it is just the same as the Spanish verb poder, the 
verb meaning “can.”  As in “Sí, se puede!,” the original “Yes, we can!”  There is discrepancy among 
organizers, and among the major organizing networks, about the different types of power:  first, about 
whether all power is the same, or whether (as theologian Bernard Loomer would have it) there were 
“unilateral” (power-over) and “relational” (power-with) types, and second, if so, whether we are only 
looking to build “relational” power (as Trevelle instructed us) or whether we are looking to build both 
kinds, for use in different situations.  See Wood, Faith in Action, 189; Chambers, Roots for Radicals, 28; 
Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 68. 
111 Like many organizers, especially when teaching new recruits at weeklong, Trevelle did not accept 
“organized ideas” as a form of power.  Knowledge isn’t power, he said, but it can help you build power.  
Power, he continued, is not about having a Ph.D., or about “that quaint phrase ‘empowerment.’”  Agreed.  
At the same time, as Boyte argues, the people-plus-money formula “fails to acknowledge power based on 
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I left feeling shaken up.  I was feeling compelled to call out the pedagogy of this 
session; thankfully, I saved it for my journal that night:  “I’m still not convinced by the 
Melian dialogue thing—the role-play was fine and good, but the dismissing people from 
the room thing is contrived.  First of all, the roles were not clearly defined—and 
especially not the role of the trainer.  I see the point, but it feels unnecessarily 
manipulative.”  Manipulative it certainly was; it was a setup.  We had come to weeklong 
to learn from our trainers.  To question them, sure, but not to be openly insubordinate.  
We were put in a situation where we couldn’t but fail.  But of course, this was probably 
part of the exercise.  Maybe it took that kind of failure, that kind of humiliation and 
powerlessness, to put us in the proper position to learn such a radical, habitus-altering 
truth about power.112  This was high-risk pedagogy, which requires immense finesse.  
Trevelle was talented, but he was new; he hadn’t quite gotten it yet.   
What I deeply appreciated about him, though, was how diligently he agitated 
people by bringing them back to “where do you live?” and “how does this affect your 
community?”  Keeping it personal, I wrote in the margins of my notes, is a “way to get 
beyond rehearsed rhetoric.”  Later that week, Doran Schrantz, executive director of 
                                                                                                                                            
control over the flow of information, communications, professional practices, and cultural productions—
what might be called knowledge power.”  This knowledge power, based in organized ideas, is not the same 
as having the right answer and assuming it’ll set you free.  It’s about doing organizing—building new 
interpretive communities, including through organizing people and money the old fashioned way—in 
“institutions such as higher education and schools, entertainment and communications industries, 
professional associations, and the intellectual life of a society.”  See Boyte, “Reinventing Citizenship as 
Public Work,” 16. 
112 The pedagogy of weeklong—authoritarian as it sometimes seems—is very similar to Freire in its focus 
on what both Freire and IAF supervisor Ernesto Cortes call praxis:  “a more theoretically informed practice 
which, in turn, is consciously reflected upon” (Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 221).  Freire defines it as 
“action-reflection.”  Chambers talks about “research, action, evaluation.”  More on this in the next section.   
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ISAIAH, similarly agitated a trainee named Larry,113 who was having trouble 
propositioning people to contribute to his organization and explaining his problems with 
abstractions about “society.”  Doran responded:  “This isn’t about ‘society.’  It’s about 
Larry, and the people you care about….Larry, you are really wrestling with whether you 
deserve this.  You can talk about anything but yourself.” 
Doran was performing one of the two most common agitations at weeklong—get 
“clear” about your self-interest; the other is get “serious” about building power to 
realize that self-interest.  These two basic dispositions, getting “clear” about your self-
interest and getting “serious” about building power, are what many organizers call 
“countercultural.”  On a neoliberalism-dominated market, where acting on self-interest 
means buying the things we like and taking power means calling people out when the 
service is bad, we don’t have much opportunity to learn or practice these dispositions.  
And so we have a hard time with them.  Back in Chapter One, I argued that Thomas 
Frank’s Kansans weren’t acting against their interests; their interests, like everyone’s, is 
to feel right; and given the market they were on, the only way they were going to feel 
right was to vote Republican.  This is true—in the same way that it was in Larry’s self-
interest to bullshit about “society” and dodge his personal pain.   
But that can’t be all there is to self-interest.  Otherwise Larry wouldn’t be at 
weeklong, trying to figure out what his self-interest really is.  It’s easy to go through life 
assuming that our consumer-based self-interest is our real self-interest; we try not to think 
about the nagging feelings of loneliness and discontent in the back of our minds; and 
besides, who has the time, or the space, to think about it?  Weeklong, a free space, gives 
                                                
113 A pseudonym. 
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people this space and time.  We put down our lives for five days, all that labor that 
constitutes the “real world,” and focus on understanding our self-interest and our path to 
power.  Power, as we’ve seen, is hard.  Self-interest—finding out what makes us tick, 
what propels us to act as we do—is no easier.  Our self-interest, there in that room, was 
clearly not just in buying things or taking the easiest path.  We had come to weeklong; we 
were asking and paying people to agitate us, to make us deal with some of the hardest 
parts of our lives.  Even people like me, who could have a happy uncritical suburban 
white professional middle-class life if I wanted one. 
But I couldn’t, actually.  For entirely self-interested reasons.  I knew, deep down, 
that trying to live that way would make me feel awful, unfulfilled, worthless, lonely.  My 
desire to take a tougher, rougher path through life—to live in public, to build power and 
make change—is fundamentally not about helping anyone else.  I certainly want others to 
be helped along the way, of course, but I’m doing what I know I need to do for myself.  
That doesn’t make it bad, but it also doesn’t make it good.  It just is.  (A couple of years 
ago—I forget under what circumstances—I got agitated after I called someone out for 
being “apathetic.”  The people I think are “apathetic,” my agitator suggested, just have a 
different self-interest than I do; they don’t care about what I care about, or what I want 
them to care about.  Do I want to change what they care about?  Fine.  Then I’ve got to 
do the organizing work.)   
But why?  Why do I feel compelled to live this kind of life?  What, exactly, am I 
after?  That, figuring that out, was the central work of weeklong.  The only way to build 
power is to know one’s own self-interest, identify other people whose self-interests 
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overlap it (mostly through doing lots of one-to-ones), and work together with those 
people out of that mutual self-interest.  That’s how broad-based community organizers 
are able to build relationships across so many different divides (culture, class, race, 
religion, political party).114  Without this self-interest bond, the work will stop being 
about building power together and degenerate into service:  into helping, charity, 
sacrifice, privilege, abstractions, self-negation, incommensurable difference, 
misunderstanding, resentment, call-outs, burn-out, and protestations that the “real 
people,” the “truly oppressed,” the people it’s really about, were never in the room to 
begin with.  That is, it will turn into ineffectiveness and loneliness. 
The session on self-interest, on Monday afternoon, was appropriately hard.  Our 
trainer, David Kimball of the Center for Community Change in California, told us he 
would train us in telling our “public narrative” or “story of self”—a concept he told us 
came from the work of Marshall Ganz, the organizer and Harvard professor who had 
advised the 2008 Obama campaign.  He also threw in Arendt’s definition of self-interest, 
the standard among Alinskyans—“something which [in Latin] inter-est, which lies 
between people and therefore can relate and bind them together”—but there he didn’t cite 
his source.115  He was smart and talented, but he tried to do too much, too quickly:  
                                                
114 The annals of organizing are filled with unbelievable stories of coalitions between the least likely allies, 
who come together to do a project on some shared shred of self-interest they’d found.  Alinsky is an 
endless source of such examples:  the segregationist union leader who champions integration for fear of bad 
press coverage (which the organizer both engineers and then helps him avoid), the gambling-hall owner 
who becomes an extremely effective Delinquency Committee chairman after organizers find out what he 
really wants is for his two young daughters to respect their father (and help him make that happen), even 
the reluctant business leader who joins a local power organization because he was frustrated at (organizers 
intentionally staging situations where he would be) feeling left out of the conversation!  See Alinsky, 
Reveille for Radicals, especially 89-173. 
115 See Ganz, “What is Public Narrative?” and Arendt, The Human Condition, 182.  I was struck, 
throughout weeklong, by how rarely any trainers talked about the sources of the techniques and principles 
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Ganz’s concept of public narrative, plus Arendt’s concept of self-interest, plus the 
example of Obama’s 2004 convention speech, plus enough personal work-time to let us 
reduce our self-interest to a coherent two-minute talk, and then to further reduce them 
into a one- to two-sentence-long description.  All this, within a couple of hours.  I didn’t 
know what to do with myself.  One of the assistant trainers/evaluators called my two-
minute talk incoherent; I’m sure it was.116  (My journal reminds me that “I was crushed.  
Nearly cried.”)  On top of all this, my notes remind me that I was feeling ashamed, as an 
“overly educated privileged person…to be talking about my own self-interest….I didn’t 
think I had the right to tell my story, without a big history of oppression.”  (I was years 
away from understanding privilege as a form of oppression.) 
But that night, I started to get it.  We went to a session called “The Big Lie,” run 
by an evangelical pastor and Civil Rights historian from Cincinnati  named Troy Jackson.  
Troy was a newcomer to organizing who, he told me in a one-to-one, was skeptical of 
                                                                                                                                            
they were training us in.  Their understandings of self-interest and (recall from earlier) of power come 
directly from Arendt, yet her name didn’t get mentioned once.  Same with the names “Alinsky,” 
“Chambers,” and “Cortes.”  The “Alinskyan tradition” and “Alinskyans” are terms I use, but they don’t:  to 
hear them tell it, they’re just “organizers” doing “organizing.”  (They did talk about the Civil Rights 
Movement some, but it usually felt more like a pop-culture reference than an acknowledgement of a 
source.)  This feels like a legitimation issue:  they don’t want to get into critical, comparative discussions of 
different modes and models of organizing.  I can understand that.  Many of them, I’ve discovered in one-to-
ones, are quite interested in questioning the organizing model and exploring other models; weeklong, they 
might argue, just isn’t the place for it.  This is a training, and the point is to develop a habitus uniform 
enough to work off of shared dispositions.  So they just insist this is how organizing is.  Warren elaborates:  
“While issues are always negotiable in the IAF, the network’s principles of organizing are not.  IAF 
participants do not discuss these principles; they are trained in them.  Unity on these principles is inherent 
in the IAF’s notion of leadership development.  Development means learning these principles, which are 
simply considered the correct way to do organizing.  These principles are skills to be learned, not political 
alternatives to be debated.”  (See the last section of this chapter for a more detailed discussion of the 
teaching techniques of weeklong and their implications.)  I do worry, though, that this closed-mindedness 
can seep into organizers’ and trainers’ own habitus and spill over from instrumental into real. Then again, 
maybe my academic habitus is making too much of this; a friend and colleague of mine once suggested that 
the biggest difference between academia and in the rest of the world is that in the rest of the world, you’re 
not expected to cite things.  See Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 235.   
116 I talked—or tried to talk—about my experiences trying to direct Assassins in high school; see the 
Prologue. 
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some of the Alinskyan orthodoxy.  This session, he told us, had its origins in something 
the black freedom movement learned from Gandhi:  “Any injustice,” Troy paraphrased, 
“involves a big lie, told often enough and in so many ways that people come to believe 
it’s true.”  Organizers asked themselves what the big lie was in the Jim Crow South, and 
they came up with:  “Some people are worth more than others.”  Segregation, they 
decided, was the clearest manifestation of this lie, and so they devised the bus boycotts 
and sit-ins as the “antidote” that would disprove that lie and move toward the truth.  (We 
would learn later in the week that there was also a strategic element to this choice.  
Segregation, organizers thought, was a particularly clear and winnable issue—so, in 
organizer-speak, they “cut” it out of the larger problem of Jim Crow.) 
Troy broke us into groups and asked us to state “the big lie in your community 
that everyone believes.”  The results were telling.  America is the land of the free.  We 
live in an equal-opportunity society.  The American Dream.  Anyone can do anything if 
they work hard enough.  I felt uneasy.  Something was wrong about all these.  I soon 
figured out what it was:  they were call-outs, big lies in reverse.  They expressed good 
things, which should be true but aren’t.  To denounce “some people are worth more than 
others” as a lie is to reaffirm your conviction that all people are worth the same—a basic 
article of faith for so many Americans, something people will fight to make real.  But to 
denounce “anyone can do anything if they work hard enough” as a lie is to reaffirm your 
conviction that…America is fundamentally corrupt and unequal?  Sure, but, where do 
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you go from there?  What shared tradition can you call upon to act?  Only the negative 
tradition shared oppression.  Which a lot fewer people will fight for.117   
This opportunity to think critically and analytically about rhetoric—that was 
something I knew how to do!—got me thinking about my own self-interest again.  Why 
did these call-outs bother me so much?  Finally, at the end of the session, I got it.  Troy 
had asked us:  “What are the lies that you’ve internalized, that get in your way?  That 
stop you from telling your story of self?”  I put my hand up.  From my journal that night:   
                                                
117 This is the big problem with two popular alternative forms of organizing:  the student-based New Left of 
the 1960s, and the “race-based” organizing practiced by groups like the Center for Third World Organizing 
(CTWO) and the now-defunct ACORN.  They don’t have much of a positive, shared tradition to draw on; 
they’re united only in the negative, by being oppressed by the same groups and wanting to call out that 
oppression.  The student radicals of the New Left “took the stance of detached social critics, outside 
American culture.  In The Port Huron Statement there is virtually no reference to American antecedents of 
its quest for ‘participatory democracy,’ no recitation of prior movements, or mention of the aspirations of 
those who had gone before….Critics who have pointed to the ineffectiveness of the New Left’s constant, 
interminable preoccupation with group process—consensus meetings, endless discussion, hostility toward 
formal leadership structures, and the like—have missed the point.  In the absence of genuine community, 
process itself necessarily became communal substance.  ‘Community Now,’ expressed in events like ‘love-
ins’ (and echoing ‘Peace Now,’ or ‘Power to the People’) was the spirit of the youth movement, 
substituting for long-term organizing campaigns.  Exhortation to ideals and feelings were the only form of 
power that existed” (Boyte, CommonWealth, 71, 73).  (This is the same amnesia toward American 
democratic traditions that explains a lot of the anti-American sentiment, and fetishism of European theory 
and Third World movements, that characterizes the still-dominant post-’68 tradition of academic theory.  
It’s a tradition that many of these same activists, who would soon “march on the English department” (in 
Todd Gitlin’s words), helped to create.)  Race-based organizing, likewise, “roots itself culturally in the 
racial identities of participants, appealing to potential participants as ‘people of color’…such a multiracial 
culture is a future ideal and a tentatively emerging reality within the organization; it is not a solidly 
established cultural reality in people’s lives, reinforced by a mutual commitment to a shared culture” 
(Wood, Faith in Action, 7, 98).  Both of these kinds of organizing are at least partially para-academic:  the 
New Left’s opposition to the “power elite” comes from 1950s sociologist C. Wright Mills; CTWO’s 
opposition to “the dominant society” and “the incarceration-industrial complex” comes from the anarcho-
liberal language of post-’68 theory (see Wood 91-95).  The major piece of academic theory to emerge from 
Third World organizing, Chela Sandoval’s Methodology of the Oppressed, is Althusserian to the core—and 
heartbreaking in its deft but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to wrench a tradition of agency out of a body 
of theory that opposes her at every turn.  (These two traditions speak a language that’s almost para-
academic; as a result, they get much more play in academia and para-academia—including on the news—
than the Alinskyan tradition does.)  This kind of all-negative tradition, Wood and Boyte both argue, is a 
thin foundation to build upon:  both traditions have had trouble building their base, expanding their 
membership, cultivating relationships with allies, and sustaining high-turnout actions and campaigns.  
Though to be fair, Boyte and Wood—and I—are all somewhat partial to the IAF tradition.  For a very well-
argued case from the perspective of CTWO, including some very valid critiques of Alinsky and the IAF, 
see Rinku Sen, Stir It Up:  Lessons in Community Organizing and Advocacy (San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass, 
2003), especially the Introduction (xliii-lxv); see also Chela Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed 
(Minneapolis, MN:  University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
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I’m glad I was able, in the evening session, to say it out loud and in public:  one 
Big Lie I am still working through is that, given my various whitenesses and 
privilegednesses (is there a better word for this?), my stories don’t matter and I 
should be ashamed in telling them, and [that] flagellating myself does someone 
good.  (Bill,118 sitting next to me, asked me what flagellating meant.  I told 
him…then started flagellating myself for using the word…then told him I was 
doing it.  (He told me not to.  Correct.)) 
 
“My self-interest,” I told Pete Marincel when we talked on the phone the next 
day, “is being valued, and not being de-valued.”  This came from a lot of deep places.  
From not having friends or people to talk to about the things I cared about, for so long.  
From getting censored and pretty harshly condescended to, just as I was developing an 
artistic voice as a teenager.  From working for years as a graduate assistant, where the 
pay’s not great and the chances for dignity are worse.  (“Oh, you’re just a student; none 
of the work you’re doing now matters.”  Not sure if anyone ever actually said that to me, 
but I certainly said it to myself a lot.)  It was my own personal way of expressing the 
universal, Arendtian self-interest:  to stop being lonely, by making a space where I can 
make things that matter with the people around me.   
I realized I got so worked-up about call-out culture because I feel like it was de-
valuing me, my stories, my experience, and my work.  Which is not okay.  The big lie 
was that privilege determines a person’s worth—in either direction; that people of 
different levels of privilege need to fight each other for recognition; and that somebody 
needs to get demeaned and de-valued in the process.  Those of us in “the movement” 
with significant privilege would never permit our less-privileged colleagues to be 
demeaned or de-valued.  We should extend the same respect and dignity to ourselves.  
                                                
118 A pseudonym, referring to a young black trainee who had earlier asked me to explain “capitalism” and 
“socialism,” and would later annihilate me at chess. 
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We are all working toward the same goal—making a world where all of us, our stories, 
our experience, and our work are valued.  Which means fighting the various organized 
money-interests that stop us from being valued.  And we are all bringing what capital we 
have, fiscal and cultural, to that fight.119 
Those lessons, about the nature of power and self-interest, were the biggest things 
I learned from weeklong.  The rest of the week was about how to implement those 
lessons, in terms of leadership, issues, actions, campaigns, and money.  This is important 
information, but it’s widely available elsewhere (especially in Chambers’s and Gecan’s 
books), so there’s no need to rehash it here.  The important point, for my argument, is 
that in good Alinskyan organizing, all of these practical matters (running the campaigns, 
winning the issues, raising the funds) go hand in hand with building a culture where 
everyone has dignity.120  This doesn’t always happen, of course, but it’s the goal—and at 
weeklong, it was happening quite a bit.  Even as I was going through days of painful 
soul-searching, I noted in my journal  
how not de-valued I feel here, as opposed to pretty much everywhere in my life 
except Appel Farm.  People actually respect me for being a teacher/“professor”—
including (especially?) poorer folks of color [some of whom, including Bill, had 
taken to calling me “the professor”…endearingly, I think].  A world of difference 
from PTO:  it is truly in my self-interest to be here and not there.  Just like I am 
                                                
119 Alinsky makes this point very clearly, even crudely, in his late-‘60s Afterword to Reveille for Radicals:  
“During the recent trial of Black Panther leader Huey Newton, many San Francisco white liberals wore 
large buttons reading ‘Honkies for Huey!’  Can you imagine if a white civil rights leader were on trial that 
blacks would go around with buttons reading ‘Niggers for ———!’  Of course not.  So long as mindless 
white masochism and unproductive, groveling guilt prevails, so long will there not be any meaningful 
communication or constructive positive changes for a world of equality” (215). 
120 Coles calls this “trickster politics”:  “a politics that one plays one game (e.g., interest-group coalition 
politics aimed at redistributions that address pressing issues) in order, more importantly, to enhance another 
one (e.g., building radical democratic relationships, counter-culture, and power).”  None of which is to say 
that winning the issues, the first game, isn’t important.  It is—both for itself, and because it is the only way 
to effectively play the second game.  This “trickster politics” is one of the biggest differences between 
work that builds power and agency, and work that provides services and help:  in service/help work, you’re 
only playing the first game, the redistribution game.  See Coles, “Of Tensions and Tricksters,” 547. 
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not interested in working with theory that necessitates my hating myself, nor am I 
interested in being in communities that necessitate my hating myself.121 
 
Like a kid with a new toy, for a while I thought I’d found the answer.  Surely if 
everyone—every idiot liberal, misguided conservative, surly pundit, Rush listener, 
academic and para-academic—went to weeklong, and got trained to understand their self-
interest and build power and became organizers that could change everything!   
Well yes, maybe it could.  But that won’t happen:  weeklong is a deeply 
interpersonal, resource-intensive process that could never be reproduced on a nationwide 
scale.  And even if it could, I’d still have my doubts.  Organizing has broken down so 
many walls and opened up so many new opportunities in my own life, and in the lives of 
so many other people—yet it is still limited, as public work.  For the volunteer “leaders” 
that do the bulk of the work, this public work is strictly separate from their “real” work.  
As fulfilling and exciting as it might be to work to build power in their own self-interest, 
they still have to set their self-interest down for eight (or more) hours every day and go 
earn a living in what is probably a very un-free space, where they are building power for 
someone else and keeping the cycle of consumption going.122   
                                                
121 To be clear:  these represent my feelings at a particular, euphoric moment.  It’s not meant to indict PTO, 
an organization and group of people I care about and respect.  I just felt its self-interest and mine starting to 
diverge—a divergence that’s continued over the years.  When I came back to Minneapolis and told Harry 
Boyte how different weeklong felt from the PTO conference I’d attended later that summer, how at 
weeklong I felt like we were all working together across differences toward the same goals, and without 
call-outs, Harry nodded, raised his eyebrow, and grinned:  “The working class doesn’t have much time for 
that.” 
122 Rinku Sen criticizes the Alinsky model for its distinction between paid organizers, who train and 
coordinate and stage-manage campaigns from behind, and at least historically have been mostly white 
(though this is changing); and volunteer leaders, who do a lot of the actual work and represent their 
community in public, and are primarily non-white.  This is a fair critique.  The unanswered question, 
though, remains:  where will the money come from to pay all of these leaders?  Especially in organizations 
like CTWO, which often reject partnerships (in mutual self-interest on given issues) with commercial 
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As for the paid staff organizers, they might make a wonderful free space for the 
volunteer leaders they recruit and train, but for themselves the space is often not so free.  
The work of a professional organizer is often “countercultural” in more ways than one.  
Despite the efforts of people like Chambers to reduce the “machismo style” of 
organizing—upping pay and job security, providing health benefits and sabbaticals, 
making the hours and working conditions more amenable to women and people with 
families—I have to agree with contemporary academic and organizer Romand Coles; 
there are still “elements of a certain ‘machismo’ that sometimes haunt organizing 
cultures.”123  It’s visible in a lot of small ways, such as a jock-like cultural market that 
values going to the bar with your fellow organizers—just organizers—and talking about 
organizing.  Sometimes about how drunk you got the other night, or all the people you’ve 
slept with lately, but mostly about organizing. 
Because organizing is the holy of holies.  There’s an unspoken feeling, among 
many organizers I know, that they’re the chosen ones.  That they’re the only ones doing 
real public work, that (with apologies to Eldridge Cleaver) you’re either part of “the 
movement” or part of “the System.”  This applies even to some of the most thoughtful 
and creative organizers out there—such as Ernesto Cortes, one of the IAF’s most 
important and visionary leaders (who apparently still argues with Chambers about who 
invented the one-to-one), who still falls right into the culture-war frame when he calls 
IAF organizations “monasteries of democracy, surviving the dark ages of a degraded 
                                                                                                                                            
businesses because they are deemed “not progressive”?  See Sen, Stir It Up, Introduction; and Wood, Faith 
in Action, 97. 
123 Chambers, Roots for Radicals, 104; Coles, “Of Tensions and Tricksters,” 556. 
   309 
 
culture.”124  This kind of medieval separatism may be hard to avoid in a profession that 
“has all the seriousness and craft of a highly skilled guild,” but it is still distressing to see 
so many organizers abandon the effort to change culture as a whole—to make the United 
States into something that we could proudly call a democracy.125   
Organizers, as a culture, have a certain “hardness” about them, a toughness, a 
Spartan-ness, even sometimes a tinge of sadomasochism.  They are people who will 
dedicate their lives to what Alinsky calls “an eternal war,” moving rapidly from one 
campaign to another, and often one organization to another, as political needs and 
funding opportunities dictate.126  They can talk with anyone—in the form of one-to-ones, 
propositions, and agitations—but often only about “hard” things like material power and 
self-interest.  They feel at home in contentious meetings and continual agitations and 
power struggles and late nights and unstable jobs and fluorescent-lit offices with bare 
walls and flip-chart paper strewn about everywhere—and often less at home in “softer” 
situations, based more in communality than conflict.  I’m not saying there’s anything 
wrong with all this.  I’m just saying it’s an ethos and an aesthetic, and ultimately a 
                                                
124 See Boyte, “Reinventing Citizenship,” 16.  Boyte elaborates, elsewhere:  “Every major organizing 
network has thus made a distinction between ‘building broad-based organizations,’ which they define as 
their aim, and ‘movements,’ which they equate with the protests of the late 1960s, ephemeral, thin, and 
transient. The contrast has had the effect of creating a sharp division between internal and external cultures 
that I have long observed, a sort of civic schizophrenia. Internally, leaders and organizers use a rich 
relational and value language full of democratic, communal, and religious allusions and references. But 
when they make public demands, their language is much sparser, expressed usually in the transactional 
politics of economic interests. Some have explained this by envisioning their organizations as ‘monasteries 
of democracy,’ surviving the Dark Age of a corrupt culture impervious to change.”  See Boyte, “Civic 
Agency and the Cult of the Expert,” 25. 
125 Boyte, CommonWealth, 189n. 
126 “A People’s Organization is dedicated to an eternal war.  It is a war against poverty, misery, 
delinquency, disease, injustice, hopelessness, despair, and unhappiness”—but a war nonetheless.  See 
Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, 133. 
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habitus, that’ll keep “organizing” accessible and attractive to only a certain, relatively 
small number of people.   
I’m not sure if I’m one of those people.  As this book makes clear, I have been 
deeply moved, and irrevocably changed (for the better), by my experiences going to 
weeklong and working as an organizer.  I’m just not convinced, given everything I’ve 
just described, that being a professional organizer is in my self-interest.  And so I’m left 
with a big question.  Here I am, with all these well-honed dispositions toward building 
power and understanding self-interest (both mine and others’), yet I don’t want to be an 
organizer.  So what do I do with them? 
I use them to do public work.  If not as an organizer per se—and who knows, 
maybe I’ll change my mind about that—then as an artist and/or a teacher, who happens to 
have an unusually sophisticated sense of the role power and self-interest play in this kind 
of work. 
In the last two sections of this chapter, I’ll explain how. 
  
Making Art:  The Dr. Evil Problem 
Scott Evil was having a rough day.  It wasn’t bad enough that he had to drag his 
father out of his underground lair.  Or that he had to show up to the therapy group, in a 
nice bright schoolroom filled with colorful happy people, with his father still dressed in a 
gray ‘60s-era World War III dinner jacket-qua-nuclear suit.  No, the worst part happened 
after they got there and sat down in the circle with all the other fathers and sons who were 
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working through their issues with each other; Scott kept trying to talk with the therapist, 
and his father just wouldn’t cooperate: 
SCOTT EVIL:  OK.  Well, I just really met my Dad for the first time three days 
ago.  He was partially frozen for thirty years.  I never knew him growing up.  He 
comes back and now he wants me to take over the family business. 
 
THERAPIST:  And how do you feel about that? 
 
SCOTT EVIL:  I don’t wanna take over the family business. 
 
DR. EVIL:  But Scott, who’s going to take over the world when I die? 
 
SCOTT EVIL:  Not me. 
 
THERAPIST:  What do you want to do, Scott? 
 
SCOTT EVIL:  I don’t know.  I was thinking, maybe I’d be a vet or something, 
cause I like animals and stuff. 
 
DR. EVIL:  An evil vet? 
 
SCOTT EVIL:  No.  Maybe, like, work in a petting zoo or something. 
 
DR. EVIL:  An evil petting zoo? 
 
SCOTT EVIL (shouting):  You always do that!127 
  
Evaluation of actions, successful and not, is a key organizing skill that we learned 
at weeklong.  (As the TakeAction Minnesota slogan goes:  if it’s worth doing, it’s worth 
evaluating.)  So how would I evaluate Dr. Evil’s attempt to move Scott into the evil-
doing business?   
                                                
127 Mike Myers, Austin Powers:  International Man of Mystery (1996), 
http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/Austin-Powers---International-Man-of-Mystery.html (January 15, 2014).  
Emphasis added, to match Mike Myers’s inflection.  The dialogue is slightly different in the final film, no 
doubt in part because of the improvisations the actors were constantly doing on set. 
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Well, we start with two people with differing self-interests.  Scott’s self-interest is 
working with animals.  Dr. Evil’s self-interest is doing evil.  Dr. Evil, we know, has built 
an organization out of his self-interest, which has grown powerful through building 
strong relationships (out of mutual self-interest) with terrorists, assassins, and henchmen 
from around the world.  But he is concerned that the organization is not developing 
enough new leadership.  So he decided to proposition his son to become a leader.   
The trouble is, while Dr. Evil is clear on his own self-interest, he is less clear on 
Scott’s.  (This is not surprising, given that they have only a three-day-long relationship, 
and their single attempt at a one-to-one was a dismal failure.  Had Dr. Evil gone to 
weeklong, he would have known this was an insufficient relational foundation for such an 
important proposition.)  He makes no attempt to understand or speak to Scott’s self-
interest, or to find places where their self-interests overlap; instead, he seems to assume 
that Scott shares his own self-interest, which he clearly does not.  For this reason, the 
proposition was unsuccessful. 
This is a common mistake, not limited to cinematic supervillains.  It’s easy to 
become so convinced of the universal rightness of the things we deeply care about—be 
they doing evil or doing good—that we forget to get clear on the self-interest of the 
people we’re working with.128  Or we forget about our own self-interest:  we get so 
                                                
128 In talking about self-interest in this context, I mean it in a broader, older sense than a lot of 
contemporary organizers (let alone economists) do.  I mean it in a populist and Popular Front sense, what a 
young Alinsky called the “habits, experiences, customs, controls, and values” of a culture.  I mean it in 
terms of the traditions that matter to us, that we’ve learned and that bring meaning to our lives, and in the 
deeds we imagine ourselves doing to achieve the greatness we see ourselves as having—as Alinsky writes:  
“Adolescent daydreams, whether they are of being a movie star, athletic hero, national political leader, or 
what, do not end with the days of adolescence; they only lessen in intensity.  These dreams express the 
inner yearnings of people who hunger for a place in the sun—preferably a good place.  They like to think of 
themselves as being admired or looked up to by others.  In their inner fantasies they are very brave and very 
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convinced of the universal rightness of the things we should deeply care about that we 
have trouble remembering or paying attention to the things we actually do.  Dr. Evil, in 
other words, can also live inside our heads—or more precisely, in our habitus.129   
I’ve seen this happen often in churches and synagogues.  It’s the difference 
between a congregation that puts shared traditions (ritual, spiritual conviction) and 
commitment to each other at the center of community life—and then decides together to 
work on an issue-campaign or raise money for a local organization as an extension and 
                                                                                                                                            
great people.”  (For this reason, it’s very important for organizers not to debunk these aspirational myths, or 
to confuse them with big lies.  They are very often self-objects; they are part of us, the part that we live for, 
our impetus to action beyond our narrowest material interests.  Going into a community of moderate, white 
Americans and calling-out the Founding Fathers for being racists makes about as much sense as going into 
a community of Orthodox Jews eating a ham sandwich—to use Alinsky’s favorite hypothetical.  Of course 
it’s your right to eat that sandwich, just as some of the Founding Fathers were racists, but it’s not going to 
get you anywhere in organizing the local community to pursue power and justice.)  The only reason public 
work is possible is because in every cultural tradition, however disparate, there are traces of the Arendtian 
impulse:  tendencies toward building free spaces and a broadly democratic (with a small d) culture.  Coles 
explains:  “In response to those who think that organizers must come into communities with an ethically 
and politically ‘correct’ vision, the IAF counters not with blind faith in the everyday traditions they find 
already in play, but a profound sense that the traditions of most communities have multiple sources 
(including traditions of radical democracy) that can be drawn upon to animate people to engage in more 
dialogical and receptive practices through which a democratically deeper and more plural ‘we’ can be 
engendered.”  Many contemporary organizers are trying to go back to this older, broader understanding of 
self-interest.  Ernesto Cortes, according to Evans and Boyte, “distinguished between ‘self-interest’ and 
‘narrow self-interest,’ or selfishness.  He argued that people’s basic concerns are not only financial or 
narrowly for themselves but also include communal ties such as the happiness of their families, the well-
being of their neighbors and friends, the vitality of their faith and their traditions, and their own feelings of 
dignity and self-worth.”  Self-interest includes living out your traditions, your convictions, and your faith, 
in public.  If organizing is to be public work—the collective production of free spaces, and of democratic 
culture in and through those free spaces—this broader, tradition-based understanding of self-interest is 
essential.  See Coles, “Of Tensions and Tricksters,” 552; Boyte, CommonWealth, 76-78; Alinsky, Reveille 
for Radicals, 115; Evans and Boyte, Free Spaces, 198. 
129 I’m intentionally riffing on Augusto Boal’s concept of “the cop in the head,” which he developed in 
exile, while working with the privileged folks of France and their (supposedly) first-world problems.  It’s 
Boal’s way of dealing with that subset of oppression called privilege.  The cop that objectively exploits you 
or hinders your pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person—stopping you from advocating for your 
dignity on the job, or working in solidarity with others whose dignity is being similarly compromised—
may be in your head now, but his barracks are outside.  In other words, no matter how subjective and 
internalized (including internalized as privilege) this oppression may feel, is still real, and still external to 
who you are, and still oppressing others in the same way.  For this reason, you can find mutual self-interest 
with others, including more and less severely oppressed others, in fighting this common oppressor.  Dr. 
Evil, I am suggesting, is one form of the cop in the head.  See Augusto Boal, The Rainbow of Desire, trans. 
Adrian Jackson (New York:  Routledge, 1995), especially 40-46 and 136-150. 
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expression of that community’s life—and a congregation that revolves around this kind 
of work, at the expense of the integrity of their traditions.  In this latter kind of 
congregation, Scott might say he wants to have a worship service (or community meal, or 
a movie night, or whatever) and Dr. Evil—in his head or elsewhere the congregation—
will interrupt:  “A social-justice worship service?”130 
In the first (not-so-)hypothetical congregation,131 the public work comes directly 
out of the same language, interpretive strategies, and dispositions that congregants share 
anyway, and that they have built together through a long history of collective work 
toward their common self-interest of building a committed religious community.  
Congregants who do public work, in this kind of community, are doing this work out of a 
deep commitment to tradition, ritual, faith, and maybe above all, to each other.  In the 
second congregation, the public work is the main language, interpretive strategy, and 
disposition that’s shared.  It’s done without building the necessary, deep foundation of 
ritual, relationships, and continual commitment—sometimes it’s even done at the expense 
of this kind of work (no time! the injustice is too pressing!).  The result is that the self-
                                                
130 Wood, in his comparative study of the faith-based (IAF-style) organizing network PICO and the race-
based CTWO, makes this argument in great detail.  Churches within the PICO network do often make 
intentional choices in their liturgy and core traditions that reflect their commitment to justice, but these 
changes “happen subtly rather than provocatively; little here makes traditionalists uncomfortable enough to 
leave the community.”  That’s the point:  to build and sustain a broad base, based not on a commitment to 
“justice” or “anti-oppression” in the abstract, but on the same shared faith values and traditions that 
congregants have always held—and then to slowly, relationally develop leaders who will express those 
values and traditions through the public work of organizing.  It’s members’ commitment to these long-held 
values and traditions and the community they’ve built around them, not a commitment to abstract concepts, 
that will “sustain participants in long-term political engagement.”  CTWO, on the other hand, has no such 
deep, shared traditions to organize around, and so they do try to organize people around abstract concepts:  
a shared (negative) experience of oppression by the “dominant culture,” and a shared (not-yet-existent) 
“multiculture” as “people of color.”  Wood argues this is one reason CTWO has been unable to build the 
kind of large, powerful organizations that PICO has.  See Wood, Faith in Action, 95-105, 120-121, 194, 
210.   
131 Of course, like any good Jew, I have two actual congregations in mind.  As per the old joke in the 
Chapter One footnote, I have the synagogue I go to, and the one I’d never set foot in! 
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interest of participants is not clear, including, often, to themselves—this is where 
white/liberal/privilege-based guilt often seeps in—and the public work is likely to come 
and go in spurts, to remain shallow and unsustainable. 
The specter of Dr. Evil haunts all public work, or work with the potential to be 
public.  He haunts faith-based organizing, as we’ve just seen.  He haunts teaching, as 
we’ll see later.  He haunts academic research, too, turning so many promising books and 
articles—with the potential to be useful organizing strategy, influential works of art, 
and/or great teaching tools—into slavish exercises in proving why Foucault (or another 
big-name theorist who has no relationship with the things or people being discussed) was 
right.132   
But most often, I’ve met Dr. Evil in the arts.  Especially in the theater, probably 
my greatest love.133  When I was twenty, I founded a theater company, and poured my 
life into it for a year, raising funds, securing space, and mounting seven productions 
                                                
132 As I discussed in the Prologue, I have been trying to model a different kind of scholarship, in this book:  
one that’s based in the Freirean/Alinskyan idea of praxis, of doing actions and reflecting on them, and then 
acting on those reflections, etc.  I have tried to introduce “theoretical” writers, like everyone else I write 
about, in the context of situations they were/are actually involved in:  Halberstam and Latour in the context 
of academia, Freire and Boal in the context of PTO, Alinsky and Arendt and Gramsci in the context of 
organizing, and so on.  The major exceptions to this rule, I think, are Fish and Bourdieu:  I introduced them 
in Chapter One as a frame, and I’ve tried to describe their ideas in enough detail—and then refer back them 
enough—that they become a sort of “native language” for this book.  After a while, I hope, “habitus” and 
“cultural capital” and “interpretive community” start sounding less like theory-with-a-capital-T, attached to 
a Big Name, and more like theory-with-a-small-t, one half of praxis, part of the way we can work through 
and understand whatever we’re studying.  This is a model I’ve developed and used in the classroom for 
many years; this book is my first major attempt at using it in a piece of writing.  It is, no doubt, imperfect. 
133 “Love,” in this case, feels like a much more accurate description than “self-interest.”  It harkens back to 
the older, broader populist definition of self-interest—see my previous note.  It also resonates with the 
quote from theologian Frederick Buechner that Troy Jackson (the pastor and “big lie” trainer) paraphrased 
to us at one of the last sessions of weeklong:  “The place God calls you to is where your deep gladness and 
the world’s deep hunger meet.”  The accident of this love (or “deep gladness”), which has drawn me to 
make theater above all else, also explains why I focus on theater in this section—a decision bolstered by 
Arendt’s convenient conviction that “the theater is the political art par excellence; only there is the political 
sphere of human life transposed into art.  By the same token, it is the only art whose sole subject is man in 
his relationship to others” (Human Condition, 188). 
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within a single year, including two musicals and several original works.  When I was 
twenty-one, it died an awful death, of betrayal and apathy.  I was plunged into deep, 
existential doubt.  I didn’t direct anything again for years.  What’s the point? I asked 
myself.  Why make theater at all?  What good is it doing in the world?  When I had my 
company, I didn’t have these same doubts, or at least they didn’t stop me from doing the 
work.  We made theater because…that’s what we did.  We were always interested in 
issues of oppression and justice—expressed mostly in agitprop theater of questionable 
effectiveness and maturity—but we made other kinds of theater, too.  It all came from the 
same place:  our self-interest—our love—was making theater.  Together.  For, and with, 
each other.  Now, with that community and those people and relationships and traditions 
gone, I was lonely.  All I had were the abstract concepts (creative! original! political! 
worthwhile!), and my guilt-ridden doubts about ever being able to live up to them. 
That’s when I discovered Augusto Boal.  I read Theatre of the Oppressed, and it 
kicked me in the ass.  “You think all theater is political?” Boal seemed to be saying to 
me.  “Sure it is.  You want to know how most theater is political?  Including all the stuff 
you’ve been doing?”  I got a little apprehensive.  “It’s political in that it tells people to sit 
down, shut up, and do what they’re told!”  I was sweating; I felt my heart beat.  “Now 
you want to do some theater that’s political in a different way?!”  I nodded my head.  
“Fine.  I’ll show you how.” 134   
I was hooked.  I was ready to make theater again. 
                                                
134 See Augusto Boal, Theatre of the Oppressed:  Chapters 1-3 on how most Western theater is oppressive, 
and Chapters 4-5 on his experiments with a theater that’s not.  It is still the most important book on theater 
I have ever read.  I am very grateful that I was able to meet Augusto and thank him for this life-changing 
moment, not quite a year before he died in 2009. 
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Of course, to do theater the way I thought Boal was telling me to, I had to give up 
a few things.  Scripts, for one.  All of those already-written plays, and especially 
musicals, I was excited to work on?  Coercive instruments of oppression.  Actors, for 
two.  We work with whom we find, in the community, otherwise we’re reifying a 
capitalist division of labor.  Theaters, for three.  We go where the community is; 
professional theaters are spaces of bourgeois domination.  Dr. Evil was talking to me, and 
I was listening.  (Boal himself, who directed plays at the Royal Shakespeare Company as 
well as in the favelas of Rio, would have counseled me differently.)  I spent years trying 
to deny my basic, elemental self-interest in making art, collaboratively, without 
necessarily attaching any prefixes (like “community based”) or suffixes (like “for social 
justice”) to it.  In my worst moments, I would literally go to a rehearsal and spend the 
whole time fixated on all the worthier people than I who were out on the streets making 
social change while I was in here doing this decadent, bourgeois activity.   
Those moments are, thankfully, behind me.  During my time on the PTO Board, I 
noticed I wasn’t the only one who enjoyed spending breaks between meetings talking 
about the non-prefixed/suffixed theater we’d been seeing and making.  I’ve started 
coming to terms with the fact that making theater, and art, are basic parts of my self-
interest—period—and that’s okay.  Yet even now I can rarely bring myself to make un-
prefixed/suffixed theater:  most of what I make is either educational theater, mostly 
during my summer work at Appel Farm, or community-based/social-justice theater, 
mostly as a contracted short-term trainer or workshop-leader.  Even if Dr. Evil has been 
tamed in my head, he still looms large on the market.  It’s not easy to find space to work 
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as a theater-making “cultural worker.”  (Like Hall, I often find myself saying:  all right, I 
want to do this, but where?  Where’s the context, the community?)135  I share this 
dilemma with Jamie Haft, professional theater practitioner and a leader with the public 
work organization Imagining America.  Haft depicts this dilemma in a short skit she 
improvised with a class of conservatory students who had “given up on their dream of 
starring on Broadway”:   
 
Prospective Arts Student:  Excuse me, are you an artist? 
 
Graduate 1: I use the arts in the public school classes I teach helping middle 
school students learn to express themselves and understand the material from their 
other subjects in new ways.  No, I’m not an artist. 
 
Prospective Arts Student:  Are you an artist? 
 
Graduate 2:  I use art to facilitate community dialogues, with the goal of 
encouraging civic participation and changing local policy. No, I’m not an artist. 
 
Prospective Arts Student:  Are you an artist?  
 
Graduate 3:  No, I use the arts to help people with spinal cord injuries find the 
will to go on. I’m not an artist. 
 
Prospective Arts Student:  What about you—are you an artist?  
 
Graduate 4:  Yes, I am!  I have a Bachelor’s of Fine Arts, and now I’m temping 
by day and bartending by night—waiting for my big break on Broadway or in 
Hollywood!!  I’m an artist!136       
                                                
135 In a statement very reminiscent of Hall, a member of the renowned 1960s radical San Francisco Mime 
Troupe once declared:  “if there were a Red Army, we would be an ‘art and propaganda team.’”  Alas, there 
was no Red Army.  (There was the United Farm Workers, including their company of organic theatrical 
intellectuals called El Teatro Campesino that was their ‘art and propaganda team’ during the famous 
Delano grape strike.  And some members of the Mime Troupe, as individuals, worked with them.  But this 
fell far short of an ongoing, organizational partnership made in mutual self-interest.)  The Mime Troupe, 
like Hall and McGowan and the rest of the Marx-inspired academics, was still waiting for Lefty.  See 
Arthur Sainer, The New Radical Theatre Notebook (New York:  Applause Books, 1997), 21.   
136 Jamie Haft, “A Civic Actor Prepares:  Training Artists for Work in Community,” in Democracy’s 
Education:  A Symposium on Power, Public Work, and the Meaning of Citizenship, ed. Harry C. Boyte 
(Nashville, TN:  Vanderbilt University Press, forthcoming 2014). 
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All right, so there seem to be a lot of advantages, as an artist, for ditching “the 
industry” in favor of public work.  First and foremost, as this scene shows, there are more 
jobs there.  In addition, many young artists (myself included) are turned off by what Haft 
describes as the industry’s “hermetic training studios” and perpetual obsession with 
“individual genius” and being “marketable in the mass popular culture.”  Haft took a 
group of Tisch students to a public work program in Kentucky; these students, who are 
normally “pitted against each other vying for limited parts in main stage productions or a 
few slots in a talent agent showcase, rejoiced in having their peers as collaborators 
instead of competitors.”  One of them told Haft:  “It’s this shameful thing to be a part of 
something, especially at Tisch.  It’s nice to see artists who are just naturally following in 
the tradition and in others’ footsteps.”  Doing public work meant getting to work in a 
better, freer space, building meaningful relationships, and making work that clearly 
matters to people.  “Here, students didn’t have to hide their cultural identities, their 
feelings for their home communities, or their concerns about social justice…community-
based art reinforces their own cultural identity, something the [NYU] Tisch training 
program was intent on stripping them of.”   
But Haft’s skit also shows that these good feelings come with a price.  Giving up 
the industry for a life of public work often also means having to repress your basic self-
interest—your love, your “deep gladness”—to work as an artist.  The first three 
graduates don’t understand themselves as artists, and it’s not because they’re dupes.  It’s 
because their jobs, however good and helpful and justice-oriented they are, make them 
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reduce the thing they love to an instrument, to achieve some other, external goal.  They 
use the arts; they don’t do art or make art or get to be an artist.  Haft concludes:  “the 
prospect for finding work as a citizen artist is better than the prospect for those in the 
professional arts industry; however, the talent and training of citizen artists is still 
woefully under-deployed.”137 
There are exceptions to this rule.  There are people and organizations that make 
art that’s both aesthetically fulfilling and politically serious.  Two examples out of many, 
which I know through my work with PTO, are Jana Sanskriti, a veritable Theatre of the 
Oppressed mass peasant movement in rural India, and Combatants for Peace, an Israeli 
theater company composed of former IDF soldiers who collaborate with Palestinians on 
performance-based actions meant to provoke the authorities and the citizenry into 
questioning the status quo.  These groups share a lot in common with Alinskyan power 
organizations.  They work together over long periods of time and build strong, lasting 
relationships, both with each other and with their audiences.  They are realistic about 
what they can achieve, starting with small winnable issues and moving on to more 
difficult ones only when they’ve built the base and the relationships.  They are clear 
about their own self-interest and are deeply rooted in the cultures and traditions they 
work in.138 
                                                
137 Ibid.  
138 See Jana Sanskriti (website), http://www.janasanskriti.org/index.html (April 10, 2014); and Combatants 
for Peace (website), http://cfpeace.org/ (April 10, 2014).  One of the most successful accounts of arts-based 
public work in written form is the ethnographer and director Dwight Conquergood’s account of founding a 
theater group in a Hmong refugee camp in Thailand in the mid-1980s.  This could have very easily been 
one of those projects, where a privileged white man went to “help” the poor starving children in the Third 
World—but it wasn’t.  Conquergood came in clear about his own self-interest, his cultural curiosity, and 
when he arrived at the camp, he immediately started building relationships and learning the self-interest of 
the people he’d be working with—including their very clear self-interest, based in long-held traditions, in 
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These kinds of organizations are still in the minority, though.  On the dominant 
market—even the dominant non-profit market, where foundation-funding and the 
service-based habitus reign supreme—it’s no surprise that most artists trying to do public 
work find themselves working in organizations whose relationship to power and self-
interest is a lot less clear.  Such is the case at zAmya Theater Project of Minneapolis, 
where I’ve done a lot of my recent arts-based public work.  zAmya describes itself, on its 
website, as “a unique creative process that brings together homeless and housed 
individuals to create and perform a theatrical production.  zAmya turns ‘homeless’ from a 
word back into a person. Or persons. Living, breathing, laughing, singing persons. Who 
act—yes, act—in entertaining, genre-defying productions that are guaranteed to change 
your mind, if not your life.”139  They typically write, perform, and tour one original play 
per year; actors come and go, but a core “troupe” has formed in recent years, which has 
stayed pretty constant from production to production.  
zAmya’s external intent, for its audience, is “to change your mind, if not your 
life”; its internal intent, for the actors themselves, is to create a free space.  In the words 
of theater historian (and former colleague) Rachel Chaves, who wrote her doctoral 
dissertation on zAmya, the goal is to create “a space free of violence and oppression, a 
                                                                                                                                            
performing and making theater.  As he worked with local youth to build the theater group, they built stories 
from within the Hmong storytelling traditions, creating new characters (only) when necessary, and they 
carefully incorporated audience feedback.  They set clear goals for their actions—would this performance 
get people to bring in their dogs for rabies vaccination, as intended?—and they evaluated their successes 
and failures afterward.  One such failure was in their choice of targets, a failure Conquergood links directly 
to his own self-interest:  I should have been more assiduous in attempts to reach the expatriate personnel 
who were most ethnocentric in their dealings with the Hmong.  My sympathies were with the refugees.  My 
interests and energies were devoted to understanding and working with the Hmong.  It was easier to 
identify with the Hmong; the dogmatic Christians became the Other for me.”  See Dwight Conquergood, 
“Health Theatre in a Hmong Refugee Camp:  Performance, Communication, and Culture,” TDR 32, no. 3 
(Autumn 1988):  174-208. 
139 zAmya Theater Project (website), http://ststephensmpls.org/programs/zamya (January 17, 2014).   
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space of agency where firsthand accounts of homelessness can be told.”140  Lecia 
Grossman, who founded the project in 2004 (and whose own politics often tend 
conservative), “didn’t want to do something for homeless people, I wanted to do 
something with them.”141   
My self-interest in homelessness is longstanding, but only recently did I start to 
understand why:  it’s the epitome of being de-valued, unseen, lonely in the most extreme 
Arendtian sense.  Being homeless, in the words of former troupe member Larry Brown, 
means “feeling lost out there.”142  And often not just “out there,” but even in some of the 
spaces designed for them.  As we’ve seen, the vast majority of environments that 
homeless people find themselves in are ones in which they’re treated (and referred to) as 
“consumers” or “clients,” not agents in their own right.143  zAmya tries to be a different 
                                                
140 Rachel Chaves, “zAmya Theater Project:  Toward an Intimacy of Social Change” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Minnesota, 2010), 73.  I discovered zAmya, like the Theatre of the Oppressed group at 
Minneapolis Community and Technical College, through professor Sonja Kuftinec, who also directed 
Chaves’s dissertation. 
141 Chaves, “zAmya,” 19.  
142 Chaves, “zAmya,” 44 
143 How to refer to this population is a much-contested issue.  Among people in the homeless-service 
industry, “clients” and “consumers” are the norm, though some workers find these terms put their “clients” 
off.  (Especially “consumer”:  when, these so-called consumers ask, do they get to go shopping?)  Others, 
in academia and the upper echelons of the nonprofit world, prefer “people experiencing homelessness”—
which seems to mark homelessness as a condition, which can happen to anyone, rather than as a way to 
mark off a specific kind of (presumably inferior) person.  Chaves, invoking Kuftinec, suggests we go even 
further:  “we say ‘the homeless, implying a lack—why not use a term like nomad…one that is not so 
pejorative?” (Chaves, “zAmya,” 17).  I have complicated feelings about this.  Of course I don’t want to call 
anyone inferior, and yes, I have met some people who actively prefer not being housed.  Most homeless 
people I have met, though, call themselves homeless—and don’t want to be.  That is, they perceive their 
condition as a lack.  (I will therefore use “homeless people” and “people experiencing homelessness”—
though not “clients” or “consumers”—interchangeably.)  Once again, my experiences mirror Alinsky’s:  
“At various universities members of the Students for a Democratic Society have asked me, ‘Mr. Alinsky, 
do you know that what you are doing is organizing the poor for the acceptance of these bourgeois, 
decadent, degenerate, bankrupt, materialistic, imperialistic, hawkish middle-class values of today’s 
society?’  There has been a long silence when I have responded with, ‘Do you know what the poor of 
America or, I might add, the poor of the world want?  They want a bigger and fatter piece of these 
decadent, degenerate, bankrupt, materialistic, bourgeois values and what goes with it!’…One can never 
reject these [middle-class] possessions unless one has experienced them, just as you cannot preach spiritual 
values to someone who is starving and whose idea of happiness is having enough food.  It is after he 
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kind of space—a space that’s theirs, where they are the producers.  “At zAmya,” Chaves 
explains, “the space of performance is owned (if only fleetingly) by the bodies of 
zAmya’s actors, some of whom own no other place of permanence.”144 
Or at least that’s the goal.  The reality sometimes falls short, for understandable 
reasons.  Most obviously, the space zAmya inhabits is not actually theirs.  For the past 
several years, due to a combination of convenience and financial necessity, zAmya has 
been a wholly-owned subsidiary of St. Stephen’s Human Services, a service-based 
nonprofit.  Unless you’re a St. Stephen’s employee—which I’m not, and none of the 
actors are—to get into the zAmya space you need to get through the familiar service-
nonprofit array of buzzers, locked doors, and starkly empty, grey hallways.  The space 
itself is large and comfortable, with plenty of room to move and play, but it’s not theirs.  
The walls are empty and bare, and anything we write on the whiteboard is likely to get 
erased.  These ownership issues pervade the culture of zAmya.  Even the name “zAmya” 
itself—which Chaves explains is “a Sanskrit word which means ‘aiming for peace’”145—
doesn’t seem to have come from the actors themselves.  None of them, to my knowledge, 
knows Sanskrit. 
                                                                                                                                            
achieves enough food for today and all of the tomorrows that he moves on to the next stage, realizing that 
this has not brought him happiness.  Then he is ready for, and starts demanding, other things” (Alinsky, 
“Afterword” to Reveille for Radicals, 229-230).  This is what the great Marxist playwright Bertolt Brecht 
meant, in The Threepenny Opera, by “erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral” (“first comes the 
feeding, then comes the morality”).  Until people have taken secured their basic dignity—which includes 
food, housing, and agency; not just agency, as the SDS idealists thought, or just food and shelter, as 
Maslow and the service people think—this basic dignity is going to be a big part of their self-interest.  We 
organic intellectuals need to recognize and respect that fact, even when it feels uncomfortable.  It’s what 
Paulo Freire meant when my doctoral advisor Robin Brown asked him, “what do you do if you enter into 
critical dialogue with the poor, and what they really want is…motor scooters?”—and Freire (to hear Robin 
tell it) answered, softly:  “Help them to get motor scooters.”   
144 Chaves, “zAmya,” 72. 
145 Chaves, “zAmya,” 20. 
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In my experience with zAmya, as dramaturg, sound designer, writer, trainer, and 
audience member, this uneasiness around ownership puts blinkers on the work.  Take the 
issue of payment.  Troupe members get paid a small-but-not-insignificant stipend for 
attending rehearsals, performances, workshops, and trainings, which in and of itself I 
think is wonderful.  The problem is, they are not held to anywhere near the standard of 
professional actors.  I don’t mean in terms of talent—I share what Haft calls “the citizen 
artist’s high regard for amateur expression”146—but in terms of accountability.  Actors 
don’t learn their lines on time, they forget their blocking, they drop character, all without 
much push-back from the director, the stage manager, their fellow actors, or anyone else.  
Rehearsals rarely start on time:  actors often arrive late or are absent without notice, and 
excuses, from transportation problems to job conflicts to child-care snafus, are indulged 
without question.   
These challenges are real, and they’re particularly hard on the low-income 
populations these actors come from.  All the same, the way zAmya handles them is 
counterproductive.  It can often feel like a kid-glove treatment, which unintentionally 
demeans and infantilizes these very talented and dedicated performers, treating them as if 
they couldn’t do better.  (They absolutely can.)  The result is a culture where actors 
sometimes feel more like clients than collaborators.  It’s feels unclear, at times, whether 
actors’ paychecks are compensation for professional work or charity for the needy.147 
                                                
146 Haft, “A Civic Actor Prepares.” 
147 Caveat:  this is my observation, based on a few years of watching how actors in the troupe behave.  It’s 
nothing that anyone else has ever expressed, at least to me or in my presence.  
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Maren Ward, the accomplished local director and theater manager who has been 
the company’s artistic director from the beginning, does a lot to set the culture of the 
troupe.  Chaves’s observations very much mirror my own: 
Maren tends to perform this kind of cosmic patience with actors—she accepts 
almost any idea that is brought to the process, is unreservedly kind and generous, 
and goes out of her way to make people feel valued and important to the project. 
This kind of attitude seems absolutely vital in this space, but it also carries a huge 
cost, which reveals itself sometimes when Maren just lays her head down on the 
table, or wanders out of the room during thorny debates about the show’s content 
and structure….Her responses to questions in rehearsal are always slow, careful, 
and tender—the result of constant self-reflection. She told me once that she’d 
rather be mugged than cross the street to move away from someone who looked 
suspicious or dangerous, and thereby run the risk of offending that person. And 
so, she gets a little emotionally mugged in rehearsal from time to time, always 
putting others’ needs and feelings ahead of her own….zAmya is committed to 
providing a space for the actors experiencing homelessness to tell their own 
stories. However, in the process, Maren’s story and labor often go overlooked, 
often through her very own actions: it is as though she has convinced herself that 
to structure the work being done by others, or to take credit for the work being 
accomplished, would be unethical, taking focus away from where it “should” 
be.148 
 
Chaves concludes:  “Maren is a terrifically talented theater artist, and bringing 
those skills to the process would, far from obscuring the work of the actors, bring it into 
relief.”149  I wholeheartedly agree—not just for Maren, but for the troupe as well.  They 
all have potential that the current culture doesn’t always let them express.  But to change 
                                                
148 Chaves, “zAmya,” 101-102.  Maren in many ways represents the “frailty” that Graeber finds often in 
anarchist and activist cultures.  (She herself is part of several such groups.)  Her baggy clothing, her 
constant plastic and glass containers of vegan food and drink, her penchant for biking everywhere even 
through the Minnesota winter, and her sensual but non-sexual presence, all resonate with Graeber’s 
description of the characteristic “maze of barriers…endless food taboos…chain backrubs…human 
chains…[and other] general patterns of touching…largely, but not strictly, desexualized.”  Such a “curious 
emphasis on weakness,” as Graeber observes, can feel very alien to outsiders.  It is not my place to call out 
this culture; I would just suggest that absent some critical reflection, it can unintentionally turn off potential 
allies and collaborators, and thus rob people within it of their potential as agents and public workers.  (It’s 
basically the same argument I made earlier about the so-called “non-violent” spaces; we’re talking about a 
lot of the same people.)  See Graeber, Direct Action, 263-264.     
149 Chaves, “zAmya,” 103. 
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that culture, to make a space where everyone can give her or his all, will be difficult.  In 
addition to organizing some other funding sources and getting their own physical space, 
they would also need to organize themselves into a different market, one based less 
around charity and service and more around agency and power—including the harder 
edge (if not quite the organizers’ machismo) that this kind of market requires. 
If they chose to go that route, I think they’d find they have the resources.  Even 
with the culture they’ve got now, issues notwithstanding, they do amazing work.  zAmya, 
both in rehearsal and performance, has a basic and unshakable feeling of love, laughter, 
and joy in each other’s company.  This is a group of people that has built a real 
community of their own, with its own deeply-rooted rituals and traditions:  Dr. Evil is not 
in charge here.  These feelings, and this community, translate into performances that are 
entertaining, compelling, and downright funny in a way a lot of “social justice” theater 
just isn’t.150  I’ve seen zAmya actors, when pushed, take tremendous risks.  In the spring 
of 2013, after a mere two weeks of training and rehearsal (led by me), they walked into a 
downtown Minneapolis soup kitchen at 10:30 in the morning; set up shop in the middle 
of the crowded and loud space; and performed an original, short piece of theater.  They 
then started the same piece over again and invited the people sitting in the soup kitchen to 
                                                
150 Chaves concurs:  “The voicing of laughter marks zAmya as a resistant space, both because it signals the 
flow of affective circuits (laughter as a contagion opening up portals between people), and because it defies 
the convention of feeling which says we, the privileged, must be serious around the homeless because their 
lives are so difficult or we, the homeless, must be sad all the time because our lives are so difficult.  As Ed 
[of one of the actors] said to me once, deadpan, ‘We enjoy humor too.’”  See Chaves, “zAmya,” 138.  
Emphasis in original. 
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interrupt, come “onstage,” and join—to discover, together, ways we can act more 
powerfully.151 
Everyone was nervous.  The troupe was nervous, Maren was nervous, I was 
nervous.  We walked into the soup kitchen—the Catholic Charities Opportunity Center, 
where many of us had performed before, and where some still came as “clients”—and the 
noise, social disconnectedness, and general feelings of malaise reminded us how 
challenging this space could be.152  As we set up, and I started my introductory talk (a 
few performances into our run, the zAmya actors would take over this duty), most of the 
people sitting and talking and drinking coffee at the tables—black and white and 
indigenous, young to elderly, and in various states of health, cleanliness, and sobriety—
did not seem to want to be bothered.  We pressed on.  Our cast of five actors performed 
valiantly, projecting their bodies and voices over the din.  Slowly, as the play went on, 
some people inched nearer:  they stopped talking, turned their chairs around, even moved 
themselves closer to our impromptu stage.   
Finally came the scariest moment of all:  when we turned to the audience and 
asked them to come up and participate.  At first, no one came.  We kept playing ourselves 
a little longer, then asked again.  A few people started looking interested.  One guy’s 
friends, sitting at the table with him, started egging him on to come up.  We joined in.  He 
                                                
151 Theatre of the Oppressed practitioners will recognize this as Forum Theatre—essentially, Legislative 
Theatre (see Chapter Three) without the lawmaking parts.  A play is performed, the (unhappy, oppressive) 
ending is discussed, and then the play is repeated again—only this time, the spectators are encouraged to 
stop the action, come up onstage, replace the protagonist, and attempt a different choice of action, to bring 
the play to a (happier, less oppressive) conclusion.  For a brief introduction to Forum Theatre, see Boal, 
Theatre of the Oppressed, 139-142; for more detail, see Boal, Games for Actors and Non-Actors, trans. 
Adrian Jackson, 2nd ed. (New York:  Routledge, 2002), 241-276. 
152 For another account of zAmya performing in this same soup kitchen, including a much more detailed 
description of the space and its challenges, see Fink, “Making Space,” 199-202. 
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got up; everyone applauded.  Many people followed.  Many more joined in the 
discussion.  Before long, people were talking, discussing, arguing with each other from 
across the room, about the issues of criminal justice, family issues, relationships with the 
police, and drugs that our play raised.  In subsequent performances, some people walked 
up onstage, not just to play a part in the play, but to hold forth on their perspective in 
front of the gathered public.  We had done it.  We had turned this soup kitchen, however 
momentarily, into a free space, an actual forum. 
One particular intervention, from a man named John, particularly stuck with 
me.153  John was onstage:  a young, clean-cut and clean-shaven man in his late 20s or 30s 
wearing a green-and-white visor and a tattoo of a snake wrapped around a crucifix.  He 
had stepped into the role of the protagonist, at the crucial moment of the play, slumped 
over on a table (in that very soup kitchen) and about to give up all hope.  I was onstage, 
too, playing a bit role:  a volunteer worker at the soup kitchen, who comes over and asks 
if he’s all right.  In the scripted play, he doesn’t respond, and my character walks away.  
But John responded.  He answered my character’s questions and wanted to get 
information from me.  I stopped the action and asked the audience for help:  I’d never 
worked in a soup kitchen, I told them; what should I say to him?   
John cut me off and launched into a speech.   
What I had done—he meant my character, I think—was to go up and listen to 
him.  No one does that.  “We all need to be heard.”  The services are fine—we get good 
food here, and good services upstairs—but no one listens to us.  Again, “we all need to be 
                                                
153 A pseudonym.  “John’s” speech stuck with me; I tried to write it down later that day.  My story comes 
from those notes. 
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heard.”  There’s stuff that connects us, all of us that are here in this room.  We’re all here 
for a reason, because of stuff that’s happened outside.  No one’s walking around, with 
lots of money in their pockets, saying, “I’m gonna go to Catholic Charities.”  We’re all 
here, once again, “looking for a place to be heard.”   
When he stopped talking, we all noticed the absence of sound.  That room, always 
loud and chaotic, was almost silent.  People were listening, nodding as John talked.  
There was a palpable sense of connection among the people in that room, the likes of 
which I had never felt in that space before.  This is it! I thought.  This is the moment of 
solidarity! 
And that was it.  The moment passed.  There was more interaction, there were 
more interventions by more people in the audience—variously insightful, thoughtful, and 
funny.  One of those interventions, by a guy who had been very reticent to participate the 
last time we came, turned into a beautiful poetry reading.  But that magical flash, that 
gripping instant of solidarity, was gone.  Never to return.  Never to be acknowledged 
again in the session, as if it’d never happened.  The noise in the room picked up again; 
“real” life was back.  We were near the end of our time.  The soup kitchen staff needed us 
to leave so they could serve lunch; the troupe member leading the session brought it to a 
close.  A few minutes later, while we were standing outside having our usual post-
performance evaluation meeting—I, ever the good Alinskyan, insisted upon it—Maren 
brought up that moment with John.  She had felt that momentary surge, just like I did.  
The rest of the troupe did, too.  She called it “one of those triumph moments.” 
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But I feel like I have to ask, what, ultimately, was it good for?  What is any of this 
kind of work good for?  Were we doing effective public work?  We seemed pretty clear 
on our self-interest, but were we serious about building power, and developing agency?  
These are essential questions; still as I ask them, I feel the pinky-sucking presence of Dr. 
Evil.  I find myself wishing I could stand with Chaves, who believes “theater’s efficiency 
cannot be measured by the extent to which its participants get permanent housing, or get 
laws passed to help the poor into affordable housing; theater’s efficacy lies in the extent 
to which it creates a space for those who have been oppressively narrativized to begin to 
tell their own stories.”154   
Yes, I want to say—but then what?  We started at weeklong by telling our own 
stories, too; trainer after trainer had insisted on how important it was to know our stories, 
to tell our stories, to share our stories.  But that wasn’t the end of it.  We then needed to 
use these stories, to build power—the kind of power that could, and must, get those laws 
passed, and get those people into housing, and work toward a culture where all of our 
stories are heard and we all have the material things we need.  Otherwise we, the 
privileged organic intellectuals who work in groups like zAmya, can turn into those 
service providers who, in Alinsky’s typically un-minced words, “come to the people of 
the slums under the aegis of benevolence and goodness, not to organize the people, not to 
help them rebel and fight their way out of the muck—NO!  They come to get these 
people ‘adjusted’; adjusted so they will live in hell and like it too.”155   
                                                
154 Chaves, “zAmya,” 166. 
155 Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, 59.  This sentiment is also the reason I always feel a little strange about 
Theatre of the Oppressed practitioners and other public theater workers who do work in prisons.  Yes I 
understand that the system is what it is, and that better to have good, productive lives in prison than bad, 
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Maybe what Chaves is saying is, the role of theater in public work is to create the 
space and let those stories be told and heard—then it’s time for other kinds of public 
work, like organizing, to step up and do their part.  I can accept that, especially if 
building power and winning campaigns is not in the self-interest of the people doing the 
theater.  (Some people just want to make great theater, and that’s just fine.  No need to 
call them out, Dr. Evil-style, for not doing more.)  But for many members of zAmya, as 
for the members of Combatants for Peace and Jana Sanskriti, I think building power and 
winning campaigns is in their the self-interest.  They just don’t necessarily know how, or 
where to start. 
It’s these kind of people, I think, who lose out when “organizing” culture is so 
insular, and “service” culture doesn’t provide a path to power.  The people of zAmya 
have so many of the dispositions necessary for public work—to confidently go into a 
hostile space and make themselves heard, to tell their stories of self in ways that intersect 
with the stories of those around them, to build communities that can withstand all kinds 
of material and spiritual poverty.  They could do it.  But not the way they’re set up right 
now.  They’d probably need a staff organizer, and some new funding sources.  And a 
longer-term commitment to projects, and to sites and communities, than just a few 
isolated performances.  And a commitment by troupe members to build relationships and 
power—which would mean the kind of hard cultural shift I talked about before.   
But it could happen.  We discovered untapped power at Catholic Charities that 
day:  muted, masked, repressed, but present.  I had thrown a little bit of power and self-
                                                                                                                                            
destructive ones—but there’s a little part of me that’s still sympathetic with my first reaction, many years 
ago, when I first heard about people doing Theatre of the Oppressed in prisons:  “The guards allow that?!”  
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interest training into my rehearsals with the troupe, and they were into it.  I had even 
started building a relationship with an unlikely ally, the soup kitchen’s intimidating 
security guard—who asked me to do a one-to-one with him, and drove nearly two hours 
to meet me near my house.  It turns out that he was an immigrant, who had once been 
homeless himself.  He was deeply interested in our work, and he offered detailed and 
very thoughtful criticism of our play, some of which we were able to incorporate into 
future performances.  I asked him, toward the end of our conversation, whether he might 
be interested in working with zAmya himself.  He said he would.156 
This kind of relationship represents one possibility—of so many—for zAmya to 
grow, and to build.  The pieces are all there.  They’re not assembled right now.  But they 
could be.   
If the people of zAmya decide they want to.   
Which they might not.   
And that’s fine. 
 
Teaching:  Getting Real 
For an organizer coming out of the Popular Front, the term “public education” 
might be redundant.  Public work was education, and education was public work.  This 
                                                
156 Like the shamans in the Hmong village where Conquergood worked, Kasey scrutinized our play for the 
ways he found it inaccurate.  He had clearly given this a lot of thought.  “I don’t want the wrong message to 
be sent,” he told me several times during our meeting.  This, to give a little context, was the same white (or 
white-reading; he came from Lebanon and had a strong accent) security guard that had horrified us a few 
weeks earlier, when we had seen him roughing up a young black man outside the Opportunity Center, 
seemingly for no reason.  I wanted to ask him about this, but it didn’t feel right in our first meeting.  
(Maybe I was just too scared.)  I was about to just leave a week-and-a-half later, so there was no second 
meeting.  I left his contact info with Maren, but I haven’t heard anything since.  Then again, good 
cyberpunk millennial that I am, I haven’t asked.  I’ve left, moved on to other places and projects.  (Not sure 
how I feel about this.) 
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conviction was felt across the many influential organizing traditions the Popular Front 
would spawn, from Alinsky-style broad-based community organizing to the movement-
based organizing of the black freedom movement.   
Ella Baker, one of the great unsung leaders of that movement from the 1930s 
through the 1960s, “was the teacher-activist in every sense,” according to biographer 
Barbara Ransby.  Mary King, one of the many organizers Baker trained, recalls:  “With 
Socratic persistence, in her resonant and commanding voice, she would query, ‘Now let 
me ask this again, what is our purpose here?  What are we trying to accomplish?’...‘Ask 
questions, Mary,’ she would say.”  Prathia Hall, another of Baker’s trainees, remembers 
her as “a consummate teacher, always opening us to new understandings….It was never 
the pounding, ‘you must do this, you must do that,’ but by raising a question and then 
raising another question and then helping us to see what was being revealed through the 
answer was her mode of leadership.”  Nor did all this questioning take away from 
Baker’s effectiveness as an organizer.  “She was the one who taught us to organize,” Hall 
said, “to organize in such a way that when we left, the people were fully capable of 
carrying on the movement themselves.”157 
Alinsky, for his part, seems to say something very similar: 
                                                
157 See Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement:  A Radical Democratic Vision 
(Chapel Hill, NC:  University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 358-360.  In this last quotation, we see Baker 
refusing the idea that there’s a tradeoff between good teaching (dialogic, listening-based) and good 
organizing (effective, goal-oriented).  Baker’s approach to organizing seems to address the concern 
expressed by Myles Horton, another of the great educators of the freedom movement:  “If you’re into 
having a successful organizing campaign and dealing with a specific project, and that’s the goal, then [it 
doesn’t matter] whether you do it yourself or an expert does it or some bountiful person in the community 
does it, or the government does it without your involvement because that solves the problem….Solving the 
problem can’t be the goal of education.  It can be the goal of organizations.  That’s why I don’t think 
organizing and education are the same thing” (Horton and Freire, We Make the Road By Walking, 119).  
Horton, like most people who have spent a lot of time with organizers (myself included), no doubt 
encountered many who made this tradeoff, and is expressing understandable frustration.  But organizers 
like Baker demonstrate that there is another way—at least sometimes. 
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In the last analysis, the objective for which any democratic movement must strive 
is the ultimate objective implicit within democracy—popular education….The 
very purpose and character of a People’s Organization is educational….In a 
People’s Organization, popular education is an exciting and dramatic process.  
Education instead of being distant and academic becomes a direct and intimate 
part of the personal lives, experiences, and activities of the people….Knowledge 
then becomes an arsenal of weapons in the battle against injustice and 
degradation.  It is no longer learning for learning’s sake, but learning for a real 
reason, a purpose.  It ceases to be a luxury or something known under the vague, 
refined name of culture and becomes as essential as money in the bank, good 
health, good housing, or regular employment.158 
 
Like Baker, Alinsky argues that through the work of organizing, you can do really 
good teaching:  teaching that’s exciting, dramatic, and directly liked to people’s self-
interest, to the real needs and struggles of their “real lives.”  But implicitly, he’s also 
arguing something else.  You can see it in his use of negatives:  education is “no longer 
learning for learning’s sake,” “it ceases to be a luxury,” “instead of being distant and 
academic.”  Yes, he’s saying, the teaching that happens in People’s Organizations is 
great—and the teaching that happens outside those organizations, and specifically in 
schools, is awful.159 
                                                
158 Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals, 155, 173.  This quotation bookends Alinsky’s chapter on “popular 
education,” one of the great overlooked twentieth-century texts on teaching, in which Alinsky writes about 
ordinary people who become veritable experts in everything from class analysis to the legislative process to 
pediatric nutrition, all through working on issue-campaigns in their own self-interests.  Alinsky also 
implicitly uses this passage to indict schools; like the Lutheran pastor advocating “nonviolent” action, this 
is another case of Gricean implicature.  When Alinsky writes—“It is no longer learning for learning’s sake, 
but learning for a real reason, a purpose.  It cases to be a luxury or something known under the vague, 
refined name of culture”—he is clearly referencing an unnamed other entity that does do learning for 
learning’s sake, without reason or purpose, for the sake of luxury or refinement.  Though Alinsky never 
names this entity, it’s not too hard to figure out what he’s talking about. 
159 Like the Lutheran pastor advocating “nonviolent” action (see note 109), this is another case of Gricean 
implicature.  If he just wanted to extol the virtues of teaching within People’s Organizations, he wouldn’t 
have needed all these negatives.  By putting them in, he flouts the maxims of quantity (don’t say more than 
you need to) and relation (don’t say things that are irrelevant) to imply something he’s not saying 
explicitly:  that school sucks. 
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Having worked for many years as a classroom teacher, I’m tempted to agree.  I 
sometimes think that learning in school is kind of like falling in love at a speed-dating 
event:  it works for some people, but for most, it just feels too forced.  Learning, 
organizers like Alinsky and Baker argue, is best understood as a by-product of other 
kinds of activity.  When you work alongside others, with the goal of making change in 
your life and world that’s in your mutual self-interest, you’ll end up learning a lot along 
the way.  (And you’ll want to be learning; again, it’s in your self-interest.)  But when you 
sit down in a classroom—often with little choice in the matters—with the goal of 
learning—“for learning’s sake,” or because you need to get the credits for a degree, or 
for some other bloodless reason—where’s the buy-in?  The self-interest?  The incentive 
to care, to work, to actually learn at all?  Wouldn’t it be so much better, Alinsky seems to 
ask, if all education happened in people’s organizations?160   
                                                
160 Alinsky’s implied question gives us occasion to pause and ask, what exactly does it mean to make a 
given kind of work (such as teaching) “public”?  To what extent does it just mean “adapting broad-based 
organizing practices,” such as getting “clear” about self-interest and “serious” about power, for use in the 
classroom, the rehearsal room, or wherever (Boyte, “Constructive Politics as Public Work,” 649)?  That is, 
to what extent is organizing, and specifically Alinsky-style organizing, the paradigm that other kinds of 
public work must follow?  To a very large extent, Alinsky and Chambers would no-doubt argue:  “Broad-
based citizens organizations like those of the IAF,” Chambers declares, “are twenty-first-century civil-
society institutions par excellence” (Chambers, “Roots for Radicals,” 63; emphasis in original).  This is a 
reductive position.  Besides the obvious existence of other traditions of organizing, like Baker’s, there are 
also whole other public-work traditions within art-making and teaching themselves, which owe no 
particular debt to Alinsky.  The folk-school traditions come immediately to mind:  schools like Highlander 
(Horton’s school) in the United States, and many others around the world.  (These folk schools are often 
linked to organizing work, but as Horton describes, they are committed to ensuring that the goals of an 
issue-campaign don’t get in the way of the education.)  I focus on the Alinsky tradition, here, because it’s 
one of the best-documented and most active traditions of organizing in the contemporary United States:  
many other traditions have either died out or been co-opted into the “service” frame—as we’ve seen with 
the work of Gramsci and Freire, and as I’m told may be happening at Highlander.  The practitioners of 
Alinskyan organizing, maybe precisely because they have remained so (monastically?) separate from this 
mainstream market, have managed to keep their organizing tradition more-or-less alive and intact, and to 
develop a language—used, among other places, at weeklong—to teach this tradition effectively to the 
uninitiated.  That’s why I use it here, somewhat simplistically, to stand in for organizing, and the distilled 
essence of public work, as a whole.  I do not mean to suggest that Alinskyan organizing is the be-all-and-
end-all of public work, or that it has all the answers.  Paul Marincel himself admitted, at weeklong no less, 
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Possibly.  And possibly not:  if organized ideas are indeed a component of power, 
it’s easy to imagine schools as critically-important power bases.  In any case, such 
questions are (if you’ll pardon the pun) academic.  In the legal, cultural, and economic 
world-as-it-is, school exists, and will continue to exist at least into the near future.  Most 
people will spend over a decade of their lives in them, as students, and many will stay 
and spend the rest of their lives there, too, as schoolteachers.  So with that reality as a 
given, how—we are left to ask—can we teachers do public work in school? 
There are a lot of different answers to this question, and we’ll explore several of 
them below.  The effective ones, in my experience, tend to follow the same basic 
theoretical premise:  the problem with school is that it feels fake.  It feels like it has 
nothing to do with the rest of students’ (or teachers’) lives, with the “real world.”  In 
Alinskyan terms:  it’s not clear in its relation to the self-interest of both students and 
teachers (why am I writing this paper?  why am I grading this paper?), and not serious, in 
relation to the power exercised by and on both students and teachers (what’s the point of 
all this again?).  It’s precisely this lack of clarity and seriousness that makes so many 
                                                                                                                                            
that “we’re doing a lot of organizing but losing a lot of things.”  Harry Boyte, in a similar vein, will often 
tell the story of Terry Pettus and his fellow houseboat-dwellers on Lake Union in Seattle, who in the 1980s 
faced eviction by the city government.  Had these houseboat-dwellers organized in typical fashion, uniting 
and collectively confronting the city government, they would have lost:  they didn’t have enough power.  
So they turned to practices of popular education instead:  they worked not against the city but with it, 
offering the lake and its inhabitants as a public resource and asset to the city and its other citizens, and 
holding “a kind of protracted workshop on Seattle’s public values that at least for a period of time tamed 
and guided the headlong rush of the city toward unbridled high-tech development.”  In this case, as in many 
others, the public work of teaching was able to accomplish a goal that the public work of organizing could 
not have.  See Boyte, CommonWealth, 145-147, 152; Horton and Freire, We Make the Road By Walking, 
especially 115-128; for more on the folk school tradition, see also Myles Horton, The Long Haul (New 
York:  Teachers College Press, 1998), and Living and Learning Democracy:  Non-Formal Adult Education 
in Sweden in South Africa, ed. Marie-Louise Ström (Cape Town:  Idasa, 2007). 
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students tune out, and so many teachers burn out.161  To do public work at school, we 
have to make it real.162  It needs to be clear and serious, aware of both the extent and 
limits of our mutual self-interest and power (what we can do and what we can’t), and 
committed working together to push those limits to the furthest extent possible.  
Efforts to do teaching as public work tend to come in two flavors:  efforts to make 
change on the institutional level, to make our schools function more like free spaces, and 
efforts to make change on the pedagogical level, to make our classrooms function more 
like free spaces.  Change on the institutional level, first of all, means understanding—and 
organizing to make decision-makers understand—that what we’re doing right now isn’t 
enough.  “The usual calls for more service learning classes and student volunteer groups 
have their natural limits in reaching our student body,” explains public work scholar and 
Denison University president Adam Weinberg.  “We need to look for new places on our 
                                                
161 Matthew Crawford observes:  “I think there are a lot of kids in school feeling like what they’re offered is 
frankly not worthy of their full attention.  If you’re studying for standardized tests, it seems like a perfectly 
natural reaction to check out mentally.  The material is not presented as intrinsically valuable, but as a 
means to an end, passing the test—just another hoop to jump through.  Whereas if what you’re doing is, 
let’s say, building a tube-frame chassis for a race car, then suddenly trigonometry becomes very 
interesting” (“Work and Dignity,” 42).  This kind of fake-ness often starts early in our education, when our 
first-grade teachers tell us we really need to learn x or y, because we’ll need it in second grade.  And then 
in second grade, we’ll need it in third grade.  And so on, as middle school prepares you for high school and 
high school prepares you for college and college prepares for…the “real world”?  (Another old Jewish 
joke:  “For a Jewish mother, fetal development ends upon graduation from medical school.”)  By that point, 
we’ve spent a full ten to twenty years being told that our work is only important in some imagined future—
a feeling some of us then find hard to shake, and end up going through much of our lives feeling like the 
“real world” is always somewhere else.  Not exactly helpful for building dispositions toward agency. 
162 Public work scholar David Hoffman, as part of an extensive study of student culture, interviewed five 
students for a total of over three-and-a-half hours.  “In those interviews I used the words ‘real’ and ‘really’ 
a grand total of seven times, often in the context of expressing that I ‘really’ appreciated their volunteering 
to participate.  The students, on the other hand, used the words ‘real’ and ‘really’ 314 times….civic agency 
and the experiences that gave rise to it felt real in a way that many of their previous experiences had not.”  
See David Hoffman, “Fostering Civic Agency by Making Education (and Ourselves) Real,” in 
Democracy’s Education:  A Symposium on Power, Public Work and the Meaning of Citizenship, ed. Harry 
C. Boyte (Nashville, TN:  Vanderbilt University Press, forthcoming 2014).  For a much fuller and more 
technical treatment of the same argument, see David Hoffman, “Becoming Real:  A Hermeneutical 
Phenomenology of Undergraduates’ Civic Agency Journeys” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland—
Baltimore County, 2013). 
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campuses to engage students”—specifically, those students not disposed to service and 
volunteer work, and who are all too often told that those are the only two ways to be 
public agents.163  Finding these “new places,” adds University of Southern California 
teaching fellow Maria Avila, will involve “a concept of community that includes the 
community within institutions of all kinds, not just the communities and neighborhoods 
outside academic institutions” 164—versus now, where there’s “the community” (or “the 
real world,” or “the biomass”) on one side and us academics on the other, and every 
market incentive encourages us to stay apart.165   
This kind of institutional change is not easy.  Not only on an organizational level, 
but also on a cultural level.  I’ve been a graduate student now for almost seven years, and 
I know the fear my colleagues and I feel so often about whether our work is legitimate, 
whether we’re worth anything, and whether we’ll ever get jobs.  To abandon the work of 
                                                
163 Weinberg, “Preparing Students for Work as Citizens.” 
164 Maria Avila, “In a Culture That Values Activity Over Democratic Practices, Can a New Culture of Civic 
Professionalism Flourish?,” in Democracy’s Education:  A Symposium on Power, Public Work, and the 
Meaning of Citizenship, ed. Harry C. Boyte (Nashville, TN:  Vanderbilt University Press, forthcoming 
2014). 
165 Weinberg explains:  “incentive structures within our institutions…have mostly pushed faculty to be less 
engaged with our students and local communities” (Weinberg, “Preparing Students for Work as Citizens”).  
And Albert Dzur elaborates:  “Universities prize their self-image as collegial organizations, yet they now 
have highly unaccountable vertical management structures.  Relying on private search firms, boards of 
trustees and regents choose presidents and provosts with no authentic input from faculty, students, or 
community members.  Once ensconced, top administrators are evaluated using procedures less transparent 
and public than in business firms.  Faculty and student opinion is rarely seriously consulted on major 
administrative measures.  The absence of a vibrant democratic culture is evident, too, in the classroom and 
in daily faculty-student non-interaction.  Though research and disciplinary specialization are commonly 
blamed, the deeper problem is social distance:  faculty members’ inability to see and act with students as 
fellow citizens, collaborators—if only neophytes—in a common public project of understanding and 
improving shared social, political, and economic structures….most contemporary American colleges and 
universities systemically fail to live up to these norms, which are overpowered by forces present in all 
modern organization—bureaucracy, routinization, legal accountability, risk management, and market 
definitions of efficiency and productivity.”  Faculty and administrators talk about community engagement 
and citizenship, of course, but as is the case for work that’s not a (market-valued) priority, “There is never 
enough time” (Dzur, “The Democratic Roots of Academic Professionalism”).  Dzur, Weinberg, and Avila 
are writing about higher education, but the same arguments apply, with minimal tweaking, to the K-12 
world. 
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hermetic research and publishing—which we know is valued—for the work of public 
engagement—which we’re worried might not be—is really scary.  Even for people who 
really want to, like me, and like many of my colleagues.  For most of us, it’s not 
something we can do alone. 
Fortunately, new markets and new interpretive communities are starting to form.  
At a handful of K-12 schools, colleges, and universities across the country, often the 
workplaces of the public work scholars I’ve been citing, there are school-wide public 
work programs in various stages of development.  The Public Achievement program, run 
out of Augsburg College in Minneapolis, teaches principles of organizing—and provides 
practice!—for K-12 schoolchildren in many states and several countries.166  And the 
“coaches” for these Public Achievement teams often come from the growing number of 
colleges and universities with public work programs of their own, such as the Action 
Research Teams (ARTs) at Northern Arizona University (NAU): 
What are the impacts of the ARTs on NAU students as they engage with deeply 
political issues democratically developed with community partners?  Many have 
stated that this work has simply changed their lives.  In response to a question 
concerning their sense of agency in the face of challenges to their communities, a 
first year student who had been a Public Achievement coach for elementary 
students in a low-income minority neighborhood lifted his forearm straight up at a 
right angle from the table upon which his elbow rested, and spoke:  “You know, 
before this experience, all the problems in the world just seemed like walls that 
were impossible to move or get around.”  Then, gesturing toward his forearm now 
lowered to the table, he said, “But now, after seeing what a team of kids can do 
with a little coaching—they learn to work collaboratively together to identify, 
research, and act on an issue—everywhere I see challenges, I’m starting to see 
pathways.”  There is no more import thing that a student can say than this.167 
                                                
166 See note 97. 
167 Romand Coles and Blase Scarnati, “Transformational Ecotones in Higher Education:  Craftsperson-
Ethos and Northern Arizona University’s CRAFTS Movement,” in Democracy’s Education:  A Symposium 
on Power, Public Work, and the Meaning of Citizenship, ed. Harry C. Boyte (Nashville, TN:  Vanderbilt 
University Press, forthcoming 2014).  See the other articles in this volume, including the others cited here, 
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Not all of us are lucky enough to work at schools like NAU.  Many of us, like me, 
are the odd (wo)men out in our departments, with most of our colleagues seemingly 
content with their non-public work.  Sometimes, over the long haul, this can be changed; 
but sometimes it can’t, at least not with the amount of organized people, money, and 
ideas we have right now.  For us, the major public work we can do on a day-to-day basis 
is in our own classrooms.  There are clear limits to this kind of work—we should not 
delude ourselves into thinking our teaching will enact revolutions—but there’s also some 
very real potential inherent in a group of people coming together in a space on a regular 
basis, for an extended number of months, with no other expectation than to learn from 
each other. 
In my many years of considering the limits and potential of classroom-teaching as 
public work, I find myself coming back again and again to a rarely-discussed but near-
ubiquitous pedagogical experience:  driver’s ed.  My own experience, I think, was pretty 
typical.  It was taught in a drab, windowless room in the basement of the local AAA.  Our 
teacher was Mr. Looby.  He was an ex-cop—who had once visited my first grade class, 
and whom I, with my six-year-old’s ability to leverage power through relationships, once 
convinced to let my dad off from a traffic ticket on his fortieth birthday—and he taught 
like it.  He stood at the front of the room and lectured.  We sat in rows and took notes.  
He wasn’t a bad lecturer, all told, but he was absolutely not interested in learning from 
us.  When he asked us questions, they were always Socratic; he’d keep pushing until he 
                                                                                                                                            
for more examples of such institution-wide public work initiatives.  They are still relatively rare, but their 
numbers are growing! 
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got the answer he wanted.  He had the knowledge, power, and authority; he was the 
teacher, giving it to us, and we were the students, receiving it. 
I would never teach this way.  I don’t think I could even make myself do it if I 
tried.  It represents, in so many ways, everything I think is wrong about teaching.  It 
seems to be exactly what Paulo Freire would call the “banking concept” of education, 
where the teacher has all the knowledge (in the bank), and the students come to class 
(with their empty bank accounts) to “withdraw” some of that knowledge.  The problem 
with the “banking concept,” simply, is that it leaves no room for students to have any 
agency.  It’s service through and through, with the teacher as the active provider and the 
students as the passive consumers.  The approach Freire proposes instead, commonly 
known as “critical pedagogy,” is based on what he calls the “problem posing” approach:  
we teachers present our students with a problem—a real problem, which we ourselves 
don’t have the answer to—and we learn together, we from our students’ skills and 
knowledge and they from ours, as we work together to solve that problem.  Problem-
posing educators tend to set our classrooms up in circles, not rows; to sit among our 
students, not stand in front of them; and to ask questions, not make statements.  In the 
best case scenario, uncommon but possible, problem-posing teachers and students can 
turn their classroom into a free space.168 
Mr. Looby, needless to say, didn’t do any of this.  But—and here’s the point—he 
was an extremely effective teacher anyway.  I learned a whole lot, got a perfect score on 
my driving test, and even to this day, while dealing with a tailgater or navigating a tricky 
interchange on the Jersey Turnpike, I’ll hear Mr. Looby’s voice reminding me what to 
                                                
168 See Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Chapter 2. 
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do.  So what gives?  Well for one, he’s just a naturally gifted teacher.  He has a solid 
sense of rhythm, pacing, and humor.  But the other, bigger reason is that the self-interest 
of everyone in that classroom was crystal clear—and all the same.  He wanted us to know 
how to drive.  We wanted us to know how to drive.  No negotiation or relationship-
building required.  (We experience these kinds of uncomplicated acts of pedagogy every 
day.  When I get off the highway, roll down my window, and ask the guy on the street 
whether the Waffle House is to the right or to the left, I don’t want him to do a one-to-one 
with me or engage me in Freirean, problem-posing dialogue.  I’m hungry.) 
The kind of teaching that happens at weeklong is very similar:   
The IAF structures its national training around teaching what the IAF claims is 
the “correct” way to organize.  Participants come to learn, not to discuss as 
equals.  In that sense, training is quite an appropriate term for the educational 
sessions.  IAF training is not a “sharing experience,” as it can often be in other 
community-building or participatory democratic settings.  IAF organizers at 
national training are not seeking to elicit the contributions of participants to reach 
a deeper level of shared understanding.  That is not to say that no conversations 
occur.  IAF organizers use the Socratic method in teaching, so that there is 
constant interaction between and among participants.  But the educational process 
is more akin to taking a college course with a professor who uses interactive 
methods of teaching, than it is to a study group among equals.  Organizers may 
sometimes overstep their authoritative role.  Some training participants appear to 
resent what they see as arrogance among IAF trainers.  But the vast majority of 
IAF participants accept the IAF’s authority to teach.  Otherwise, they would not 
be attending the sessions, and the local organizations to which they belong would 
not pay for these services.169 
 
This kind of teaching works at weeklong, like at driver’s ed, because everyone’s 
self-interest is the same.  Everybody’s there to build leadership and organizing skills, and 
everybody gets that next week, trainers and trainees will be working side by side on 
                                                
169 Warren, Dry Bones Rattling, 225. 
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organizing campaigns that represent the epitome of critical pedagogy, posing problems 
and working together to solve them out of clear and shared self-interest. 
School, alas, is a more complicated case.  Here, self-interest is neither so clear nor 
so shared.  If you’ve worked as a classroom teacher for any length of time, you know 
what I’m talking about.  We teachers—who, given the current economic and political 
situation, are bound to be in it for the love and not the money—usually have a strong self-
interest in teaching our students things, in their leaving our classes with new knowledge 
and new skills.  We “critical” teachers, further, we want to guide our students through 
meaningful experiences of relationship-building and problem-solving that will increase 
their ability to think, act, and reflect.  We teachers who are looking to do public work, on 
top of all this, want to create a situation—a free space—where students can understand 
and exercise their own agency, their ability to act in public and work collectively to shape 
their world.170 
                                                
170 Public work, then, is related to but not exactly the same as critical pedagogy.  They share a lot of the 
same goals and commitments, but I see at least three big differences.  (Of course, these may vary based on 
how exactly how one defines “critical pedagogy.”)  First:  public work cannot take place, entirely, within 
the four walls of a classroom.  It must work, in some way, to create a democratic culture not just in the 
(constructed) free space of the classroom, but also through it.  Second:  public work, unlike some critical 
pedagogy, is not about “empowerment.”  (Like Trevelle at weeklong, the public work tradition rejects the 
assumption that one person can empower another—basically, a service relationship.)  Public work, rather, 
is about people being clear about their own self-interests and serious about building power together.  The 
best a teacher can do for a student, or a student for a teacher, is to work to make a free space where they 
both can build power, together.  Third:  public work requires us to be clear on everyone’s self-interest, and 
to put that self-interest at the center of the work.  Critical pedagogy isn’t always so clear about that.  
According to many critical pedagogues, the way to teach a given academic subject critically is, basically, to 
turn it into social-studies:  you make science class “critical,” for example, by studying environmental 
racism, or AIDS policy around the world.  The problem with this approach, from a public-work 
perspective, is that it doesn’t necessarily speak to the self-interest of a student who wants to do science.  
(One imagines the voice of Dr. Evil:  “A critical science project?”)  A public-work approach to science, on 
the other hand, might put science students into dialogue with local residents and community groups, to see 
what scientific questions are affecting their lives, and how they could all investigate those questions 
together, using the practices of science.  For a thorough and thoughtful introduction to “critical pedagogy,” 
for better and worse, see Ira Shor, Empowering Education:  Critical Teaching for Social Change (Chicago, 
IL:  University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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Our students, on the other hand, might just want an A. 
Usually not.  Usually they’re looking for all kinds of things, including some 
things they might not (yet) be aware of.  Like most people who haven’t been to 
weeklong, and even some of us who have, they’re still figuring out their self-interest.171  
But unlike at weeklong, or driver’s ed, we can’t assume we know their self-interest, or 
that it’s the same as ours.  Especially in the all-too-common situation where they’re there 
against their will—because they’re under sixteen, or they have to fulfill a graduation 
requirement, or whatever.  To do public work in this context, part of that work—the first 
and maybe the most important part—has got to be to get to know our students.172  And to 
get real with them:  to get clear on what their self-interests are (as opposed what we 
might like them to be); to get clear with them about what our self-interests are (which are 
just as important as theirs, if we’re to have a relationship based on agency rather than 
service);173 to get serious about what is and is not possible in this classroom (including 
                                                
171 There’s an obvious danger of lapsing into Thomas Frank territory here:  of believing, as I did in the 
epigram to Chapter One, that our students are “dumbfucks…who who THINK they know what they need 
but honestly have no clue.”  The trick is to remember that if they’re not always in touch with their own self-
interest, neither are we—with theirs, or with our own.  To teach, as public work, means to probe all of our 
self-interests together, even as we work together to work and act in them.  
172 Freire took months, before any educational effort began, to do research on the culture he was going to 
work in, including lots of relational meetings.  (See Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Chapter 3.)  Most 
of us don’t have the resources to do that.  But we can take it as an ideal, and do as much as we can, in that 
direction:  we can meet with our students, give incentives to them to meet with us, and structure classroom 
activity and assignments in ways that allow us to learn as much as we can about them, where they come 
from, what they’re about, and what makes them tick.  Finally, sometimes the most difficult part, we can be 
present and honest with them, in a way that allows them to get the same knowledge of us. 
173 It’s easy for us teachers—like all workers in a service-based field—to forget about our own desires for 
dignity, community, purpose, and real-ness.  We help neither ourselves nor our students by doing so.  
Boyte has observed that teachers “feel increasingly cut off from local communities” (see Barker, “The 
Colonization of Civil Society,” 15).  The recent, neoliberal move toward de-skilling teachers and set-in-
stone curricula, combined with the cyberpunk obsession with technology to solve every problem—both 
often backed by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation—often “makes the teacher feel like a functionary” 
(Crawford and Rose, “Work and Dignity,” 44).  Teachers, no less than students, are subject to loneliness.  
Teaching, even with all its opportunities for student-interaction, can be uniquely lonely:  you are almost 
always working by yourself, rarely with colleagues.  Teaching, as public work, can and must address 
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our power to impose our self-interests on them, and how we plan to use it); and, given all 
these realities, to find some common ground to start building on.174   
The good news is, this common ground is almost always there.  As in broad-based 
community organizing:  the Arendtian impulse, if nothing else, unites us.  It’s still so rare 
for a teacher to take students’ self-interest seriously, let alone to work with them to 
express their agency (if not exactly build power), that for many students it’s a revelation.  
Even gestures as simple as taking the time to learn each other’s names, putting the desks 
into a circle and sitting down in the circle with them, allowing the class to proceed based 
on their ideas rather than a PowerPoint presentation, and giving them the opportunity to 
research and write about the things they care about (in whatever frame is necessary to 
teach the course material)—for some of our students, it’ll be the first time they’ve ever 
experienced something like this.  If my experience is any guide, a few will resist it, but a 
great many will embrace it. 
The final step is to exercise that agency—to make things together.  Real things.  
Things that matter to us, here, now.  (Not things that just matter because they’re 
preparing you for the “real world.”)  In writing-based classes, this means, above all, no 
“papers.”  Writing assignments, like all other assignments, need to let students deal with 
                                                                                                                                            
teachers’ loneliness as well.  Co-teaching is one way to start, if—as I have occasionally been able to do—
we can find our way around most institutions’ ways of dis-incentivizing it.  Building closer relationships 
with students is another.  There are risks here, of course, and professional lines we must be careful not to 
cross.  But most of us are so far on the other side of that line, we don’t even come close. 
174 The power part can be especially tricky, and it’s especially important.  An academic classroom is not 
democratic.  Period.  It involves an unequal power relationship between teacher and student.  If we want to 
be serious, it’s essential that we acknowledge it and talk about it openly and critically—even when 
(hopefully!) that means joking and laughing about it, too.  But pretending it doesn’t exist doesn’t help 
anyone, and it can actually end up disempowering our students.  See Lisa D. Delpit, “The Silenced 
Dialogue:  Power and Pedagogy in Educating Other People’s Children,” Harvard Educational Review 58, 
no. 3 (August 1988):  280-298; and Ellsworth, “Why Doesn’t This Feel Empowering?” 
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(at least some) material that matters to them; they need to know whom they’re writing 
for; and they need this audience to actually receive the piece of writing, and if such a 
thing can be arranged, to respond to it.  (In smaller, earlier writing assignments in my 
classes, that audience is usually the rest of the class; they post the writing to a blog or 
wiki, and others are required to read and comment on it.  But there’s still a big difference 
between writing directly for the rest of the class, and writing a blithe, faked “paper” that 
the rest of the class will happen to read.  As with most parts of public work, it’s all in the 
context.) 
Finally:  what about power?  Other than the institutional power we have over our 
students—grades, etc.—is there room to build power with our students?  This is 
uncharted territory.  Certainly at places like Northern Arizona University, which has 
embraced public work across the whole institution, some serious power-building is 
possible.  But just in a classroom?  I remain suspicious.  One does not simply build a 
power organization, in a matter of months, with a group of students who come in with all 
kinds of different self-interests. 
But what is possible—and is, for me at least, both the greatest potential for 
teaching as public work and the reason why teaching remains so deeply in my own self-
interest—is the formation of relationships.  Deep, lasting relationships, which can change 
people in all kinds of ways, including ways that have profound public implications.  
Relationships that go beyond the typical “my teacher changed my life” stories, and 
actually provide the kind of lived experience of crossing cultural boundaries necessary to 
participate in a culture war-free future.  At the risk of sounding sappy, I will close with 
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the story of one such relationship, which changed my own life, and which suggests 
what’s possible. 
It’s the story of a young man named Mike.175  I met Mike during my first summer 
at Appel Farm, when he was twelve and I was twenty-four.  (Appel Farm, where we live 
with students 24/7 for weeks on end, and often see the same students year after year, is an 
environment much more conducive for this kind of relationship-building.  We need more 
places like this.)  Mike was from South Jersey.  Way South Jersey:  south of Philadelphia, 
south of some parts of Maryland, south of the Mason-Dixon line.  Full of farmland, and 
not much else:  the part that’s actually the Garden State.  He grew up here, poor and 
white, spending the first eight-or-so years of his life in a trailer.  (He came to camp on a 
three-year full scholarship.)   
Mike, to put it bluntly, was a menace.  His father, who listened to Limbaugh 
every day, had told him to watch out for all of those kids—you know, the ones that’ll be 
everywhere at an arts camp—and if one of them ever tried to “come onto” him…well, he 
knew martial arts.  (He told me he’d told his son all this.  I kept my professional 
composure.)  Our bunk, of course, ended up being about as diverse as you could possibly 
imagine:  it was Mike, plus three poorer black kids from Newark (two loud, one quiet), a 
couple of richer suburban white kids (one loud, one quiet), and yes, one quiet, well-off, 
openly gay Latino kid from Queens, who loved to knit and wear tight pink jeans. 
You can guess the rest.  Only it was probably worse.  The first night, Mike was so 
homesick, and so scared, he sat on my bed after lights out, crying and hyperventilating 
and begging me to call his parents to come pick him up.  (I sat with him, and tried to 
                                                
175 His real name.  With his permission. 
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comfort him, but made no such call.)  His pain continued, and he expressed it the only 
way he knew how.  Almost every day there were fights.  He said something to make one 
of the kids from Newark mad, or hit too hard in a pillow fight, and down it spiraled.  He 
constantly insisted his bunk-mate (you know which one) was “giving him looks”—which 
he wasn’t—and nearly cried when I wouldn’t believe him.  He got into more fights.  He 
chipped a tooth.  I wanted to quit.  I wanted him to be thrown out.  Neither happened.   
So I stuck with him, more for lack of other options than out of any particular 
heroism or generosity on my part.  And slowly, ever so slowly, we started to build a 
relationship.  Out of total honesty.  I couldn’t have hidden how pissed I was at him, even 
if I tried.  (And I didn’t.)  We started talking.  What did we have in common?  A few 
things, it turned out.  Music, to an extent; he was a rock musician, and I was a classical 
singer, but it was something.  And, of course, politics.  He was as far right as you can 
imagine, and he was very open with me about it.  I was as far left as he could imagine—
and I was very open with him about it.  We kept talking.  By the end of four weeks, he 
felt the growing love beneath our differences.  As did I.  He told me all about his 
childhood on the last night of camp, sitting on my bed after lights out once again.  When 
his parents picked him up—his father looking genuinely happy to see me—he bounded 
up to me and showed me his already-filled-out application for next year.  (Oh boy, I 
thought.) 
Sitting at the laundromat in Minneapolis that day in 2009, with my nose in my 
Freire, listening to those two men talking about how Obama was “telling people how to 
think” and Glenn Beck was on their side, there was nothing I could do.  As Freire was in 
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the process of telling me:  “Their view of the world reflects their situation in the world.”  
In this case, that situation was being unemployed or underemployed, and not knowing 
exactly what or who was oppressing them, stripping away their dignity and agency, but 
they knew something or someone was.  And they knew they didn’t like it.  And they were 
trying to do something about it—as we all do—with the habitus and the interpretive 
strategies they had.  And I, with no relationship to them, and no understanding of their 
self-interest beyond what I’d read in Thomas Frank, was in no position to change any of 
that. 
But with Mike, it was different.  We had the time.  Partially out of luck and 
circumstance.  Partially because we made it.  We kept up with each other.  He came back 
to camp the following year and got kicked out for fighting.  We kept talking anyway.  
Slowly, he started to change.  I had no idea how much I was responsible for that.  He 
clearly thought I had something to do with it; he told me so.  He didn’t change 
completely.  But when he came back to camp for a third year, he was talking a lot more, 
and fighting a lot less.  No:  he wasn’t fighting at all.  And he was open to relationships 
with all kinds of kids, including the openly gay ones. 
I came back to camp for a fourth summer, in 2011.  (Nor was this my last; I’m 
currently preparing for my seventh summer, in 2014.)  Mike wouldn’t be back:  his three-
year scholarship was up.  On the way down at the beginning of the summer, while driving 
through endless cornfields, I saw a placard nailed to a telephone pole that announced that 
the Tea Party Patriots of Gloucester County would be hosting a rally that Saturday at the 
Salem County Fairgrounds.  I was already a student of American populism and 
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organizing, and I’d just taught a course partially about the Tea Party, but I’d never been 
to a Tea Party rally before.  Come to think of it, I wasn’t sure if I’d ever actually met a 
real-live Tea Partier before in my life.  So of course I went.  I drove the half-hour from 
Appel Farm to the fairgrounds, paid my $5, and parked my car. 
I hadn’t walked fifty feet before I saw Mike’s parents.  They seemed genuinely 
happy to see me.  I was genuinely happy to see them.  They told me Mike had already 
gone inside, and they gestured for me to come in with them. 
I’m not sure if I’ll ever forget that day.  Not because anything shocking or 
outrageous or offensive happened.  Quite the opposite.  I found people’s political 
positions offensive, in all the predictable ways, but as people they were friendly and 
welcoming and interested to talk.  (I’m sure it helped that I was white; I don’t remember 
seeing anyone there who wasn’t.  I’m honestly not sure how they would have received 
me otherwise.  And I’m not sure how much Mike’s parents knew about my political 
views; Mike certainly knew plenty.)  We walked up and down the rows of booths, and I 
met the local NRA folks, the local constitution-protection people, and so on.  When 
anyone asked me why I’d come, I answered—honestly—that I was interested in learning 
more about the Tea Party.  I never talked too long at any one booth, but there always 
seemed to be more to talk about; I imagine, without too much work, we could find some 
significant patches of shared self-interest.  We listened to a Texas preacher-turned-
organizer give a fiery speech about how he’d built a local organization to oppose sex 
education in schools; Mike and his dad told me later they didn’t really like the speech; 
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they thought it was too extreme.  (They wished I’d been there earlier; apparently the 
Geno’s Cheesesteaks guy had given a much better speech, on economic issues.)   
There’s no grand conclusion to this story.  We parted ways that day; I went back 
to camp, they to their rural right-wing lives.  We spent another evening together, later that 
summer, first just Mike and me having dinner, then later with his parents, having a lively 
and friendly debate about tax policy while sitting on the living room floor.  We’re still in 
touch, from time to time.  Mike’s now finishing his first year of college.  He’s nearly 
fluent in German, and he’s thinking about majoring in sociology.  We’ve got any number 
of things to talk about these days.  I can imagine lots of ways he and I—and even maybe 
his parents—could find common self-interest, and could organize together around if need 
be.  But I realize we haven’t really talked “politics” in a while.  For all I know, he might 
still be a right-wing Republican who enjoys Glenn Beck non-ironically. 
And honestly, either way, I’m not sure it really matters. 
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EPILOGUE 
Three Steps Toward a Workable Solution 
 
  
…They are good at a certain kind of analysis but never have a workable solution 
in the last chapter.   
—Ed Chambers, cont.1 
 
 
Guilty as charged? 
Guess it depends what he means, or you or I mean, by a “workable solution.”   
I think we got close, by the end of the last chapter.  Still, it’s not like there was a 
list of instructions anywhere.  So in this short epilogue, I’ll try to be a little more explicit.  
There’s not  much new material here.  Basically, I’ll be rephrasing sections of Chapter 
Four into a simple, three-step guide, a codification of a method I realize I’ve been 
following in my own work for years.   
A guide to what, exactly?  Well initially I thought of it as a guide to teaching.  
Which it still is.  (You’ll find many of the examples, and some of the assumptions, are 
teacher-slanted.)  But as I stepped out of the classroom and into the worlds of choral 
singing, theater directing, and nonprofit consulting, I discovered it could be a guide to, 
well, pretty much anything—as long as the goal is to do it as public work.   
So here they are:  three steps, plus some commentary, written in an indeterminate 
style, somewhere between a doctoral dissertation, a consultant’s report, a self-help guide, 
and a sketch.   
May you, reader, and perhaps you too, Ed, find it a worthy “last chapter.” 
 
                                                
1 Chambers, Roots for Radicals, 110.  Recall from the Prologue epigram that the sentence begins:  “Avoid 
Ph.D.s.  They can’t act.  They get lost in writing books for one another…” 
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Step One:  Get To Know Each Other 
This is the most important thing. 
All public work comes from relationships.  Relationships with colleagues, 
collaborators, funders, students, supervisors, subordinates—anyone other than you who is 
involved with the work.  (Your relationship with yourself is important too, of course; see 
the sections of Chapter Four on loneliness and self-interest training.)  The single most 
important part of any work, at least if it’s to have any chance of being public, is to build 
those relationships as strongly as possible.  This must be a priority from Day One. 
All of that may sound obvious.  In practice, it’s often not.  It is very easy, 
especially when doing tasks that feel important and urgent, to throw the relationships out 
the window, or at least to put them off until later; there’s no time right now.  All too 
often, tasks trump relationships, and efficiency trumps capacity-building.  This is the urge 
we’ve got to resist.  Public work is not about efficiency.  It’s about long, slow, profound 
change.  To do public work we’ve got to be people-oriented.  The people and the 
relationships come first, always.   
This doesn’t mean we don’t get the tasks done (we do).  Or that we don’t get the 
tasks done well (we usually get them done better) or quickly (it depends).  What it does 
mean is, we don’t operate in crisis mode.  We take the time to listen, and we don’t 
steamroll people, no matter how urgent the situation seems.  We take time:  the time it 
takes to build the relationships, to develop them, and to let the work, tasks, and issues 
flow from them—not the other way around. 
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Lead from the relationships should be a slogan for everything we do.  (“Issues 
follow relationships,” Chambers wrote.)  Keep it as a fortune cookie; check it against 
everything you do.  If you’re not leading from the relationships, see how you  might be 
able to adjust what you’re doing in order to lead from the relationships.  One challenge I 
struggle with, in this vein, is my tendency to come into a classroom and immediately talk 
for ten or fifteen minutes about things that seem so important to me—before I have any 
idea where my students are at.   Far better, in some way or another, to structure some 
kind of question, discussion, or activity where I get to hear everyone else a chance to talk 
and express where they are, what’s on their minds, etc., first.  Then when I talk, it gets to 
be in the form of a response:  I now know where they are, and I can talk directly to their 
needs and questions and issues.  People also tend to listen much better that way, in my 
experience:  I’ve demonstrated that I care, and I’m following their lead, not the other way 
around. 
Getting to know each other also means taking some risks.  It’s not the easiest or 
most comfortable thing in the world, to go into a classroom full of reticent Minnesota 
college students and tell them to get up, move the chairs around, and participate in a silly, 
movement-based game so we can all learn each other’s names.  But I do it.  In almost 
every course I teach.  And it works.  It establishes a tone.  It moves the parameters of 
what’s expected, and what’s possible.  And most importantly:  it actually means we all 
know each other’s names.  I cannot possibly stress how important that is, to know 
everyone’s name.  It changes everything.  Everything after that feels better, closer, more 
comfortable. 
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A useful (if limited) way to think about relationship-building is by thinking in 
terms of the three particular forms of one-to-one interaction that Alinskyan organizers use 
at important milestones.  The first is the one-to-one relational meeting (often just called a 
“one-to-one”).  One-to-ones are inquiry-based:  we’re not looking to “get” anything out 
of them.  We’re just looking for a better knowledge of a person—including that person’s 
self-interest—and a better relationship with that person.  One-to-ones are the basic 
building block of all serious relationships.  Whenever possible, use them that way.   
The second is the proposition.  This is when, after having established a 
relationship with a person (though at least one one-to-one), we’re asking that person to do 
something, to make a commitment, to take on a particular role or responsibility.  
Propositions are prepared in advance:  we come in a plan, we make a specific ask of the 
person we’re propositioning, we share our vision of the person’s potential and how saying 
yes to our proposition will help that person fulfill that potential, we pledge to partner that 
person in fulfilling that role or responsibility (in whatever way is appropriate), and we 
ask that person, gently but firmly, for a commitment.   
The third, finally, is the agitation.  This is when there’s something getting in the 
way of that person doing what we know that person could be doing.  Like propositions, 
agitations are strategically planned and prepared in advance, with a standard structure.  
We present the person with three judgments and a proposition:  (1) where s/he is now, (2) 
where s/he could be, (3) what’s in the way, and finally (4) what we think s/he should do.  
Then we let the person respond and “own it”—including the decision either to accept or 
to reject our agitation. 
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These three forms of engagement aren’t appropriate in every situation, but they 
are useful to think with.  When doing a serious interaction with someone we’re working 
with, it’s sometimes helpful to ask:  is this a one-to-one?  a proposition?  an agitation?  
none of the above, but something else?  Making that decision can help us get clear and 
strategic about exactly what we’re trying to get out of the interaction, and how we’re 
trying to get it.  If it’s a one-to-one:  what are we learning, about the person’s self-
interest?  Are we really listening to the person?  Where can we probe further, to listen and 
learn more?  If it’s a proposition:  do we have a strong enough relationship with the 
person?  Have we planned it out?  Have we gone through all the steps, and been clear 
about each?  If it’s an agitation:  all the questions we’d ask for a proposition, plus, how is 
agitating this person in both of our self-interests?  Are we keeping our own feelings in 
check, and keeping it about the other person? 
Finally:  the more we build relationships, the more we can build on those 
relationships.  Part of that is about propositioning and agitating people into growing and 
doing more.  Another part of it is using the relationships we have as a springboard for 
other relationships.  Chambers always asks, in a one-to-one, for other people he should be 
talking to.  This is how to build capacity:  to build relationships, and strengthen them, and 
use them to build more relationships, and so on. 
 
Step Two:  Make Things Together 
It almost doesn’t matter what you make.   
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I mean of course it does—and depending on the situation, it might matter a lot—
but what I mean is:  there is value in the making, itself, apart from any intrinsic value that 
the thing you make might have.  There is value in the experience of you and me coming 
together and working together on our world, to add to that world something that matters, 
at least to us.  The more of this kind of work that’s in our lives, the more public and less 
lonely those lives are likely to be. 
When we make things together, we are all producers.  (By definition.)  Again this 
may sound trite, but think about how rare it is that we actually get to do it.  The dominant 
model, for so much of our lives, is not collective production but individual consumption.  
This goes for entertainment—we sit passively in front of the TV or movie screen or the 
computer screen (even in Web 2.0, most of what we actually do is still consumption of 
stuff made by others, and monetized by others still).  And for politics—we consume 
news, we consume advertisement, we consume talking points, and we occasionally go 
into an isolated booth to choose whom we’d prefer to consume from.  And for 
education—individual students, at separate desks, consuming information from lectures 
and textbooks, and told not to talk too much.  Or even the newer, “activity”-based models 
of K-12 instruction, where students are supposedly doing things and working with others, 
but the lessons and outcomes are tightly scripted and planned—by someone else.  (Often 
not even by the teacher.)  Kids are no more stupid than we are, and often less.  They’ll 
know if it’s bullshit. 
There’s nothing wrong with consumption—as long as we’re okay with the status 
quo.  But if we’re looking to change something, if we don’t like the kind of schooling and 
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politics and entertainment we’re being fed, the only way to do that is through production.  
And unless you’re lucky enough to be fabulously wealthy—i.e., with enough organized 
money to constitute a significant power base on its own—you’ll need to produce 
collectively. 
Plus, collective work often ends up being a lot more fun and personally fulfilling.  
A classroom based on the principle that we’re all making things together—whether those 
“things” be pieces of writing, other projects, interventions, or even just interpretations of 
texts and theory—is far more fun and fulfilling, as well as more pedagogically effective, 
than a classroom based on the principle of I-the-teacher have something and you-the-
students are going to consume it.  Note that this does not necessarily mean lecture = bad 
or discussion = good.  A “discussion” where the teacher always knows the answers s/he’s 
looking for, and doesn’t consider others, is not an act of collective production.  And a 
“lecture,” given in a context where it’s responding to expressed interests or needs, is a 
critical part of the work of collective production.  (Just make sure you, the teacher, aren’t 
the only one who gets to lecture!) 
Healthy, sustainable public work is based in what the Marxists call praxis—
theory/practice, action/reflection—and what the Alinskyans call research-action-
evaluation.  Same thing.  It’s an ongoing cycle:  we make something together, then we 
think together about how it went, then we incorporate those thoughts into the next thing 
we make together, then we think together about how that went, and so on.  Again, for 
these purposes, it doesn’t matter what that thing we’re making is.  Even when we’re just 
making the interpretation of a text, when we understand what we’re doing in that way, 
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rather than just “reading and discussing something,” it transforms the experience—into 
something where agency is possible, and probable. 
 
Step Three:  Get Real 
This is the part about being clear and serious.  About knowing what’s possible 
and what’s not, in any given situation, and then working based on that knowledge.  The 
two main factors that determine what’s possible and what’s not are power and self-
interest. 
Sometimes getting real can be depressing.  When we understand power—that the 
people with more organized people, money, and (institutionalized) ideas behind them 
tend to get their way, and the people with less don’t—suddenly it becomes hard to think 
about doing work that’s going to change the world, or about being a revolutionary 
teacher or writer or artist.  When we understand self-interest—that people are going to do 
what they care about, and what feels right to them to do, and there’s no use telling them 
what they care about or what they’re feeling is wrong—suddenly it becomes hard to 
imagine our neighbors or political leaders making decisions because it’s the right thing to 
do, or our students putting their hearts into our classes for the love of learning. 
But it doesn’t have to be depressing.  It can actually be liberating.  First of all, it 
liberates us from silly false expectations.  Of course we’re not going to change the world 
if we just come up with the right in-class exercise—it’ll never happen, it can never 
happen, so we don’t have to worry or fret about it.  We won’t be heroes; we can’t be 
heroes; we don’t need to be heroes.  If the leaders of the black freedom movement tried to 
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end segregation all at once, they would have failed:  they didn’t have the power.  So they 
didn’t.  They “cut”—out of this big problem—the smaller issue of segregation in the 
Montgomery bus system.  That, they had the power to tackle.  By realistically analyzing 
what they did not have the power to do, and acting on that analysis, they made real and 
really important change.   
Second, it liberates us from the academic and para-academic myth that there’s a 
“real world” out there somewhere, that we and our work aren’t part of.  This is the world.  
Right here.  This is it.  (Same thing when people talk about “the people,” which never 
means the people here.  Here we are.)  Alinsky and Chambers talk about the “world-as-it-
is” and the “world-as-it-should be.”  Cynics believe the “real world” is just the world-as-
it-is.  Naïve people, who are often cynics in their own way, believe the “real world” is 
just the world-as-it-should-be.  They are both wrong.  The real world includes both of 
these worlds.  It is defined, as Chambers says, by the dialectical tension between them.  
This means that there will always be limits on our work, but there will also always be 
opportunities to push those limits.  My students will be taking too many credits at a time 
and working ridiculous hours on top of it, and they will want to get a decent grade in my 
class with as little work as possible.  At the same time, if I design a course that both holds 
them accountable for the work I expect them to do, and speaks (at least in some ways) to 
things they care about and want to know, those students will often put in a whole lot of 
work, learn a ton—and have fun doing it. 
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That’s the one last part.  Having fun, and having fun together, is an essential part 
of any good public work.  They teach you that at weeklong:  one of the essential steps to 
any public action—the last—is to “celebrate.” 
As I’m about to do, right now. 
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APPENDIX 
A Doctoral Dissertation in Thirteen-Plus-One Facebook Updates 
 
 
In the following pages, you will find the evidence of a little side project I 
conducted while writing this dissertation.  Between September 2013 and February 
2014—the period during which I also wrote the first draft—I wrote and posted thirteen 
public Book Updates to my Facebook profile.  (Plus one extra, tangentially-related not-
quite-Book Update for Christmas.)  I tried to keep rough pace with the writing of the 
chapters, so the Book Updates would come out at approximately the same time I was 
writing about the same subjects in the chapters themselves.  Together, these thirteen-plus-
one Book Updates chronicle the progress of my argument, from the beginning of Chapter 
One through the end of Chapter Four, in condensed and (I hope) readable form.   
Why did I do this?  Pretty much out of naked self-interest.  I had set myself an 
intense, rigorous writing schedule, and after two years of trying to write this book and 
producing virtually no text at all, I wanted to make damn well sure I’d do it this time.  
These Book Updates were a way to hold me publicly accountable for seeing the project 
through, and a way to continually remind me that this project was, in fact, public; it 
wasn’t just about me.  They also provided me a way to indulge (and test) my pretense that 
the issues I was writing about were important, that they needed to be discussed publicly, 
and that people actually wanted to hear and talk about them.  (I reproduce a large and 
representative sample, but not all, of my readers’ comments below.  They are an archive 
in and of themselves.  It is particularly interesting to see which Updates receive a lot of 
   379 
 
comments and likes, and which not so much.  Unsurprisingly, given the audience and 
medium, Chapter Three wins hands-down.) 
Writing these Updates was also a useful and challenging exercise for me, to see if 
I could re-tell the same story I was writing about here, in a much different format:  faster-
paced, more colloquial, less scholarly, more direct, and above all, shorter.  As you can 
imagine, it had its ups and downs.  I reproduce these Updates as archival material; they 
are mostly un-revised first drafts; I can’t necessarily stand behind everything I say here.  
At the same time, I am proud of the work I did.  In some places, I think, I express my 
arguments here in the Book Updates better than I do in the book itself.  And there were 
several instances in which, after writing a Book Update, I would go back to the 
corresponding section of the book and revise it based on the insights I’d had while 
writing the Update. 
One final note:  I reproduced these updates (and a smaller number of comments) 
in a thirty-page “tl/dr” document (Internet-speak for “too long / didn’t read”) that I 
distributed to people coming to the dissertation defense.  The idea—we’ll see how well it 
works—is to have as informed an audience as possible, so we can dispense with a lot of 
the summary and get right into the interesting and difficult questions. 
Enjoy. 
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BOOK UPDATE #1: ON METHOD 
 
So as some of you know, I'm writing a book this year. I could call it a dissertation -- that 
would also be accurate -- but then I wouldn't want to write it. Dissertations are a private 
hazing ritual, required by an institution and read usually by about four people. Books are 
public, at least in ambition. In order to keep myself honest about the public nature of my 
work, I will be posting periodic updates on what I'm doing and writing about. I'd be very 
interested in hearing your thoughts on any of this, and you will no doubt see some of 
those thoughts show up in the book. (Properly cited, of course. Because I heart 
intellectual property laws.) 
 
I started today. Well actually I started about two years ago. But I started the earnest, 
systematic work of putting the thing together today. My goal is to have a (very) rough 
draft done by Christmas, and a defensible draft done by April.  
 
I'll get into the content of the book in future posts, as I start writing it. For this first post, I 
want to talk about method -- how we do what we do. I have never written a book before. 
The longest thing I've ever written, play adaptations aside, is a forty-four-page thesis 
paper. So this is a new thing for me. I've tried various ways to write, over the past two 
years, and they've all failed. I tried all kinds of different outlines -- didn't work. I tried 
just sitting down and banging it out -- didn't work. I tried talking it through and recording 
myself and then writing from there -- didn't work. I got all sorts of suggestions from all 
sorts of people about all sorts of methods. Most often I got told that "everyone has their 
own method, and you just need to find yours." Subject-very agreement aside, no doubt 
true. Yet utterly unhelpful. So I went into today pretty scared. "White. A blank page or 
canvas." What was to stop the blank screen of death from staring me down into 
submission again? 
 
I'm convinced that some of our most important epiphanies are the ones that, in retrospect 
at least, seem completely obvious. And that's what happened to me today. That epiphany 
was, in brief: lead from what you know (not from what you don't), and what you CAN do 
(not from what you can't). Sure I haven't written anything as long or involved as a book 
before. But you know what I have done? Directed a whole ton of plays. Really difficult 
plays. With kids. With very short rehearsal periods. And I think I'm pretty good at it. 
(Camp people, feel free to chime in if I'm being inappropriately immodest.) So, I asked 
myself, why don't I write this book as if I were directing a play? That would mean: start 
with big conceptual play (in theater, source-work). Then do some reflection (table-work). 
Then write a very rough draft of each chapter (compositions and rough staging). Then go 
back and edit the hell out of it (final blocking). Most important of all, keep it fun. 
Always. If you're not having fun, do something else.  
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And that's what I did. I was dreading looking at the blank screen of death, so I barely 
touched my computer all day. I sat on the floor and wrote conceptual outlines -- lists, 
really -- of each chapter, with colored markers on big pieces of easel paper. I 
consolidated my notes from the past three years. At the end of the day, when I cleaned 
up, I felt like a kid putting away his toys. I had budgeted four hours of work, but I 
couldn't stop -- I kept going, until I had over eight pages of easel paper covered in color-
coded notes. Some of which tomorrow, on another piece (or several) of easel paper, I'll 
turn into an outline of Chapter One. And then I'll start writing...because with all these 
notes and outlines hanging on the walls around me, I am not scared of the blank screen of 
death anymore. This is the wisdom of theater teacher Jan Mandell: can't pull ideas out of 
thin air? Then make the air thicker. And the wisdom of English teacher Michael Kuhne, 
paraphrasing Geoff Sirc: follow the fun. 
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BOOK UPDATE #2: ON "US" AND "THEM" 
 
The first chapter of the book, like every chapter thereafter, starts with a tale of a fail. A 
personal fail. (This is the point. It's a very critical book, but it's a critical of my friends, 
my colleagues, and most of all myself, with the goal not to tear us down but to 
understand and learn from our mistakes.)  
 
This tale of a fail took place a few years ago, while I was sitting in a laundromat in 
Minneapolis, waiting for my clothes to dry (and reading, of all things, Freire's 
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED) and listening two guys -- 30s or 40s, working-
class, one white, one Latino -- bash the hell out of Obama. He was "telling people what to 
think" about health care. Versus Glenn Beck, who was letting people speak their minds.  
 
I sat there, for almost an hour, listening to this, and felt like there was nothing I could do, 
nothing I could say. And I don't think I was wrong. Sure I could have tried to get into a 
conversation with them, ask them good problem-posing questions, etc., but they didn't 
seem in the mood. And I was pretty professor-ed up in my jacket and slacks. No, the fail 
wasn't my inability to act heroically. The fail is ours, collectively, letting what we call 
"politics" disintegrate to such a place where I, sitting with my Freire, and they, standing 
by a row of dryers mere feet away, might as well be from different planets. 
 
What is this book about? It's about that fail. It's a study in rhetoric, pedagogy, and 
organizing that tries to answer two questions. First, WHY CAN'T WE TALK WITH 
EACH OTHER? And second, WHY DO PEOPLE LIKE THESE TWO GUYS WORK 
SO ACTIVELY AGAINST THEIR OWN INTERESTS? (In this case: against their own 
cheaper, better health care?)  
 
My first move: to answer these questions right, we have to answer them together. First, 
because it's always "us" -- the pundits, politicians, academics, and related professional-
middle-class commentators like myself -- who are always defining "them"...including 
"their own interests." Second, because the logic of Culture War (US vs. THEM; fight!) 
has come to define what "politics" means to us, and we define our own interests 
accordingly. Third, because it's very likely that "we" don't act in "our" own interests any 
more than "they" do.  
 
Why do we take non-profit do-gooder jobs over better-paying corporate ones? Or do 
volunteer work? Or give to charity? Or buy fair-trade goods? Or care about the poor / 
oppressed / underprivileged / marginalized / [pick-your-term] at all? Or even choose to 
have children? All of these things make us lose money. Often, a LOT of money. We do 
them because...because they make us feel good. Or, more elementally, because they 
FEEL RIGHT.  
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So that's the next question. How did certain things come to FEEL RIGHT to certain 
groups of people, in certain places and times? Because in a lot of cases, I'm going to 
argue, it was no accident. 
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BOOK UPDATE #3: ON KANSAS 
 
"Why do people work against their own interests?" wrote Andrew Hakomaki Granger in 
response to my last post. "In the case of your friends at the laundromat the answer is 
probably simple; they've been duped." This is a popular answer. And an intellectually and 
emotionally satisfying one. We on the left side of things have entertained it for some time 
-- in fact, it's the essence of the 1968 fusion of Marx and Freud: "You have false 
consciousness!" Of course, it's usually the other people who have been duped. WE 
understand our self-interest. It's THEM over there who don't. Some of us, more 
masochistically-inclined, might say we've ALL been duped, that NONE OF US acts in 
our self-interest (which leads me to wonder, in that case, what self-interest is at all).  
 
In this book, I make the opposite argument: that we ALL act in our self-interest. All the 
time. If it appears that some people don't, that's because we don't sufficiently understand 
their self-interest. Now hold on a second. Am I saying that we all always act as we 
should, or even in ways that benefit us? Of course not. Many of us engage in all kinds of 
self- and other-destructive behavior. But we do these things because, for one reason or 
another, we have come to understand them as in our self-interest. Not because we (or 
they) have been duped, but for real, objective, understandable reasons. The challenge -- 
the challenge I take up in this book -- is to understand those reasons. And then to see 
what we can do to change them. 
 
Case in point, and the central case-study of the first chapter, is Thomas Frank's 2004 
book WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? This is maybe the best example of the 
"they've been duped" argument that's ever been written. It's well worth a read, but in 
brief: Frank, a native of Kansas, goes back to his home state to try to figure out why so 
many of its poor and working-class citizens keep voting for the Republicans -- the party 
that has destroyed their towns, outsourced their jobs, and handed their money over to the 
rich in the form of massive tax cuts. His answer? They've been duped. Specifically, 
they've been convinced by self-serving politicians and pundits that the REAL issues that 
matter aren't these "economic" issues, but rather the "social" issues. The true villains, in 
other words, aren't the greedy corporate overlords but the elitist liberals, who oppress 
them with secularism, science, smut, and most of all, abortion. So working-class Kansans 
organize themselves and build impressive mass-movements...that end up empowering 
their oppressors.  
 
It's a powerful and well-made argument, which captivated a generation of angry 
liberals...myself included. There are just two problems with it: (1) it's useless, and (2) it's 
incorrect. It's useless because it seems to say there's no possible way we can do anything 
to change the situation. And even if we could, it wouldn't work: the solution would be in 
terms of "how WE can free THEM from their false-consciousness" -- thus confirming the 
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stereotype of elitist and condescending liberals. (I don't think I'm dumb. And I wouldn't 
want to listen to someone who called me dumb. You?) It's incorrect because when you 
read the book and analyze Frank's description closely, you see that his working-class 
Kansans are merely doing what we all do: we act in ways that allow us to get by and feel 
decent about ourselves in the cultural situations we find ourselves in. That often has 
nothing to do with economic self-interest. Rich undergrads at Duke drive BMWs and buy 
expensive condos. Rich undergrads at the University of Chicago take public transit and 
live modestly. The difference is the culture: one values displays of wealth, and one 
doesn't. But in both cases, the self-interest is the same: do the things that make you 
valued in the culture you're in.  
 
Self-interest is indeed about maximizing your value, as economists would have it. But 
value isn't always about money. It's also about cultural capital (to use sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu's term). Cultural capital isn't counted in a bank; it's felt in our bodies (Bourdieu 
calls it our "habitus"). When we've got a lot of cultural capital in a given culture, we feel 
comfortable, well-liked, supported -- good. When we don't, we feel out of place, 
disconnected, alone -- bad. Which cuts all ways. Yes, some poorer Kansans support 
Republicans, because that's what's valued in the cultures where they developed their 
habitus. And for the same reason, some richer Kansans support Democrats (and thus 
incur massive tax hikes) -- because they've developed their habitus in cosmopolitan areas, 
and they just couldn't vote for someone who's pro-life.  
 
(And for the same reason, I'm currently jeopardizing my own health. For the first time in 
eleven years I'm living with my parents, and without good health insurance. I've had a 
bad cough for weeks. I know I need to get it checked out. My parents agree, and they said 
they'd pay for a doctor if I want/need. So it would seem like going to the doctor would be 
totally in my self-interest. But I've been having a really hard time making myself do it. 
My habitus is putting up an awful fight. It just feels really wrong -- either to "waste" 
hundreds of my own dollars, or to rely on my parents' "charity." (Yes, yes, I'll make 
myself go to the doctor...soon. I just bring this up to illustrate the point. Please don't 
comment with worries about my health!)) 
 
So what's the point of all this? The point is, if we want to defeat the culture wars and 
make meaningful social, political, and economic change, we've got to ask a different 
question. We can't ask, "How have these people been duped, and what can we do about 
it?" That's a dead end. We have to ask, instead, "How have these cultures, in which so 
much self-destructive behavior is so highly valued, been BUILT?" 
 
That is the question that the rest of the book will try to answer. 
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BOOK UPDATE #4: ON ORGANIZED IDEAS 
 
If you spend any time training or working as a broad-based community organizer (i.e. 
roughly in the tradition of Saul Alinsky), you'll encounter the central concept of POWER. 
The whole point of organizing is to build power. "But," interrupts the stereotypical straw-
man liberal, "power corrupts! Power is inherently oppressive! Power is the thing we're 
fighting against...we need to RESIST it!" Bullshit, say well-trained organizers. Without 
power, you can't make any change...or do anything else for that matter (other than 
whine). With it, and only with it, you can get things done. If you're serious about the 
changes you want to make in the world, you'll spend your time building power. 
 
Power, in the traditional formula, comes in two forms -- and only two forms: (1) 
organized people, and (2) organized money. Period. No wishy-washy liberal fantasies. If 
you want power, get a whole lot of people and money together. But in recent years, 
explained Pamela Twiss at a training I attended, there's been an "esoteric debate" within 
the field of organizing. Not about whether you need organized people and organized 
money -- you definitely do. But, she and others argue, you need something else 
too...namely, as Liz Loeb exclaimed from the back of the room: "Organized ideas!"  
 
Organized Ideas. That's the title of my book. (The subtitle, "Defeating the Culture Wars," 
was explained in previous installments.) It's a concept that's easy to misunderstand, 
especially for people (such as myself, sometimes) who are otherwise uncomfortable with 
power. It doesn't mean you can change the world by writing a book or publishing an 
article or becoming a "public intellectual," as goes the liberal/academic dream. It actually 
means the opposite. It means that people's ideas, their most deeply-held beliefs, are a 
product of how those people are organized. Of the communities we're organized into. If 
you're a part of a community that reads all deviance from the Bible-as-interpreted-by-
Jerry-Falwell as sinful, you're going to hate Michael Moore and Barbara Ehrenreich, no 
matter how good their arguments are. Same goes for everyone else -- we're ALL 
members of these kinds of communities (literary theorist Stanley Fish calls them 
"interpretive communities"), which have -- literally -- taught us how to read. 
 
So, to link up with where we ended last time: interpretive communities build cultural-
capital markets. Our habitus -- our sense of what "feels right," including what IDEAS and 
IDEOLOGIES feel right -- has been developed on the markets built by the interpretive 
communities we are, and have been, a part of. (We're all part of multiple interpretive 
communities, and different interpretive communities tend to have different and often 
conflicting ways of reading the same thing. That's why this is so complicated.) 
 
Now here's the key part: interpretive communities don't occur naturally, or happen 
spontaneously. Like all communities, they exist because they've been ORGANIZED. By 
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the labor-intensive work of people and organizations with power: organized people, 
organized money...and organized ideas. (It's cyclical: the more power you build, the more 
power you have to build even more power. Some organizers have likened it to Marx's M-
C-M' cycle.) 
 
This is the major argument of the book. It may seem simple and obvious -- in some ways 
it IS simple and obvious -- but we also forget it, all the time. When we get mad as hell at 
Ted Cruz's constituents -- the ones who've decided it's a great idea to keep the 
government shut down for as long as it takes to destroy the Constitutional system of 
checks and balances (at least for as long as the current non-white/American/legitimate is 
in office), even if it costs them their own jobs -- it's easy to throw up our hands and think 
that they're hopelessly deluded, totally irrational, forever on the other side of a permanent 
culture-war divide. But that's not true. However strong and deeply-held their ideas are, 
they're not natural or inevitable: they are the product of organizing. A whole lot of 
organizing. 
 
Which means, of course, that given enough power (people+money+ideas), they can also 
be dis-organized. And re-organized. But to do so, we've got to figure out how they've 
been organized. To do what organizers call a power-analysis. And that's where we're 
going next: to do a power-analysis of one of the most powerful and dangerous organized 
ideas in the contemporary world, an idea that I call "cyberpunk neoliberalism." 
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BOOK UPDATE #5: ON SOLIDARITY 
 
Another tale of another fail. Or two fails, actually. Three years ago, in the fall of 
2010, Robin Brown and I were teaching Introduction to Cultural Studies to Gina 
Musto, Alex Slivinski, and 198 other undergraduates at the University of Minnesota. And 
we had a brilliant new idea for an assignment. (Or so we thought.) We split the class into 
pairs of students with differing views of labor politics. We showed them all a fiercely 
pro-labor documentary film about a brutal, deadly labor dispute (Barbara Kopple's 
HARLAN COUNTY, USA). And then we told them to try to convince their partner, in 
writing, to interpret the film in the way they themselves did -- basically, to change their 
partner's mind about labor. 
 
We expected the film, with its gripping, graphic descriptions of industrial poverty and 
suffering at the hands of greedy bosses, to divide the class sharply into pro- and anti-labor 
interpretive communities: one siding with the workers and with the film, the other with 
the bosses and against the film. We expected a culture war. Wrong. What we got instead 
was, basically, consensus. A weird, muted, passionless consensus. It wasn't that they 
were anti-labor: they almost all felt sympathy and a certain amount of outrage at the 
workers' squalid living conditions, and they were no fan of the bosses. And they weren't 
really pro-labor either: they were very skeptical of unions and strikes and prolonged 
collective action. No, the overwhelming majority of students -- regardless of their 
positions on labor politics (we asked and controlled for this) -- reacted to the workers' 
suffering by asking: "Why don't they just leave?" As in, yes, this mining job seems to 
suck -- so why waste nine months on a strike that'll leave you starving and, at best, only 
get you this sucky job back? Why not leave, go somewhere else, maybe go back to 
school, and get a better job? (Fail #1.) 
 
Oh goodness did my outrage fly. Not at my students, thankfully -- hi Alex and Gina and 
my many other former-student Facebook friends who might be reading this! -- but vented 
to my friends and colleagues, any chance I got. Just get up and leave. Forget the 
community you've spent your whole life building. Forget the fight you've spent your 
whole career working to win. Just leave. I was appalled at my students' insensitivity, at 
their unchecked privilege, and above all, at their lack of any sense of solidarity. Have we 
become so obsessed with individualism, so addicted to the romance of mobility (in all 
senses), that we no longer see ourselves, and our self-interest, as connected to the people 
around us, who are in it with us? 
 
Well, yes. And that "we," I would soon learn, includes me. I learned this a couple years 
later, when the graduate assistants at the Minnesota lost a union vote -- after a campaign 
that'd lasted many years, and that I'd been involved in. (Admittedly, in a pretty minimal 
way.) I was crushed, disheartened, depressed. I felt like we'd all been collectively slapped 
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in the face and told our labor wasn't worth anything. And so what did I do? Did I regroup, 
stay connected to my fellow grad workers, and keep working to build solidarity? Nope. I 
just left. Greetings from West Hartford, Connecticut, where I'm living rent-free with my 
wealthy-enough parents, working as an independent research consultant, in solidarity 
with no one, and -- honestly -- much happier for it. Feeling empowered, even. If my 
students were insensitive, blindly privileged, and unable to feel any deep sense of 
solidarity with fellow suffering workers, than so am I. (Fail #2.) 
 
Okay, so once we're done flagellating ourselves for our sins (which is always very 
helpful), we can ask: what makes us all feel this way? To answer this question, I want to 
propose we look at ourselves the same way we looked at the Kansans in past posts: we're 
just people, doing what feels right. And what feels right, as always, depends on what 
market our habitus has been formed, which itself depends on what interpretive 
communities we've been organized into.  
 
And there's a lot of organizing going on. Unions, themselves, are interpretive 
communities -- powerful ones. (Thomas Frank, in the Kansas book, cites an AFL-CIO 
study of the 2000 election: white males voted 2 to 1 for Bush. White males in unions 
voted 2 to 1 for Gore. Same goes when you control for lots of other demographics.) 
Unions, of course, are on the decline. Along with lots of other kinds of interpretive 
communities that encourage solidarity, that encourage us to understand our self-interest 
as bound up with the self-interest of our neighbors, our co-workers, our communities. 
And not by accident. What we are witnessing, in my classroom, in our union drive, in so 
much of contemporary American culture, is the result of an extensive, eighty-year-long 
organizing campaign to seek out and destroy all interpretive communities -- as small as 
small businesses, as large as nations and governments -- that stand in the way of the final 
triumph of capitalism over every aspect of our lives. That organizing campaign, to which 
we'll turn next time, is called "neoliberalism." 
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BOOK UPDATE #6: ON NEOLIBERALISM 
 
Why do we -- my students, my friends, myself, and very possibly you -- run away from 
our colleagues, co-workers, and communities and into the arms of our oppressors? What 
makes it so hard for us to join together with the people around us, who suffer the same 
oppressions we do, and work collectively to fight those oppressions? Why do we feel the 
need to see ourselves as so cut off from the people around us, working like hell to 
succeed in perpetual competition with them? Even when it just seems to make us poor 
and lonely?  
 
In short: the dominant interpretive community we live in, the market where we've formed 
our habitus, leaves us very little choice in the matter. It feels good -- cool, powerful, real -
- to see ourselves as mobile and independent. And it feels bad -- outdated, powerless -- to 
see ourselves any other way. (For examples of what I mean, see Book Update #5.)  
 
This is not an accident. It's not just "the way things are." It's happened this way because 
of a whole lot of organizing work -- to organize people, money, and ideas -- that started 
some eighty years ago. This is the political campaign called "neoliberalism." It started in 
the 1930s, when some conservative economists in Europe and the U.S. started organizing 
to oppose state intervention in the economy -- all the rage at the time, at the height of the 
Depression. It got institutionalized in the 1940s, when Austrian economist Friedrich 
Hayek, author of the Glenn Beck favorite THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, met a very rich 
and very Roosevelt-hating furniture salesman from Kansas City (you can't make this s#!t 
up) in Chicago. 
 
It took only a few years for the two of them -- with their organizing skills and a whole lot 
of Kansas City furniture cash -- to turn the University of Chicago into a center of radical 
right-wing economics, philosophy, and law. And from there, they went global: they 
organized the international Mont Pelerin Society, an annual worldwide meeting of 
economists, businesspeople, and policymakers, which over the next couple of decades 
would develop neoliberalism into a full-fledged worldwide campaign. One of its most 
famous products was Chicago economist, pundit, and Pinochet aide Milton Friedman, 
whose 1962 neoliberal manifesto CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM has never gone out of 
print. 
 
Fast forward to the early 1970s. The global economy was in crisis. And the neoliberals, 
after 30 years of organizing, were ready to strike. Mainstream economists didn't have any 
answers. But the neoliberals did. Within only a few years, they'd taken control of 
governments around the world, with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the lead, 
and implemented their radical agenda: eliminate every interpretive community that stood 
in the way of boundless corporate growth, from unions (which were busted with a 
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vengeance) to community organizations (which were systematically defunded) to entire 
national governments (which were toppled and replaced). "There is no alternative" to 
radical free-market capitalism, Thatcher said. Which was increasingly true...because they 
MADE it true. 
 
Why didn't we resist? Why didn't we put up a fight against our communities getting 
destroyed? Well, many people did. (This was when lots of present-day progressive 
organizations, from Citizen Action groups to NPR, got their start.) But not enough. The 
change happened so fast, backed by so much organized money and people and ideas, and 
in a time of so much crisis, that most people felt powerless to do anything about it. (A 
familiar feeling, having just lived through the shutdown.) And of course, the neoliberal 
campaign had lots of talented propagandists like Friedman.  
 
But all of this, in itself, isn't enough to explain why neoliberalism has so thoroughly 
dominated our culture. As powerful as the neoliberal campaign was, it owes a lot of its 
success to a seeming coincidence. Just as neoliberals were taking power in the early 
1980s, a new subgenre of science fiction was emerging, which would reshape the way we 
understood technology, our work lives, our communities, and ourselves. This new 
subgenre, cyberpunk, would prove to be neoliberalism's most effective (if unwitting) 
propaganda tool. Cyberpunk would convince us, more than any neoliberal propaganda, 
that there is truly no alternative. And more than that: it would convince us to love it. 
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BOOK UPDATE #7: ON CYBERPUNK 
 
Okay, so it's no surprise that the job market sucks. We supposedly came out of the 
recession years ago, and still no one can find a job. And when you do find a job, it's 
likely that it won't be full-time, won't pay like it used to, won't provide decent benefits 
(which is where so much of the healthcare hubbub comes from in the first place), and 
won't offer much job security. "Precarious labor," some academic types call it. Temps. 
Adjuncts. Contract workers. My job. Maybe yours too. This is the new normal. Where 
you get less and your boss keeps more.  
 
What might be surprising, though -- as it was for me -- is that this new reality didn't just 
happen. It wasn't the inevitable result of "market forces." It was carefully planned. The 
editors of Business Week laid it all out back in 1974: "It will be a hard pill for many 
Americans to swallow -- the idea of doing with less so that big business can have more. 
Nothing that this nation, or any other nation has done in modern history compares in 
difficulty with the selling job that must now be done to make people accept the new 
reality." And as neoliberals like Thatcher, Reagan, Deng, Pinochet, and even Clinton took 
power, that's just what they did. Sure, they used a lot of violence (both physical and 
economic) to redistribute wealth upwards. But violence without consent will only get you 
so far. You've got to make people accept it. Or better yet, like it. 
 
Ironically, the most effective neoliberal propaganda didn't come from the neoliberal 
movement at all. It came from science fiction. Specifically, from cyberpunk, a subgenre 
of SF that was coming into existence just as neoliberalism was coming to power. 
Cyberpunk authors, as far as I know (and please correct me if you know more; I'm no 
expert), don't have much of a political agenda -- they range from being apolitical to being 
vaguely anarchist in that kind of Pirate Party, information-wants-to-be-free kind of way. 
What they're interested in is technology. And the way technology is going to change the 
way humans are going to live and interact with each other. More than anything, they're 
interested in the Internet. In fact you could make a good argument that cyberpunk writers 
invented the Internet, at least as we know it today. The concepts of "cyberspace," 
"microsoft," and "the matrix" come from William Gibson's 1983 novel 
NEUROMANCER. The idea of the Internet as a place where everyday people go for fun 
and consumption, as opposed to a secured database accessed only by experts and hackers, 
came from Neal Stephenson's 1992 novel SNOW CRASH. Many of the programmers 
and entrepreneurs who made these ideas a reality admit to being big fans of Gibson and 
Stephenson -- and some of the Internet's most revolutionary programs, including Google 
Earth and Second Life, are direct steals from their novels. 
 
Gibson and Stephenson didn't just dream up a bunch of new futuristic technology. They 
dreamed up a whole whole new futuristic world for their technology to live in. Think 
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BLADE RUNNER. (Dick's story is from an earlier moment in SF, but the movie is very 
cyberpunk.) Think about the dark, steamy, neon-lit cityscape; the general lawlessness; the 
fly-by-night speed of business, pleasure, relationships, everything. This is a world where 
everything is run by huge corporations. Where every union has been busted. Where every 
regulation has been lifted. Where every government has been drowned in Grover 
Norquist's bathtub. Where every problem has a technological solution ("there's an app for 
that"), and everything without a technological solution (massive poverty, unemployment, 
exploitation, environmental destruction) is no longer considered a problem. To me, it 
sounds like a dystopia. To a neoliberal, it is paradise. 
 
And whatever our political beliefs, when we read cyberpunk, it's hard not to love it. How 
do they do it? How do Gibson and Stephenson make a commie like me love a neoliberal 
utopia? It's all in the characters. Sure, we see the masses of starving, hopelessly 
oppressed people -- but only for a moment, as they're being driven past, stepped on, or 
shot at. The protagonists, the people we care about, are all young, über-hip hackers. They 
are WAY too cool for backward things like community and family and long-term 
relationships, let alone politics. Who needs a union, after all, when you have the power to 
jack into the matrix, transfigure yourself into pure data, penetrate the walls of the world's 
most powerful corporations, and single-handedly bring them down? Not that they're 
looking to bring down capitalism -- they're working for other powerful entities, who 
stand to benefit from these corporations' downfall, and who reward our protagonists with 
the first big paycheck in their lives. Cyberpunk is basically Horatio Alger with a lot more 
sex, violence, and implants. Our heroes are enterprising individuals, who start off as poor 
nobodies, and through hard work and talent alone, they become fabulously rich. Of 
course, as in Alger, there's also a lot of luck involved. And after the task is done, they 
don't just lose their jobs; they also lose their connection to the people they've been closest 
to for a long time and might even love. Sometimes they even seem to almost maybe get a 
little sad about it. But...on to the next job. 
 
We are living in the world cyberpunk dreamed up. All the thrilling, boundless 
technology; all of the political decline and massive corporate control; all of the low-wage, 
low-benefit, low-stability work; and all of the basic, existential loneliness. Neoliberalism 
made sure there was no alternative to this world. Cyberpunk made us love it. 
 
And I do mean "us." Even those of us who consider ourselves very liberal, leftist, 
progressive, transgressive, anti-capitalist, anti-racist, anti-oppressive, whatever. Because 
most of us have formed our habitus on a market that's no less cyberpunk-neoliberal than 
the rest of society: the market that I will call "academia and para-academia." 
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BOOK UPDATE #8: ON CONFERENCE FAILS 
 
Back in 2009, I was the de-facto stage manager for a unique piece of theater. On an 
afternoon in late May, about fifty actors, artists, activists, and academics from around the 
country and world, led by Julian Boal (and including Kelly Howe, Katherine Burke, 
and Sonja Kuftinec), descended on Minneapolis City Hall and performed political theater 
in the council chambers, for a diverse audience that included four City Council members. 
The council knew we were coming -- but they didn't know we would radically rearrange 
the space, shifting the focus from the front to the back, from the council members to the 
people. And they didn't know we would be performing a piece that directly criticized 
their recent attempt to close the city's Department of Civil Rights -- which many local 
communities of color saw as an attack. 
 
The session was a success, in so many ways. We transformed the space. We brought lots 
of people into the seat of government, who otherwise never would have come there, and 
created a space where they had a voice. We threw the government off guard, and made 
them confront the public in unusual and unexpected ways. And we all left the 
performance feeling excited and energized and ready to do more. 
 
But nothing more ever happened. No follow-up meetings, no more theater sessions, no 
accountability, not even a real evaluation meeting. The Department of Civil Rights ended 
up staying open, but through no further effort of ours; we didn't even know about it until 
months later. Or should I say, I didn't know about it until months later. By then, there was 
no more "we" left. The group that had organized the performance was long gone. We had 
finished our task, and -- cyberpunk-style -- gone our separate ways.  
 
Why? Well, on the most obvious level, because we never set out to organize a movement. 
We were organizing an EVENT -- specifically, the annual conference of Pedagogy and 
Theatre of the Oppressed. This performance was one of the headline events of the 
conference. That's where all of our energy went. Once it was over, many people went 
back to their homes around the world -- and those of us that stayed were burnt out and 
ready to move on to other things. Sure, some of us had talked some about solidarity and 
long-term relationships and sticking together, but it just didn't feel right. Or at least, it 
didn't feel necessary. And so it didn't happen. 
 
What I want to argue is, this is no coincidence. For academics, doing things that lead to 
long-term solidarity, organizing, and agency NEVER seems to feel right. Even for those 
of us (like me) who work outside academia, who are committed to fighting oppression, 
and who know that this kind of action is what we need to do to get there. We think about 
it and talk about it and write about it, but something always gets in the way of DOING it. 
I'm out to find out what that "something" is. 
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I found a clue when I read the tale of another conference fail, from back in 1986 at the 
Modern Language Association (the big conference for humanities academics). 
Apparently, at a panel called "Criticism and Social Change," a well-known feminist and 
Marxist critic gave a talk about how she had successfully organized to make real change, 
to promote women scholars in universities across the country. It was concrete, confident, 
and pragmatic. And. No. One. Clapped. (After a long moment of awkward silence, the 
next speaker was introduced.) If you've ever been to an academic conference, you'll know 
this is unheard of. Say any old s#!t that sounds vaguely right, and people will clap.  
 
Which is the point. The things she said did NOT sound even vaguely right. They sounded 
foreign, alien, even vaguely threatening. To the point that her audience, supposedly 
interested in "criticism and social change," did not know what to do...and ended up acting 
horribly. In essence, they were just like us, who stayed in Minneapolis after the 
performance at City Hall and did nothing with all the energy and power and relationships 
-- the potential agency -- we had built. 
 
Are we all just hypocrites? That would be the easy answer. But I don't think it's right. I 
don't feel like a hypocrite. And I don't think my friends are, either. No, once again, I think 
we need to look to the market we've been organized into. It's tempting to call this market 
"academia," but it's bigger than that. It also includes all the places where people trained in 
academia tend to end up -- including think tanks, nonprofits, arts organizations, activist 
groups, and wide swaths of the mainstream media and blogosphere. These are the 
organizations I will call, collectively, "para-academia." The market of academia and para-
academia, I will argue, is why so many of us, even so many of us who are self-
consciously "radical" or "activists" or "political," will gladly work on a single, subversive 
performance (or paper, or march, or whatever) but will actively resist taking agency, or 
even seeing ourselves and others as organized at all. 
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BOOK UPDATE #9: ON CALL-OUT CULTURE 
 
So, we all know there are a lot of things that suck out there in the world. Some of those 
things (death, taxes, cliches) are pretty much here to stay. But many others, we could do 
something about. It's doesn't HAVE to be true that a small number of people get 
freakishly rich while most of us have trouble finding a job, affording our housing and 
transportation and healthcare, and otherwise getting by. It doesn't HAVE to be true that 
huge numbers of people suffer and die from preventable diseases, preventable wars, 
preventable poverty, and preventable under- and malnutrition. It doesn't HAVE to be true 
that our government only responds to about 1% of us. If these things are true, they're only 
true because people -- organized people, and money and ideas -- worked hard to MAKE 
them true. And there's no reason we couldn't organize, likewise, to make different things 
true. 
 
Some people, obviously, are doing this. But there's a lot more of us -- including, usually, 
me -- who aren't. Who, when presented with the opportunity to organize and build 
collective agency, resist. (See Book Update #8 for examples.) It's not that we're lazy. 
After all, we all work hard to build things that matter to us. We build friendships, and 
relationships, and bikes, and blogs, and bands, and artworks, and films, and theater 
companies, and Magic decks, and fantasy football leagues, and Ninja Turtles action 
figure collections. All of this building takes time, and effort, and usually money. We 
rarely get paid for it, and when we do, the money's hardly ever worth it. We do it because 
it's worth it on its own. And it's not that we don't care about improving the world. We 
spend a lot of time volunteering, giving to charity, and treating others kindly and 
selflessly. Like organizing that Legislative Theatre session in Minneapolis. That took 
TONS of time and resources. 
 
So what stops us from building power? Well, a few things. Most basically, most of us 
don't know where or how we could do it. The places where it's happening -- even if 
they're just down the road -- are off our cultural radar screen, in a different interpretive 
community entirely. Political activism, as we academics and para-academics understand 
it, means doing individual acts that resist The System (the man, the dominant, the 
Ideological State Apparatuses). Most commonly, it means doing call-outs. We call out 
the government or the banks for their dishonesty (at a protest or on an online petition). 
We call out our awful friends-of-friends on Facebook for posting sexist things. We repost 
Jon Stewart calling out Megyn Kelly for saying Santa Claus is white. We write papers 
that problematize/trouble/de-center the dominant colonial narrative of thisorthat. It all 
follows the same form: we identify something that's factually/morally/politically wrong -- 
it all kinda feels the same -- and we publicly declare that thing's wrong-ness. And at the 
same time, of course, our own right-ness. 
 
   411 
 
This feels great. We feel confirmed in who we are and what we stand for. We feel like 
we're speaking truth to power. We feel like we're righting a wrong, liberating the 
oppressed from their bondage. Umm...not quite. Language, on its own, is not that 
powerful. But we academics and para-academics, very at home with language and NOT 
at home with power, often forget this. Especially when it's in the negative: if someone 
says or does or posts something prejudiced or otherwise wrong, that person is BEING 
OPPRESSIVE -- and unless we call it out, we are, too.  
 
Let's assume, in a given instance, that we have the truth -- that we're right, and the people 
we're calling out are wrong. That may get us a good grade on a paper, or a lot of likes and 
retweets among our friends. It will not, in and of itself, set anyone free. But it just might 
make the people we call out never want to talk with us again -- much less organize and 
build power and collective agency with us.  
 
(To my fellow teachers: just imagine what would happen if we called out our students 
every time they said something objectionable. We would have no relationship with them, 
no foundation of trust, and could not teach them anything. This happened, when I taught 
English as a second language in Germany. When I first got to the school, my students 
were terrified to speak English. It didn't take me long to find out why: my well-
intentioned colleagues would correct them every time they made a mistake, thinking that 
if they didn't, they would be reinforcing bad habits. I, on the other hand, just let them 
talk: I responded to them conversationally and corrected only their worst and most 
repeated mistakes. Soon they were talking much more confidently -- and with many 
fewer mistakes.)  
 
Most people, it turns out, don't like being called out. We may respond, "fine, I didn't like 
them anyway." But if we dismiss everyone with sexist, racist, homophobic or otherwise 
impure tendencies -- as a lot of "safe spaces" require -- that doesn't leave us a lot of 
people to work with. If we take our own theory literally, and believe (as I do) that we all 
are affected by the oppressive and unequal culture that we live in, then we couldn't work 
with ANYONE. Generally, in practice, it means we work only with those people who 
have mastered a very specific language for talking about and around oppression. This is 
the language of social-justice bloggers and anti-oppression workshops, the language of 
"PGPs" and "POC" and "intersectionality" and "historically marginalized communities." 
You don't have to be David Horowitz to be put off by this kind of language. It's exclusive 
at best, and downright aggressive at worst. It creates a counterculture, where it's really 
easy to assume that we are factually, ethically, and politically superior to the rest of 
"society," whose people and culture we call out. In this way, we perpetuate a culture war. 
(This, I think, is what conservatives mean when they talk about "liberal elitism" -- and I 
don't think they're wrong.) 
 
And even within this counterculture, it makes organizing very hard. Once we've turned 
every issue into an evil -ism, -phobia, or -archy, evil manifestations of The Man, to be 
resisted and called out by righteous individuals...we end up spending a lot of our time 
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calling it out, including in each other. I've seen classes, trainings, even whole 
organizations fall apart over endless fights about "the sexism in the room," "the racism in 
the room," etc. It's one of the reasons why I stepped back from Pedagogy and Theatre of 
the Oppressed. In a culture where you're always anxious about being called out, it's really 
hard to build trust and solidarity. Which makes it extremely hard to work together across 
differences.  
 
Or to build much of anything at all. Once you've built something, it's immediately under 
suspicion. Whose voices are being silenced? Whose stories are not being told? Whose 
interests are not being represented? How long until the thing you've worked hard to build 
is called out, ransacked, torn to the ground? Not even because our colleagues would 
WANT to do this. But because they feel like HAVE to: if you don't call out the sins, the 
logic goes, you're complicit in it. All the cultural capital on the academic and para-
academic market comes from staying on the caller-out side, not from building something 
that can be called out by others. Which explains, finally, what we did in the Legislative 
Theatre session: we did a one-off act of resistance that called out the oppression implicit 
in the state power structure of the City of Minneapolis -- and we left it at that.  
 
A final note: in writing all of this, I do recognize that I'm a white male of significant 
economic means. Feel free to call me out for my unchecked privilege if you'd like. Just 
know that privilege, including my own, will be the subject of my next installment. It is a 
concept that's extremely important and extremely misunderstood. And if we can 
understand it better, I will argue, we might just find a way to overcome call-out culture 
and start building power and agency together. 
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NOT (EXACTLY) A BOOK UPDATE: ON RENT 
 
Christmas is, for me, a lonely holiday. It's always been, as long as I can remember. It's 
like watching the whole world throw a party that I'm not invited to. I've long thought that 
learning to deal with this experience is a rite of passage for every Jewish kid. (And, I 
imagine, for other kinds of non-Christian kids, too.) My sister Jessie used to get sad: 
"why can't I be a part of it?" I, on the other hand, used to get mad: "why won't they 
acknowledge OUR holiday?!" (The token menorah in the mall parking lot just didn't cut 
it.) 
 
I've learned to deal with this loneliness in different ways. I do a lot of choral singing, so I 
tend to find myself in churches and Christmas concerts a lot; this helps. (Oh Evan, how I 
miss our shared concertgoing.) I go to the mall at least once in December -- not for too 
long, and usually not to buy anything, but just to be there; my parents were indulgent 
enough to go with me this year. I used to go (with Courtney and Shaylie and..Raysh (we 
went once, right?)) to the beautiful Midnight Mass at St. Agnes Catholic Church in St. 
Paul, featuring a full orchestra and chamber chorus performing Mozart's Coronation 
Mass. (For anyone in the Twin Cities without plans tonight: highly recommended.) 
 
Then there's this one other Christmas ritual I have. I'm a little ashamed of it. Forgive me, 
fellow musical-theater snobs: I listen to RENT. In its entirety. Usually several times. It 
started several years ago, with just the "Christmas Bells" montage (still, I will argue, the 
best "Tonight-Quintet" knockoff since "One Day More"), and it quickly grew into the 
whole show. Why, you ask? I wasn't sure. It wasn't nostalgia -- I didn't LIKE the show as 
a teenager. I thought it was overwrought, humorless, and pretentious. (Rebellious. Kids. 
Living. Bohemianly. Making. Art. Having. Sex. Doing. Drugs. Fighting. The. System.) 
And I pretty much still think so. In the language of my book, it's the glorification of an 
anarcho-liberal, para-academic counterculture that thrives on calling out the rest of 
"society," which it's convinced it's better than. 
 
And yet it...speaks to me. It fills me with a kind of longing, for something I don't have. It 
shows me, so painfully clearly, what I want and don't feel like I have: a world that's mine. 
Not mine in the singular -- as in mine and no one else's -- but mine in the plural: a world 
that all of us, who live there, collectively make and live in together. It never made sense 
to me, when I was fifteen, why Mark wouldn't go home and spend Christmas in a warm 
house (as opposed to a disgusting, power- and heat-less loft) with his loving family who 
wanted to be with him (as opposed to his hedonistic, drugged-out maybe-friends...yes I 
was (am?) a tad conservative). But now it makes perfect sense. His parents' house wasn't 
his. He had no role in making it. Nor could he, nor would he want to even if he could.  
 
Yes, the Christmas he and his friends made in the East Village was childishly 
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countercultural, oversexed, and otherwise self-indulgent. It was also all their own. It was 
completely, utterly affirming of them as people, of them as a community, of their 
individual and collective work as artists and political activists, and of the life and space 
they were all making (birthing?) together. It was, basically, the perfect Christmas.  
 
That's what I want. I wonder if that's not what we all want. I used to call out the suburban 
soccer moms wearing RENT T-shirts as hypocrites. I don't do that anymore. Maybe 
they're just looking for the same thing I am. And maybe they're aware of how tragically 
far away they are from it. I'm not saying they're miserable, or even unhappy -- I wouldn't 
call myself either one, I don't think. But in our quiet moments, and especially on this 
silent night, we can feel that something's missing. Something we all need, and none of us 
have. Something that a cheesy rock musical from the '90s gives us a glimpse of, and an 
opportunity to momentarily, vicariously, experience. 
 
I've had it, for quick moments. With Evan and Clayton and Alison and Mia at 5401. 
With Katy and Lola and Sarah at Tanglewood. And, sometimes, at Appel Farm. (I miss 
you all, very much.) So I know it's possible. It's just hard. My book, so far, has basically 
been an explanation of why it's so hard, of all the things that get in our way. But now, as I 
enter the new year and the last chapter and the final four book updates, I'm changing 
direction. I'm starting to write about how we can overcome these things, and build our 
own world anyway. It's going to be the hardest part. Definitely the scariest. I may sound 
naive, uninformed, clueless. But that's what second drafts are for. 
 
Merry Christmas to those who celebrate. Happy holidays to those who don't. And best 
wishes for the new (Christian-qua-secular) year to all. You are wonderful. 
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BOOK UPDATE #10: ON PRIVILEGE 
 
"I’m a white woman who lives a comfortable life in the suburbs. What right do I have to 
come in to this place, their place, and then drive home to my safe neighborhood?...My 
biggest fear is white privilege, which I struggle to see and deal with on a daily basis...I 
may have good intentions, but I am naïve. I’ve been told before to check my racism. 
Who, me?"  
 
So asks Katherine Burke, in a brilliant piece she posted to the Pedagogy and Theatre of 
the Oppressed website a couple of months ago. (You can read the whole thing 
here: http://ptoweb.org/2013/11/katherine-burke-considers-the-beginning/. Highly 
recommended.) If you, like me, are a privileged white person who is interested in doing 
"social justice" work alongside "oppressed communities," Burke's questions probably 
sound familiar. What makes us think we can do this work at all? How could WE, with all 
our privilege, ever hope to be able to work with THEM, with all their oppression? These 
are hard questions. So hard that they keep a lot of people from doing the work at all. And 
those that remain often feel they have to be constantly looking over their shoulder, and 
into their navel, for fear of getting called out for unchecked privilege.  
 
But these questions don't actually have to be so hard. Allow me to explain. 
 
A few years ago, as the protests raged in Wisconsin, there was a joke that floated around 
the Interwebs. It wasn't actually very funny, but it made a point. It went something like 
this: a public-sector worker, a private-sector worker, and David Koch (the oil billionaire 
and Tea Party funder) sat around a table, with a plate of 75 cookies in the middle. David 
Koch quickly took 74 of the cookies for himself. Then he took the last cookie, handed it 
to the public-sector worker, and told her: "Watch for that private-sector worker. He's after 
YOUR cookie!"  
 
The moral is simple enough. David Koch could have taken that last cookie for himself. 
But then he'd have had two pissed-off workers on his hands, who would most likely band 
together and take his cookies from him. What he did was a lot smarter. By giving one 
cookie to one of the workers, he turned them against each other. The private-sector 
worker would spend his time fighting the public-sector worker, because she got 
something and he got nothing. The public-sector worker would spend her time defending 
herself, and the one cookie she has, against the public-sector worker. And David Koch 
would make an easy getaway -- and go gorge himself. 
 
This is the story of privilege in America. It's been around ever since white people first 
showed up on its shores. Back in colonial Virginia, the rich white plantation owners were 
scared that their poor black, white, and indigenous workers (slaves and almost-slaves) 
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might all band together and revolt. So they gave the white workers a cookie. Now they 
could whip their fellow non-white workers, just like the bosses. And when they 
themselves got whipped, they could keep their shirts on (oh happy day!). Long story 
short: it worked. The white workers switched teams: they joined together with the bosses 
(their fellow whites...who still paid them nothing and treated them like s#!t) against the 
non-whites (their fellow oppressed workers). White privilege and racism were born. 
 
The key point: these white workers were STILL oppressed. They were still dirt poor and 
treated horribly and had basically no wealth or rights. And now, with their "privilege," 
they could no longer join together and build power with other (non-white) people who 
shared their oppression. 
 
I am all kinds of privileged. I'm a white, able-bodied, straight(ish) male from upper-
middle-class suburbia. I've had all kinds of advantages that people of other races, 
genders, abilities, sexualities, and socioeconomic classes often don't. And yet I'm still 
worried about finding a good job and affordable housing, getting decent healthcare, and 
living in a supportive community. All worries I share with people a lot less privileged 
than I am. All things that we all need. And all things we could be working together to get 
-- it's all in our shared self-interest.  
 
What stops us? The way we understand privilege. We understand it as the opposite of 
oppression. It's not. It's a form of oppression. It oppresses us by keeping us apart and it 
keeps keeps us all powerless...while David Koch takes all our cookies.  
 
How to work with people with different levels of privilege? Simple: find the places of 
common self-interest, and work from there. It's not that we should ignore the differences 
in privilege; we just don't need to obsess about them. (White people obsessed with our 
privilege tend to be scared of our shadows -- not helpful. White people unaware of our 
privilege tend to take over the whole space and not listen to anyone else -- also not 
helpful.) We just need to get to know the people we work with, and get to understand our 
common self-interest, and work based on that common self-interest. Then we'll be doing 
real solidarity work -- the kind of work Lila Watson talked about: "If you have come here 
to help me, you are wasting your time. But if you have come because your liberation is 
bound up with mine, then let us begin." 
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BOOK UPDATE #11: ON LONELINESS 
 
Loneliness is a political issue. A really, really important one. 
 
Loneliness doesn't mean being alone, at least not necessarily. I know I've spent some of 
the happiest, most fulfilling moments of my life alone, walking, driving, writing, 
cooking, even just sitting and thinking. What makes this kind of being alone -- solitude -- 
different from loneliness, is that it's a choice. We can be happy in solitude when we know 
we have a place to go back to, if and when we want to: a home, a community, a place in 
the world that accepts us as part of it, and that we accept as part of ourselves. Literally, as 
part of our SELVES: that part of us that's made by the people and things that are closest 
to us. The Hicksville that you can't take out of the girl. (They changed it to "Jersey" when 
RENT went on tour; take your pick.) 
 
Loneliness is what happens when we DON'T have that place. When we're isolated from 
it, or kicked out of it, or when it doesn't exist anymore. When we're alone, not because we 
choose to be, but because there's nowhere for us to go...and we don't know when, or if, 
that'll ever change. When being alone, or even being among lots of people, makes us feel 
desperate and empty and helpless and scared. When we feel like we have no ownership or 
control over the world that we live in, not even over our tiny little part of it. 
 
Loneliness, understood this way -- which I take from the German-American political 
philosopher Hannah Arendt -- explains a whole lot of our politics. It's especially helpful 
for understanding the ugliest parts of our politics, including what we sometimes call 
"culture wars." The argument goes like this: we live in a culture, and especially an 
economy, that's made a lot of us lonely, and a lot more of us scared of becoming lonely. 
This has going on for awhile, and it's getting worse. This is the victory of neoliberalism: 
towns and cities getting torn apart, skills that took a lifetime to learn going obsolete 
almost overnight and workers getting thrown to the wayside, job security is harder and 
harder to find, the house gets foreclosed, the rent skyrockets, and we all know we might 
have to "just leave" our closest people and places -- or have those people and places leave 
us -- at any moment. (And on top of all that, of course, is the cyberpunk part: we're 
supposed to LIKE it.) 
 
In a world like this, as we feel less and less in control of our own lives and worlds, it's 
easy to understand why a lot of us are lonely -- and scared of becoming lonelier. It's also 
easy to understand our common reaction to that fear: to hold on really, really tight to that 
tiny corner of the world we still have. It explains why people are so invested in owning a 
home -- and will sometimes get lots of guns to protect that home. It explains why people 
are so invested in their religious, ethnic, regional, political, sexual, and other adjectival 
identities -- and will sometimes spend hours a day online calling out anyone who seems 
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to challenge those identities. 
 
It also explains, to take one final example, why it was such a bad idea to try to integrate 
public schools by busing kids from their neighborhoods across town. Are there a lot of 
racist white people out there? Absolutely. But that's not the whole answer. It was Big 
Government going to people who already felt their world was slipping away from them 
and there was nothing they could do about it, and TAKING THEIR KIDS AWAY 
FROM THEM. It was a really stupid move, tactically. It was very unpopular. And it 
didn't work: our schools are still hideously segregated. (And, of course, it handed a whole 
segment of white Americans, gift-wrapped, to the race-baiting Right.) 
 
None of us, regardless of our politics, wants to be lonely. We ALL want a place to 
belong, that's ours, that no one can take away from us, where we can work, alongside the 
people around us, to make the world we live in -- the ability to have agency, and to do 
what some scholars call "public work." However different we might be, that's something 
that's in pretty much ALL of our self-interest. 
 
So...have we reached a moment of perverse optimism? Is it possible to do politics 
differently, out of our shared interest in not-being-lonely -- or put positively, in making a 
place for ourselves in the world that's ours? Yes. Yes it is. It is not easy. It is still very 
much being developed. But it is possible, and it is happening. It is the tradition called 
"broad-based community organizing." To which we will turn, next time. 
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BOOK UPDATE #12: ON BROAD-BASED COMMUNITY ORGANIZING 
 
Have you read the YouTube comments lately? (Or Reddit? Or the responses at the 
bottom of stories on your local newspaper's website?) There's the occasional stroke of 
brilliance, but as Mack suggests, most of them are ignorant, selfish, offensive, and/or 
cruel. (And the spelling and grammar -- oh my.) Spend more than ten minutes reading 
these comments, and you'll find yourself struggling to maintain faith in humanity. Not to 
mention democracy. If people are that awful, you'll wonder, how could they ever govern 
themselves? And if you're like me, you may conclude: they can't. 
 
This is humanity at its worst. Which is to say, at its loneliest. It's people sitting alone, 
behind screens, writing the most extreme and shocking things possible, because if they 
don't, they might get lost and forgotten in a sea of severed, anonymous humans. (It's the 
"human nature" of Hobbes and the Hunger Games.) But thankfully, humanity isn't always 
like that. When people are in less lonely situations, when we feel valued by and 
connected to the people around us, we act a lot differently. We go out of our way to 
support our friends, our families, and our communities. We understand their needs and 
hopes, their self-interest, as bound up with our own. We work together, out of that mutual 
self-interest, and make amazing things. 
 
Lots of philosophers have spent lots of time trying to figure out which of these is the 
"true" human nature. I think it's a B.S. question. We all act differently depending on the 
situation we're in. If we want to make a world where people behave more generously and 
inclusively, we need to make a world where people can feel valued and connected. (NOT 
the other way around, as some people have argued.) But of course, to organize a world 
where everyone is valued and connected means to fly in the face of cyberpunk 
neoliberalism, that massive campaign determined to divide and conquer us for the sake of 
profit. This is not an easy thing to do. 
 
To do it, first you've got to develop a deep understanding of your own self-interest -- 
what it is, exactly, that drives YOU to leave the comfortable confines of consumer 
capitalism to organize people into changing the world. ("I like to help others" won't cut 
it.) Then you've got to develop the ability to understand OTHER PEOPLE's self-interests, 
spend huge amounts of time building relationships with other people, find people who 
have a self-interest that overlaps with yours and the ability to be leaders, and get them to 
work with you. Finally, you need to work with those people to build power: to organize 
enough people and money -- and, through them, ideas -- to start chipping away at the 
cyberpunk-neoliberal stranglehold.  
 
These are the basic principles of broad-based community organizing. You don't learn 
them in school. (I learned them by falling ass-backwards into a few interpretive 
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communities who practice them -- a theater group, a Lutheran faith community, a union, 
a network of rogue scholars -- and then getting shipped off to weeklong training, 
basically boot camp for organizers.) They're hard to learn, and harder still to practice. 
You need to find (or found!) an organization that practices them and shares your values 
(they tend to be faith networks, citizen action groups, and certain kinds of unions). And 
you need to have (or develop) a habitus that's disposed toward conflict, public action, and 
-- in various ways -- using people.  
 
I've spent the last few years working to develop these dispositions. At the same time, I 
also have my doubts about them. In my experience, "organizing" can become a 
counterculture of its own, elitist and manipulative and even jock-like. Some organizers I 
know really do think that they, and they alone, are doing the "real" and "important" work 
in the world, and everyone else is a Kansas-style dupe. Beyond that, there are a lot of 
people who will never have these kind of dispositions -- it's just not who they are. Are we 
saying these people have no role in building a better world? 
 
Of course not. And there is a small-but-growing movement, of which I am a part, of 
people looking to practice the principles of broad-based community organizing in all 
kinds of other work, from farming to engineering to teaching. This is the movement 
called "public work." And it is with a discussion of this movement that my book -- and 
these updates -- will conclude. 
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BOOK UPDATE #13: ON PUBLIC WORK 
 
Poor Scott Evil. He was having a rough day. It was hard enough getting his father out of 
his underground lair and to a support group meeting. Even worse was when the group 
leader started talking with Scott, and his father wouldn't stop interrupting. When Scott 
said he wanted to be a vet, his father interrupted: "An EVIL vet?!" No, Scott said, like, 
maybe work in a petting zoo. "An EVIL petting zoo?!" "You always do that!" 
 
It's not Scott isn't interested in evil. (Later on, as we know, he'll propose a more efficient 
way to kill Austin and Vanessa -- i.e., shooting them, rather than dropping them in a sea-
bass tank and assuming they're dead.) It's just that what really drives him, what really 
matters most, isn't evil but caring for animals. Dr. Evil either doesn't see that, or refuses 
to accept it. For him, evil always has to come first. And as a result, he loses a valuable 
partner who could help him do better evil work. 
 
Replace "evil" with "social justice," and you'll see the point. "I want to produce a play." 
"A SOCIAL JUSTICE play?!" "We're going to have a film screening." "A RADICAL 
film screening?" The intention is good, but it alienates a lot of people. Like...me. I deeply 
care about working for justice and dignity for all people. But this isn't what drives me, 
day to day. What drives me, what gets me out of bed in the morning and makes me want 
to do immense amounts of hard work for not much pay, is the basic joy I find in making 
things -- theater, music, writing, teaching -- with people. Of course, the things I make -- 
the theater, music, writing, and teaching I do -- will often serve the cause of justice and 
dignity (at least I HOPE they do), but the basic drive is in the work (making things with 
people), not the abstraction (being committed to justice). 
 
The problem with a lot of "political" work is that most people are like Scott and me. We 
care about the evil, but what really drives us is our work at the petting zoo. And we're put 
off when "activists," "organizers," and other "political" people talk with us like Dr. Evil 
talks to Scott. They treat "politics" and "justice work" like it's separate from and/or more 
important than the work we care most about. To get involved, we're asked to put the 
petting zoo aside, or to stop caring so much about working with the animals and using it 
as just a means to an (evil) end. (Have you seen much "social justice" theater? It's often 
not very good.) This is a big reason many of us don't get involved in politics -- even when 
we care about the people and issues a lot. In the words of Luke Skywalker, it just feels 
"such a long way from here." 
 
There's another way. In the practice of "public work" -- a new term for a very old 
tradition -- everything's grounded in the petting zoo. We work with animals; that's what 
we love, that's what we do, that's what sustains us. We know that it's IMPORTANT to 
work with animals and we want to SHARE this work, so we start inviting other folks in 
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the community to work with us...and start building relationships with that wider 
community. We want to work WELL with animals, so we make sure to hire good 
workers at good wages and have good equipment and facilities...and organize to make 
sure management makes those things happen. And suddenly...we're doing important 
political work. Not out of some liberal guilt or abstract sense of "justice," but out of a 
wish to do the work that we love, well. (Broad-based community organizing is ONE form 
of public work. It might be the most explicit form, that sets the terms. But as discussed in 
Book Update #12, there's only so many people who can be truly driven by this kind of 
work.) 
 
Public work is slow and hard. It's a long-term commitment. It doesn't produce quick 
"wins" or results. It can't be the only kind of political work. But it's the deepest work, and 
it can produce the deepest results. I leave you with an example of this kind of work. 
Remember way back to the guys at the laundromat in Book Update #2, who were bashing 
Obama for "telling people what to think" but holding up Glenn Beck as an example of 
true freedom? There was nothing I could say to them. The culture wars had defined our 
relationship.  
 
But now consider, by contrast, the case of Michael F. Owens. I met Mike when he was 
twelve (and I was twenty-four). He was in my bunk at camp. And he was -- I say this 
with love (and permission) -- a menace. He had grown up poor and white in southern 
New Jersey, which if you haven't been there, is pretty damn SOUTHERN. And here he 
was, in the middle of a bunk that embodied so many of America's racial, ethnic, sexual, 
religious, political, and class divides. Hilarity ensued. And by hilarity, I mean fighting. A 
whole LOT of fighting. Much of which he started. And so much pain and hurt, physical 
and otherwise. I was overwhelmed. I wanted to leave. I wanted HIM to leave. Neither 
happened. So I stuck with him -- at the time, if I'm to be honest, due less to affection than 
to lack of other options. We got close. We bonded over a shared love of music and 
politics (from VERY different perspectives) and a shared sense, in different ways, of 
being weird outsiders. 
 
Five years later, Mike is sensitive, thoughtful, caring, deeply curious person -- and a dear 
friend. We exchange stories, opinions, languages. We went to a Tea Party rally together 
(and met some very interesting people). We still talk and visit occasionally. Have I 
changed his mind on important political issues? Not sure. Does he still quote Bill 
O'Reilly and Glenn Beck? Yep. Does he accept everything they say uncritically? No way. 
And we talk about it. We have a deep relationship, founded in years of doing pedagogy 
and the arts together. Whatever the issue, whatever the situation, whatever our positions, 
we know we'll be able to deal with it -- and talk about it -- and listen to and learn from 
each other. 
 
Does this mean I've solved the Culture Wars? No. But it does mean there are other 
options, other possibilities, and we can do them. If things like culture wars, call-outs, and 
the Comments section are the effects of loneliness, public work may be the opposite: a 
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way toward living a less lonely life. It is a long, difficult process: to build relationships, 
understand each other's stories and passions and interests, and work together out of the 
places where those interests overlap. But when we do this work, it becomes possible to 
know, and work with, and build a world with...pretty much anyone. If there's a greater joy 
out there, I don't know it. 
 
 
 
 
 
